The Indian Army: Borders and other such
lines
By Ali Ahmed, Ph.D
Journal of Peace Studies, Vol 20, Issue 3&4, July-December 2013
Introduction
A legacy of colonial rule has been the undefined state of India’s
borders. That borders remain unsettled along a significant portion of their
length until today can no longer be attributed to the colonial power. The
Indian state has also not remedied the untidy state of its borders in the
period since Independence.
While the state has exerted to ensure defence of its borders, not arriving at a
settlement with its neighbours ensures protraction of state insecurity by
intractable conflict. Extensive military presence on the border, variously
called Line of Control (LC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC) etc, appears
inevitable.
Consequences for the military and the army in particular have been
considerable, not all of them beneficial. The army is forced to remain a ‘mass’
army. Therefore, despite its effort towards modernisation as a ‘lean and mean’
force, it remains an army characterised by numbers and a corresponding
attrition orientation in its military culture. Fallout on higher planes exists as
well ranging from the strategic to the sociological. For the state, the
security-development balance gets unwarrantedly skewed in favour of security.
Unsettled borders lead to the second preoccupation of the army, counter
insurgency. This creates civil-military tensions where none need exist.
This paper explores the affects of the unsettled nature of India’s borders on India’s army. The aim is to bring
out that the army’s concentration on its primary task of defending territory
has had deleterious consequences for both, the army and at one remove for
national security. There is therefore a need not only for a meaningful foreign
policy thrust to resolve borders with ‘give and take’ informing such an
exercise, but in the interim to also rethink the border guarding role, central
to the military’s doctrinal thinking. The paper arrives at this conclusion by first
taking a discursive look at the manner the army has responded in fulfilling its
primary role over the years. It then looks at the specific practices the army
employs to defend territory. Thereafter it examines the implications in terms
of strategic doctrine and sociology of the military. Lastly, it suggests that
the otherwise less visible issues revealed by the paper warrant a pragmatic
rethink on India’s
border problem.
‘No inch of
territory’
The Indian army scrambled to make Kashmir’s
borders its own on 27 October 1947. From the airfield at Palam it airlifted 1
Sikh to bring succor to Srinagar
under threat from raiders. Over the remainder of the year, the army valiantly
swept back the kabailis, but not to
their start point at Muzaffarabad. The frontlines in J&K ranging from
Poonch to Ladhak firmed in over the following year. The ceasefire on 1 January
1949 resulted in a line agreed to at Karachi
in July. That war in ‘slow motion’ has been of long term and deep significance.
The ceasefire line was along an ethno-political frontier at which Nehru called
off operations, between the Kashmiri and Punjabi ethnic groups and at the outer
limit of Sheikh Abdullah’s political sway. This enabled territorial depth to Pakistan’s heartland Punjab,
since it allowed that state to retain the territory that had not been retrieved
by Indian army. The Kashmir problem remaining
beyond the war ensured that the line was not converted into a border. As a
result the army has had to defend it along its length of over 700 km. Since Kashmir was disputed territory the threat of it changing
hands needed warding off by an omni-present and ever-alert military. This
implied holding ‘every inch’ of land. This came to define the army’s structure
and culture subsequently.
Borders came to fore equally dramatically in the manner the
Chinese overran Indian positions deployed precariously as part of a ‘forward
policy’. Ironically, defence meant to deter such attack perhaps provoked it,
particularly because terrain, equipment and deployment conditions did not
convey the message of deterrence. The defensive nature of India’s reaction
can be discerned from the description in Ministry of Defence (MoD) Annual Report for the year:
‘Our frontier in NEFA…was subjected to a
fresh aggression by the Chinese on 8th September of 1962, when they
intruded into our territory in the Tsedong area in the Kameng Frontier
Division. Subsequently, on the morning of 20th October the Chinese
launched a sudden and massive attack with overwhelming superiority…and forced
our troops to withdraw from the Tsedong area to Lumpu, from there to Tawang,
and further to the rear…After a lull of a few days, the Chinese after
regrouping and further preparations, mounted another offensive in November
1962. Our troops had to give up positions in Jang, Se La, and Bomdi La under
considerable pressure….At midnight on 21/22 November, the Chinese announced
ceasefire and withdrawal proposals. While we were not party to these proposals,
we did not do anything to disturb the ceasefire (MoD 1962-63: 1).’
The lesson learnt by India
was on non-provocative defence on the China front as long as its
preparedness lagged behind. For its army the set back only deepened a ‘never
again’ commitment to its primary role. Ware withal not being available for
intimate defence of territory and, happily, the necessity having receded in the
Chinese reverting to status quo, India managed the border by raising
ten mountain divisions. Even if manageable in the geopolitical circumstance of
the times, the China
border was never far from strategic considerations. Manekshaw’s input on the
timing of the operation in East Pakistan was
determined in part by his consideration of the passes being closed in winter
making winter an ideal time for military adventurism. Less visible, though
non-trivial, have been the sociological implications. This expansion of the
army, in particular its officer corps by emergency commissioned officers, led
speedily to an ‘Indianisation’, or a permanent eclipse of the inheritance of
the Raj in the army. Clearly, what happens on the border can seldom confined to
that locale.
