The Modi Era

Impact on Strategic Culture

https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/21/strategic-affairs/modi-era.html

https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2019_54/21/CL_LIV_21_250519_Ali_Ahmed.pdf

The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But, a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability. 

This column was written before the election results were announced.

The author would like to thank Kajari Kamal for comments that helped improve the article.

It is by now a trite observation that a change in India’s political culture has been wrought over the past three decades, dated variously to Indira Gandhi’s religiosity on display in the Jammu belt in the run-up to assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1980s, or to Lal Krishna Advani setting off on his rath yatra in 1990. The nomination of a terror-accused “sadhvi,” Pragya Singh Thakur, as a parliamentary candidate by the ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is emblematic as a culmination of this trend. The BJP’s impact with a parliamentary majority for the first time in three decades is liable to leave behind an unmistakable ­saffron imprint on India’s body politic (Arun 2019), and if it stays on in power, it would prove an indelible one.

The change in question is a marked shift rightwards beyond the traditionally-conceived conservative segment of the political spectrum under the impact of the political ideology of cultural nationalism—Hindutva—adhered to by the BJP. The Hindutva project is to create and convert a religious majority into a parliamentary majority (Noorani 2019: 27). Both dimensions of the project—the societal and political—are mutually reinforcing and have registered success over the past three decades. Even though a Supreme Court verdict of 1995 elevates it to “a way of life,” in practice, the term Hindutva now symbolises what to the Court it was not: “narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry” (Hindu 2016). Majoritarianism subscribed to by the Sangh Parivar—of which the BJP is the political front (Noorani 2019: 100–08)—is now a feature of political culture. An indicator is the invisiblisation of India’s largest minority, the Muslims (Mustafa 2017). Even the opposition party, the Congress, has been unwilling to chance the Hindu vote by projecting itself as a secular alternative and has instead settled for so-called soft Hindutva, symbolised by the temple-hopping engaged in by its leadership.

Hindutva and Strategic Culture

What has been the effect of the seeding of political culture by Hindutva on India’s strategic culture? The cultural space can be imagined as three layers, namely political culture, strategic culture and organisational culture. Political culture includes “commitment to values like democratic principles and institutions, ideas about morality and the use of force, the rights of individuals and collectives, or predispositions toward the role of a country in global politics” (Lantis 2002: 90). Strategic culture is the ideational milieu setting pervasive strategic preferences based on widely held concepts of roles and the efficacy of use of force in political affairs (Johnston 1995: 46). Political culture provides the top-down context for strategic culture—sometimes referred to as political–military culture—and feeds into creating and sustaining it, alongside a bottom-up influence of organisational culture of the military (Kier 1997).

While multiple cultures can exist in society, control of the political–military authority and apparatus of the state may render a subculture dominant and more influential (Duffied 1999: 778). Being the ruling party helps ease and expand the scope of such influence. A change in political culture has a corresponding influ­ence on strategic culture. This is multiplied if the political culture has an impact on the organisational culture through penetration of cultural artefacts and tropes, opening up an indirect bottom-up route to further make an impact on strategic culture. The political–cultural ferment with majoritarian nationalism as driver has been active over an appreciable duration of three decades. It is reasonable to infer that strategic culture—taken in theory as resilient and slow-to-change (Lantis 2002: 109–10)—has not escaped impact.

Besides, the incidence of majoritarian lines of thinking in strategic literature is such that it can be taken as having made inroads into the military’s organisational culture, thereby enhancing the impact on strategic culture. The rightwing has an insidious presence across intellectual spaces to hollow out institutions; the military cannot be an exception. Its influence on the military’s organisational culture has been largely through the writings by elements in the veteran community perched in right-wing think tanks in the internal publications of the military, echoed in part by unwary serving officers in such publications and on social media (Ahmed 2016). While not elaborated here it can also be asserted that the inflection in strategic and military professional literature of Hindutva trope calls out for an academic study as was done by Christine Fair of the presence of political Islamic thinking in the Pakistani army (Ahmed nd). The election-time controversy over the politicisation of the military is a pointer of worries within the military (Peri 2019).

Strategic culture, in turn, provides the setting and impetus for strategic doctrine, the approach to use of force that ranges across the continuum: defensive, deterrent, offensive, compellent (Posen 1984: 14). Elizabeth Kier (1995: 67), a key participant in the academic debate in the 1990s on the impact of culture on security, elaborated the manner in which organisational culture mediates the influence of political culture on military doctrine. Strategic doctrine can be inferred from strategic behaviour. A hardening of strategic culture has resulted in the strategic doctrine moving from a strategy of restraint to strategic proactivism (Ahmed 2016). Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his electioneering referred to strategic conduct in the surgical strikes of September 2016 that succeeded the Uri terror attack in the same month, the aerial strike at Balakot undertaken in the wake of the Pulwama car bomb incident in February 2019, the resulting stand-off—described by Modi as “qatl ki raat” (night of slaughter), referring to the reported activation of missiles sites (Hindu 2019)—and the anti-satellite test in March. India appears poised to undertake coercion of Pakistan. This locates India in between the offensive and deterrent ­segment. However, offensive–compellent is but a step away.

In a nutshell, political culture with Hindutva as a principal ingredient has had an impact on strategic culture towards strategic self-assertion. Organisational culture has also been separately impacted, through penetration of cultural nationalist thinking, thereby making it receptive to changes in strategic culture. This explains the offensive content in the strategic doctrine—offensive–compellent—reflected in offensive military doctrines. Drawing back entails a dilution of Hindutva agenda as a prerequisite.

