Thursday, 29 September 2022

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/another-modi-masterstroke-a-regime

Another Modi masterstroke: A regime favourite as CDS

The Modi regime is now well known for its masterstrokes. However, the appointment of General Anil Chauhan as the second Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is not another surprise pulled out of its hat. General Chauhan did figure as a front runner at points in the race. While other contenders fell out progressively as the parameters of the appointment changed, retrospectively it seems that the rejigging of these – by allowing all three-star brass a shot at the post, even those retired but below 62 years of age - was almost designed to see him first past the post.

The announcement

The surprise was in the announcement taking this long, since General Chauhan has been around all the while and could well have been elevated well earlier. It is strange that his tenure as the military adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat is not mentioned in the press release, though it makes a generic reference to his continuing engagement with security matters even after superannuation – mentioning twice over that he retired in May 2021. Was this oversight to obscure the conflict of interest that might have figured in his advice on the selection, given that as military adviser he must surely have had a say on who succeeds General Rawat?

The press release mentions one of two of the responsibilities that go with the appointment of CDS, making clear that he would also serve as Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs. The second responsibility – Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee – has not found mention. However, when General Rawat was appointed CDS, the press release made no mention of the two main responsibilities.

These were reckoned as part of the CDS’ package of responsibilities written up in the press release when the post was created. Perhaps an explicit mention of the Secretary role is to dispel the idea doing the rounds that the role of secretary demeans the CDS appointment in protocol terms, while saddling him with bureaucratic responsibilities that he could well do without. Even so, there was no reason to be so responsive to rumours as to categorically dispel them in the press release.

The silver lining from the ‘deep selection’ taking this long is the regime did not find sufficiently politicised generals.  However, it appears that the regime finally found a candidate with the pliability levels it is comfortable with. When General Rawat was appointed Chief of the Army, since he superseded two seniors, the regime had gone out its way to impress army watchers that the reason for the choice was the doctrine of ‘ease of doing business with’ – as one veteran tasked with the messaging put it in his advocacy for the unprecedented supersession back then. It is plausible that ‘relative ease of working’ with is aided by a shared ethnicity. Is it a coincidence that not only was Rawat Garhwali, but so is Chauhan, as is National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval?

Even so - as a distinguished veteran brought to this author’s notice - the regime has taken care to keep the sword hanging over the new CDS’ head by making the appointment - though allowing for the incumbent to go on till 65 years - tenable only ‘till further orders’!

The surgical strikes’ controversy

General Chouhan has demonstrated a high pliability quotient, which his appointment suggests has paid off handsomely. During the last national election, a political controversy arose on the surgical strikes of 2016. Chauhan in his capacity as Director General Military Operations (DGMO) then, intervened in famously answering a Right to Information (RTI) query that his directorate had no record of surgical strikes prior to the one executed in 2016. This punctured the opposition’s view that surgical strikes were de rigueur, only political parties per convention did not help themselves to the credit as did the ruling party in wake of the surgical strikes of 2016. For its part, the Congress had listed six operations it had overseen in its time, which this reply dashed to the ground. Though this transpired just after the elections, the controversy preceded it and can be expected to have had an effect on the outcome, feeding the information war surrounding the aerial surgical strikes that decisively shaped the outcome.

The RTI query itself was perhaps provoked by an exchange well prior to elections between the successive commanders of the Army’s Northern Command – Generals Hooda and Ranbir Singh. In retirement, Hooda, though avowedly apolitical, had drafted a national security policy for the grand old party, the Congress. This was a first of its kind document in fleshing out a national security doctrine to complement a political party’s manifesto. He was commanding general at the time of surgical strikes in wake of the Uri attack, while Ranbir Singh was the then DGMO.

Hooda held that surgical strikes were part of the Indian Army repertoire on the Line of Control. Though the strikes in 2016 were of a different order of magnitude, he was not in favour of these being over-hyped. In rebound, Ranbir Singh said, "From military point of view, these were successful tactical operations, which conveyed a very strategic message and the Indian Army was able to convey a very clear message to Pakistan that should they not stop any kind of misadventure along the LoC, they shall be given befitting reply." The matter might have rested at this, since neither general was saying anything outside military logic.