The next war India
fought, the 1965 War, had borders more directly at its center. Pakistan tested India’s
military renaissance underway after the Chinese debacle at the Rann of Kutch early in the year. A marginal area, it was
a skirmish soon forgotten by consigning the border delimitation to arbitration.
But, ominously, the military tryst served as prelude to the second invasion in Kashmir by irregulars. These came across in August in eight
infiltrating columns to stir an imagined uprising in the Valley. India’s
response was to plug the infiltration by capturing the Haji Pir pass across the
ceasefire line. Pakistan, deluding
itself into a belief that the ceasefire line and the international border were
disconnected, launched an armed attack in Jammu
sector to sever Kashmir’s lifeline from India. India
by speedy reaction across the international border in the Punjab
sector dispelled this notion. With the army unable to exploit success of its
lead elements in taking Batapore across the Ichhogil Canal,
the war ground on for three weeks. The two states continued skirmishing for
tactical advantage after ceasefire till they agreed to at Tashkent to respect the status quo. This
resulted in India
vacating Haji Pir, an act, rankling the military till this date, perhaps casts
a shadow over its attitude to pulling off the Saltoro ridgeline at Siachen
today. The war served to shift the focus away from the mountains to the plains,
but with a carry over of the territorial and defensive mindset forged there
southwards. The initial effect was in terms of development of defences based on
water obstacles along the Indus Water Treaty based canal networks.
Even as these defenses were stabilising, Indian army executed the
epitome of maneuver warfare in helping liberate Bangladesh in 1971. Though an
attritionist mindset dominated the planning stage in which it was originally
envisaged to nibble at some territory to plant the Bangladeshi flag, Lt Gen
Jacob recalls inserting the provisions into the plan and preparations that
eventuated in the brilliant victory. On the western front, borders and lines
held supreme in a repeat of the draw of 1965. At war’s end, the ceasefire line
was so adjusted that the gains made across it, such as at Kargil, were
legitimised at the Simla conference in the upgrading of the ceasefire line as
the LC. With the war having enabled creation of an additional strike corps, II
Corps for operations on the eastern front, thinking on supplementing the
defensive strategy with operational punch emerged over the remainder of the
decade. This culminated in Rao-Sundarji initiative on mechanisation of the
Indian army over the following decade.
Through the eighties, defence budgets reflected India’s
regional power aspirations. These crossed three percent of the gross domestic
product for the only time. Though intended to provide security, they were more
indicative of India’s
sense of insecurity. Even though India recast its security ambit to
include maritime frontiers, borders did not recede from the consciousness. The
preceding mechanization resulted in the manner of their defence changing partially.
The central feature was still ‘denial’, i.e. ensuring that the enemy did not
‘gain an inch of territory’. The aspect of ‘punishment’ was built in by the
reequipped strike corps and reorganized plains infantry divisions (RAPID). The
opening narratives of the ‘whites’ of military exercise usually read: ‘Nark
Desh, having fostered proxy war in Swarg Desh, launched an attacked to gain the
disputed territory. Swarg Desh having fought off the attack by Nark forces launched
its strike corps in riposte/counter offensive….’ This brings out the emerging
reality of the period, proxy war, and India’s response. No sooner had India exercised
its offensive formations in a compellence mode in Exercise Brasstacks, the
situation turned into one of crisis, Operation Trident. The crisis heralded
nuclearisation of the subcontinent, precursor of which was the 1974 ‘peaceful’
nuclear test. Initially covert, nuclearisation nevertheless made crossing of
the border (and LC) acquire significance as a first step up a notional
escalatory ladder or, to some, down a ‘slippery slope’. Dangers have only heightened
with overt nuclearisation a decade later and succeeding vertical proliferation.
With nuclearisation as the silent aspect of the era, it was low
tech proxy war instead that was the more salient feature of the nineties. Proxy
war was intended by Pakistan
to force a rethink on the territorial status quo represented by LC with the
prize, Kashmir valley, on its ‘wrong’ side.
Thus, ensuring the sanctity of the LC became even more necessary for the army.
The length of the LC became an important counter infiltration battlefield, as
fierce as the counter insurgency in the hinterland. In Punjab,
the army deployed along the border in Operation Alert, to supplement the
paramilitary with a border-guarding role, the Border Security Force (BSF). A
border fence that was progressively electrified and lit-up was erected to
stanch the flow of terrorists from across the elephant grass covered terrain.
The difference of the LC from the IB was as stark as deadly. Beginning in
sporadic firefights, the war across the LC reached considerable levels of
violence. One version of the causes of the Kargil War has it that the incursion
was but an expansion and intensification of what was on along the LC elsewhere
and in Kargil. The opportunity at Kargil was used dexterously by India
to cover the LC with a sanctity reserved for the IB.