Politics of Strategy

Hindutva, as a driver of change in political culture, contends that India has to overcome its millennia-old aversion to the use of force. The image of Hinduism as an accommodative and heterogeneous faith has to be rescinded in favour of a militant, unified religion (Noorani 2019: 101–05). A simple illustration is the recent macho depiction of Lord Hanuman (Bhatia 2018) in images and art.

This approach is reflected in strategic behaviour in a heightened threshold of retaliation to Pakistani provocations firming in. In case Modi is re-elected, he is liable to be hemmed in by a commitment trap of election-time rhetoric. Zero-tolerance, the very first manifesto promise (BJP 2019: 11), requires terrorism to be “paid back in the same coin, with compound interest” (BJP 2019: 3), colourfully put by Modi as “ghar me ghus ke maarenge” (forcible house entry) (Times of India 2019), evoking a dialogue from an eponymous film on the Uri surgical strikes. The use of force is also liable to be higher since the information war over the Balakot–Naushera episode has obscured whe­ther India did indeed get the better of Pakistan.

Even if a different government is formed, the necessity to “mow the grass” occasioned either by periodic provocation or to end Pakistani impunity, is now common sense. India has evidently learnt from its key strategic partner. Retired general D S Hooda (2019: 12), to whom the Congress turned to help gird up its national security image, tendered a report reinforcing the policy on cross-border operations. Modi’s overplaying the card at election time forced the Congress to claim it oversaw six such strikes—though the military operations branch denied having any record of the same (India Today2019).

The response to terror provocations at the interstices of the sub-conventional–conventional level has long been reckoned as viable. A Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI 2010: 48) report back in 2010 had dwelt on surgical strikes. Pakistan’s nuc­lear awning, based on tactical nuclear weapons, is not designed to cover the lower portion of the escalation ladder. India did not respond sternly earlier, since no terror attacks warranted such response, testifying to the success of the post 26/11 strategy of restraint. Shiv­shankar Menon, who was party to the decision as foreign secretary, retrospectively surmises that, “the decision makers concluded that more was to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from attacking it” (Menon 2016: 62). Menon rightly reminds that the world economy was then in the midst of an “unprecedented financial crisis” (Menon: 64).

In contrast, the BJP has been only too keen to derive political mileage out of military action, taking advantage of the diversionary effect to paper over concerns regarding its performance on issues such as farmer distress, employment, etc (Indian Express 2019). Though it took care to set restrictive parameters to the Balakot aerial strike—leaving out civilians and the Pakistani military from potential target lists (PTI 2019)—this laudable precaution in the event mattered little. The Pakistani counterstrike makes for a combustible mix in the future.

It is with reason that D S Hooda (2019: 12) in his version of the national security doctrine calls for being wary of the risk of escalation. Modi was willing to run this risk, ready to chance a missile exchange merely for influencing the release of a downed pilot.

Clearly, the BJP marches to a different tune than a “normal” conservative party. The BJP’s political interest supersedes the national interest since it is charged with state capture. The aim is a majoritarian democracy, shifting the constitutional goalposts from civic nationalism to ethno-religious nationalism (Economic Times 2017). The Pakistan angle helps generate hyper-nationalism and militarism (Ayoob 2019), deflecting Hinduism from its civilisational moorings (Tharoor 2018: 209–10).

Retracting from the Brink

The strategic cultural shift towards an assertive India has long been in the making. The continuity owes to the rule of the Congress as it remained fearful of being outflanked by the BJP for being soft on security. As a result it continued with the strategic trajectory set in the National Democratic Alliance’s first term (1999–2004). An example of like-mindedness in national security perspectives is seen in the omission of Hindutva terrorism by the national security adviser in the first United Progressive Alliance’s period in his post-retirement ref­lections on terrorism (Narayanan 2019). This is indicative of a pervasive bias in strategic culture, attributable to the Hindutva-generated cloud over Indian Muslims. Hence, it is an evidence of the genuflection of strategic culture to political culture.

The Indian strategic cultural discourse echoes the right-wing thesis of Indian effeteness. This impels the military’s approbation of strategic assertion through surgical strikes and is manifested in its doctrinal products valuing proactivism and the offensive. This places India in harm’s way. The Pulwama–Balakot–Naushera episode should sensitise the region to dangers ahead.

An electoral verdict enabling crystallisation of the political culture along Hindutva lines is liable to push strategic culture towards compellence. There is also the bogeyman of Akhand Bharat, an up-­stream element of the Hindutva project. The backstory to a radioactive denouement is the mainstreaming of Hindutva into political culture. If the electoral verdict is against Hindutva, the opportunity must be used by the incoming government to insulate political culture and cauterise strategic culture by bottling up Hindutva.

References

Ahmed, Ali (2016): “India’s Strategic Shift: From Restraint to Proactivism,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 51, No 48, pp 10–12.

— (2017): “The Dark Side of the Army’s Social Media Groups,” Tribune, 2 March, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dark-side-of-army-s-social-media-groups/371308.html.

— (nd): “Comments and Reviews (unpublished),” https://www.dropbox.com/s/s3payxkvnjkd0d8/Ali%20writings%20-comments%20and%20reviews.pdf?dl=0.

Arun, T K (2019): “How India’s Politics Has Changed over the Last Five Years,” Economic Times,15 May, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/69332255.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

Ayoob, Mohammad (2019): “Is the Future of Indian Democracy Secure?,” Hindu, 17 May, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/is-the-future-of-indian-democracy-secure/article27153232.ece?homepage=true.

Bhatia, Sidharth (2018): “Art Appreciation Modi Style,” Wire, 8 May, https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-angry-hanuman-art-sangh-parivar.

BJP (2019): “Sankalp Patra: Lok Sabha 2019,” https://www.bjp.org/en/manifesto2019.