Chauhan as DGMO settled the controversy in Ranbir’s Singh’s favour, deflating the opposition’s clamour. His reply was quoted by Ranbir Singh in a press conference subsequent to elections. Both generals know very well that the reply was a lie, as do all who have served in the Indian Army and on the Line of Control of both sides, India and Pakistan.

Raids have been conducted across the Line of Control (LC) and the Congress contention that some of these trans-LC operations were in their time at the helm is certainly true. That the two generals held a belief to the contrary suggests they were trimming their sails to the prevailing wind. As is the wont of the regime in going after those who challenge it and rewarding those that do its bidding, both generals have been suitably rewarded.  Though Ranbir Singh was an early front runner for the CDS appointment, he received a sinecure as head of the Army’s think tank. Chauhan was made Military Adviser for his services, that continued in like vein even after his DGMO tenure.

Chauhan does not rest on his oars

Chauhan in his next appointment as Army Commander, Eastern Command went further. Taking cue of his regiment officer, CDS Rawat, he went on to egregiously comment on the anti-Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) protests. Recall, Rawat while speaking about leadership at a lecture, quite unnecessarily bad mouthed those on the barricades in defence of the civic concept of citizenship that informs the Constitution. CAA had overturned this in favour of an ethnic concept of citizenship, in line with the Hindutva philosophy of the ruling party. Since this was immediately prior to him being appointed CDS, it shows up a tacit criteria for the appointment: being a regime spokesman.

Rawat, true to form by way of which he had acquired a notoriety for discoursing on matters outside the military’s traditional pail, with confidence acquired from his proximity to Doval, had waded into the CAA controversy in favour of the regime’s position. Chauhan, over at Kolkata, chimed in similarly, saying, “The current government is keen on taking hard decisions that that have been pending for a long time. The Citizenship Amendment Bill was passed despite reservations from a couple of North Eastern states.” 

CAA intimately affected people in his Command’s area of operation. Since there was a potential for backlash - one that his statement shows he was aware of, presumably in reference to a potential blowback in Assam – his statement was of a political nature and, worse, was jarringly gushy. But then high achievement in this regime requires candidates for higher office to be suitably volubly and sycophantic. Recall the effusiveness in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence of the justice who went on to head the National Human Rights Commission.

Is General Chauhan professional?

Had the general stuck to his brief as a military man, at the time his eyes should have been pinned on what was happening across on the Tibetan plateau. His Command frontage witnessed a brief border flareup in North Sikkim, coincident with the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh. It is for the record that the Eastern Command’s frontage remained inert during the entire Ladakh crisis, with the commanding general only recently seeming to suggest that this was a good thing. Instead, there is viable case to be made that even if - for the sake of argument - Ladakh was imposed on in a manner that it could not strike back, there is no reason why Eastern Command could not needle the Chinese as a counter move?

Clearly, accountability for this inaction is to be laid at Rawat’s door, since as CDS he had a view of the entire frontage and could have shifted the weight of India’s response in a manner as to outpoint the Chinese. However, Chauhan could have also bottom-up agitated for having a go at the Chinese in theatres of advantage. Only the previous autumn, the Army had conducted exercises validating the Integrated Battle Group concept in Arunachal Pradesh. Troops were therefore readily available and well-practiced. The Command had stood up to the Chinese at Doklam. Chouhan did not have the imagination nor gumption to call the Chinese bluff on escalation. Both regime favourites – Rawat and Chauhan – thus let their side down.

The masterstroke – in regime terms

The regime is not about to take on the Chinese. As seen in its response to Ladakh, it has gone in for a policy of appeasement, trading space in the form of buffer zones for quietude. It has rationalised this with the argument that the time gained will be used to narrow the gap in comprehensive national power. What it would not let on is that the time gained gives it the space to consolidate Hindutva, the philosophy that informs the foundation of New India.

The regime came to power after ten years in the political wilderness, after much manipulation of the political field and the electorate’s perceptions. Polarisation was instilled by a fake narrative of a Muslim threat manifested in false flag bombings across Indian cities. A Hindu vote bank was thus created.

Alongside, a champion was manufactured in Narendra Modi as a larger-than-life figure who could be expected to be strong-on-defence. The narrative was bolstered by the hype over the surgical strikes. Though the landward surgical strike was a credible feat, the strategic outcome was shown up in the following Pulwama terror strike. The aerial surgical strike was a failure, as was the Indian response to Pakistan’s aerial riposte.

