1965
War: Through today’s lens
http://www.idsa.in/jds/9_3_2015_The1965IndoPakWar.html
JOURNAL OF DEFENCE STUDIES
The 1965 Indo-Pak War: Through Today’s Lens
July 2015
Volume:
9
Issue:
3
(NOT THE FINAL VERSION - FOR FINAL VERSION SEE JDS LINK AT idsa.in)
Between the two India-Pakistan wars, the 1965
and the 1971 Wars, the latter, a resounding victory, is more talked about since
in contrast the 1965 War was widely seen as a draw. With the 1971 victory,
India was seen to have partially exorcised the defeat in the 1962 India-China War.
By then, the cadre of King’s Commission Indian Officers were replaced with
professional, trained-in-India generals. The war put paid with a degree of
finality to the ‘two nation’ theory. In the Simla Agreement that followed, Pakistan
tacitly accepted the futility of the military option for wresting Kashmir by
agreeing to bilateral talks for resolving outstanding disputes. India emerged
as a regional power. The war set the stage for both states going nuclear, with Pakistan
launching its nuclear weapons programme soon thereafter at Multan on 20 January
1972[1]
and India’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion taking place in 1974.
Understandably, the 1971 War model has had a relatively
higher influence on how India’s conventional doctrine shaped up. Mechanisation
of the army followed. The thrust was on how to employ the strike corps in
strategic pincers and gain decisive outcomes, albeit in a counter offensive
scenario. In one strategy option, Pakistan was to be cut into two at the
midriff at the Indus at Rahim Yar Khan, a re-enactment of the race to Dacca. Despite
some indications of the two states having acquired nuclear capabilities covertly
by end of the eighties, this line of thinking persisted for another decade. Even
overt nuclearisation in 1998 did not result in change of doctrine. The shock
administered by the Kargil War the following year revealed India’s conventional
options had been constricted by the advent of the nuclear factor. India
acknowledged as much at a conference on 1 January 2000 at the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses. Clearly, a full scale conventional war in the
1971 War model was passe.[2] As
result, its poor cousin, the 1965 War, attuned to Limited War,[3]
gained ground.
The doctrinal turn was only being crystallised
with the first corps exercise of the nuclear age, Exercise Purno Vijay of 1
Corps,[4] when
India was faced with a decision on conflict. Operation Parakram after the terror
attack on India’s Parliament in December 2001 revealed the switch over to a
1965 War model of Limited War had not been completed doctrinally. As a result
the military was unable to offer the political leadership the limited options giving
confidence to chance the military option. For instance, the second ‘peak’ of
the ‘twin peaks’ crisis of 2001-2 reportedly found all three of India’s strike
corps poised in the desert but with no plausible objectives worth running the new
nuclear dangers.[5]
Consequently, India settled for calling its largest ever military mobilisation
as an exercise in coercive diplomacy.
The soul searching[6] that
followed resulted in the doctrine colloquially called the Cold Start Doctrine
in October 2004.[7]
By 2008, while the doctrine was in place and so arguably was the training and
psychological reorientation to the offensive turn of the doctrine, the Mumbai 26/11
terror attack revealed gaps, particularly in terms of equipment.[8] Faced with constructive criticism on the release of its
doctrine in the open domain, the Army at one juncture even distanced itself
from ‘Cold Start Doctrine’.[9] Eventually,
while acknowledging that it had cut its readiness timings to but a few days,[10]
it released internally a revised doctrine in 2010.[11]
Since the revised version is confidential, unlike its predecessor, it is
unknown as to which of the two doctrinal models – the 1971 War model seeking
decisive outcomes or the 1965 War model with its Limited War bias – informs the
current doctrine.
A closer look at the 2004 avatar of doctrine however
suggests that the 1965 War model has had a more influence on thinking than is
obvious. A ready pointer is that the concept of large number of ‘wide front - shallow
depth’ offensives simultaneously propounded in Cold Start doctrine is
reminiscent of the race to the Ichhogil that occurred across the Punjab Front
straight from cantonments in early September 1965. Cold Start apparently gets
its name from formations racing for the border in a near repeat of 1965 War. Also,
shallow depth operations cognisant of prospective nuclear thresholds also hark
back to 1965 when India planned to threaten rather than capture vital
objectives for a viable peace to emerge at the end of the war. Then, with
Pakistan’s military taught a lesson, a negotiated peace was thought possible.