Recurrence of crises on the Pakistan
front led India
to wisely place the eastern front on a back-burner. Beginning with Rajiv
Gandhi’s visit in 1988, the China
border witnessed confidence building measures (CBMs) as part of a dialogue
process through the early nineties. India somewhat reassured itself on
its deterrence posture in the east by staring down the Chinese at the Nathu La
incident of 1967. The model was used two decades later to impel India’s
energetic reaction to Chinese provocation at the Wangdung (Sumdorong Chu)
crisis further east in Arunachal Pradesh. The defensive posture was based on
keeping the area underdeveloped. The gains a hypothetical Chinese attack could
make would be slower, giving enough time to India to place troops in depth. Air
force modernization over the eighties would help to offensively interdict the
attackers as also transport reinforcements closer to areas of ingress. India
lacked the capability to retrieve lost ground as also take the fight to the
enemy. Bridging this gap along with a change in the attitude to infrastructure
along the LAC awaited change in India’s
economic fortunes over the turn of the century.
Proxy war, taken as evidence of a waning conventional deterrence,
led India
to upgrade its conventional power. The Infantry sucked into proxy war was
substituted by the Rashtriya Rifles. A third strike corps was created by
converting headquarters of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) on its return
from duty trans-Palk straits. It is popularly held that the three strike corps
failed to impress since Pakistan
ratcheted up its proxy war. However, it can equally plausibly be suggested that
it was perhaps mechanization, and the earlier demonstration of in 1971 of what
that capability meant, that led to Pakistan’s deepening of proxy war.
Keeping India tied down made
strategic sense to a military dominated Pakistan. India for its part kept a military lid on proxy
war, while Pakistan
took care to keep it simmering below that lid though there were episodes of
provocation beyond the proverbial threshold of Indian tolerance.
Pakistan’s continuing provocations prompted an
offensive military mindset. Evidence is in the ‘activation’ of the LC. The doctrinal
shift reflecting this can be dated to the first doctrinal document of the army,
put out in 1998. It declared with asperity that the army intends to fight the
next war on enemy territory. This was largely a bottom-up expression of the
thinking then in Army Training Command (ARTRAC), by then just out of infancy. This
proto-doctrine presaged the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, itself a response to the
successive crises with Pakistan
of the period.
India had acquired a higher profile after its
nuclear tests with the US
engaging it more seriously as a dialogue partner. The nationalist government
was also ideologically predisposed to take India to its ‘rightful’ place. Economically,
there was a break out from the low of the nineties. 9/11 and the associated
terror spike in India best represented by the terror attack on parliament, led
to an exercise in coercive diplomacy in a massive deployment of troops in
Operation Parakram. The offensive message to Pakistan was taken beyond the
redeployment back to barracks in October 2002 by getting grafted into the
freshly minted military doctrine two years later.
The new doctrine was predicated on a quick response to terror
provocation to ensure that terror remained manageable. This required creation
of requisite capacities. While strike corps existed, these had to be made
quicker off the blocks. Since in any case this would take time given the
intervening distance to the border from their bases in British era cantonments,
‘pivot’ corps were to be entrusted with taking the battle to the enemy in real
time. This responsibility entrusted to the defending corps led to the change of
nomenclature from the erstwhile ‘holding’ corps to ‘pivot’ corps. This entailed
revision of the manner the army had hitherto held the borders. The troops-heavy
manner was discarded in emulating the Pakistanis who had sought to substitute
manpower with firepower. This released troops for offensive tasks entailed by
the ‘proactive’ doctrine. In the mountain sector, additional Rashtriya Rifles
raisings, that doubled the strength of the force last decade, are available for
taking over of LC management in order to release Infantry so held up for
offensive tasks.
The subtext is that the army has finally moved beyond borders and
their defence. Nevertheless, the site for Cold Start is the border itself. The
nuclear threshold compels its ‘broad front, shallow depth’ logic. Border
formations would speedily capture vulnerable locales in the vicinity of the
border and LC by undercutting the advantage of the mobilization differential
that has hitherto been in Pakistan’s
favour. It is in a way a replay of the Hussaniwala-Sehjra battles of the 1971
War which changed hands. The gains would help open up Pakistani innards, a
useful juncture for beginning parlays. Deeper and more ambitious offensives by
strike corps are outside the remit of ‘Cold Start’, predicated as these would
be on wider war aims. Cold Start is therefore at best a punitive military
reaction to further terror provocation, but the thinking behind it in not
transcending borders makes it at best ‘old wine in new bottles’.
In the event, when push came to shove at 26/11, the army was found
less than ready, both equipment-wise and culturally for the shift entailed by
doctrine. While the responsibility, if not blame, for the former can easily be
shifted to the bureaucrat-dominated ministry, ownership of the latter lies
squarely with the service itself. The post Operation Parakram doctrinal shift
had apparently not translated adequately into action by then. The staging
forward of armour formations from traditional bases is an ongoing exercise. The
army, due to promotion and acquisitions policies that privileged the infantry
and the artillery respectively, was arguably still the proverbial Indian
elephant and not quite the sprightly tiger of its re-imagining. Clearly, the
territorial fixation has not lost its place in military thinking.
