1965 War: Through today’s lens

http://www.idsa.in/jds/9_3_2015_The1965IndoPakWar.html

JOURNAL OF DEFENCE STUDIES

The 1965 Indo-Pak War: Through Today’s Lens

July 2015

Volume: 

 9

Issue: 

 3

(NOT THE FINAL VERSION - FOR FINAL VERSION SEE JDS LINK AT idsa.in)

Between the two India-Pakistan wars, the 1965 and the 1971 Wars, the latter, a resounding victory, is more talked about since in contrast the 1965 War was widely seen as a draw. With the 1971 victory, India was seen to have partially exorcised the defeat in the 1962 India-China War. By then, the cadre of King’s Commission Indian Officers were replaced with professional, trained-in-India generals. The war put paid with a degree of finality to the ‘two nation’ theory. In the Simla Agreement that followed, Pakistan tacitly accepted the futility of the military option for wresting Kashmir by agreeing to bilateral talks for resolving outstanding disputes. India emerged as a regional power. The war set the stage for both states going nuclear, with Pakistan launching its nuclear weapons programme soon thereafter at Multan on 20 January 1972[1] and India’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion taking place in 1974.

Understandably, the 1971 War model has had a relatively higher influence on how India’s conventional doctrine shaped up. Mechanisation of the army followed. The thrust was on how to employ the strike corps in strategic pincers and gain decisive outcomes, albeit in a counter offensive scenario. In one strategy option, Pakistan was to be cut into two at the midriff at the Indus at Rahim Yar Khan, a re-enactment of the race to Dacca. Despite some indications of the two states having acquired nuclear capabilities covertly by end of the eighties, this line of thinking persisted for another decade. Even overt nuclearisation in 1998 did not result in change of doctrine. The shock administered by the Kargil War the following year revealed India’s conventional options had been constricted by the advent of the nuclear factor. India acknowledged as much at a conference on 1 January 2000 at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Clearly, a full scale conventional war in the 1971 War model was passe.[2] As result, its poor cousin, the 1965 War, attuned to Limited War,[3] gained ground.

The doctrinal turn was only being crystallised with the first corps exercise of the nuclear age, Exercise Purno Vijay of 1 Corps,[4] when India was faced with a decision on conflict. Operation Parakram after the terror attack on India’s Parliament in December 2001 revealed the switch over to a 1965 War model of Limited War had not been completed doctrinally. As a result the military was unable to offer the political leadership the limited options giving confidence to chance the military option. For instance, the second ‘peak’ of the ‘twin peaks’ crisis of 2001-2 reportedly found all three of India’s strike corps poised in the desert but with no plausible objectives worth running the new nuclear dangers.[5] Consequently, India settled for calling its largest ever military mobilisation as an exercise in coercive diplomacy.

The soul searching[6] that followed resulted in the doctrine colloquially called the Cold Start Doctrine in October 2004.[7] By 2008, while the doctrine was in place and so arguably was the training and psychological reorientation to the offensive turn of the doctrine, the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack revealed gaps, particularly in terms of equipment.[8] Faced with constructive criticism on the release of its doctrine in the open domain, the Army at one juncture even distanced itself from ‘Cold Start Doctrine’.[9] Eventually, while acknowledging that it had cut its readiness timings to but a few days,[10] it released internally a revised doctrine in 2010.[11] Since the revised version is confidential, unlike its predecessor, it is unknown as to which of the two doctrinal models – the 1971 War model seeking decisive outcomes or the 1965 War model with its Limited War bias – informs the current doctrine. 

A closer look at the 2004 avatar of doctrine however suggests that the 1965 War model has had a more influence on thinking than is obvious. A ready pointer is that the concept of large number of ‘wide front - shallow depth’ offensives simultaneously propounded in Cold Start doctrine is reminiscent of the race to the Ichhogil that occurred across the Punjab Front straight from cantonments in early September 1965. Cold Start apparently gets its name from formations racing for the border in a near repeat of 1965 War. Also, shallow depth operations cognisant of prospective nuclear thresholds also hark back to 1965 when India planned to threaten rather than capture vital objectives for a viable peace to emerge at the end of the war. Then, with Pakistan’s military taught a lesson, a negotiated peace was thought possible. In the nuclear age military force can only have similar utility in at best sensitising the enemy to abandon the military course in favour of the political.

Decisive victory being potentially unaffordable in the nuclear age, India, as the stronger power, must be wary of a strategic temptation to prevail militarily. How to gain one’s political ends militarily without tripping on the nuclear tripwire is a key doctrinal question. Mining the 1965 War for nuggets of wisdom on this may be worthwhile. Towards this end, this article concentrates largely at the political level. On this count, the fiftieth anniversary of the war is timely.

Recapitulating the war

The largely non-controversial official history of the war, endorsed in early nineties, remains under wraps due to official secrecy.[12] Quite like its more famous counterpart, the Henderson Brooks Report on the 1962 conflict,[13] it can be found on a non-governmental website.[14] To begin at the beginning, in the popular narrative the Rann of Kutch episode of spring 1965 is taken as a strategic diversion on Pakistan’s part in a wider plan to wrest Kashmir. However, the official history has it that it arose from local actions in which Pakistan deployed its Pattons.[15] Feeling empowered from the ensuing patrol level actions, Pakistan’s Army was goaded by the ‘megalomaniac politician(s)’,[16] Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, into attempting to wrest Kashmir militarily.[17]

The timing was just right. India was in the midst of arming itself after its 1962 debacle, having started off on the first defence five year plan just the year before, intending to create a million-man army by its end.[18] It had also announced an intention to integrate Kashmir into its constitutional framework by normalising its special relationship.[19] Therefore, Pakistan, espied a closing window of opportunity, both militarily and politically.

Since it’s joining the Western Bloc in 1954, Pakistan had received $650 million in military grants, $619 mil­lion in defence support assistance, and $55 million in other assistance[20] The aid modernised Pakistani defence capabil­ity, catering for its training, firepower, mobility and improving command, control and communication facilities. Nevertheless, the cultural changes necessary to use the technologically superior weaponry, such as Patton tanks, did not keep pace. Archaic notions of martial superiority continued. Geopolitically, the warming up with China since that country’s 1962 attack on India buttressed by the ceding of Shaksgam Valley in 1963, presented India with a two-front problem that Pakistan could exploit.

At the turn of 1963-64, Kashmir had witnessed unrest over the missing holy relic, the Moe-e-Muqaddas.[21] Unrest following Sheikh Abdullah’s third incarceration in May 1965 (following his trips to jail in 1953 and 1958) led Pakistan to believe that the time was ripe for stepping up its violations along the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Violations between January and May numbered 1347.[22] There was a flare-up in Kargil in May 1965 in which India was forced to capture locations occupied at the retreat of winter by Pakistani troops and also some across the CFL.[23] India withdrew from across the CFL prior to the War at the behest of the UN on the promise of the UN Observer Group keeping a more watchful eye. This muscle flexing was to divert Indian attention and stretch India militarily since there was a limitation in the number of troops India could maintain in J&K as per the CFL deal under UN oversight.