In the nuclear age military force can only have similar utility in at best
sensitising the enemy to abandon the military course in favour of the
political.
Decisive victory being potentially
unaffordable in the nuclear age, India, as the stronger power, must be wary of
a strategic temptation to prevail militarily. How to gain one’s political ends
militarily without tripping on the nuclear tripwire is a key doctrinal
question. Mining the 1965 War for nuggets of wisdom on this may be worthwhile. Towards
this end, this article concentrates largely at the political level. On this
count, the fiftieth anniversary of the war is timely.
Recapitulating
the war
The largely non-controversial official
history of the war, endorsed in early nineties, remains under wraps due to official
secrecy.[12]
Quite like its more famous counterpart, the Henderson Brooks Report on the 1962
conflict,[13]
it can be found on a non-governmental website.[14] To
begin at the beginning, in the popular narrative the Rann of Kutch episode of
spring 1965 is taken as a strategic diversion on Pakistan’s part in a wider
plan to wrest Kashmir. However, the official history has it that it arose from
local actions in which Pakistan deployed its Pattons.[15]
Feeling empowered from the ensuing patrol level actions, Pakistan’s Army was
goaded by the ‘megalomaniac politician(s)’,[16] Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, into attempting to wrest Kashmir militarily.[17]
The timing was just right. India was in the
midst of arming itself after its 1962 debacle, having started off on the first
defence five year plan just the year before, intending to create a million-man
army by its end.[18]
It had also announced an intention to integrate Kashmir into its constitutional
framework by normalising its special relationship.[19]
Therefore, Pakistan, espied a closing window of opportunity, both militarily
and politically.
Since it’s joining the Western Bloc in 1954, Pakistan
had received $650 million in military grants, $619 million in defence support
assistance, and $55 million in other assistance[20]
The aid modernised Pakistani defence capability, catering for its training, firepower,
mobility and improving command, control and communication facilities. Nevertheless,
the cultural changes necessary to use the technologically superior weaponry,
such as Patton tanks, did not keep pace. Archaic notions of martial superiority
continued. Geopolitically, the warming up with China since that country’s 1962
attack on India buttressed by the ceding of Shaksgam Valley in 1963, presented
India with a two-front problem that Pakistan could exploit.
At the turn of 1963-64, Kashmir had witnessed
unrest over the missing holy relic, the Moe-e-Muqaddas.[21] Unrest
following Sheikh Abdullah’s third incarceration in May 1965 (following his
trips to jail in 1953 and 1958) led Pakistan to believe that the time was ripe
for stepping up its violations along the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K). Violations between January and May numbered 1347.[22] There
was a flare-up in Kargil in May 1965 in which India was forced to capture locations
occupied at the retreat of winter by Pakistani troops and also some across the
CFL.[23] India
withdrew from across the CFL prior to the War at the behest of the UN on the
promise of the UN Observer Group keeping a more watchful eye. This muscle
flexing was to divert Indian attention and stretch India militarily since there
was a limitation in the number of troops India could maintain in J&K as per
the CFL deal under UN oversight.
Ayub Khan launched Operation Gibraltar in
early August, based on the flawed advice of Bhutto that India would not react
militarily across the International Border (IB). Pakistan’s infiltration comprised
eight to ten forces of Pakistani regular officers and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(POK) units.[24]
On 5 August, Gujjar shepherd Din Mohammad, espying the columns, alerted the
army.[25]
India’s counter-infiltration moves involved creation of a ‘Sri Force’ for the
hinterland enabling XV Corps to exclusively concentrate on proactively
interdicting the launch pads by offensives in the Haji Pir Bulge and in the Kishenganga
Valley.
India captured Haji Pir Pass on 25 August 1965
and attempted to link up from Poonch side to wrap up the Haji Pir bulge. This
prompted Pakistan to snap off the Rajouri-Poonch sector by launching its
Operation Grand Slam into Akhnoor on 1 October. Often an expansive aim is
attributed to Grand Slam, to threaten India’s lifeline to Srinagar via Jammu.
This would have only been the case had Pakistan got as deep as Akhnoor in first
place.[26]
Doing so would have triggered a wider Indian response, one that a more modest
operation may have escaped. While Pakistan wanted Kashmir it was not at the
cost of a wider war. Therefore, a more modest aim for the operation can be
reckoned, which was to influence the adverse situation developing for it on the
Poonch-Uri front in order to keep its infiltration going. At best it could have
had been an ‘aim plus’ of Pakistan’s 1 Corps in case India had chosen to
restrict the fighting to J&K.