This is self-evident from the doctrinal deficit on the aims of
Cold Start. The idea is to capture sufficient territory in quick-time
(therefore the term ‘Cold Start’) to force the exposure of Pakistani reserves
to punishment by firepower from both land and air. Pakistani army hurt directly
thus would therefore agree post war to reform itself. This has not reckoned
with the Pakistani reaction in terms of vertical nuclear proliferation and (sensibly)
the very public introduction of tactical nuclear systems into its armoury, such
as ‘Nasr’. The former has been forced by India’s march towards second strike
capability based on a ‘triad’ in conjunction with its doctrine of ‘massive’
punitive retaliation. The latter is more directly fallout of Cold Start,
despite Cold Start for its part envisaging shallow gains that are not worth
wasting nuclear ordnance on. However, hypothetical scenarios such as the
‘Sehjra option’ compel a pause. In this, Pakistan
resorts to defensive use of a tactical nuclear weapon on its own border
territory – in this scenario on the curiously shaped Sehjra enclave near India’s
Firozpur when captured by Cold Start forces - not so much to stop an armoured
advance but as nuclear signalling. The outcome is consequence of the army’s going
public with Cold Start.
Developments on the China front reinforce the
observation on the army’s territorial mindset. The border has returned to fore,
despite two decades of ministering of a peace process. The rise of China and India’s
warming to China’s rival, the
USA, combine to position India at the future
geopolitical hub. Further, Chinese infrastructure developments in Tibet
led to an adverse threat perception. The potential for conflict is in patrol
clashes resulting from ‘transgressions’ by Chinese patrols of the Indian claim
line. Periodic alarm has been raised by strategic circles in the media on this
count. This has provoked arming and expansion of the army, perhaps just as
intended. Two divisions have been raised for the purpose. The mountain strike
corps under consideration has lately been put on hold, ostensibly due to the
draw-down in the economy occasioned by global turbulence.
The build-up has been informed by the ‘two front’ thesis since the
turn of the decade. The element of collusion between the two, such in reported
presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit, has accentuated this aspect. The origin
of the thesis goes back at least a couple of decades to Pakistan going
nuclear with Chinese assistance. It first found mention in K Subrahmanyam’s
post 1971 War monograph on the emerging contours of national security. While
geopolitical maneuverings involving a hegemonic tryst between US and China provides
the backdrop, unsettled borders provide the tinder.
Borders as a lived reality
Borders are not in distant mists for the army man but instead have
life defining dimensions. The chief characteristic of service life prior to the
onset of proxy war was the alternation between field and peace stations every
two to three years. Field was in earlier more leisurely times normally on the
border, usually in high altitude and inevitably remote. Stories of riding
elephants to reach outposts, braving hairpin bends, violent streams and
precipices at night are nostalgically exchanged in officers’ messes and at barakhanas (military banquets) to this
day. Once there, the lack of communications dictated the pace of the day. Since
the first step in the military art is to master terrain, the beginning is
invariably with gaining a measure of the alignment of the LC, with every kink
and turn. Once embedded in consciousness, life revolved around leave,
operational alerts, visits and daily routine of reports at reveille and
retreat. The idyll was periodically
shattered by wars and crises. Some sectors were renowned for being active,
where intermittent firing made life challenging. Even the 1971 War, though
dated to Pakistan’s air
attack of 3 December, was actually well underway at least a fortnight prior
with aggressive Indian patrolling and ingress along East
Pakistan’s borders.
Forebodings of a change were evident by the early eighties with
the launch of Operation Meghdoot to take over and retain Siachen by occupying
the Saltoro heights. With proxy war gaining momentum over the early nineties,
the LC was now a battlefield with ordnance being traded across it. Over the
past decade, with decline in proxy war and infiltration across LC, it is the LAC,
as the line held on the China
front is referred to, that has came to fore. Borders in the plains sector in
the interregnum between wars intruded into peacetime soldiering during the
annual defensive exercise, Operation Alert. However, in periods of crises,
ranging from the Kargil War to Operation Parakram, they assumed the immediacy
of life and death as defensive lines running parallel to them in successive
tiers. India, seeing itself
as a stronger power, could not afford to lose terrain lest Pakistan have
something to bargain with at war’s end.
Borders have witnessed the execution of the primary responsibility
of the army: territorial defence. The two constraints in this have been terrain
and resources available. The latter have inevitably been scarce, given the
extent to be held, while the former has only served to accentuate the scarcity.
Terrain has varied from plains to foothills to implacable mountains. In the
plains is the IB sector. Here troops are practiced in rushing from cantonments
close at hand to man pre-prepared defences. These defences have over time
become concretized. While infantry understandably holds ground, armour,
assisted by the mechanized infantry, is to restore the line in case of enemy attack.
The defensive battle begins across the border with ‘eyes and ears’ and
firepower increasingly reaching well beyond it. Currently, radar and missile
cover take the ‘area of interest’ and ‘area of influence’ of formations well
into enemy depth areas.