Ayub Khan launched Operation Gibraltar in early August, based on the flawed advice of Bhutto that India would not react militarily across the International Border (IB). Pakistan’s infiltration comprised eight to ten forces of Pakistani regular officers and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) units.[24] On 5 August, Gujjar shepherd Din Mohammad, espying the columns, alerted the army.[25] India’s counter-infiltration moves involved creation of a ‘Sri Force’ for the hinterland enabling XV Corps to exclusively concentrate on proactively interdicting the launch pads by offensives in the Haji Pir Bulge and in the Kishenganga Valley.

India captured Haji Pir Pass on 25 August 1965 and attempted to link up from Poonch side to wrap up the Haji Pir bulge. This prompted Pakistan to snap off the Rajouri-Poonch sector by launching its Operation Grand Slam into Akhnoor on 1 October. Often an expansive aim is attributed to Grand Slam, to threaten India’s lifeline to Srinagar via Jammu. This would have only been the case had Pakistan got as deep as Akhnoor in first place.[26] Doing so would have triggered a wider Indian response, one that a more modest operation may have escaped. While Pakistan wanted Kashmir it was not at the cost of a wider war. Therefore, a more modest aim for the operation can be reckoned, which was to influence the adverse situation developing for it on the Poonch-Uri front in order to keep its infiltration going. At best it could have had been an ‘aim plus’ of Pakistan’s 1 Corps in case India had chosen to restrict the fighting to J&K.

In the event, the Indian Air Force (IAF) joined the fray in the late evening to check the attack on Chhamb, albeit at some cost to itself and friendly forces.[27] The Defence Minister simultaneously approved army preparations for opening up the Punjab front, as per a plan approved on 9 August.[28] Later that evening, the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet that is precursor to today’s Cabinet Committee on Security, approved his initiatives.[29]

On 6 September, the Indian attack was launched across the IB. This considerably eased the situation in Chhamb-Akhoor sector, as inter-alia it was intended to, although the situation there had stabilised. An inexplicable pause on the Pakistani side in which General Yahya Khan took over command of the operation mid-way had resulted in it fizzling out.[30] Yahya Khan later rationalised this as a deliberate so as not to provoke and to de-escalate.[31] But it was too late for Pakistan.

‘All Out’ war had begun.[32] As the defence minister put it, Operation Riddle was to teach Field Marshal Ayub Khan ‘a good lesson’. The war objectives were:

(1) To defend against Pakistan’s attempts to grab Kashmir by force and to make it abundantly clear that Pakistan would never be allowed to wrest Kashmir from India; (2) To destroy the offensive power of Pakistani armed forces; (and) (3) To occupy only the minimum Pakistani territory to achieve these purposes which would be vacated after the satisfactory conclusion of the war.[33]

Limited offensives were envisaged along the Punjab front into Lahore sector and from the Samba-Jammu line into Sialkot sector, while some diversionary actions were mounted in the desert sector. Indian forces were well prepared, having trained during Operation Ablaze, the alert status during the Kutch episode. They had returned to barracks only in July 1965 after the ceasefire in Kutch on 1 July.

On 6 September, the three divisions of XI Corps kicked off across its frontage in the Lahore sector. The offensive commenced with troops moving directly from cantonments into action without staging in concentration areas.[34] The kickoff by 15 Infantry Division caught Pakistan by surprise, and in its very success, the division also surprised itself. The 3^rd Battalion of the Jat Regiment (3 JAT) went across the Ichhogil Canal; but unsupported and under air attack, it was ordered back.[35] Further North, the bridge captured across the Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak sector was lost to Pakistani troops equally quick to react. To the south, 7 Infantry Division engaged in a series of tactical battles of attrition to gain the eastern bank of the canal. Further southwards, 4 Infantry Division lost its initial gains in a surprise strike by Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division into Khem Karan. The battle that ensued caused some consternation in upper echelons of the chain of command, resulting in controversy over whether the Army Chief ordered his Western Army Commander to fall back to the Beas in face of the attack.[36] In the event, at the fortuitously named village, Asal Uttar, 4 Infantry Division beat back the disorganised Pakistani attack regaining its reputation from World War II that had suffered from its performance in the 1962 War.

On receiving the ‘go ahead’, India’s 1 Armoured Division moved Northwards from its interim area near Jullundur (now Jalandhar) to position itself for attack into Sialkot salient as part of 1 Corps. Delayed readiness of 1 Corps led to its attack getting delayed by two days after the offensive had started further south. 1 Corps freshly formed only in May, made gains till Phillaura, but a ‘slogging match’ ensued thereafter at Chawinda. The battles further south of Sutlej, though under logistic constraints forced by the desert terrain in Barmer and at Gadra Road, did result in some territorial gains. The Air Force put up a credible showing, despite Pakistan having a technological edge; while the Navy’s hands were tied down by the defence minister wanting to limit the scope of the war.[37] Likewise, the eastern front against East Pakistan was kept dormant, lest action there provoke the Chinese into following through with their threats made in the course of the war. 

In today’s light

An assessment of the Indian showing requires examining the achievement of Indian aims against their achievement and contrasting these with Pakistan’s. The return to status quo brought about by the peace treaty at Tashkent in January 1966 implied that the Pakistani war aim of wresting Kashmir failed. However, Pakistan did manage to put it back on the agenda of the international community. Militarily, as part of the war in Kashmir, Pakistan was not able to execute its offensive for the capture of Akhnoor. Nor could it pull off its outflanking move to defeat Indian forces west of River Beas at Khem Karan. Nevertheless, it held on in the battles of attrition, though with proportionately higher losses in tanks and territory. Its technologically superior aircraft took their toll. Clearly, the window that had opened up with the Chinese attack in 1962 had slammed shut too soon for Pakistan. But, Pakistan could take home the sentiment that it had put paid to any notion in India that Pakistan could be undone. This was never an Indian aim, but its own apprehension that it could now dispel.   

India for its part achieved what it set out to do, but only partially. It caused attrition on Pakistani military and captured territory, both intended to bring home to the Pakistanis that Kashmir was beyond military reach. Returning territory captured even along the CFL was to prove India’s bona-fides and incentivise Pakistani reconciliation with the status quo.  But if military operations taught Pakistan a ‘good lesson’, in YB Chavan’s diary entry is an open question:

To begin with we are not a war minded nation; and I think I am proud for it. Yet there comes a moment in a nation’s life when it has to stand up against a bully and teach him a good lesson. That is what we are out to do. We are not thinking in terms of a fight between a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation. We want a peaceful neighbour. And a neighbour who thinks he can get away with all his aggressive activities easily will never be peaceful. He needs to be told effectively in action that this will not do.[38]

The expansion of the war to the rest of the western front, while useful for forestalling any potentially adverse situation in J&K, was instead to serve the political purpose of telling Pakistan that aggression just ‘will not do’. It demonstrated that since Kashmir was an integral part of India, India would, unlike in 1947, defend it in any manner it chose. Even so, in administering this lesson, India took care to keep the war limited. The defensive aims of the war were an outflow of the development-centric grand strategy.