Gaining a second tenure at the helm owed to a higher voting percentage and number of seats brought about by the information war over the military’s showing in both strikes, and at Doklam against the Chinese. This was swiftly taken advantage of for pushing the regime’s ideological agenda, first in Kashmir and then with CAA.

It is evident that the crackdown in Kashmir had the backing of the military, even though in its advisory function it should have brought home to the regime that regime interest is not necessarily Indian interest. Even if - as Foreign Minister Jaishankar points out the feared number of deaths have not occurred – it does not take a peace studies professor to know that the problem has only been kicked down the road.

Violence indices mean nothing if the problem has not been tackled politically. What’s unfolding in Kashmir – with a gerrymandered election coming up - cannot be taken as a political ‘solution’, since it can only aggravate matters. It’s for the military, charged with the mandate of counter insurgency, to point this out. It has a secondary role in internal security; and, so must have a say.

This raises the question: What was Chauhan’s input as DGMO when Amit Shah evacuated Article 370 of any worth? It can be reasonably surmised – that just as many other brass hats – his input – if any – was a green light.

Then is the case of Agnipath. Rumour has it that Rawat was no in favour of this scheme. It is to General Naravane’s eternal credit that the regime had to wait him out before launching it. This begs the question what was the role of the two military advisers – Chauhan advising Doval and his predecessor in the post of military adviser, General Khandare, now advising Defence Minister Rajnath Singh? It is only befitting that Chauhan is now saddled with implementing what he perhaps advised favourably on: Agnipath.

What kind of CDS do we now have?

This implies the regime either has a like-minded or a ‘Yes Man’ as CDS. Like-mindedness is better than being a ‘Yes Man’. The former implies having a mind with an inclination that coincidentally happens to be aligned with that of the regime. A ‘Yes Man’, on the contrary, follows the dictate.

It would be fair to speculate that Chauhan is inclined towards a particular political position. Globally, most generals vote conservative. From Chauhan going out of his way to conform to the regime’s position, it cannot be readily ascertained that he publicly subscribes to its position of his own volition or has been put to it. If the former, then like-mindedness can be conceded. If nudged to intervene on the regime’s behalf, then it would show him up as pliable.

Here is cannot be irrefutably said either way of what make Chauhan is. That he has been elevated to CDS post makes a dim view of him credible. Even if this is mitigated by him being like-minded, it is still not in line with a traditional view of civil-military relations anchored in an apolitical military, going about its professional task and not interfering in political matters.

Our reading shows that Chauhan has not only been sub-professional in the two areas he could have made a difference: Kashmir and the response to Ladakh; but, has also made uncalled for political interventions. The primary finding of military sociology is that political and professional do not cohabit comfortably in the military brass.

The regime has a CDS it deserves

Regime interest is in a like-minded CDS, aligned with its ideology and willing to look the other way or participate in its implementation. The regime’s ambition is to upturn the secular pillar of the Constitution’s basic structure. When it goes about that, it would not like a backlash. It is setting the conditions for this already: witness the defanging of Muslims – one quarter from which protest might be expected - in the ongoing pursuit of the Popular Front of India.

As part of preliminary operations towards this end, the regime is taking care to render the military inert. A military sensitive to its guardianship role as regards the Constitution may take umbrage to its overturn. The regime has insured against such a hurdle coming its way, by putting the military to a professional till on high mountain fastnesses in the Himalayas. It is making the military chase its tail in restructuring into theatre commands at the higher level and into battle groups at the lower end. The military has been further hobbled by the Agnipath scheme. Thus, just as the other institutions of the State have been rendered ineffectual, the military has also been domesticated.

This explains the delay in getting a new CDS into place. The regime has a CDS who has a proven record of docility. No doubt socialisation into the regime’s thinking would have continued when Chauhan was Military Adviser. Thus, from the regime’s perspective, he is the right choice. The next crisis at the border or in Kashmir will show whether what is good for the regime is also in the national interest. The regime – and the nation - will find out if the masterstroke was a safe gamble.