Duffield, John S (1999): “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neo-realism,” International Organisation, Vol 53, No 4, Autumn, pp 765–803.

Economic Times (2017): “Hamid Ansari Pitches for Liberal Nationalism,” 14 February, //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/57151507.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

FICCI (2010): Task Force Report on National Security and Terrorism, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi.

Hindu (2016): “Hindutva at the Hustings,” 27 October, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Hindutva-at-the-hustings/article15801007.ece.

— (2019): “On Home Pitch, Modi Bowls the ‘National Security’ Line,” 21 April, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/on-home-pitch-modi-bowls-the-national-security-line/article26904755.ece.

Hooda, D S (2019): “India’s National Security Strategy,” March, https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.pdf.

India Today (2019): “In RTI Reply, Centre Says No Records of Surgical Strikes during Upa Regime,” 7 May, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/rti-reply-upa-surgical-strikes-1519181-2019-05-07.

Indian Express (2019): “Mind the Gap,” 30 March, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/narendra-modi-election-speeches-national-security-balakot-lok-sabha-5649338/.

Johnston, Alastair I (1995): “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol 19, No 4, pp 32–64.

Kier, Elizabeth (1995): “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International Security, Vol, 19 No 4, Spring.

— (1997): Imagining War: French and Military Doctrine between the Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lantis, Jeffrey S (2002): “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” International Studies Review, Vol 4, No 3, pp 87–113.

Menon, Shivshankar (2016): Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Mustafa, Seema (2017): “The Invisibilization of Muslims,” Citizen, 13 December, https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/12497/The-Invisibilization-Of-Muslims

Narayanan, M K (2019): “The Many and Different Faces of Terror,” Hindu, 3 April, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-many-and-different-faces-of-terror/article26714414.ece.

Noorani, Abdul Ghafoor (2019): RSS: A Menace to the India, New Delhi: LeftWord Books.

Peri, Dinakar (2019): “More Veterans Oppose ‘Politicisation’ of Army,” Hindu, 14 April, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/more-veterans-oppose-politicisation-of-army/article
26836906.ece.

Posen, Barry (1984): The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, Germany between the Wars, London: Cornell University Press.

PTI (2019): “No Pak Soldier or Civilian Died in Balakot: Sushma Swaraj,” Hindu, 19 April, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-pak-soldier-or-civilian-died-in-balakot/article26881304.ece.

Tharoor, Shashi (2018): Why I Am a Hindu, New Delhi: Aleph.

Times of India (2019): “Ghar me Ghus ke Maarenge, PM Modi Warns Terrorist Outfits,” 5 March, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68262587.cms?utm_source=contentof­­i­­­­­nterest&utm_medium=text&utm_cam­pai­gn=cppst.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/16687-modi-2-0-indian-muslim-survival-kit

Modi 2.0: Indian Muslim survival kit

NOTE: THE ADIL AHMAD DAR MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE BELOW IS ERRONEOUSLY DONE BASED ON A  MISTAKEN REPORT IN THE KASHMIR TIMES. THE SURRENDERED MILITANT REFERRED TO WAS ADIL HUSSAIN DAR, NOT THE PULWAMA BOMBER, ADIL AHMAD DAR. 

On the renewal of his mandate for another term by India’s voters, Narendra Modi has reportedly promised inter-alia an ‘inclusive’ India. Normally it would not be fair to question a positive intent within days, but in light of Modi’s past five years at the helm it is easy to agree when some question his commitment to inclusivity.

The principal features of his first term has been the political marginalization of Muslims, their invisibilisation from democracy’s representative institutions and instilling of fear through micro-terrorism practiced by his supporters, the most visible form of which being lynchings. His elevation of a monk with known anti-Muslim predilections to the chief ministership of India’s largest state, that has 20 per cent Muslim population, and—the final straw—the nomination for parliament of terror-accused, Pragya Singh Thakur, are illustrations of what can be expected from his regime continuing.

In Kashmir, the killings this year are just shy of the three figure mark. Arguably, the operational zeal of security forces resulted in the Pulwama terror attacked, that was in turn capitalized on by Modi for political gains. Now that he has returned to power, it is a no-brainer that the antecedents of the terror attack will be glossed over, such as where the 80 kgs of explosives was obtained from by the terror group in the most heavily militarized and surveilled place on earth. The fact that the Jaish member who set off the car bomb, Adil Ahmed Dar, was earlier picked up by security forces from an encounter site in which two Hizb militants died will be covered up. Suspicion will therefore forever cloud the incident that led up to the Indian reprisal with the Balakot aerial strike.

By his own campaign-time soliciting, Modi’s election sweep can be attributable to the decision to strike back. Never mind that there is no evidence of any damage at the target end, reportedly due to his decision to go ahead in a cloudy night (which to his mind would limit radar effectiveness!) that led to no photographic evidence with India to show for bomb damage. It is a separate story that the Pakistanis hit back with alacrity and in the ensuing dogfight India lost a plane, with the pilot being captured. The rest – a downed F-16 – is information war. Modi’s claim that his threats to bring down a ‘qatl ki raat’ on Pakistan is just that, a story which even he does not take ownership of, but attributes to some western sources.

It is this so-very convenient timing of the incident for Modi compels ruling in other explanations — such as Pulwama being yet another black operation — than Pakistani sponsorship alone, reminiscent of the Parliament attack. In the 26/11 episode, it bears recall that the so-called Deccan Mujahedeen that made a guest appearance has not been seen since. It enabled the ruling party to escape answering tough questions of significance for voters, forcing these off the radar by the diversionary resort to faux nationalism for vote-fetching purposes. It enabled Modi to don the mantle of Hindu Hriday Samrat, worthy of a statue on retirement taller than the one he built of the Iron Man of India, Sardar Patel. For his showing in putting India’s Muslims into a corner and intimidating Pakistan, he received India’s largest mandate.