The war’s onset was graduated. Hardly had the Kutch episode been settled, the center of gravity shifted to J&K. Infiltration by Pakistan led to India snapping off the infiltration routes across the CFL, in turn prompting Pakistan to put pressure on India’s supply lines in J&K. This led to India in a planned move expanding the war from J&K for the first time to include the rest of the international border (IB) sector. While there was a degree of planned escalation on both sides, escalation could conceivably also have resulted from other causes. For instance, had India got across Ichhogil in strength or Pakistan broken through from Khem Karan, both states would have respectively posed grave dilemmas for the other. The Chaudhuri-Harbaksh Singh exchange on whether to withdraw to the Beas line suggests that this is not an imaginary scenario. This puts a premium on the role of the political leadership in escalation management by keeping sight of war aims.

In the event, Prime Minister Shastri accepted the ceasefire in accordance with military advice. He had stalled for time in mid-September when UN Secretary General U Thant had paid a visit to the region to get a ceasefire organized.[39] This was to give the military more time to achieve the objectives delivering political aims. Post-war it has been reckoned that had India fought on for longer, Pakistan that was at the end of its tether, particularly in terms of artillery ammunition, would have folded up. The story goes that, instead, Gen Chaudhuri advised acceptance of the ceasefire prematurely under the mistaken belief that India was on the verge of exhausting its own artillery ammunition.[40] However, the manner India was slogging on in all sectors indicates that attrition would have been all it could have achieved and at some cost to itself.

Besides, India, with good reason, did not have rubbing Pakistan’s nose into the dust as a political aim. Firstly, India lacked the military capability; secondly, it could have prompted uncertain Chinese action; and lastly, Pakistan was not exactly friendless politically. Therefore, sensing when to stop is a vital political level responsibility that the Prime Minister Shastri discharged with moral courage. In the event, the statesmanship exacted a great personal cost: his life under the pressure of compromise.

Military action at best sets the stage for political resolution from a position of advantage. It cannot serve as a substitute for political agreements politically arrived at. By this yardstick, the Tashkent Agreement of 10 January 1966 was politically sensible in that it preserved the status quo in Kashmir in India’s favour, even if it could not resolve the issue. The return to status quo ante was an investment in Pakistani good sense, incentivising it to reconcile to the status quo in Kashmir. That the status quo in Kashmir held for about two decades indicates that Shastri delivered credibly at Tashkent. There is no guarantee that the converse - a decisive Pakistani defeat - would have led it to abandon its claims. In fact, even inflicting the 1971 War defeat on Pakistan was not able to achieve that. It can be plausibly argued that on the contrary, the defeat in 1971 increased Pakistani desire to avenge itself in Kashmir.

What has been missing and continues sub-optimally is inter-services coordination. While the highpoint of the 1965 interaction was in Arjan Singh conferring with Chaudhuri on air support in the Chhamb sector,[41] the low water mark was in the Navy facing embarrassment at Dwarka.[42] At Kargil, the story was different when General Malik asked Air Chief Tipnis for air support.[43] Recent reports of the government contemplating appointing a military chief, even if fifty years late, are nevertheless heartening.[44]

Echoes from across a half century

Fifty years on, India and Pakistan remain at odds over J&K. In Pakistan, the military’s control of strategic affairs continues and India’s two-front problem remains. While the US is no longer behind Pakistan as then, Pakistan has compensated by leaning on China. Pakistan has gained an ability to wage proxy war that it lacked in both 1947 and 1965. Kashmiris were not enticed earlier, but by the nineties they allowed their militancy to be hijacked by Pakistani proxies. India for its part has acquired both the tools and the will to counter the proxy war, both at the subconventional[45] and conventional levels. Finally, India is on the ascendant while Pakistan is perpetually on the cusp of being a failed state. However, decidedly the greatest game changer has been the acquisition of the great equalizer - nuclear weapons - by both states. The last cannot but condition all strategic analysis hereon.  

A major implication of nuclearisation is how potential conflict triggers should be viewed. That the two states have accepted the need to work out mutually and peaceably a solution to outstanding issues is explicated in the Simla (now Shimla) Agreement. The understanding was that that Bhutto would tame the Pakistan military and convert the LC into the border.[46] That this was not borne out by subsequent events suggests that waiting for a turn in civil-military relations in Pakistan is to wait indefinitely. For the interim, India is left with two strategies.

The first, tried out partially by India, involves the negotiation process. Both the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments in their respective first innings took this up seriously. Pakistan proved largely responsive, best evidenced by the NDA initiative of interfacing with Musharraf being taken just short of its logical conclusion by the UPA government.[47] Thereafter, Pakistan’s pointing a gun either at India, as at Mumbai 26/11 or at its own head, has not helped matters.

This has left India with the second strategy option, currently at play. This is one of strategic dexterity involving diplomacy, intelligence and military instruments. India is upping the military ante by increasing military asymmetry with Pakistan. Economic and political opening up are incentives held in reserve in case Pakistan does get the message. However, while this can sustain a favourable status quo; the moot question is can it do so indefinitely till civil-military relations reform in Pakistan?

As seen in the 1965 War, war clouds can advance as inexorably as the monsoons. Escalation can also occur within war: note the connections between India’s counter infiltration operations leading to Pakistani attack in Chhamb and in turn leading to India releasing the pressure on J&K by opening up the Punjab front. The escalation in war aims from gaining territory in East Pakistan to racing for Dacca in the 1971 War further indicates that escalation is intrinsic to war.

The current common place escalation scenario is in a terror incident sparking Indian conventional reaction, leading up to Pakistani firing off a tactical nuclear missile in fear or panic. Central to the critique of Cold Start is such potential escalation in light of uncertain nuclear thresholds. Generating asymmetries in quick time may unsettle a nuclear armed enemy enough to have him contemplate a nuclear bail out under conditions of perceived existential danger clouding such judgment. On this count, exploiting operational success with a manoeuvrist approach – as the offensive turn to Indian military doctrine dictates - may be useful for pedagogic reasons on a sand model but not so in a nuclear environment. On the contrary, an attritionist approach as seen in the 1965 War is slower paced and deliberate. This enables saliencies built in for exit strategies and conflict termination to kick in and gives diplomats time to do their thing. The attritionist approach lends itself to both the limited war under a nuclear overhang. A Monty-like general trumps a Rommel in a nuclear battlefield. Strategic rationality suggests options of limited offensives not involving full-throated mobilisation and also possibly limited nuclear retaliatory options.

At the political level, statesmanship is in the ability to gauge advancing war clouds and as necessary disperse or seed them in light of grand strategy. In case of conflict, escalation avoidance in first place and escalation control and de-escalation in second, require continuing political sensitivity to grand strategy for a firm hold over the strategic and military levels of war.

1965 War provides right precedence in the role Shastri played as war leader. It can be argued that this is part of an unacknowledged Indian tradition. In end 1948, Nehru stopped at the ethno-linguistic frontier in order to enable Pakistan to reconcile itself to a piece of the cake. In 1971 Indira Gandhi provided firm leadership, even countenancing escalation in the east while forgoing it in the west. At Kargil, Vajpayee laid down that the LC will not be crossed. With the national security institutions India now has in place – with the strong Prime Minister’s Office dating to Shastri’s time in office - this facet of Indian approach to war – simultaneous restraint and resolve - has strengthened.

Retrospective criticism has it that in all cases, India was not able to win the peace decisively. This does not necessarily imply infirmity in war aims or perceived shortfalls in their achievement as goes the corollary in such analyses. How to win the peace perhaps requires both greater theoretical attention and grand strategic application.  