In the event, the Indian Air Force (IAF) joined
the fray in the late evening to check the attack on Chhamb, albeit at some cost
to itself and friendly forces.[27] The
Defence Minister simultaneously approved army preparations for opening up the
Punjab front, as per a plan approved on 9 August.[28]
Later that evening, the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet that is precursor to
today’s Cabinet Committee on Security, approved his initiatives.[29]
On 6 September, the Indian attack was
launched across the IB. This considerably eased the situation in Chhamb-Akhoor
sector, as inter-alia it was intended to, although the situation there had stabilised.
An inexplicable pause on the Pakistani side in which General Yahya Khan took over
command of the operation mid-way had resulted in it fizzling out.[30] Yahya
Khan later rationalised this as a deliberate so as not to provoke and to
de-escalate.[31]
But it was too late for Pakistan.
‘All Out’ war had begun.[32] As
the defence minister put it, Operation Riddle was to teach Field Marshal Ayub
Khan ‘a good lesson’. The war objectives were:
(1) To defend against
Pakistan’s attempts to grab Kashmir by force and to make it abundantly clear
that Pakistan would never be allowed to wrest Kashmir from India; (2) To
destroy the offensive power of Pakistani armed forces; (and) (3) To occupy only
the minimum Pakistani territory to achieve these purposes which would be
vacated after the satisfactory conclusion of the war.[33]
Limited offensives were envisaged along the Punjab
front into Lahore sector and from the Samba-Jammu line into Sialkot sector, while
some diversionary actions were mounted in the desert sector. Indian forces were
well prepared, having trained during Operation Ablaze, the alert status during
the Kutch episode. They had returned to barracks only in July 1965 after the
ceasefire in Kutch on 1 July.
On 6 September, the three divisions of XI
Corps kicked off across its frontage in the Lahore sector. The offensive
commenced with troops moving directly from cantonments into action without
staging in concentration areas.[34]
The kickoff by 15 Infantry Division caught Pakistan by surprise, and in its very
success, the division also surprised itself. The 3rd Battalion of
the Jat Regiment (3 JAT) went across the Ichhogil Canal; but unsupported and
under air attack, it was ordered back.[35] Further
North, the bridge captured across the Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak sector was lost to
Pakistani troops equally quick to react. To the south, 7 Infantry Division
engaged in a series of tactical battles of attrition to gain the eastern bank
of the canal. Further southwards, 4 Infantry Division lost its initial gains in
a surprise strike by Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division into Khem Karan. The battle
that ensued caused some consternation in upper echelons of the chain of
command, resulting in controversy over whether the Army Chief ordered his
Western Army Commander to fall back to the Beas in face of the attack.[36]
In the event, at the fortuitously named village, Asal Uttar, 4 Infantry
Division beat back the disorganised Pakistani attack regaining its reputation
from World War II that had suffered from its performance in the 1962 War.
On receiving the ‘go ahead’, India’s 1
Armoured Division moved Northwards from its interim area near Jullundur (now
Jalandhar) to position itself for attack into Sialkot salient as part of 1
Corps. Delayed readiness of 1 Corps led to its attack getting delayed by two
days after the offensive had started further south. 1 Corps freshly formed only
in May, made gains till Phillaura, but a ‘slogging match’ ensued thereafter at Chawinda.
The battles further south of Sutlej, though under logistic constraints forced
by the desert terrain in Barmer and at Gadra Road, did result in some
territorial gains. The Air Force put up a credible showing, despite Pakistan
having a technological edge; while the Navy’s hands were tied down by the defence
minister wanting to limit the scope of the war.[37]
Likewise, the eastern front against East Pakistan was kept dormant, lest action
there provoke the Chinese into following through with their threats made in the
course of the war.