The magnitude of his vote share is of significance in thinking about the next five years. That 37 per cent of the voters voted for him suggests that the earlier patronizing perception of the native wisdom of the electorate is no longer valid. Modi’s New India is just that, a New India, with a new, ugly Indian. Such voters bought into the line that it is payback time for Muslims for their over-lordship of India for some seven hundred years. They are the potential foot soldiers who will indulge in one-sided violence on call and form part of lynch mobs. To expect them to snap out of their trance in the next five years is naïve. They are the product of thirty years of brainwashing by an organization with the largest membership in the world, the Sangh Parivar.

The next five years are likely to see an intensification of the conditions that prevailed in the last five. Modi’s first tenure was heralded by the killing of a techie in Pune, who as the killer mob later claimed ‘looked like a Muslim’ and - therefore - beaten to death. Modi’s parliamentary majority will be deployed for making constitutional changes to further throttle secularism. There is the Citizen Amendment Bill issue to be taken forward. Now that the north-east that had some reservations is in the kitty, it can be proceeded with. Its provisions define Indian identity, restricting it to those with religious affiliations anchored in the subcontinent.

As sop to his north-eastern voters and those who voted for him in West Bengal, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) will be taken to its logical conclusion. In the north-east, gulags will likely be established to place the forty lakh odd people falling afoul of the procedures mandated by the Supreme Court-monitored process. The ruling party head has promised to extend the NRC elsewhere in the country, which perhaps fetched his party some Bengali votes. The Supreme Court is seized with hastening the matter, having ruled against the intervention of an activist, Harsh Mander, on the process outcome.

The most deadly terror attack in South Asia, the Sri Lankan Easter day terror attack, has put the spotlight back on terror in India, this time in South India. Apparently the intelligence on the impending attack in Sri Lanka was provided by Indian agencies after interrogation of a Tamilian involved. The Sri Lankan army chief claimed the bombers had visited Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Bangaluru. The National Investigation Agency can be expected to deploy its resources more diligently on this case than the manner it investigated the Samjhauta blast and the Abhinav Bharat cases. This will put the Muslim communities that are relatively forward under scrutiny.

In Kashmir, the threat to Articles 35A and 370 looms. It is of an existential nature to the culture of Kashmir. Any constitutional and legal tinkering will provoke a political fight back, with youth liable to join with violence. There are also some 340 militants yet to be wrapped up in Operation All Out. The usual 100-odd terrorist infiltrations may compensate for some of those killed. While 40 youth signed up this year so far, the number could cross a 100 by year end. This means that there would still be some 300 odd militants left over as the assembly elections loom large sometime in autumn. The pressure cooker in Kashmir can thus be set to continue, even though the government could well change tack. Having demonstrated its muscles and winning the national elections, the hardline is expendable now.

What line it pursues in Kashmir would be dependent on what it plans to do with Pakistan. Pakistan for its part has offered talks. The chances of this are bright, if only so that on terminating these down the line sometime, India cannot be blamed for not having tried the talks route. It is apparent that the pressure of the United States on both sides, emanating from its overriding need to exit Afghanistan, is more likely to see the two sides talk rather than not. This may be useful in letting up the anti-Muslim pressures within the country, since some bhakts are apt to conflate Indian Muslims with Pakistan.

The survey of the security environment besetting the minority suggests that the insecurity will persist for another five years. It may do so indefinitely till a balance reemerges in Indian politics against the current sway of Hindutva forces. Muslims would require surviving the interim. This might entail continuing the pragmatic policy of the last five years in which they concentrated on bread and butter issues and long-term improvements as education and employment. They must not be left out of the handouts by the regime, since reportedly the economy is liable to slow down ahead. The key to survival is to keep the focus on outlasting the regime, with the help of liberal and progressive forces. There is no call to be the foil in the resolution of the dilemmas internal to our compatriot Hindu society.

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/politics/modi-2-0-where-is-indias-pakistan-policy-headed-4015981.html

Modi 2.0 | Where is India’s Pakistan policy headed?

Even as elections in Kashmir ended, the Army intensified its operations in the state, going in for 14 ‘kills’ in Defence parlance. The tally of militants dead is pegged at 86 so far this year. The upping of the ante after the elections even though Ramzan is ongoing was perhaps intended to set the stage for the next government. The new Modi dispensation with its renewed mandate can thus hit the ground running in the trouble-torn state.

Its return to power owes much of the dynamics  of its Kashmir policy, from which flows the conjoined Pakistan policy. The Pulwama terror attack provided an opportunity for the ruling party to walk its tough talk. It is a separate matter that the terror attack was arguably brought on by the pressure cooker conditions of the preceding months that resulted in killings of seven, allegedly stone-throwing civilians, in December.

Commentary has it that the reprisal aerial attack at Balakot was put to good use by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to embellish his strongman leader image. His campaigning references to surgical strikes and Balakot can be taken as the outline of his government’s strategic doctrine, illustrated best by his phrasing borrowed from the tagline of a film: ‘andar ghus ke maarenge’.

For its part, as the general elections results came out, Pakistan not only had Imran Khan tweeting his congratulations and hopes for taking the peace process forward with the new government, but alongside take care to test a Shaheen II missile as a signal of its deterrent.

It has also appointed a new envoy to Delhi for exploring any opportunity for talks. Alongside, it is in the process of filling in the position of its national security advisor, vacant since Imran Khan took over, with a military man so that a credible interlocutor is in position for a back-channel process.