The strategic level aims to deliver favourable war termination conditions from a position of advantage. War termination cannot always wait till a situation of advantage is reached, since the closer the military gets to this stage, nuclear dangers multiply. Consequently, the political level must be able to sense when to de-escalate and signal willingness for conflict termination. It must have the moral courage and political capital to impose its will on its strategic instruments even if at a political cost. Here again there is precedence, for instance, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reportedly contemplating and stepping away from a military counter to 26/11. This contradicts the interpretation of political will as solely the willingness to use military force. Instead, for a nuclear power, withholding from using military power must be considered as an equally pertinent exercise of political will. The difference of the nuclear age is that it is not the amount of pain inflicted on the enemy and sustained by one’s own society that counts but also the amount of pain and damage avoided.[48] 

Conclusion

Vijay Diwas commemorates the victory in 1971. In the nuclear era, ‘victory’ is debatable as a political aim in war and it may not be militarily feasible either since nobody ‘wins’ a war gone nuclear. Therefore, settling for a ‘draw’, as in 1965, may well be the saner choice. It allows face-saving for both sides and helps set the stage for the inevitable ‘give and take’ of peace talks. India has shown strategic rationality in all its wars. Pakistan has proven a strategic actor too. Take 1965. It did not press home its attack in the Jammu sector. In 1971, Yahya Khan called off troops poised for counter offensive.[49] At Kargil, it chose a relatively insignificant stretch along the LC for its probes. Since it requires two to keep a war limited, Pakistan can prove a responsive partner at war avoidance and limitation, simply because owing to force asymmetry it stands to lose more both in absolute and relative terms. The medium of doctrinal exchanges envisaged in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding is an available start point. This cannot await resumption of negotiation processes.[50]

Even so, all the four wars so far, with the last one fought early in the nuclear age, have shown that neither state has achieved its political aims. Pakistan has not been able to wrest Kashmir nor has India been able to convince it to do so. The nuclear factor makes redundant resort to a full spectrum war as an option for either aim. Negotiations being the only route eventually, it is only a question of when: at the end of a potentially nuclear war or in pre-empting it well prior? Precedence in the form of Tashkent exists of India’s readiness for accommodation on the negotiation table. It should not take a war to get Pakistan to the table.

---

[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Nuclear Blackmarkets: A Net Assessment, London: IISS, 2007, p. 15.

[2]

[3]

[4] Baweja, Harinder, ‘Readying for nukes’, India Today, 28 May 2001, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/for-the-first-time-after-india-became-a-nuclear-power-army-stages-a-nuclear-war-game/1/233562.html, accessed on 7 May 2015.

[5]Ladwig, W., ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine’ International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter, 2007/2008), pp. 158-190, pp. 164-66.

[6]

[7] Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Indian Army Doctrine, Shimla: ARTRAC, 2004, available at ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/indianarmydoctrine_1.doc, accessed on 23 February 2015.

[8] Joshi, M., ‘Was the Indian Army ready for war?’ Mail Today, 17 January 2009, available at http://mjoshi.blogspot.com/2009/01/was-indian-army-ready-for-war.html, accessed on 15 February 2015.

[9]

[10]Pubby, M., ‘No Cold Start doctrine, India tells US’, Indian Express, 9 September 2010, available at http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/no--cold-start--doctrine-india-tells-us/679273/, accessed on 10 January 2015.

[11]

[12] Shukla, A., ‘The day nothing happened’, Business Standard, 1 September 2014, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-the-day-nothing-happened-114090101482_1.html, accessed on 20 February 2015.

[13] Chakravarty, B.C., History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, Government of India: Ministry of Defence, Available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/, accessed on 20 February 2015.

[14] Sinha, P.B. and A. Athale, History of the Conflict with China, 1962, Available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/History/1965War/PDF/, accessed on 1 February 2015. The Henderson Brooks Report is at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/TopSecretdocuments2.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2015. 

[15]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, pp. 37-38.

[16] Pakistan Army, ‘War History’, available at  https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=47&rnd=443, accessed on 2 February 2015.

[17]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, pp. 55-66.

[18] Pradhan, R.D., Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65, New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, p. 239.

[19] Pradhan, R.D., 1965 War: The Inside Story, New Delhi: Atlantic, p. xvii.

[20] Pakistan Army, ‘A journey from scratch to nuclear power’, available at https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=18&rnd=157, accessed on 14 January 2015.

[21] Curiously the official history dates this episode to 27 December 1964 to 4 January 1965 (History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, pp. 45-46).

[22]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 48.

[23]

[24] Ibid. pp. 63-64.

[25] A similar story repeated itself at the onset of the Kargil War in which local shepherds in Kargil spotted Pakistani intrusions on 3 May 1999. Likewise, for counter insurgency operations in the Valley, India sent in the Rashtriya Rifles HQs from Delhi to Srinagar in 1999, so that the LC formations could concentrate on counter infiltration and conventional operations.

[26]1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 12, and History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 112.

[27] 1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 3

[28]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 140.

[29]1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 3.

[30]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 118.

[31]

[32] The chapter on the operations of XI Corps in the Lahore sector is titled ‘All Out War’ in History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 140.

[33]Debacle to Revival, p. 262. This constituted the ‘higher direction of war’ and a laying down of war aims. This was an advance from what occurred in 1962 and indeed according to General Padhmanabhan yet again in 1999.

[34]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 142.

[35]Hayde, D., The Battle of Dograi, New Delhi: Vanity Books, 1984, pp. 49-52. 

[36]1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 59;Debacle to Revival, pp. 286-7; and History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 178. The official history talks of ‘top brass’ and RD Pradhan refers to the originator of the idea of withdrawal as ‘Top’ in a disguised reference to General Chaudhuri. Among the defenders of Chaudhuri in this controversy is Lt Gen Harwant Singh, ‘1965 War: General Chaudhuri did not order withdrawal behind River Beas’, Indian Defence Review, 2 May 2004, available at

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/1965-general-Chaudhuri-did-not-order-withdrawal-of-western-army-behind-river-beas/ accessed on 14 February 2015.  

[37]1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 118.

[38]1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 15.

[39]Debacle to Revival, p. 286.

[40]History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p. 33.

[41]1965 War: The Inside Story, p. 3.

[42]In its version of the war, Transition to Triumph (available at http://indiannavy.nic.in/book/1965-indo-pakistan-war, accessed on 2 February 2015), the Navy informs: ‘In a letter to the Times of India on 29 November 1978, Admiral Soman stated that the Ministry of Defence directed Naval Headquarters in writing that the Navy was not to operate in a threatening or offensive manner north of the latitude of Porbandar and that nowhere on the high seas was the Navy to initiate any offensive action against Pakistan unless forced to do so by their action.’

[43] Press Trust of India (PTI), ‘Army was reluctant to tell govt about Kargil: Tipnis’, Times of India, 7 October 2006, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-was-reluctant-to-tell-govt-about-Kargil-Tipnis/articleshow/2116089.cms, accessed on 1 January 2015.

[44]IANS, ‘India to have a chief of defence staff: Minister’, Business Standard, 16 February 2015, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-to-have-chief-of-defence-staff-minister-115021601868_1.html, accessed on 20 February 2015.