In today’s
light
An assessment of the Indian showing requires examining
the achievement of Indian aims against their achievement and contrasting these
with Pakistan’s. The return to status quo brought about by the peace treaty at
Tashkent in January 1966 implied that the Pakistani war aim of wresting Kashmir
failed. However, Pakistan did manage to put it back on the agenda of the
international community. Militarily, as part of the war in Kashmir, Pakistan
was not able to execute its offensive for the capture of Akhnoor. Nor could it
pull off its outflanking move to defeat Indian forces west of River Beas at
Khem Karan. Nevertheless, it held on in the battles of attrition, though with
proportionately higher losses in tanks and territory. Its technologically
superior aircraft took their toll. Clearly, the window that had opened up with
the Chinese attack in 1962 had slammed shut too soon for Pakistan. But,
Pakistan could take home the sentiment that it had put paid to any notion in
India that Pakistan could be undone. This was never an Indian aim, but its own
apprehension that it could now dispel.
India for its part achieved what it set out
to do, but only partially. It caused attrition on Pakistani military and
captured territory, both intended to bring home to the Pakistanis that Kashmir
was beyond military reach. Returning territory captured even along the CFL was
to prove India’s bona-fides and incentivise Pakistani reconciliation with the
status quo. But if military operations taught
Pakistan a ‘good lesson’, in YB Chavan’s diary entry is an open question:
To begin with we are not a
war minded nation; and I think I am proud for it. Yet there comes a moment in a
nation’s life when it has to stand up against a bully and teach him a good
lesson. That is what we are out to do. We are not thinking in terms of a fight
between a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation. We want a peaceful neighbour. And a
neighbour who thinks he can get away with all his aggressive activities easily
will never be peaceful. He needs to be told effectively in action that this
will not do.[38]
The expansion of the war to the rest of the western
front, while useful for forestalling any potentially adverse situation in
J&K, was instead to serve the political purpose of telling Pakistan that
aggression just ‘will not do’. It demonstrated that since Kashmir was an
integral part of India, India would, unlike in 1947, defend it in any manner it
chose. Even so, in administering this lesson, India took care to keep the war
limited. The defensive aims of the war were an outflow of the development-centric
grand strategy.
The war’s onset was graduated. Hardly had the
Kutch episode been settled, the center of gravity shifted to J&K.
Infiltration by Pakistan led to India snapping off the infiltration routes
across the CFL, in turn prompting Pakistan to put pressure on India’s supply
lines in J&K. This led to India in a planned move expanding the war from
J&K for the first time to include the rest of the international border (IB)
sector. While there was a degree of planned escalation on both sides,
escalation could conceivably also have resulted from other causes. For
instance, had India got across Ichhogil in strength or Pakistan broken through
from Khem Karan, both states would have respectively posed grave dilemmas for
the other. The Chaudhuri-Harbaksh Singh exchange on whether to withdraw to the
Beas line suggests that this is not an imaginary scenario. This puts a premium
on the role of the political leadership in escalation management by keeping
sight of war aims.
In the event, Prime Minister Shastri accepted
the ceasefire in accordance with military advice. He had stalled for time in
mid-September when UN Secretary General U Thant had paid a visit to the region
to get a ceasefire organized.[39]
This was to give the military more time to achieve the objectives delivering political
aims. Post-war it has been reckoned that had India fought on for longer,
Pakistan that was at the end of its tether, particularly in terms of artillery
ammunition, would have folded up. The story goes that, instead, Gen Chaudhuri
advised acceptance of the ceasefire prematurely under the mistaken belief that
India was on the verge of exhausting its own artillery ammunition.[40] However,
the manner India was slogging on in all sectors indicates that attrition would
have been all it could have achieved and at some cost to itself.
Besides, India, with good reason, did not
have rubbing Pakistan’s nose into the dust as a political aim. Firstly, India
lacked the military capability; secondly, it could have prompted uncertain
Chinese action; and lastly, Pakistan was not exactly friendless politically.
Therefore, sensing when to stop is a vital political level responsibility that the
Prime Minister Shastri discharged with moral courage. In the event, the
statesmanship exacted a great personal cost: his life under the pressure of
compromise.
Military action at best sets the stage for
political resolution from a position of advantage. It cannot serve as a
substitute for political agreements politically arrived at. By this yardstick,
the Tashkent Agreement of 10 January 1966 was politically sensible in that it
preserved the status quo in Kashmir in India’s favour, even if it could not
resolve the issue. The return to status quo ante was an investment in Pakistani
good sense, incentivising it to reconcile to the status quo in Kashmir. That
the status quo in Kashmir held for about two decades indicates that Shastri
delivered credibly at Tashkent. There is no guarantee that the converse - a
decisive Pakistani defeat - would have led it to abandon its claims. In fact,
even inflicting the 1971 War defeat on Pakistan was not able to achieve that. It
can be plausibly argued that on the contrary, the defeat in 1971 increased
Pakistani desire to avenge itself in Kashmir.