Early in his innings, Khan had reached out to India, but amid scepticism that he was  fronting the Pakistan Army, he decided to keep his powder dry till a new government was sworn in. During election rounds, Imran Khan made a mention of Pakistan’s preference for a right wing government in Delhi, perhaps believing that such a government, more self-assured, would be more ameable to the give-and-take of negotiations.

Recent feelers include reports of the Pakistan Army keen to de-escalate on the Line of Control.  There was a stage-setting exchange of pleasantries between the two foreign ministers at the Shanghai Cooperation Council foreign ministers’ meeting in Bishkek earlier.

How India responds to Pakistani overtures will be known soon enough. Previously when Modi was sworn in as the PM, he invited neighbouring prime ministers to the Rashtrapati Bhavan forecourt. India may keep Pakistan waiting till it peoples the Cabinet first.

Even as the context to its Kashmir policy is shaping up in Delhi, on the ground, the annual operational momentum can be expected to continue. There is no repeat of the Ramzan ceasefire of last year. The summer campaign under way is gearing up for the Amarnath Yatra.

Since Pakistan is attempting to woo India back to the table, it is likely to keep its infiltration levels down for now though the Northern Command’s chief –reports that it continues its usual tricks. With fewer locals signing up for insurgency – 40 at last count for this year – the security forces are looking to whittle down the overall number of militants currently pegged at 340 further.

The key decision to be taken early by the new government would be the timing of the Assembly election. Autumn is being touted as the likely window after another extension of the Governor’s rule takes it into the second year.

The manner the elections shape up will be contingent on the security situation. In the case of talks with Pakistan, the proxy war will likely be in low gear. Pakistan requires refurbishing its proxy fighters to keep the insurgency going. If its talks offer gets thwarted, heightened infiltration and activities along the Line of Control is likely.

While a political party cannot be held to its campaign rhetoric – intended as such mouthing is to garner votes – the new government could shift gears in case it wishes to reciprocate the Pakistani outreach.

The government is in a position to do this since it has already demonstrated its strength. It can afford to dictate the agenda and restricting talks with Pakistan to the latter ending terror and demonstrating this on the ground.

It can take advantage of Pakistan being on the ropes economically, with the financial action task forcekeeping tabs on the actions against terror. It can ride its victory at the UN on the Masood Azhar sanctions.

Within Kashmir, the fear over Articles 35A and 370 will energise an election turnout so that the Assembly poses a legal hurdle to any constitutional tinkering by the ruling party’s parliamentary majority. The younger parties will also mount a challenge to their older counterparts, making for feisty polls – putting to rest the question mark over voter turnout of a mere 30 per cent recently.

Though speculation over the twin policies – Pakistan and Kashmir – is not warranted this early, it can be hazarded that the elections crystallise into a strategic cultural shift towards a self-assertive New India. This may play out pending any gear shift towards a softer approach to Pakistan and in Kashmir in the near term by Modi 2.0.

http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=6

Gratis advice for the next National Security Adviser

NOTE: ADIL AHMED DAR, THE PULWAMA BOMBER, IS MISTAKENLY REFERRED TO AS THE SURRENDERED MILITANT FROM AN ENCOUNTER IN SHOPIAN ON 11 SEP 17, BASED ON AN ERRORNEOUS REPORT IN KASHMIR TIMES THAT GOT THE NAME OF THE MILITANT WRONG. THE SURRENDEREE WAS ADIL HUSSAIN DAR.  

The right wing’s information warriors that comprise self-selected nationalists, former spooks, unwary denizens of the strategic community, ruling party inclined hacks and paid-up members of the bhakt brigade, are having their last hurrah. Having manipulated opinion polls, they have extended ‘acche din’ by a week. Even so the nation awaits the electoral verdict with bated breath, to learn if it is possible – as the information warriors believe – to fool all the people all the time.

The last bit of pulling wool over peoples’ eyes was in the information operations surrounding the Balakot-Naushera episode. The narrative was that India came out on top, delivering a mortal blow to Jaish at its labyrinth within mainland Pakistan, bringing down an F-16 with a Mig-21, and scaring the living daylights out of Imran Khan, forcing him to hand back the captured Indian Mig-21 pilot.

The unfortunate part of this was that the target was not so much Pakistan - itself a target of the Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations’ General Asif Ghafoor – as much as the Indian electorate. The electorate needed diverting from naysayers looking for dirt in Gross Domestic Product numbers, unemployment figures, demonetization effects, suicides by farmers etc. Alongside, for good measure, some ten such contrarians were locked up for being urban Naxals out to ‘get Modi’, making others similarly-inspired more circumspect.

The nation awaits the electoral verdict if this strategy of buoying the national morale with tales from the Pakistan front worked. The opinion polls have it that it has done wonders. But this amounts to the information warrior brigade writing-up its final confidential report on its showing over the year. That it has done a creditable job of what it was put to is without question.

There is nary a word on the possibility that the Pulwama terror attack may have been a black operation. The antecedents of Pulwama bomber, Adil Ahmad Dar, who was constantly in and out of police stations as much as in and out of tanzeems, needs probing further, especially the cryptic report in this publication that he was once whisked away from the site of an encounter in which two Hizb compatriots died. That such suspicion can legitimately be entertained is clear from the immaculate timing of the episode, enabling the response to Pulwama enough time to play out and be taken advantage of electorally by the ruling party.

That the information warriors have carried the day is also clear from the absence of a round of missile exchanges even though India went down in the psychological-ascendance game after the Pakistani Naushera riposte to its over-hyped Balakot aerial strike. Strategising and war-gaming would have reckoned with following up to even the score. Instead, information war was resorted to, to paper over the loss of high ground.