[45]

[46]

[47]Subramanian, N., ‘India, Pakistan had a solution for Kashmir in 2007: Kasuri’, The Hindu, 21 January 2015, available at

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-had-a-solution-for-kashmir-in-2001-kasuri/article6805890.ece, accessed on 12 February 2015.

[48]

[49]Musharraf, P., In the Line of Fire, New York, Simon and Shuster, 2006, pp. 54-55.

[50]The MOU states: ‘shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.’ Available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/ip_lahore19990221.pdf, accessed on 1 January 2015. 

Book Review

Conflict Literature: A Sociological Perspective

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-4473/2015/June/6/conflict-literature-a-sociological-perspective.html

CIVIL WARS IN SOUTH ASIA: STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEVELOPMENT 
Edited by Nandini Sundar and Aparna Sundar  
Sage Publications, Delhi, 2014, pp. 273, Rs. 850.00

VOLUME XXIX NUMBER 6 June 2015

The book originated at a workshop in Delhi University’s Department of Sociology in 2010. Consequently it helps fill a gap in writings on internal security that are usually security related and state centric at that. The development perspective relying on human security and peace studies on conflict resolution frameworks are fast emerging as strong competitors. Nevertheless, the sociological angle deserved greater visibility than it has received so far, even if it has been much in evidence within the academia and in progressive tracts.

On that count, the book serves to bring the sociological perspective to the general readership to flesh out conflict literature and is a contribution to both strategic and peace studies in South Asia. For this we can credit noted scholar Nandini Sundar, and her sister, Aparna Sundar, Associate professor at the Azim Premji University, along with the team of academics brought together for the purpose at a workshop.

The jointly written introduction by the sister-duo that comprises the editorial team spells out what they mean by civil wars and how they situate the concept to the region. Simply put, civil wars to them are armed conflicts that challenge state sovereignty. States have taken care to refer to these instead as insurgencies to be able to operationalize and legitimize a counter-insurgency approach. Finding this wanting, particularly in the conflict management approaches it gives rise to, the two wished for a more holistic reappraisal to include ‘structures and dynamics’ (p.4) that give rise to or are set in place by armed confrontations.
Their intent was to examine civil wars in the region for ‘theoretical implications and from a comparative and regional perspective’ (p. 3). They problematize sovereignty in order to enhance the study of the state, not in its ordinary ‘everyday administrative practices’ (p.5), but how it behaves in the context of internal conflict. They complicate the relationship between economic development and civil wars by counter intuitively bringing out, using the cases of Sri Lanka and India, that conflict can buoy economics, such as by the boost to the military, humanitarian and developmental sectors, and to social segments and political actors advantaged by conflict. They challenge the thesis of state fragility as cause of conflict bringing out that South Asian states on the contrary have robust centralized authority and rely on ‘extraordinary’ laws inherited from their colonial forbears. Yet, there is a fragmentation of sovereignty with power being shared with ‘overlapping centers of local authority’ (p. 20) in which ‘militants, states and others are more or less successful in enforcing their writ over limited areas’ (p. 23).
A tour-de-horizon follows by academicactivist Nandini Sundar, famous for her keeping the state to the straight and narrow in its operations in Central India. The chapter contextualizes those that deal with each country separately; Maldives and Bhutan being left out since their set of internal troubles do not amount to civil wars. Myanmar has been rightly included into South Asia, even if it overlaps with South East Asia. The categorization of causes is discrimination on ethnic, religious and linguistic grounds; in addition, the unfinished business of decolonization; wars for democracy and redistribution; and finally, wars with Cold War as context and more recently the ‘war on terror’.
The book has its initial three chapters on the political economy of conflict covering economic growth in the time of conflict in Sri Lanka; smuggling and drug trade, remittance, non-state armed groups and humanitarian NGOs in Afghanistan; and the relationship between aid and Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. The next two chapters are on institutional legacy of colonialism, examined respectively in chapters on insurgency and counter-insurgency in Pakistan’s North West and the legal inheritance from the British in the shape of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in India’s North East. Finally, there are two chapters with ethnographic approaches examining civilian agency with a chapter each on ethnic Karen-Burman relations in eastern Myanmar and on two local, though structured and organized agitations, in Kashmir that are part of but simultaneously distinct from the larger resistance movement there.
A summing up chapter has not been necessary owing to the editors covering the ‘significance of the book’ in their introductory chapter itself. Rajesh Venugopal’s chapter on Sri Lanka discusses how market reform coincided with the outbreak of insurgency in Tamil areas. The unpopular liberalization policies however were easier administered by the military expanding ten times, resulting in absorption of the surplus manpower in Sinhala rural areas that could have otherwise been dissident in the form of two preceding Sinhala insurgencies. The author argues that the ‘civil war has been of functional significance to the promotion of economic growth by mitigating the adverse effects of the market reform agenda in the South’ (p. 73). His chapter raises the question whether this phenomenon is not visible in India too with the military and central police forces expanding steadily over the last two decades of India’s economic reform, ostensibly to cope with ‘civil wars’ in Kashmir and Central India. Alessandro Monsutti brings out that despite over a decade of ministrations by international organizations and humanitarian and developmental actors in Afghanistan, ‘the population remain unconvinced by the merits of programmes promoting democracy and transparency, human rights and women’s empowerment’ (p. 111). The transnational networks share sovereignty with the state and channel resources that can be used in political and social struggles, resulting in ‘multiple and segmented de facto sovereignties’ (p. 112). In the same vein, Antonio Donini and Jeevan Raj Sharma explore how developmentalist assistance got intertwined in Nepal’s insurgency. It brings out the competing narratives between the humanitarians and developmentalists by taking recourse to specific examples from Nepal’s experience where both domains intersected and contended.
The study on Bangladesh has A. Dirk Moses look at the confusion in the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office as to how to approach the civil war in 1971. That this was true for the US—witness the neglect of the Archer Blood telegram from the US embassy in Dacca in Washington D.C.—also suggests the problems external players have in understanding and engaging with civil wars in general, resulting in ultimately being guided by the ‘national interest’ raison d’etat. He notes multiple axes of conflict as characterizing civil war, with violence occurring between Bengalis and Biharis, Bengalis and the military, India and Pakistan, and outright criminal activities.
Haris Gazdar, Yasser Kureshi and Asad Sayeed in their chapter attribute the rise of Jihadi militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas to state complicity. The Army wanting to control the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir outsourced these to proxies. This imposition of the national security paradigm has resulted in the displacement of authority in tribal areas away from Maliks to Mullahs. The backlash has been in the form of ‘sovereignty divided in Pakistan’s northwest tribal areas’ (p. 186).
The chapter of greater interest for Indian readers is the one on AFSPA in which Sanjib Baruah informs of the manner India has subverted the concept of emergencies in international law by refusing to recognize that the laws it operates in conflict areas are meant for a the temporary period of great challenge to the state. He rightly notes that, ‘Decisions to proclaim an area as “disturbed” are made rather casually.’ Testimony to this is the manner AFSPA was extended recently in Arunachal Pradesh from along a 20 km wide stretch along its border with Assam to all bordering districts by New Delhi without consulting the State Government. The latter’s remonstrations led to the State capital being left out of the ambit and the strip being increased to 30 km.
Gowhar Fazili is informative on the manner local resistance continues even outside the wider framework of the movement and militancy in Kashmir in his examination of two incidents of 2009: the killing of two youth by security forces in Bomai and the better known one of drowning of two women in Shopian. He recounts how local agitationists took pains to dissociate from the wider movement in order to press their cases for justice lest the state gain a handle for suppressing or ignoring their cases. Stephen Campbell relies on his three-and-a-half-year research experience with the Karen Human Rights Group to argue in his chapter on Karen-Burman relations in South East Myanmar that, ‘a recognition of, and appreciation for, local context is crucial, both in explaining the diversity of individual articulations of grievance and in challenging politically restrictive master narratives’ (p. 242).