While the earlier defensive doctrine was predicated on awaiting
the enemy offensive, opening of the front was never so constrained at the
tactical level. Thus, raids, patrols, ambushes and trans-border operations,
such as capture of enclaves, were well practiced. This ensures that a
‘Christmas truce’ never develops. However, with an offensive turn to the
doctrine, these pin-prick attacks are now to be with added weight, befitting
the aim of provisioning offensive formations with a choice of launch pads. The
Cold Start doctrine therefore is not so much about mobilizing to one’s own
defences, as hitherto, as much as being the ‘firstest with the mostest’ at the
enemy’s defences.
In the mountains there are two variants of defences along borders,
depending on the opponent faced, Pakistan
or China.
Along the LC the defences are considerably dense. These have developed over
half century into formidable fortresses not only in terms of defence works but
also in minefields, fields of fire and wire obstacles. These have been
reinforced over the period of proxy war not only from a force protection point
of view but also for an anti-infiltration purpose. Duties in the ‘No War - No
Peace’ scenario have become multifarious, ranging from fire assaults to
minefield resuscitation. At the height of an ‘active’ LC, raids have been
launched across it in reply to Border Action Team shock action from the other
side. Their violence was such that these cannot be said to have been cognizant
of international humanitarian law stipulations! With relative stability
settling in since the November 2003 ceasefire on the LC, SOPs (standard
operating procedures) have virtually reduced the Infantry to a role akin to the
BSF, sitting as it does in nakas’ (preset
ambushes), along the ‘Vij line’. The plus-point is in the heightened
technological threshold that the anti-infiltration fence has forced,
reminiscent of Israeli measures and indicative of that connection.
Defences themselves are reminiscent of the fabled Maginot,
Siegfried and Bar Lev lines. The unfortunate fate of those lines is an ever
present reminder of the gravity of vigil and vigorous response. Given the
density of defences and field works, these are not held in full strength. Where
there are no objectives of high net worth, the BSF is also represented. The
pattern of operations is based on discovering enemy thrust lines and
reinforcing timely. The battle on the LC boils down to reserves, their
placement and recreation. The Rashtriya Rifles has been co-opted to help ease
this. However, since defence has to be actively conducted, several offensive
options are in the works to disrupt Pakistani plans as also to unlock enemy
defenses. On the LC, the prevailing understanding is that land taken is land
retrieved since it is India’s
to begin with. Also, the likelihood of war beginning in this sector is more
credible. The LC serves as site of fierce, sometimes underreported, military
engagements such as the post Kargil War stand-off over Point 5353 in the Kargil
sector and Point 3260 in the Gurez sector. Therefore planning and preparations
are more true to life unlike in the plains sector where though thorough and professional,
there is a certain unreality associated with preparedness.
Since the LC terminates at the coordinates Point NJ 9842, the line
thereafter is termed Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in the Siachen sector.
While casualty statistics have become negligible over the years since 1984,
what is certain is that battle deaths have been considerably fewer than
casualties from cold and altitude. The Siachen ribbon remains credible as one
earned against the odds. No comparable catastrophe having occurred on the
Indian side as befell the Pakistanis at Gyari, there is little incentive for
the army to get off the heights. As and when there is talk of interfacing with Pakistan on the
issue, the army takes care to air its view publicly. It is uncertain if this is
with tacit support of the government or as anticipatory veto of any decision
the government may be contemplating contrary to the army’s internal input in
the decision. This internal dimension in effect makes Siachen more than a low
hanging fruit in a bilateral relationship.
Thereafter, the AGPL merges into the LAC. The defences on the China front
have rightly earned a place in military mythology. The stadium in Firozpur
cantonment has a marble plaque commemorating its completion by the use of troop
labour of the legendary 4 Division of World War II fame. Ill clad soldiers were
sent up from such tasks in the hot plains to prepare defences at places such as
Thag La on India’s
claim line. In the defence concept, strong points were to be held on to based on
the few communication centers and politically significant places so as to buy
time for troops to be rushed up from camps with better access and amenities in
depth. The intervening spaces were to be dominated by long range patrols. Peace
time life included operational works maintenance, warding off malaria and annual
family visits. There were few volunteers, either of units or officers, for
tenures here. Distances, quality of schooling for children, different people
and climate were disincentives.
Further along the border, the Burma and East Pakistan borders
(later Myanmar and Bangladesh borders) have proven sites of extensive
patrolling in search of the elusive ‘encounter’ with hostiles having bases
across. Here the Assam Rifles, operationally under the army but better
appointed with amenities owing to its parent (home) ministry largesse, holds
sway. The creation of Bangladesh
in 1971 did not ease cross border predicament. This eased up finally with the
Naga ceasefire in place since 1998; with Bhutan
launching Operation All Clear in 2003 that witnessed escaping militants falling
into the army dragnet in the plains; and when a friendly Awami League
government came to power in Bangladesh.