This restraint makes sense only in terms of domestic politics. The uncertainty that attends escalation – such as an untimely Diwali - is something the political head could have done without in elections run up. So it made sense to wrap up early, with the pickings magnified by information war: 300 jihadis dead, one F-16 downed, Imran the Khan pleading for peace etc. The reasoning is perhaps that the score can be evened in killing some more Kashmiri armed youth – the score has long crossed 600 over the last three years of Operation All Out, with 87 killed this year of which 9 were killed last week. This spike since end of polls in Kashmir suggests a certain desperation to get even before being boarded out of power.

The desperation was in evidence as the rounds of polls progressed. Information warriors not only manage perceptions, but also keep tags on the information space. So it was within their ken to feel the electoral pulse through the rounds. The feedback perhaps explains the desperation that culminated in the nomination as the ruling party’s parliamentary candidate of the terrorist, Pragya Singh Thakur, even as the breathtaking spin put out by no less than the prime minister was that she was the epitome of a five thousand year old Hindu civilization.

That no Hindu could be a terrorist implies that all terror India has been subject to over the past fifteen years has been Muslim-perpetrated. (The violence in the north east and in central India is attributed to insurgency not counting as terrorism.) In one instance, this writer heard a former foreign secretary opine in an open forum that the Hindu terror angle needs to be mellowed down lest it impact India’s Pakistan strategy cornering it over terror. The opinion polls suggest that the nation has bought into this line. That this line has been in evidence over the past decade and half implies ownership by some amorphous entity.

Information war of the order surrounding the elections as depicted here bespeaks of an organization behind it rather than a set of non-governmental information warriors under a right wing umbrella. In an earlier column in this publication (23 March 2018), the possibility of an Indian ‘deep state’, based on its intelligence agencies subscribing to the cultural nationalist philosophy and participating in its project, had been mooted. The buck in the shadowy intelligence world stops at the door of the national security-cum-intelligence czar’s door.

It is self-evident that the reins of the governmental complex that unwarily participated in the field operations connected with the electoral information war are National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval, controlled. It can be reasonably surmised – from the hagiographies put out on Doval and breathless tracts on the Modi-Doval doctrine – that he holds the reins also of the non-governmental side, with former spooks owing him allegiance bridging the two. There is also the Amit Shah controlled apparatus comprising ruling party trolls, which more than likely defers to the larger intelligence project of returning Modi to power. Modi’s two Man-Fridays – one managing the governmental side and the other the non-governmental – have timed beautifully. That politics is outside an NSA job description indicates the extent of rollback pending.

Operation Elections - the information war project that has surrounded it - has shot its bolt. The Election Commission can yet retrieve is down-in-the-dumps credibility in case it keeps election voting machines sacrosanct over the coming days. In case the Election Commission redeems itself, what should be the national security agenda of the next NSA?

The objective in this rather-extended introduction has been to present the extent of the problem. The next NSA has his task cut out: to identify, contain and dismantle the ‘deep state’. This would not be easy since those self-selecting to the deep state are impassioned by the belief in their cause of midwife-ing religious majortarianism. If the gullible voters need perception management to this end, then manipulating democracy and subverting institutions is small price to pay. An awareness of the iceberg below the water surface is a good start point for an incoming NSA.

Obviously, this cannot be done unless the political class bottles-up Hindutva: religious majoritarianism masquerading as cultural nationalism. Merely wresting the national discourse back from the ideology’s grasp does not make India safe. The NSA can help retrieve the state from right wing formations that made instrumental use of the ideology for state capture. A state duly freed from right wing infiltration and penetration can assert its space, emboldening throwing away of ideological blinkers by society at large. A resulting virtuous cycle can over time undo the damage of the last thirty years to polity, society and institutions.

Is there a (wo)man for the job? To acknowledge that the intelligence community is outsized is passé. Two NSAs in quick succession from within its ranks have revealed its limitations and dangers. The foreign service provided three head honchos. The first was over-extended, overseeing the governmental apparatus alongside as principal secretary; the second could not withstand the demands physically; and the third, though right-minded, was light-weight. The steel frame abdicated, allowing NSA Doval to take headship of the strategic policy group. Yet another policeman cannot be risked. This leaves the military, its credentials burnished since dismantling the iceberg requires moral fiber that only a military life can impart. (There is civil society to also be vetted as site for candidates, but space prevents going into this here.)  

Some candidates with demonstrated intellectual capital, professional stature and moral strength are easy to spot, to wit, Admiral Arun Prakash and retired lieutenant generals Rustom Nanavatty, HS Panag and Prakash Menon. One needs look no further than General DS Hooda, presciently picked by the Congress to upbraid its national security credentials. He courageously put out a well-regarded blueprint that informed the fairly forward-looking security paragraphs in the manifesto of the Congress party. The agenda is spot-on in its intent to bring the NSA appointment to parliamentary heel, a constitutional-empowering of the appointment as necessary first step in the rollback of the deep state.

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https://www.dropbox.com/s/bch58m97lvd28t5/ebook%20of%20book%20reviews%20%281%29.docx?dl=0

Firing from others’ shoulders

By Ali Ahmed

eBook XI – Compilation of book reviews

For Major General (Retired) Dipankar Banerjee

In gratitude

Preface

This ebook compilation comprises book reviews written 2008 onwards. The book is aptly titled, Firing from others’ shoulders, since it discusses ideas thrown up by authors in respective books. The books were prominent contributions to the literature, mostly in the field of strategic studies. Some have been agenda setting and many discussed ideas already in the national security discourse. Between them, they illuminate vast stretches of South Asia, its happenings and times over the past decade. Many of the points made have been referred to by me in my writings, collected in the earlier ten compilations. The strategic studies field has been greatly advantaged by the swirl.