A Handy Reference Book

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-4458/2015/May/5/a-handy-reference-book.html

NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA: KEYWORDS AND CONCEPTS 
By Rajesh Rajagopalan  and Atul Mishra 
Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 306, Rs. 850.00

VOLUME XXXIX NUMBER 5 May 2015

The book is a long awaited one on three counts. One is that it fills a gap in South Asian strategic affairs litera¬ture and on that score will be valued by stu¬dents and initiates among the attentive pub¬lic. The second is that its explication of the well chosen entries is such that it settles some of the misconceptions that have attended strategic terms. Third, there has been a re¬current demand for a shared vocabulary and common understanding of it, for use both within the Indian strategic community and with interlocutors across the border. In do¬ing this, the book does not neglect ‘western’ definitions even as it adapts them to Indian and regional usage and conditions, a case in point being ‘massive retaliation’.

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The book, compiled under the tutelage of nuclear authority and realist theoretician, Professor Rajagopalan, is potentially a valu¬able resource. It carries a short history of the nuclear trajectory of both South Asian states as its introduction. It begins with expand¬ing the set of abbreviations in the nuclear field and goes on to a brief chronology. It wraps up its 229 pages of terms and their definitions with 17 pages of select bibliog¬raphy. The reading list does not restrict it¬self to the region, but includes classics such as Freedman’s Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Neither does it ignore nuclear pacifists in its inclusion of Bidwai and Vanaik’s On a Short Fuse and N. Ram’s Riding the Nuclear Tiger. It’s over 400 entries cover personalities, nuclear installations, doctrines, equipment, legal regime and organizations. This way it puts between one set of covers a thought¬fully compiled and competently written, comprehensive overview and detail of nuclear matters in the region. However, its effort could have been enhanced by an index for ease of consultation.
Perhaps its next edition, suitably dis¬tanced in time, say, five years on, could in¬clude a section with terms having relevance outside the region. The US could be repre¬sented for instance by reference to its Nuclear Posture Review and Strategic Defence Re¬views. Those who tend to think that India weighs in with China and should not be bracketed with Pakistan may also want in-clusion of China specific terms such as Jin class and Chengdu Military Region. This of course risks offsetting the book’s current ad¬vantages: that it is not bulky as to weigh-down a student satchel and is within the price range not entirely off-putting for stu¬dents. Also, some minor glitches could be removed such as its placing of HQs 12 Corps in Bhatinda and extending its calendar of events of the past four years from its cover¬age of a mere two pages.
The book is important in the sense that any book dealing with nuclear issues is. There are too few books dealing with the subject, as a result there is not enough concern over the fact that the region is now indubitably into the nuclear age. Whereas the world managed to get by without any of its 60000 warheads at the peak in the last eighties be¬ing fired in anger or panic, the dangers from regional nuclear arsenals, numbering over 200 warheads today, are not any less. After Mumbai 26/11, it will take but a few jihadis to set off a conflagration. Two South Asia hands in the US whose work figures in the bibliography, Tellis and Perkovich, have in a senate testi¬mony early this year indicated as much.
It is reckoned that a regional nuclear war involving half this number would result in two billion deaths worldwide, resulting not so much from the direct effects of blast, heat and radiation, but from dust clouds blank¬ing out the sun. Nuclear winter should not be the region’s answer to global warming. There is simply not enough apprehension in the two states on this score, evident from the book including a reference to CNDP (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace) in the abbreviations but carrying only a perfunctory entry on a nuclear peace move¬ment in South Asia and of knowledgeable peace mongers such as Parvez Hoodbhoy or more lyrical activists as Arundhati Roy.
Arguably, the peace lobby is equally Subrahmanyam and the IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses). However, while there are references to the agitations surrounding Jaitapur and Kudankulum, the lack of space for the former is only reflective of the lack of attention the peace lobby com¬mands in the region in general. It may re¬quire growing into a movement before it fig¬ures in proportion to its importance. This needs happening soon, lest parts of the coun¬try end up as the Nanda Devi mountain fast¬ness, rightly covered in the book.
The book is also useful in its coverage of nuclear energy. Over the past decade, the in¬terconnected issues of energy, foreign and stra¬tegic policy have been so beclouded as to be under virtually a radioactive nuclear overhang. With its very first entry on the 123 Agree¬ment, the book throws some light on the In¬dia-US nuclear deal that appears to have brought the two ‘estranged democracies’ to¬gether. With China looming, this relation¬ship can only grow, even if Obama’s visit over Republic Day has not helped dispel the haze surrounding the deal. The book can assist the lay reader in appreciating the headlines bet¬ter and arrive at their own conclusions on the desirability—or indeed otherwise—of the nuclear route to energy sufficiency.
To Nehru the nuclear complex was part of the modern temples of India. After Chernobyl and Fukushima, these are no more ‘holy cows’. Nehru, alongside left scope for what Oppenheimer, quoting the Bhagwad Gita, observed on witnessing what he (Oppenheimer) had wrought: ‘the radiance of a thousand suns’. On this score, the book’s non-inclusion of Nuclear Zero amounts to a shortfall.
Neither the Strategic Plans Division (‘Directorate’ in the book) nor the National Disaster Management Authority (surpris¬ingly omitted) can save the region, and the globe, in case a sub conventional trigger sets up a conventional push to nuclear shove. Tightly-coupled, crises-ridden systems such as South Asia need light the book helps pro¬vide. And a little more to appreciate the find¬ings of the Vienna Conference on the hu¬manitarian consequences of nuclear ex¬changes: ‘The only assurance against the risk of a nuclear weapon detonation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.’

Doctrine in Civil-Military Relations

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/doctrine-in-civil-military-relations/

16 May , 2015

Supervision of doctrine making is one way by which civilian control is exercised over the military. Military doctrine writing is largely done within the military. However, it is to be in close coordination with the Ministry and national security institutions. This is clear from the fact that, firstly, military doctrines are based on the government’s strategic doctrine; secondly, the civilian part of government has to have a sense of ownership of the doctrine by being part of the process; and, finally, military doctrines must receive ministerial imprimatur to signify that they are outcome of a shared process and responsibility.

As for the first, the fact that India does not have a strategic doctrine in the form of a white paper or an open-domain strategic defence review is well known. While the National Security Advisory Board does undertake defence review, it is not within the pail of government. As seen when it released the Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999, the government indicated that it is merely advisory. As for the second -civilian participation in doctrine making – it is not self-evidently the case in India. And, the last – governmental ownership – can be assumed from the press statements that accompany release of doctrine.

This article reflects on the second aspect: ministry participation in doctrine making.