The concept of ‘active deterrence’ taking hold, there is an
equivalent of a scramble to catch up with the Chinese. The wider defence
network is co-opted, with the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) stepping up its
output and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) working on
niche areas such as high altitude ration and, indeed, environment-friendly
waste disposal. Deterrence has perked up with the placement of Brahmos missiles
in location, Su-30 warplanes, refurbishing of advanced landing grounds and induction
of armoured elements where terrain makes possible. Strategic deterrence is in
the works with operationalisation of the triad and Agni V a matter of time. However,
critical to all this remains the fighting man. Troops, made available by
expansion of the army, have staged forward for speedier reaction and acclimatization.
The Kargil War has provided considerable ballast to thinking on how to do
battle. Firepower, ability to move reinforcements within a sector and reserves
between theatres, perfecting of new techniques such as destructive artillery
shoots, cliff assault and multidirectional attacks, employment of Special
Forces and irregulars etc are possible areas. Training exercises with the
Americans are no doubt charting innovative military terrain. Transport aircraft
bought from Americans under the less procedurally challenging foreign military
sales route symbolize the American ‘pivot’ in Asia and India’s place in it. The
somnolence of the East is now history.
Some effects of the military’s border presence have not been
recognized. Firstly, it bears reflection that the military, largely drawn from
the hinterland, is oft an alien presence. Living as it does in isolation from
local communities and with resources that are relatively abundant, there is an
overpowering local footprint. For instance, the remote high altitude lake in Sikkim,
Gurudongmar lake, has come to be associated with the travels of the founder of
Sikhism, Guru Nanak. This is likely an apocryphal story, but one inspiring for
Sikh troops when deployed. The profusion of temples on passes, dangerous
stretches of road and locations of military presence has transformed the
profile of areas that are otherwise not inhabited by Hindus. There is a certain
redefining of the religious geography of such regions and in the process a
defining of India
itself. A scene in the movie, ‘Border’, one of Bollywood’s all-times hits,
depicts military men viewing the Muslim herders living in the desert alongside
their camps as suspect owing to their religious affiliation with their kinsmen
on the other side of the border. The popularity of the movie and its repeated
telecast through the years particularly as a symbol of nationalism on national
days tells that the existence of such thinking is of an order as to be entirely
unremarkable.
Such social and cultural distance cannot be easily effaced through
civic action such as Operation Sadhbhavna, the most rigorous instance of which
has been in Kargil after the war there. Opposition in Kashmir
in particular, where the military is in search of land for setting up permanent
cantonments for the Rashtriya Rifles units once they are taken off the counter
insurgency grid, is instance of the reaction. Locals have been recruited into
the service such as in the Ladhak Scouts, created as a regiment from a
paramilitary after its gallant showing in the Kargil War. This has spin-offs
for the local economy as does the employment of hardy local residents as
porters in the military posts along the LC. The latter however is not an
unmixed blessing in that porter money for their labour has been known to have
been put to alternative use not as an exception, but as a rule. Oversight by
labour officers and the defence audit has singularly, and spectacularly, failed
in plugging this. Worse is when porters are put to military and surveillance tasks
such as clearing improvised explosive devices on interconnecting foot tracks
between defended posts. Acknowledging such practice needs weaving into the
final narrative of the military’s tryst with subconventional conflict.
Lastly, is the environmental impact, one that cannot be obscured
by raisings of Territorial Army (Ecological) units. Earlier when military
budgets were meager, the military would supplement its stock of wood and coal
for cooking by foraging near its post to the extent that minefields in the
vicinity allowed. Most defence works were earlier from local resources. Reports
on timber smuggling have been muted. The army’s contribution to the great
Himalayan brown carbon haze, along side that of other military’s in the region,
cries out for attention at the regional level and is a candidate case of a very
useful CBM. Lately, the thrust on infrastructure building has led to friction
on the environmental impact between the army and the bodies in charge of
conservation of environment. When the final story of the anti-infiltration
fence, the minefields and the occupation of Siachen is written, the
environmental impact of these will surely sully the otherwise justifiably
glorious military record.
Implications of unsettled
borders
Consequences of protracted conflict with both neighbours can be
discerned at the political, strategic and institutional levels of analyses. This
section discusses the fallout at each of these levels separately, while noting
that there is interconnectedness between them. Not only do two adjacent levels
have permeable boundaries, but the phenomenon of the ‘strategic corporal’ of
late has collapsed the levels onto each other. An illustrative, if hypothetical,
example is of a patrol clash at the site of Chinese intrusions, ‘transgressions’
in official parlance, leading to a border skirmish. The ‘face saving’ aspect
when institutional self-image and adversarial nationalisms act as propellant
could lead to conflict spiral. In effect, a corporal leading a patrol can end
up initiating decisions with strategic import up the hierarchy. While CBMs keep
a lid on such scenarios, border settlement alone can make them history.
Political level
Simply put, borders can either be seen as the ‘symptom’ or the
‘cause’ of intractable conflict. In case of the former, the cause is seen in
power relations, with asymmetry in the two dyads, India-Pakistan and
China-India. Therefore the game of ‘catch up’ is in play, with Pakistan for its part resorting to proxy war and
India exerting to gain a measure
of equivalence, if notional, with China. In case of the latter,
defence of borders acquires added significance. In either case, over the
interim, maintaining the status quo is required. Answers lie in defence and
deterrence.