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/hindutvas-outreach-to-muslim-india 
Hindutva’s ‘outreach’ to Muslim India 
 
Lately, Hindutva vehicle, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has been engaged in an outreach to the Indian Muslim community. Sarsanghchalak Dr. Mohan Bhagwat has toured a madrassa, had a meeting with a leading imam at a masjid and also met with a few members of the Muslim elite. This follows some conciliatory statements on his part in the recent past. 
The outreach and its attendant publicity show that the Hindutva strategy thus far has worked. As intended in the strategy of maximum pressure (to borrow a Trumpian phrase) employed by Hindutva against Muslim Indians, the Stockholm Syndrome has kicked in. Muslims - sufficiently softened - are right for the picking. Overwhelmed, the imam – perhaps accurately – referred to the saffronite heavy-weight as rashtrapita. 
However, the timing of the outreach suggests that it’s a tactical move and no change of heart is in the offing. 
Timing betrays intent 
 Firstly, it is in wake of the Nupur Sharma episode, so is a continuing bid to stanch adverse fallout of her remarks. The coming year portends a vishwaguru bid by India. India chairs the G20 and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation groupings in the upcoming year, with back-to-back summits in Delhi next autumn. With India figuring among electoral autocracies and majoritarianism eroding Indian soft power, it has much homework to do. For its part, with its 100 years coming up, the mother ship of India’s right wing, the RSS, needs a whitewash to its image, tied up as it is with communalism, violent extremism and non-participation in the freedom movement. 
 Secondly, alongside has been an India-wide crackdown on the Popular Front of India (PFI), an operation touted as the National Investigation Agency’s biggest. If the incarceration of Bhima-Koregaon-16 is indicative, there couldn’t be much water in the evidence sloshed about by the godi-media. After all, developments in the Nanded case – on accidental detonation of bombs intended to be planted by Hindutva agents in false-flag operations across Deccan - indicate that the Patna blasts – allegedly by PFI - could also well have been false-flag operations. Perhaps, the Patna blast is now being papered over, just as accountability for the Gujarat pogrom is being judicially swept under the carpet. (Recall the implication that human rights defenders made up a false case that the Narendra Modi-led provincial administration was complicit in the Gujarat pogrom.) Under the circumstance of State sponsored subterfuge, an outreach is the carrot in a ‘carrot and stick’ approach.
Thirdly, it helps dilute potential Muslim angst from the outcome of the Gyanvapi Mosque case. The Sarsangchalak earlier reined in Hindu extremists, indicating that they should not go beyond the three sthans – one of which was judicially delivered by Chief Justice Gogoi (for which he was duly rewarded), the second - egregiously reopened by the judiciary – being well on its way and a third - Mathura - in the pipeline. 
 Like the Titanic, the RSS with 100-years of history weighing it down, cannot change gears swiftly. There are impending strategic moves by the regime that require preemptive conditioning of Muslims, a setting of the stage for the rollout of these moves. This belies a change of heart. The famous ‘chronology’ – follow-on bugbears of Muslims to the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) - was Covid-interrupted. The census has been delayed, likely in order to get the chronology implemented alongside. Bonhomie and expectations from a dialogue in the run-up would defuse Muslim wariness and dissipate pushback, allowing for easier wrapping up of the exercise. 
 Simultaneous, ridding the Muslim community of its activists and militants will prevent recourse to protests that embarrassed the regime during the anti-CAA protests. A defanged community will line up with its papers and the empty-handed will populate detention camps mushrooming across India. 
Since stability on the social front is required till the two summits late next year are over with, the interim will be used to defuse tensions ratcheted up. The carrot and stick policy will be operational. The probability of Muslims succumbing to the carrot would be higher if the stick prevails over its militants. Thus, by when India is declared a Hindutva Republic in the centenary year of the RSS and the platinum jubilee year of the Republic, there would be consensus all round. 
 Dialogue by all means, but… 
 To be sure, dialogue has its uses. It can help both sides gain a measure of the opposite side’s thinking. For the RSS, if the dialogue gets Indian Muslims - held hostage in their own land –onboard the Hindutva enterprise, it would be a coup worth attempting. It helps RSS with legitmation. Hindutva’s vishwaguru-hood requires an Indian consensus to be in place. For the beleaguered minority, a dialogue could degrade negativity directed at them and allow them a place in the sun. 