It is not known as to the extent the Ministry of Defence is part of the process of doctrine formulation in India. Its website carries no mention of doctrine formulation. There is also no reference to conventional doctrines in the Annual Report of the Ministry. This suggests the Ministry is keeping at a distance from the doctrinal sphere, perhaps under the mistaken impression that the doctrine function is solely the military’s preserve.

If this inference is a fair approximation of reality, it is certainly yet another area of deficit in civil-military relations in India. It indicates that the ‘lesson’ of 1962, of civilians keeping out of military matters has possibly been over-learnt. Since there is considerable overlap with the civilian sphere, the doctrinal space is not one that can be left to the military alone. While the overlap is self-evident for subconventional doctrine involving as it does the defence and home ministries, it is equally so for conventional doctrine.

The region now into the second decade of the nuclear age, the nuclear and conventional doctrines are intertwined. Since the nuclear doctrine is a politico-strategic function, with apex level military input and participation, the nuclear doctrine making is understandably a civilian led process. Military conventional doctrines are to be sensitive to the demands of nuclear doctrine on the conventional space. For instance, conventional doctrine cannot envisage operations that are overly escalatory. Since conventional military doctrines have to be cognizant of the civilian led nuclear doctrine, they cannot be without reference to civilian expertise in the national security establishment. Such participation of civilians is at two levels: at the ministry and at the National Security Council institutions.

Military doctrines give out the manner the military wishes to fight future wars. Consequently, in peacetime they are critical to the type of military being formed in terms of strength, equipment, training and elan, and serve to inform military plans. In wartime, they inform military strategy. Since the Ministry has a role to play and an interest in all these aspects, such as for instance in platform acquisitions necessitated by doctrine, it needs to play its part in the doctrinal process. In case the Ministry’s engagement with the process is suboptimal then problems emerge down the line.

An illustration is the indication by the defence minister of a stepping back for financial reasons from the creation of the mountain strike corps. 17 Corps is reportedly to be pruned so as to make its additional manpower and necessary equipment acquisitions affordable. The corps has been under discussion for over half a decade. It is a result of the revision in army doctrine that was reported in the press in end 2009. The army doctrine of 2004 had thereafter been revised and released internally in 2010. The revision of doctrine was however not revealed in the public domain through a press release as is usually the case.

The revised doctrine, unlike its 2004 predecessor, being confidential, press reports on doctrinal change of the period suggest a ‘two front’ doctrine with a similar offensive turn on the China front being envisaged as had been adopted on the Pakistan front under the 2004 doctrine.The ‘two front’ doctrine envisages a counter offensive capability also be created for the China front, akin to the strike corps in the plains. The implications for size and equipment of the army are of such magnitude that a doctrinal shift cannot obviously be taken without governmental imprimature.

The previous UPA government authorized two mountain divisions late last decade and with reluctance gave approval for the mountain strike corps only in mid 2013 after much stalling by the finance ministry. It would appear that the present government’s reservations on the costs are a legacy of the period. It can therefore be concluded that had a ‘whole of government’ approach been part of doctrine formulation at the outset itself, this awkward stepping back on 17 Corps would not have been necessary.

A second illustration of disconnect between the ministry and the military concerns subconventional doctrine. It has recently emerged that in 2013 the army adopted a new edition of the Doctrine on Sub Conventional Operations of 2006. As with the 2010 revision of the conventional doctrine, Indian Army Doctrine 2004, the DSCO 2013 has been kept confidential. It is not known as to the extent the changes are merely cosmetic making the 2013 version merely a new edition or are substantial enough to reckon that it is indeed a revised doctrine. Since it is confidential, it cannot be known as to the levels of participation of the two ministries in internal security – defence and home – in its revision.

The DSCO 2013 was released internally without intimation in the open domain through a press release. Therefore, it cannot be known if the doctrine has ministerial imprimature. Clearly, subconventional operations overlap the civilian sphere almost wholly. Since the DSCO 2006 version was in the open domain and well received for its ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ thesis, that the 2013 version has instead been kept confidential is intriguing. Had the two ministries been hands-on participants in doctrine making then this situation would unlikely have arisen.

This underlines the point of ministries distancing themselves from the doctrine sphere. It can be argued that this owes to ignorance of matters military. This is probably quite right, but cannot on that account be allowed to stand unchallenged. The ministry cannot abdicate the doctrinal space owing to its deficiency. It has to be instead to be held accountable. It has to create the structures necessary to participate actively and exercise oversight effectively. This can be done, for instance, by empowering the affiliated think tanks of the ministry and the forces HQs. Just as the ministry of external affairs has ratcheted up its policy and planning division under the new foreign secretary, the defence ministry could likewise upgrade itself with an in-house think tank of academics, bureaucrats, veterans and practitioners.

Clearly, there is a case for governmental ownership of the doctrinal space even if the military is in the lead.It must begin with an NSCS strategic review followed by a ministry driven doctrine process with the product minimally being acknowledged in the open domain or, maximally, being democratically placed in it

indian military exercises 2015

What This Year’s Maneuver Season in India Tells Us

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/05/12/what-this-years-maneuver-season-in-india-tells-us/

From separate media reports on ‘massive’ exercises in India’s western deserts, we learn that India’s premier ‘strike’ corps, 2 Corps, and a ‘pivot’ corps, 10 Corps, are being exercised. Interestingly, media reports that carry mention of the 2 Corps exercise, ‘Exercise Brahmashira’ (Ultimate weapon), make no mention of the other exercise, Exercise Akraman(Attack) II of 10 Corps, and vice versa. It would seem that the two are not interconnected, especially since 2 Corps is affiliated with India’s Western Command and 10 Crops is under is South Western (SW) Command.

However, this is improbable since the exercises are taking place in the same geographic area, Suratgarh sector, and the two exercises finished together. Therefore, it can be plausibly be inferred that a pivot corps and a strike crops exercised together. What are the implications?

‘Pivot’ corps are erstwhile ‘holding’ corps in a defensive role. India’s doctrine, now a decade old, converted these into ‘pivot’ corps, equipping each with an offensive element, termed ‘integrated battle group’ (IBG). From the name of the pivot corps exercise, Akraman II, it is evident that the 10 Corps exercise was to practice its integrated battle groups (IBG). Since the pivot corps in the semi-desert terrain has two mechanized Reorganised Plains Infantry Divisions, it is capable of sending into attack two IBGs.

Each of India’s three ‘strike’ corps is orbatted to one of the three geographic commands facing Pakistan. 2 Corps under Western Command is understood to operate in the developed plains sector in Punjab which Western Command faces. However, strike corps, owing to their inherent mobility, are able to move between sectors and achieve surprise by launch across the entire front. In this case, it appears that 2 Corps was put through its paces in the semi-developed terrain opposite South Western Command. This implies two options.

In addition to the two IBGs of the pivot corps in action, in the first option, there is also the strike corps affiliated to SW Command, 1 Corps, available for launch across its front. However, in case 2 Corps is practicing launch across SW Command frontage, in this option 1 Corps is instead held back as a countervailing force in a defensive role.