The problem is in border management being taken as a necessary and
sufficient response. While necessary, it is so because border management is by
itself insufficient absent efforts towards conflict resolution. In light of the
(mis)understanding that border management is sufficient, conflict resolution,
centered on negotiated settlement involving ‘give and take’ and the compromises
that attend negotiations, is not pursued meaningfully. With CBMs in place and interminable
‘talks’ on (fifteen round of talks have been held with China so far), there is little
incentive to create the political heft required for settlement.
The political class is preoccupied with managing the neoliberalism-informed
transition of Indian state and society. National security bureaucrats are to
help shape the external environment by leveraging military and diplomatic power
to ensure that this endeavour is not thwarted. Persistence of the ‘1962
syndrome’, evident from the commemorative navel-gazing at the half-century mark
recently, also keeps political initiative along conflict resolution lines
firmly in check. With respect to Pakistan,
firmness is directed against Pakistan’s
use of terror as strategy. However, to Pakistan this suggests an
unwillingness to discuss. Weaning Pakistan away from its policy choice,
albeit an illegitimate one, requires going beyond ‘talks about talks’. India’s
approach can otherwise be interpreted as being pledged to talk, it engaged in
talks as an end in itself and not a means to an end. Talks are instead the
means to a solution and not meant to be an interminable process. Rethinking India’s
approach to talks would be an investment in Indian security.
Externally, wider Indian geopolitical and operational attempts
such as inclining towards the US and pursuing China-centric missile program
respectively; resurrecting defence along the China border; keeping special
powers for the armed forces operational in Kashmir etc, are instances of
political determination. These ensure India has insurance. Another
positive is in the reaching out through opening up of the commercial sector acquiring
an internal political cover. The perception is that the public will accept the
latter in case it sees the former also in place alongside. The upswing in
relations with Pakistan and
the two decades of engagement of China are outcome. This is seen as
enough in light of political energy being deployed in other crucial areas of
national life, not excluding political survival.
The political level is janus-faced, having external and internal
dimensions. Internally, the indication is that the government is not ‘soft’ on
defence. A positive perspective is in India
is negotiating with China
on the border not as a submissive weak power, but an equal. The idea is that
the ‘nation’ would be amenable to an outcome from talks only if India talks from
a ‘position of strength’. This would legitimize the border talks and any
eventual settlement involving trade-offs. This stage of notional equivalence
would perhaps be arrived at by end decade. Yet, the converse needs being wary
of. With the military enhancing its capability to defend borders lately, the
logic understandably is that unsettled borders warrant preparedness. However,
the converse, that of such preparation prevents any meaningful engagement over
borders needs reckoning with. Concentrating on an ability to defend leaves
little incentive to settle.
Strategic level
The political imperative of status quo on the border implies more
than mere military vigilance. In a military contest with Pakistan, a
draw, such as the 1965 War, would be equivalent of a loss. Against China, there is
a will to ensure that, in the words of the army chief, there would be no
‘repeat of 1962 War’. However, in the military’s reading maintaining the status
quo implies catering for the worst case. It is no wonder that the ‘two front’ war
thesis is ascendant. Capability build up across the board, from nuclear to blue
water, acquires a rationale. In this understanding, even a border war, such as
brought on by a Chinese thrust to take over Tawang for instance, compels having
nuclear deterrence to cover the Chinese eastern seaboard as also an ability to
choke the Malacca straits. Such a capability to escalate will ensure, firstly,
deterrence, and secondly, limitation. The problem is in localized conflicts
ending up as the proverbial spark to nationalism as tinder.
Strategic doctrine dictates military doctrine. The diversity of
terrain and distances involved entail multiple theatres. With respect to Pakistan, the build up with China in the crosshairs brings
about a differentiated strategic doctrine. On the China front, ‘deterrence by denial’
can change to ‘deterrence by punishment’ in case a mountain strike corps comes
up. Not only is China
to be administered a bloody nose in case it raises its covetous eyes, but its
jaw is also to be dislocated. Moving beyond would amount to getting into
uncharted nuclear terrain and India’s
defensive aims do not reckon doing that.
The strategic doctrine in respect of Pakistan is different. The
feasibility of the mountain strike corps acting on the Pakistan front, in case of a dormant China front,
enables compellence. Therefore a potentially compellent strategic doctrine is
clearly discernible, though India
disavows from any such intent. Three strike corps in the plains theatre have
practiced to an extent that former army chief, General VK Singh, let on that
what was taking two weeks during the Operation Parakram era now takes a week
and with time will take but two to three days. The gain is that ‘no loss of territory’
takes place, which can otherwise place Pakistan on a footing of
equivalence. In this scheme, borders do not merely serve as start lines to
offensives but in the nuclear backdrop are critical to an evaluation of the
depth to which such offensives can go. This in effect limits compellence,
bringing into question the sense behind such a strategic doctrine in first
place.