The ebook traces the intellectual ferment in strategic, security and peace studies. The books covered touch topics ranging from nuclear doctrine to terrorism. In discussing the books - and adding my two pennies worth - the attempt has been to deepen thinking on regional and national security. I believe the mainstream can do with some stirring. It is far too statist, cloistered in realism and – worse - made vapid over the period by the ideological contamination of ascendant cultural nationalism. Swimming against the current has been challenging, but made interesting on that account all the same. It can hopefully be seen on these pages from choice of books to review and the particular idea to highlight, thrash out or trash.  

I am grateful to editors who have given space in their publications, in particular the prominent journal, The Book Review India. I must mention Adnan Farooqui in this breath. I have not included the reviews that were carried in service journals in the period and prior to 2008. In the nineties, I was an avid contributor of book reviews to the United Services Institution Journal, where some 30 reviews were published, albeit with a few being merely a paragraph long. All told, I have crossed the 100 book reviews mark. Not only have I enjoyed the reading, but also the thinking that went into taking the work further to sets of readers, both within and outside uniform. The book would interest students and academics, besides helping narrow the reading lists of practitioners constantly short of time. The books appear chronologically, making it easier for lay readers to follow the developments from the global to the local.

I dedicate the book to General Dipankar Banerjee, who I have had the privilege of knowing all through my time on the strategic circuit and who has constantly had an encouraging – and at times life defining - word all along.

As with all other Preface write ups in my ebook compilations, I end this one with a word of thanks for my family, who have patiently allowed me to disappear from time to time behind book covers and then proceed right away to bang away at the keyboard. My excuse has been that the output might be worth something. Since I fire from others’ shoulders in this book, I am certain this time round it would not be a lame excuse.

Contents

Happymon Jacob, Line on Fire: Ceasefire violations and India-Pakistan escalation dynamics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019

Srinath Raghavan, The Most Dangerous Place: A History Of The United States In South Asia, 2019, Penguin Random House, Gurgaon, India

Saifuddin Soz, Kashmir: Glimpses of History and the story of Struggle, Rupa Publications India, 2018

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Pshycho-nationalism: Global Thought, Iranian Imaginations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp.170, ISBN – 978-1-108-43570-3.

Chris Ogden, Indian National Security, New Delhi: Oxford University Press (Oxford India Short Introductions), 2017; ISBN 0-19-946647-5, pp. 152; Rs. 295/-

Chris Ogden (ed.), New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2016, pp. 183, ISBN 978 81 250 62615

Avinash Paliwal, My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal, HarperCollins; 1 edition, 2017

Kaushik Roy and Sourish Saha, Armed Forces and Insurgents in Modern Asia, Routledge, 2016

TV Paul (ed.), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future, Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 326, ISBN – 978-1-316-63394-6

Sumit Ganguly, Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations At The Dawn Of The New Century,  Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2016, 188, 395

Ikram Sehgal, Escape from Oblivion: The Story of a Pakistani Prisoner of War in India, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 138, Rs. (Pak) 695/-, ISBN – 978-0-19-906607-0

Vivek Chadha, Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A Perspective on Human Rights, Occasional Paper 2, IDSA, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 40

Nandini Sundar and Aparna Sundar (eds.), Civil Wars In South Asia: State, Sovereignty, Development, Sage Publications, Delhi, 2014, pp. 273, Rs. 850.00

Rajesh Rajagopalan  and Atul Mishra,  Nuclear South Asia: Keywords And Concepts,

Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 306, Rs. 850.00

Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Gaddafi: Libya And The Limits Of Liberal Intervention,

Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 249, Rs. 495.00

Taj Hashmi,  Global Jihad And America: The Hundred-Year War Beyond Iraq And Afghanistan, Sage Publications, Delhi, 2014, pp. 322, Rs. 995.00

Ahmed S. Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat Of The Tamil Tigers ,

Foundation Books, Delhi, 2013, pp. 267, Rs. 850.00

Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla (eds.), Afghan Endgames: Strategy And Policy Choices For America’s Longest War, Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 229

Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making Of The Pakistani Bomb, Foundation Books, Delhi, 2013, pp. 520

V.R. Raghavan (ed.), Internal Conflicts Military Perspectives, Vij Books, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 324,`1250.00

Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson (eds.) Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, And Limitations On Two-Level Games, Foundation Books, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 259.

D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari (eds.), Armed Conflicts In South Asia 2011: The Promise And Threat Of Transformation, Routledge, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 297, `795.00

Ali S. Awadh Asseri, Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabias Role In The War On Terror, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 196, Rs 450.00

Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, Pentagon Press, Westport (CT), 2008,

pp. 221, Rs. 795,  ISBN 978-0-275-99945-2

K.S. Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2010, pp. 88, ISBN 978-93-80502-24-3, Rs 225. 

Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis

Behaviour and the Bomb, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 251, $126, Rs 795, ISBN

978-0-415-44049-3

Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova (eds.), Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 266, Rs. 695, ISBN 978-81-7829951-8 (Hardback)

Harsh V. Pant, Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, pp. 202, ISBN 0-230-60458-7

M.J. Akbar, Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan, Harper Collins, New Delhi, 2011, 343 pp., Rs 499, ISBN 978-93-5029-039-2

Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army: Vision 2020, New Delhi, Harper Collins, 2008, pp. 342, Rs. 495/-, ISBN 13: 978-81-7223-732-5

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism, Hurst and Company, London, 2011, $45, 338 pp., ISBN 978-184904-097-6

Talmiz Ahmad, Children of Abraham at War: Clash of Messianic Militarisms, Delhi: Aakar Books, 2010, pp. 475/-, Rs 1250/-, ISBN 978-93-5002-080-7

