‘COLD
START LITE’ IS NOT ENOUGH
Published in Agni, Oct-Dec 2013, Vol XV, No. VI
Introduction
In the wake of the Kargil War, India developed a Limited
War doctrine. The key elements of this
doctrine are that it is ‘proactive’ and ‘offensive’. It is ‘proactive’ in the
sense that while being strategically reactive, for instance to a terror
provocation emanating from Pakistan, it is proactive at the operational level
in choosing the time and place of conventional response and shaping of the
battle. It is ‘offensive’ in terms of its intent of taking the battle to the
enemy, fighting on and making gains on enemy territory and in its aim-plus of
punishing the Pakistani military. Since these two ingredients have to reckon
with the nuclear backdrop, limitation has been worked into the doctrine in
terms of shallow depth of attack operations and choice of such areas being
limited to those that would not provoke the proverbial nuclear ‘redline’, such
as for instance avoiding a thrust towards Lahore. This limitation is what makes
for the doctrine being characterised as a ‘Limited War’ doctrine. The media
short-hand for this is ‘Cold Start’, highlighting its supposed reliance on
being quicker-off-the-blocks than Pakistan’s army that has hitherto enjoyed a
mobilisation differential. The change from its previous edition, the Sundarji
era conventional doctrine of Second World War style armoured operations, has
been in the rethinking on strike corps employment that was thought to be too
flirtatious of nuclear thresholds.
Given the nuclear dimension over the past quarter
century, and unmistakably so ever since both states going overt in 1998, on the
face of its being ‘proactive’ and ‘offensive’ would be to be unmindful of the
nuclear overhang. In fact, while arguing for the nuclear deterrent during the
covert years, its proponents, including the redoubtable K. Subrahmanyam, had
argued that changed nuclear equations would make war redundant and would
therefore brighten the chances for peace with Pakistan. Instead, Cold Start has
replaced the ‘Sundarji (conventional) doctrine’ and it is not certain if this
change over is cognisant of continuing nuclear dangers.
In the chronological narrative, inception of the
doctrine is at a conference at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
(IDSA) in January 2000 in wake of the Kargil War. The Kargil War had brought
home to the Indian military that there was a conventional space between the
subconventional and nuclear threshold for military exploitation. Even as
conceptualisation of the change was underway, the ‘twin peaks’ crisis -
Operation Parakram - intervened. The ‘twin peaks’ refer to the spikes in
tension immediately following the parliament attack and the terror attack in
Jammu the following summer. In neither event could India exercise its
conventional power. The first time round, its strike corps apparently took too
long to mobilise and in the second instance, they were so programmed, by all
three being poised in Rajasthan, that they would invite a nuclear reaction from
Pakistan. The limitations of India’s ‘all or nothing’ approach, signified by
the ‘Sundarji doctrine’, were clear. The 2004 document – Indian Army
Doctrine - was the outcome of ‘lessons learnt’.
Limited Nuclear War?
The conventional doctrine, in nutshell, countenances a
quick mobilisation followed by multiple offensives across a wide front. The doctrine
caters for the changed nuclear reality by envisaging that military advances
would be to limited depth in light of possible nuclear thresholds. Limitation
has been brought about by the need to avoid triggering the envisaged nuclear
thresholds of Pakistan. These thresholds are often taken to be along four
dimensions: military attrition, territorial losses, economic viability and
internal stability. In the event, concerted offensive action by the three wings
– land, sea and air - of the Indian military would simultaneously nudge all
four thresholds directly and indirectly. The cumulative physical and
psychological impact would tend to unhinge - and possibly lower - the nuclear
retaliation threshold. Interestingly, escalatory possibilities that attend
offensives are to be innovatively utilised to make Pakistan back down. This
explains India’s across-the-board thrust for ‘escalation dominance’. The idea
is to be set to prevail at any level Pakistan may choose to escalate to,
thereby dampening any tendency in Pakistan to escalate. Pakistan is expected to
rationally choose to lose cheaply than more resoundingly at the next higher
level.
As can be expected, Pakistan has come up with its own
answers. At the conventional level, it has, through its Azm e Nau series of
exercises since 2009, attempted to undercut any gains India’s conventional
offensives could make. Alongside, in the nuclear plane, it has postured a lower
nuclear threshold, for instance, by inducting battle field nuclear weapons, the
Nasr nuclear-tipped missile system. At the end of the Azm e Nau IV wargames in
the summer of 2013, Pakistan has expressed its confidence in stymieing India’s
Cold Start thrusts by returning the mobilisation differential in its favour.
This would force India to move a notch higher in its conventional exertions.
To cope with Pakistan’s nuclear card, Cold Start has
apparently been pruned to ‘Cold Start lite’ or ‘Cold Start Minor’. This
explains a former army chief arguing that there is nothing called Cold Start.