In the second option, along with the two pivot corps IBGs, both 1 Corps and 2 Corps are launched into semi-desert terrain opposite SW Command. In this year’s exercise, 1 Corps did not figure since India usually practices only one strike corps a year in rotation and 1 Corps exercise, Exercise Sarvada Vijay (Always Victorious) was held last year. But that 2 Corps is practicing in the terrain of the neighboring geographical command, it can supplement 1 Corps. In other words, at a maximum, two strike corps comprising their integral six IBGs and two IBGs of the pivot corps can be launched into the semi-desert terrain into Pakistan. This gives India the ability to cut Pakistan in half between Lahore and Karachi.

How dangerous is this in a nuclear context?

In the doctrine, while the initial offensives are launched by division-sized IBGs of pivot corps and of strike corps formations located closer to the border, the remainder of the strike corps mobilizes in their wake. It can use the areas already captured by IBGs for jump off into battles deeper within enemy territory.

While Pakistan may be able to countenance shallow thrusts by IBGs along the front with equanimity, deeper thrusts that could potentially threaten its vital areas and communication networks may be pushing the nuclear threshold a bit.

In this case, in the semi-developed sector, there is arguably greater space for strike corps operations without flirting inordinately with the proverbial nuclear threshold as would be the case in developed terrain, say, opposite Lahore. Therefore, if in the current exercise the strike corps is advertised as rehearsing maneuvers that ‘will allow the Army formations to break through multiple obstacles within a restricted time frame’, then the army expects sufficient space for territorial gains and attrition of Pakistani reserves without the nuclear factor intervening.

Pakistan has in its testing of a tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems hinted at a lower nuclear threshold precisely to stay such operations by India’s strike corps in their tracks. India, for its part, appears to be exhibiting nonchalance by going about such exercises to indicate that it is not deterred. The two states are playing the ‘game of chicken’ which they are racing towards each other hoping the other would swerve. Through its exercises, India is depicting that it is getting into the car and visibly throwing away the wheel.

Unlike India’s 2004 conventional doctrine called ‘Cold Start’, the revised version of its doctrine of 2010 is not in the open domain. Therefore, it is not known if the 2010 version took into account the criticism that had greeted the 2004 version that deep operations may inordinately push Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. From the exercises just held it is not certain that the criticism has registered, especially if the second option discussed was the exercise scenario.

Had the doctrinal space in India been more transparent, it would have been easier to discern if its military is adequately cognizant of the nuclear reality now well into its second decade. The employment of India’s strike corps on maneuvers reminiscent of the pre-nuclear halcyon days of conventional operations in the eighties, as seen this year, does not lend confidence that India and its military are sufficiently sensitive to the onset of the nuclear age.

Exercise Brahmashira

This Year’s Maneuver Season In India

http://www.eurasiareview.com/11052015-this-years-maneuver-season-in-india-oped/

From separate media reports on ‘massive’ exercises in India’s western deserts, we learn that India’s premier ‘strike’ corps, two Corps (Kharga Corps), and a ‘pivot’ corps, 10 Corps (Chetak Corps), are being exercised. Interestingly, media reports that carry mention of the two Corps exercise, ‘Exercise Brahmashira’, make no mention of the other exercise, Exercise Akraman II of 10 Corps, and vice versa.

It would seem that the two are not interconnected. However, this is improbable since the exercises are taking place in the same geographic area, Suratgarh sector. Therefore, it can be plausibly be inferred that a pivot corps and a strike crops are exercising together. What are the implications?

Pivot corps are erstwhile ‘holding’ corps in a defensive role. India’s doctrine, now a decade old, converted these into ‘pivot’ corps, equipping each with an offensive element, termed ‘integrated battle group’. From the name of the pivot corps exercise, Akraman (attack) II, it is likely that the Chetak corps exercise is to practice its integrated battle groups (IBG).

Each of India’s three strike corps is orbited to one of the three geographic commands facing Pakistan. Kharga Corps, under Western Command, is reasonably understood to operate in the developed plains sector in Punjab which Western Command faces. However, strike corps, owing to their inherent mobility, are able to achieve surprise. Therefore, they can be launched across the entire front at any point. In this case, it appears that the Kharga Corps is being put through its paces in the semi-developed terrain opposite South Western Command.

In the doctrine, while the initial offensives are launched by division-sized IBGs of pivot corps and of strike corps formations located closer to the border, the remainder of the strike corps mobilizes in their wake. It can use the areas already captured by IBGs for jump off for battles within enemy territory.

Clearly, in light of possible Pakistani nuclear thresholds, one salient exit point from conflict for both sides is therefore prior to launch of strike corps. Pakistan may be able to countenance shallow thrusts by IBGs along the front with greater equanimity than deeper thrusts that could potentially threaten its vital areas and communication networks in greater depth by strike corps in deep battle.

In this case in the semi-developed sector there is arguably greater space for strike corps operations without flirting inordinately with the proverbial nuclear threshold as would be the case in developed terrain, say, opposite Lahore.

Therefore, if in the current exercise the strike corps is advertised as rehearsing maneuvers that ‘will allow the Army formations to break through multiple obstacles within a restricted time frame’, then the army expects sufficient space for territorial gains and attrition of Pakistani reserves without the nuclear factor intervening. Presumably, this is so in the desert sector further south too, where another strike corps, 21 Corps, is slated to operate under Southern Command.

Pakistan has in its testing of a tactical nuclear weapon hinted at a lower nuclear threshold precisely to stay such operations by India’s strike corps in their tracks. India, for its part, is exhibiting nonchalance by going about an exercise that takes the strike corps across multiple obstacle systems to indicate that it is not self-deterred from using its conventional advantage.

The two states are playing a ‘game of chicken’.

The questionable part is in the doctrine being practiced envisages strike corps operations in depth areas. This does not lend confidence to whether India’s 2004 ‘Cold Start’ doctrine that was revised in 2010 is sufficiently cognizant of the criticism that had greeted its release in 2004. The critique primarily had two points: one is the short time window for crisis response since IBGs were to be launched in short order, and second, that deep operations could trigger nuclear thresholds.

Unlike the 2004 doctrine, the 2010 revised version is not in the open domain. Last heard, a leak at the turn of the decade in late 2009 had it that the 2004 doctrine was under revision in the form of the ‘two front’ doctrine. That it has been thereafter adopted has not been made known in a press release as is the form in India. Can it be that the confidentiality owes to the military neglecting the critique in its revision of doctrine?

If this is the case with revision of the conventional doctrine, it is possible that such doctrinal reticence can also attend India’s nuclear doctrine. Nuclear doctrine revision had found controversial mention last year in the run up to elections. India’s reaching out under Mr. Modi to Japan had resulted in the revision being shelved. However, given the manner the new edition of the conventional doctrine has been kept internal to the military, a shift from declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 cannot be ruled out.

Currently, India envisages ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation to any form of nuclear first use by Pakistan. However, if its army formations are practicing maneuvers that could trigger tactical nuclear first use by Pakistan, it is possible that India is prepared with the more appropriate nuclear retaliatory response: proportional retaliation. Deterrence may be tending towards nuclear war-fighting, something India’s nuclear trajectory of delivery vehicles and nuclear ordnance enables.

Had the doctrinal space been less opaque, it would have been easier to substantiate this argument and raise a timely warning. India would do well to revert to doctrinal transparency in order that it benefit from the doctrinal debate that follows. In the nuclear age, how the state intends to defend the nation is a legitimate public query. A reading of the exercises underway does not inspire confidence India is sufficiently mindful of the nuclear overhang.