Suba Chandran, D., “Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo Pak Conflict”; India Research Press, New Delhi, 2005; pp. 161, Rs. 495/-

Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007, Pp. 258. Price: Rs 495. ISBN 978-0-415-40459-4

Carey Schofield, Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror, Pentagon Press; 2012 

Astri Sukhre, When More Is Less: The International Project In Afghanistan 

Hurst & Co, London, 2011, pp. 293, £ 25.00

D. Caldwell, Vortex Of Conflict: US Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan And Iraq, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011 (First South Asian Edition 2012),

Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation, New Delhi: PenguinViking, 2010

Priyanjali Malik, India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb, New Delhi: Routledge, 2010, ISBN 978-0-415-56312-3, pp. 344, Rs. 795/-

Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia; Ranikhet, Orient Longman Pvt Ltd; pp. 373, Rs. 695/-; ISBN 81-7824-231-1

Karnad, B., ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy’: New Delhi, MacMillan, 2002; pp. 724, Rs. 795/-

Rajagopalan, Rajesh, Fighting Like a Guerilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, 2008, Routledge, New Delhi

Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence, New Dehi: Knowledge World, 2009, pp. 395, Rs. 880/-, ISBN 978-81-87966-70-8

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/politics-the-bogey-of-islamic-state-in-kashmir-3981691.html

The bogey of the Islamic State in Kashmir

The resurfacing of Al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (IS), when he took credit for the worst terror attacks in South Asia, the Easter Day attacks in Sri Lanka, is indicative that though United States’ (US) President Donald Trump declared victory over the IS in end-February, the terror entity is not quite history as yet.

It is unlikely to be defeated with finality any time soon since it finds conflict zones are fertile grounds for thriving in and such zones are aplenty in the region ever since the US chose to deploy the extremist philosophy of Saudi origin, Wahabbism, as a mobilization tool to entrap the Soviet Bear in Afghanistan. Current day, Afghanistan is site for pockets of IS presence, confined by the Taliban’s ethnic-nationalist, rather than pan-Islamist, insurgency in Afghanistan.

Even as close-at-hand Kashmir continues as a conflict zone, this does not amount to IS being at India’s doorstep. As a conflict zone, Kashmir can be expected to attract the IS’ sympathetic and self-serving attention and in turn its once-ascendant star may have attracted disaffected Kashmiris youth surfing social media, its recruiting ground. But that is as far as the IS has gotten to yet.

Over the past five years there have been over-blown reports of IS activity in Kashmir. Black flags made an appearance in some street demonstrations. Terror mastermind, Zakir Musa, currently with an Al-Qaeda inspired outfit, once advocated the caliphate. For his pains, he was roundly criticized for weakening the political dimensions of the Kashmir problem and expelled from his position as leader of the local group, the Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen.

Over the turn of the year, masked youth appeared Srinagar’s historic Jamia Masjid after the Friday prayers waving IS flags, prompting a rally the following Friday by the separatist conglomerate, the Hurriyet, against what they claimed was an attempt by unspecified forces to way-lay their ‘indigenous’ movement for ‘self-determination’. For its part, the Pakistan-sponsored Lashkar-e-Toiba pointed to ‘Indian agents’ being behind the incident.

The latest instance of IS rising its head is in its designating Kashmir as Wilaya-e-Hind, a province of a to-be caliphate. Earlier, Kashmir was on the radar of the IS-affiliate overseeing its supposed Khorasan province that includes Afghanistan.

The claim was made in immediate wake of the killing by security forces of the last known surviving member of the group, IS in Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK). The ISJK had only a handful of self-proclaimed cadre to begin with and no links with West Asia. It was wiped out in successive operations over the past two year, while two alleged associates were caught in the mainland.

The police has thus rightly characterized the IS announcement as propaganda, since there are no IS remnants in Kashmir. The claim is transparent as a bid to break out of its current status as a virtual threat confined to cyber space.

Not having made inroads in Kashmir even when at its height and when the post-Burhan Wani phase was at its peak, a return of the IS under improved conditions of today is unlikely.

Besides, the last IS-affiliated terrorist was also known for tanzeem hopping, having signed up to terrorism after reportedly being tortured by security forces. Another fighter was reportedly disgruntled at losing a cousin in police firing. This indicates motives other than radicalism, pointing to a magnification of radicalization as threat.

The Kashmir police was apt in rejecting the allegation by the Sri Lankan army chief that the Easter Day terrorists had visited Kashmir, there being no record of the visit. The image of Kashmir as a hot-bed of radicalism does not square with the politics of Kashmir rooted as they are in an inter-state territorial dispute

Hyping of any IS mention in the media appears in Kashmir as motivated attempts to tarnish the ‘movement’. Likewise, strategic commentary taking IS’ claims at face-value betrays a confirmation bias, useful as it is for points-scoring against Pakistan. Electoral dividend is also sought by motivated political forces feeding into an anti-Muslim discourse as part of a rightwing project of Othering Muslims. There is danger of reports of IS being manipulated to continue with a militarized status quo. Placing it in perspective is necessary. 

Even so, it takes merely a handful of terrorists to perpetrate horrendous outrages such as the Easter Day attacks and Mumbai 26/11. Vigilance is inescapable. It would be denial to believe that the politics and insurgencies in India provide no opportunity for attention of nefarious forces. Alongside, therefore, ‘root causes’ must be addressed.

The United Nations plan of action for prevention of violent extremism provides a comprehensive framework of response. The report says, ‘Urgent measures must be taken to resolve protracted conflicts.’

This underscores the necessity to bring back a political track to complement the military prong of strategy in Kashmir. Ending the status of Kashmir as a conflict zone can best preserve it from the proverbial evil eye.