Since Cold Start became difficult to sell to politicians, rightly mindful of
the nuclear threat, the shift has appropriate conventional retaliation to
Pakistani terror provocations. This is aimed at ending the impunity of the
Pakistani army and ensuring that it pays a price for terror by proxy. Cold
Start therefore is no longer ‘wide front – multiple thrust’ but is conventional
retribution restricted to capture of a few key locations and air inflicted
attrition to Pakistani military and terror assets. The former is to bring home
to the Pakistani army high command the seriousness of India’s intent which the
latter alone cannot convey. Military action across the various lines of varying
degree of authority that India shares with Pakistan – IB, LC and AGPL - has the
advantage of turning the diplomatic screws on Pakistan in a way that a
stand-off, ‘air alone’, retaliation cannot.
The intent is to pose a decision dilemma on Pakistan:
accept the beating or escalate. India’s preceding efforts at ‘escalation
dominance’ are to persuade Pakistan against the latter. The intended political
affect is a psychological blow to the military in Pakistan, opening up greater
space for mainstream civilian political forces in that country. Operationally,
the idea is to militarily catalyse external diplomatic and political pressure
internal to Pakistan to bear on Pakistani army’s adventurism. It is possible
that with NSCS orchestration, such politico-diplomatic goals can be militarily
mid-wifed.
However, two problems could arise. The first is that
setting back the Pakistan army does not necessarily translate into gains for
mainstream political forces in Pakistan. It would open up a vacuum in which
extremism could spread. This is more likely in case of religious nationalism
being prompted by the military set back. Political implications of Cold Start
have not attracted as much attention as the strategic implications. The second,
at the strategic level, is in Pakistan army wanting to preserve its
post-hostilities position within Pakistan’s power structure, could
up-the-military-ante. It would be under pressure from Islamist lobbies and from
their sympathisers within the army. This would in turn force Indian exertion up
a few notches. This may entail India either reinforcing a failure or opening up
new fronts and fresh objectives. Escalation thus could lead up to the nuclear
dangers ‘Cold Start lite’ was designed to avoid. Even if India’s
advantage continues, it would be at a higher price; and at an uncertain rung up
the proverbial ladder of escalation, a nuclear price.
For its part, to obviate nuclear deterrence breakdown,
India’s nuclear deterrence is based on ‘assured retaliation’. Te promise of
‘unacceptable damage’ is intended to heighten the adversary’s nuclear threshold
in order to provide space for the offensive posture of Cold Start. India
believes nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons and not war. Thus, there appears
scope for war, albeit a Limited War. The declaratory nuclear doctrine has a
proviso that such retaliation would be of higher order, ‘massive’, levels. This
makes nuclear doctrine reminiscent of ‘massive retaliation’. Pakistan’s
posturing of lower nuclear threshold suggests that it finds ‘massive’ nuclear
response by India less than credible, in face of its nuclear numbers that have
reportedly crossed the three figure mark. Since it can pose threat of like
punishment on India, even if broken-backed, India may be forced away from
‘massive’. Therefore, Pakistan’s introduction of nuclear weapons into the
conflict would be to threaten a nuclear war, albeit, a Limited Nuclear War. In
its thinking, India, unwilling to chance the price, would then desist from
exercising its conventional advantage.
India continues to invest in its conventional advantage
for the sake of ‘escalation dominance’. It believes that Cold Start lite,
is not provocative of nuclear thresholds, even lowered ones predicated on the
likes of Nasr. However, the underside of escalation dominance is in Pakistan’s
resort to the nuclear card: at first for posturing and at the crunch, at lower
order levels. ‘Escalation dominance’ at lower order levels would entail an
ability to sustain fighting, including nuclear warfighting and conventional
operations in a nuclear environment. This obviously implies also having in play
an exit strategy for ending the conflict at that level. Escalation dominance,
or ability to prevail at the next higher level, is not good enough since
prevailing then would be more costly. Therefore, escalation dominance cannot
alone inform strategy. De-escalation, conflict end games and exit strategies
are equally if not more significant. Doctrine has to evolve in this direction
it the military instrument is to retain its relevance.
Doctrinal recommendation
India needs doing two things: one each at the
conventional and nuclear levels. At the conventional level, it needs to
supplement Cold Start lite with an explicit Limited War doctrine. Cold
Start lite is a useful response to Pakistan’s threatened lowering of the
nuclear threshold. It denies Pakistan any reason or legitimacy for going
nuclear by pruning objectives. However, as seen in the preceding discussion,
there are escalatory possibilities that need to be contended with. This can be
done by adoption of an explicit Limited War doctrine. While the current
doctrine is taken as a Limited War one, it is not self-consciously one such.
That it is a Limited War doctrine is an interpretation, not one that the
doctrine itself admits to. The assumption is that that all wars will be
limited, an assumption that the test of war might find insufficient. An
explicit doctrine would look at competing saliencies up the ‘ladder’ to define
prospective ‘exit points’. It will mesh the political-diplomatic with the
military, enabling arrival at a military plateau and also de-escalation. Such a
doctrine will therefore not be military’s alone, but an NSCS-led product of an
‘all of government’ effort.