Institutional level
While the primary role of defending borders keeps the military
professional and outward looking, it also keeps it large in size, attritionist,
static and defensive in orientation. Though the Cold Start - ‘proactive and
offensive’ – mindset has been in the works for over a decade, territorial
imperative still commands a centrality. The offensive is still geared to
territorial objectives. This time it is not to seize territory: the US predicament
post Iraq War II decisively dispels that. It is to threaten decisive objectives
so as to draw out the enemy reserves and decimate them by maneuver and fire
from land assets and air power. This implies ‘more of everything’ – maneuver
elements, firepower resources, infantry to hold the line, Rashtriya Rifles for
countering irregular warfare. This is good from the perspective of arm specific
‘lobbies’ internal to the military. The disquiet between the arms most closely
identified with mass, specifically infantry and artillery, and the mechanized
and technical arms is an underestimated undertow within the military. The overall
loss is the army continuing as a ‘mass’ army. Military ‘transformation’, in the
works for half-a-decade, is rendered even more remote.
Not usually finding mention in strategic commentary is an outcome in
relation to internal politics, specifically civil-military equations. The
routine refrain that civil-military relations are on even keel in India serves to
obfuscate the reality that is considerably more nuanced, if not quite vexed. The
security sector can acquire vested interest in unsettled borders. Continued
national munificence and institutional salience can be expected to ensue. This
can have internal dividend for the army. Further, the army’s position on
Siachen, AFSPA, ‘two front’ war etc. has a constituency, whipped up by the
veteran community. In case a convergence is contrived with forces in polity
this could have grave implications. Settling borders makes such unanticipated
possibilities recede. Not doing so is a current vulnerability that can
constitute an opportunity for nefarious political end in an indeterminate
future.
Lastly, expansion appears as the characteristic reaction of the
army to all manner of threats, ranging from conventional threat across borders
to unconventional threats of proxy war and insurgency. This knee-jerk response can
only have diminishing marginal utility. While the eighties witnessed mechanization
and the nineties onwards the raising of the Rashtriya Rifles, the latest wave
of expansion has been on the China
front. In the ‘two and half front’ formulation, addressing the ‘half front’ –
internal conflict - the army has reportedly asked for expansion of six
divisions! This is not impossible if soaking up India’s vast armies of unemployed
was all that is involved. The problem is that training and socialization are
also intrinsic. The quality of this is already under question. More
importantly, the narrowing of the recruitment base, particularly of the officer
cadre, to the Hindi speaking ‘cow dust’ belt is underway. A decline in the
all-India sociological complexion of the military could be discernible if the
statistics were made available. In the absence of authentic data this can only
be apprehended. Doing so here may prove timely.
The civil-military relations problem that can emerge, and arguably
is emerging already, is along two dimensions. The first is on the cultural gap
between the army and its area of deployment in marginal border areas or in
internal security such as in Central India in
future. Second is in the possibility of the army’s secular credentials coming
under siege, for instance, in case of extremist variants of cultural
nationalism find anchor in the recruit catchment areas. Unanticipated outcomes
also need guarding against. Since unsettled borders impel expansion, tackling root
causes - in this case, borders – entails meaningful border negotiations.
Conclusion
That unsettled borders have given the military a raison d’etre is
easy to comprehend. That they have helped with ‘nation’ building in terms
internal nationalist consolidation against covetous neighbours is less obvious.
Unsettled borders go further in the nation-state building project. They enable
mobilization of the power by the state and its external projection. They enable
state control of its geographic periphery. Unsettled borders therefore are not
without benefits. However, keeping them unsettled with a purpose is different
from not addressing them purposefully.
Strategies appear to be in place for coping with consequences.
Take for instance the unstated strategy in respect of Pakistan. Asymmetry
is being deepened – using China
as rationale - in the hope that Pakistan
reacting rationally throws in the towel. The peace process is minimally intended
to tide over the interim without Kashmir buffeting India’s growth trajectory. ‘Backchannel’
advances, not having been taken to their logical conclusion through political
investment in their potential, ensure that seeds of conflict, even plausibly, nuclear
conflict, remain. Borders are predicated on the ‘final settlement’ of the
Kashmir issue, one to which India
is pledged. The strategy of ‘deepening asymmetry’ carries unwarranted risks in
the interim. The strategy of ‘catching up’ with China is equally fraught. Therefore
instead of the attenuated premium on the cliché that diplomacy must be
under-grid by military muscle, diplomacy to beget border settlement must
acquire precedence. The lop-sided statistic of the military commissioning twice
the entire number of Indian Foreign Service officers every year is a telling
one.
Borders have had a dual effect on the military. They have served to
keep it professional, and by that yardstick, in the developing world’s context,
apolitical. However, to the extent that borders, and equivalent lines that
testify to their unsettled status, acquire an overbearing place in the
institutional consciousness - and at one remove the national - then its time
for rethink. Adding threat of such fallout to the reasons why borders could do
with a definitive settlement should tip the balance in favour of settling these
earlier than later.