What has been missing and continues
sub-optimally is inter-services coordination. While the highpoint of the 1965
interaction was in Arjan Singh conferring with Chaudhuri on air support in the
Chhamb sector,[41]
the low water mark was in the Navy facing embarrassment at Dwarka.[42] At
Kargil, the story was different when General Malik asked Air Chief Tipnis for
air support.[43]
Recent reports of the government contemplating appointing a military chief,
even if fifty years late, are nevertheless heartening.[44]
Echoes
from across a half century
Fifty years on, India and Pakistan remain at
odds over J&K. In Pakistan, the military’s control of strategic affairs
continues and India’s two-front problem remains. While the US is no longer
behind Pakistan as then, Pakistan has compensated by leaning on China. Pakistan
has gained an ability to wage proxy war that it lacked in both 1947 and 1965.
Kashmiris were not enticed earlier, but by the nineties they allowed their
militancy to be hijacked by Pakistani proxies. India for its part has acquired
both the tools and the will to counter the proxy war, both at the
subconventional[45]
and conventional levels. Finally, India is on the ascendant while Pakistan is
perpetually on the cusp of being a failed state. However, decidedly the
greatest game changer has been the acquisition of the great equalizer - nuclear
weapons - by both states. The last cannot but condition all strategic analysis
hereon.
A major implication of nuclearisation is how
potential conflict triggers should be viewed. That the two states have accepted
the need to work out mutually and peaceably a solution to outstanding issues is
explicated in the Simla (now Shimla) Agreement. The understanding was that that
Bhutto would tame the Pakistan military and convert the LC into the border.[46]
That this was not borne out by subsequent events suggests that waiting for a
turn in civil-military relations in Pakistan is to wait indefinitely. For the
interim, India is left with two strategies.
The first, tried out partially by India,
involves the negotiation process. Both the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) governments in their respective first innings
took this up seriously. Pakistan proved largely responsive, best evidenced by
the NDA initiative of interfacing with Musharraf being taken just short of its logical
conclusion by the UPA government.[47]
Thereafter, Pakistan’s pointing a gun either at India, as at Mumbai 26/11 or at
its own head, has not helped matters.
This has left India with the second strategy
option, currently at play. This is one of strategic dexterity involving diplomacy,
intelligence and military instruments. India is upping the military ante by increasing
military asymmetry with Pakistan. Economic and political opening up are
incentives held in reserve in case Pakistan does get the message. However,
while this can sustain a favourable status quo; the moot question is can it do
so indefinitely till civil-military relations reform in Pakistan?
As seen in the 1965 War, war clouds can
advance as inexorably as the monsoons. Escalation can also occur within war:
note the connections between India’s counter infiltration operations leading to
Pakistani attack in Chhamb and in turn leading to India releasing the pressure
on J&K by opening up the Punjab front. The escalation in war aims from
gaining territory in East Pakistan to racing for Dacca in the 1971 War further
indicates that escalation is intrinsic to war.
The current common place escalation scenario
is in a terror incident sparking Indian conventional reaction, leading up to
Pakistani firing off a tactical nuclear missile in fear or panic. Central to the
critique of Cold Start is such potential escalation in light of uncertain
nuclear thresholds. Generating asymmetries in quick time may unsettle a nuclear
armed enemy enough to have him contemplate a nuclear bail out under conditions
of perceived existential danger clouding such judgment. On this count, exploiting
operational success with a manoeuvrist approach – as the offensive turn to
Indian military doctrine dictates - may be useful for pedagogic reasons on a
sand model but not so in a nuclear environment. On the contrary, an
attritionist approach as seen in the 1965 War is slower paced and deliberate.
This enables saliencies built in for exit strategies and conflict termination
to kick in and gives diplomats time to do their thing. The attritionist
approach lends itself to both the limited war under a nuclear overhang. A
Monty-like general trumps a Rommel in a nuclear battlefield. Strategic
rationality suggests options of limited offensives not involving full-throated
mobilisation and also possibly limited nuclear retaliatory options.
At the political level, statesmanship is in
the ability to gauge advancing war clouds and as necessary disperse or seed
them in light of grand strategy. In case of conflict, escalation avoidance in
first place and escalation control and de-escalation in second, require
continuing political sensitivity to grand strategy for a firm hold over the
strategic and military levels of war.