At the nuclear level, India prefers to believe that
nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons, and not war itself. It wishes to keep
the conventional option open for response to Pakistan’s sub-conventional
provocation. However, the onus of choice to go nuclear being with Pakistan
means that the nuclear dimension cannot be wished away. A nuclear doctrine
posited on ‘unacceptable damage’ means that India opens itself to receiving
‘unacceptable damage’ in return. The ‘unacceptable’ cost has to be weighed
against the minimalist aims of Cold Start lite that may have led up to
the nuclear juncture. Even if Pakistan pays a higher and no doubt a prohibitive
cost, there is no call for India to sustain a cost asymmetric with the original
aims. This means that avoiding damage must inform Indian nuclear deterrence
thinking rather than the ability and willingness to inflict damage that
currently under-grids nuclear deterrence thinking. Inflicting unacceptable
damage in return for receipt of unacceptable damage makes eminent sense.
Creating the conditions for receipt of unacceptable damage by disproportionate
nuclear retaliation amounting to unacceptable damage to lower order nuclear
attack(s) makes little sense.
Therefore, to
bring its conventional advantage back into the reckoning India would require
ensuring a departure of its ‘operational’ nuclear doctrine from its
‘declaratory’ nuclear doctrine: shifting from ‘massive’ to ‘assured’
retaliation, the degree of retaliation being dependent on nature of Pakistani
nuclear first use. This amounts to recourse to the ‘Sundarji nuclear
doctrine’ that had envisaged quid pro quo and quid pro quo plus
levels of retaliation options. Doing this enables India to think of plausible
answers to Pakistan’s Nasr; thereby enhancing nuclear deterrence.
War-gaming this may be useful for the argument. In case
of Pakistani terror attack, India may choose Cold Start lite over Cold
Start. Cold Start lite in itself is not provocative of nuclear
thresholds as is Cold Start per se. However, selective attacks could
either meet with Azm e Nau practiced formations that may place victory beyond
reach. Or they could be successful, leading to Pakistan’s decision dilemma to
either up-the-ante or give in. In the first case, India may be posed the
decision dilemma of escalation. This may have nationalist and organisational
reasons impelling it; after all India cannot be expected to retreat after its
proactive operations suffer a bloody nose. In the second case, Pakistani giving
up the fight would be to play into India’s hands since India would be seeking
to discredit the Pakistani army. The army seeking a way out may well escalate
by either evicting India from its gains or attempting to take territory
elsewhere. The competitive mobilisations, with nationalist and media frenzy in
the background in both states, will see both cross thresholds unintended at the
outset. This may bring Nasr into the equation.
India would then be faced with a nuclear strategy choice
of responding at a lower order level or according to the dictates of its
declaratory doctrine. Pakistani deterrence in terms of numbers surviving an
Indian strike of ‘unacceptable damage’ or ‘massive’ levels cannot be wished
away. India would be severely set back and for at least a generation. If this
is brought about by terror provocation, one that is not necessarily Pakistani
establishment sponsored, then it would be strategic imbecility to expose India
to such a strike. Clearly, then India needs a ‘tit for tat’ nuclear response;
one informed by the need to keep nuclear war limited with damage avoidance as
political rationale.
It
emerges that two areas need working on: limitation at both conventional and
nuclear levels as recommended.
Conclusion
The foremost policy relevant conclusion is that India needs to arrive
at an explicit Limited War doctrine. Even so, it must be mindful that Limited
War has its limitations and the nascent, and perhaps fledgling impulse
distancing the military from a default resort to Cold Start in favour of Cold
Start lite, should be taken to its logical conclusion. Cognizant of the
nuclear-conventional interface, India needs to make the structural changes
necessary, in particular the creation of the CDS or permanent COSC in order
that orchestration of the military and diplomatic instruments for political
ends is made feasible.
Conventional doctrine has been an under-studied field in
India. While nuclear doctrine and counter insurgency doctrine, that have aura
of urgency, have received attention, conventional doctrine has remained elusive.
This owes to the perception that the doctrinal domain is internal to the
military. However, the nuclear backdrop makes continuing with this
misperception is untenable. Limitation needs to attend both the conventional
and nuclear realms of military application. Diplomacy has to be interwoven into
the doctrine to enable exploitation of exit points for suitable end games.
Clearly, this is easier said than done. What needs doing alongside is to repair
foreign relations in a manner as to create a reasonable buffer between the
military instrument and its seeming utility as a strategic policy choice.
* Ali Ahmed, PhD is author of the forthcoming The Doctrine Puzzle:
India’s Limited War Doctrine, Routledge India. He blogs at
www.ali-writings.blogspot.in.