1965 War provides right precedence in the
role Shastri played as war leader. It can be argued that this is part of an
unacknowledged Indian tradition. In end 1948, Nehru stopped at the
ethno-linguistic frontier in order to enable Pakistan to reconcile itself to a
piece of the cake. In 1971 Indira Gandhi provided firm leadership, even
countenancing escalation in the east while forgoing it in the west. At Kargil,
Vajpayee laid down that the LC will not be crossed. With the national security institutions
India now has in place – with the strong Prime Minister’s Office dating to
Shastri’s time in office - this facet of Indian approach to war – simultaneous
restraint and resolve - has strengthened.
Retrospective criticism has it that in all
cases, India was not able to win the peace decisively. This does not
necessarily imply infirmity in war aims or perceived shortfalls in their
achievement as goes the corollary in such analyses. How to win the peace
perhaps requires both greater theoretical attention and grand strategic application.
The strategic level aims to deliver favourable
war termination conditions from a position of advantage. War termination cannot
always wait till a situation of advantage is reached, since the closer the
military gets to this stage, nuclear dangers multiply. Consequently, the
political level must be able to sense when to de-escalate and signal
willingness for conflict termination. It must have the moral courage and
political capital to impose its will on its strategic instruments even if at a
political cost. Here again there is precedence, for instance, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh reportedly contemplating and stepping away from a military
counter to 26/11. This contradicts the interpretation of political will as solely
the willingness to use military force. Instead, for a nuclear power, withholding
from using military power must be considered as an equally pertinent exercise
of political will. The difference of the nuclear age is that it is not the
amount of pain inflicted on the enemy and sustained by one’s own society that
counts but also the amount of pain and damage avoided.[48]
Conclusion
Vijay Diwas commemorates the victory in 1971.
In the nuclear era, ‘victory’ is debatable as a political aim in war and it may
not be militarily feasible either since nobody ‘wins’ a war gone nuclear.
Therefore, settling for a ‘draw’, as in 1965, may well be the saner choice. It
allows face-saving for both sides and helps set the stage for the inevitable
‘give and take’ of peace talks. India has shown strategic rationality in all
its wars. Pakistan has proven a strategic actor too. Take 1965. It did not
press home its attack in the Jammu sector. In 1971, Yahya Khan called off
troops poised for counter offensive.[49]
At Kargil, it chose a relatively insignificant stretch along the LC for its
probes. Since it requires two to keep a war limited, Pakistan can prove a
responsive partner at war avoidance and limitation, simply because owing to
force asymmetry it stands to lose more both in absolute and relative terms. The
medium of doctrinal exchanges envisaged in the Lahore Memorandum of
Understanding is an available start point. This cannot await resumption of negotiation
processes.[50]
Even so, all the four wars so far, with the
last one fought early in the nuclear age, have shown that neither state has
achieved its political aims. Pakistan has not been able to wrest Kashmir nor
has India been able to convince it to do so. The nuclear factor makes redundant
resort to a full spectrum war as an option for either aim. Negotiations being the
only route eventually, it is only a question of when: at the end of a
potentially nuclear war or in pre-empting it well prior? Precedence in the form
of Tashkent exists of India’s readiness for accommodation on the negotiation
table. It should not take a war to get Pakistan to the table.
[1] International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS), Nuclear
Blackmarkets: A Net Assessment, London: IISS, 2007, p. 15.
[4] Baweja, Harinder, ‘Readying for nukes’, India Today, 28 May 2001, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/for-the-first-time-after-india-became-a-nuclear-power-army-stages-a-nuclear-war-game/1/233562.html,
accessed on 7 May 2015.
[5]Ladwig, W., ‘A Cold Start
for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine’ International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter, 2007/2008), pp.
158-190, pp. 164-66.
[7] Army Training Command
(ARTRAC), Indian Army Doctrine,
Shimla: ARTRAC, 2004, available at ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/indianarmydoctrine_1.doc, accessed on 23 February 2015.
[8] Joshi, M., ‘Was the Indian
Army ready for war?’ Mail Today, 17 January 2009, available at http://mjoshi.blogspot.com/2009/01/was-indian-army-ready-for-war.html, accessed on 15 February
2015.
[10]Pubby, M., ‘No Cold Start
doctrine, India tells US’, Indian Express,
9 September 2010, available at http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/no--cold-start--doctrine-india-tells-us/679273/, accessed on 10 January
2015.
[12] Shukla, A., ‘The day
nothing happened’, Business Standard,
1 September 2014, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-the-day-nothing-happened-114090101482_1.html, accessed on 20 February
2015.
[13] Chakravarty, B.C., History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965,
Government of India: Ministry of Defence, Available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/, accessed on 20 February
2015.
[14] Sinha, P.B. and A. Athale,
History of the Conflict with China, 1962,
Available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/History/1965War/PDF/, accessed on 1 February
2015. The Henderson Brooks Report is at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/TopSecretdocuments2.pdf, accessed on 15 February
2015.
[16] Pakistan Army, ‘War
History’, available at https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=47&rnd=443, accessed on 2 February
2015.
[18] Pradhan, R.D., Debacle
to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65, New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, p. 239.
[19] Pradhan, R.D., 1965 War: The Inside Story, New Delhi:
Atlantic, p. xvii.
[20] Pakistan Army, ‘A journey
from scratch to nuclear power’, available at https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=18&rnd=157, accessed on 14 January
2015.
[21] Curiously the official
history dates this episode to 27 December 1964 to 4 January 1965 (History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, pp.
45-46).
[24] Ibid. pp. 63-64.
[25] A similar story repeated
itself at the onset of the Kargil War in which local shepherds in Kargil
spotted Pakistani intrusions on 3 May 1999. Likewise, for counter insurgency
operations in the Valley, India sent in the Rashtriya Rifles HQs from Delhi to
Srinagar in 1999, so that the LC formations could concentrate on counter
infiltration and conventional operations.
[32] The chapter on the
operations of XI Corps in the Lahore sector is titled ‘All Out War’ in History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965, p.
140.
[33]Debacle to Revival, p. 262. This constituted the ‘higher
direction of war’ and a laying down of war aims. This was an advance from what
occurred in 1962 and indeed according to General Padhmanabhan yet again in
1999.
[35]Hayde, D., The Battle of Dograi, New Delhi: Vanity
Books, 1984, pp. 49-52.
[36]1965
War: The Inside Story, p.
59;Debacle to Revival, pp.
286-7; and History of the Indo-Pak War,
1965, p. 178. The official history talks of ‘top brass’ and RD Pradhan
refers to the originator of the idea of withdrawal as ‘Top’ in a disguised
reference to General Chaudhuri. Among the defenders of Chaudhuri in this
controversy is Lt Gen Harwant Singh, ‘1965 War: General Chaudhuri did not order
withdrawal behind River Beas’, Indian
Defence Review, 2 May 2004, available at
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/1965-general-Chaudhuri-did-not-order-withdrawal-of-western-army-behind-river-beas/ accessed on 14 February
2015.
[42]In its version of the war, Transition to Triumph (available at http://indiannavy.nic.in/book/1965-indo-pakistan-war, accessed on 2 February
2015), the Navy informs: ‘In a letter to the Times of India on 29 November
1978, Admiral Soman stated that the Ministry of Defence directed Naval
Headquarters in writing that the Navy was not to operate in a threatening or
offensive manner north of the latitude of Porbandar and that nowhere on the
high seas was the Navy to initiate any offensive action against Pakistan unless
forced to do so by their action.’
[43] Press Trust of India
(PTI), ‘Army was reluctant to tell govt about Kargil: Tipnis’, Times of India, 7 October 2006,
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-was-reluctant-to-tell-govt-about-Kargil-Tipnis/articleshow/2116089.cms, accessed on 1 January
2015.
[44]IANS, ‘India to have a
chief of defence staff: Minister’, Business Standard, 16 February 2015,
available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-to-have-chief-of-defence-staff-minister-115021601868_1.html, accessed on 20 February
2015.
[47]Subramanian, N., ‘India, Pakistan had a solution for Kashmir in
2007: Kasuri’, The Hindu, 21 January
2015, available at
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-had-a-solution-for-kashmir-in-2001-kasuri/article6805890.ece, accessed on 12 February
2015.
[49]Musharraf, P., In the Line of Fire, New York, Simon and
Shuster, 2006, pp. 54-55.
[50]The MOU states: ‘shall take
immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of
nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating
measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed
at prevention of conflict.’ Available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/ip_lahore19990221.pdf, accessed on 1 January
2015.