 However, a dialogue can also be part of strategy to tire out, divide, hide and obscure. Further, peace studies insights have it that asymmetric dialogue is unhelpful. Power equations being awry, in such a dialogue there is little prospect of a win-win result. In such circumstance, the empowered wrest on the negotiation table what it cannot be gained otherwise - in this case willing subscription by the Muslim minority to its relegation in citizenship status. 
 Presumably, demands when met will lead to a letting up of the stick. The stick has been much in evidence comprising as it does micro-terror in the form of lynchings; violent extremism of processionists; the State’s bulldozer-terrorism; invisibalisation of Muslims through a cultural genocide; in-your-face threat from under-completion detention camps; information war through anti-Muslim misinformation; judiciary-sanctioned political detentions of Muslim Kashmiris and activists; judicial impunity for perpetrators for crimes against humanity; and public threats of genocide. Forcing compromise, even if conceded in a dialogue, would amount to extortion. 
 A dialogue examined 
 From the dialogue with the five Muslim wise men – they were all men - it turns out that, substantively, the RSS wishes Muslims to give up beef and accept Muslims are Hindu. Inter-alia, a juvenile demand is that Hindus not be referred to as kafir. Asking Indian Muslims to declare their Hindu antecedents is triumphalism on the RSS’ part. In the event, the five elite Muslim interlocutors did not subscribe to the Sarsangchalak’s reasoning that Muslims are a Hindu subset. They rightly put the Sarsangchalak wise that Muslims are instead, Indian. However, the civic concept of Indian citizenship has a dwindling subscription. The Muslim elite - its Ashrafs of foreign origin - are liable to miss this churn. This explains Prime Minister Modi asking his party to reach out Pasmanda Muslims, who - duly incentivized - can appreciate their ethnic roots in fresh light, engineering a horizontal schism in Muslims. 
Hindutva has it that Muslims are outsiders – professing devotion to an external holy land. Descendants of Hindus are part of the Hindu fold. Hindutva believes conversions were under duress and it magnanimously holds the door open for a return to the fold. The Sarsangchalak’s curious ask that madrassas also teach the Gita, along with the Quran, is thus explicable. It is the first – stealthy - step in Muslims being frog-marched to towards ghar wapsi. 
 As for giving up beef, it is a championing of an upper caste position. Muslims giving up beef in deference to upper caste sentiment is to buy peace. But, it’s also a step closer to upper caste fetish, vegetarianism, with demands ranging from no meat along kanwariya routes, no meat selling in vicinity of temple sites in Assam, no meat during navratri etc. (Strangely, the last has been absent this year compared to its stridence last year.) 
 It would be easy to concede that Kafir, having turned an epithet, can be excised from the Muslim vocabulary. The term is associated with jihad. Jihad has been odious since Islamists elevated it to being a sixth injunction in Islam. This misreading and indoctrination in it has seen untold suffering elsewhere in the Muslim world and has been comprehensively rejected everywhere. Hindutva asks that it be acknowledged there are many spiritual paths. Dogmatism of the orthodox on this score could in an internal dialogue be tempered by the logic in revelations such as ‘to each his own’; ‘there is no compulsion in religion’; and that all lands have been blessed by messengers, Hindustan being no exception. Dialogue is predicated on ‘give and take’ and sincerity. Muslims cannot have their cake and eat it too. 
Preconditions of dialogue 
 On a Muslim response to the outreach, deserting a potential joint front with other likeminded political parties, civil rights groups and liberal proponents would not do. Hindutva would prefer Muslims are isolated from such synergistic meeting of minds. A dialogue must simultaneously be broached with others, at the very least for apprising them of developments on the Hindutva track. In light of the right wing dominance in political culture, opposition forces sink or swim together. Hindutva appears to have understood this, therefore its salami slicing approach – singling out Muslims for outreach attention. 

Dialogue must also be proceeded with alongside and separately within the community. A takeover of the minority’s imagination by militants or various orthodoxies is best avoided. For its part, Hindutva will provoke militant backlash, so that its use of the stick can be justified. Hindutva is hydra-headed and gargantuan, capable of outpointing a piecemeal approach. Outreach responses can turn out as ineffectual as the successive missives fired off by the Constitutional Conduct Group. 
 It would be churlish to deny mobilization by Muslims in the gallies and mohallahs in anticipation of an existential threat. The State has been shown up complicit in incidents of violent extremism. There is a Statist push to neuter community self-protection by propaganda that these are ‘sleeper cells’. The State may argue for monopoly over force, but is selective on who it devolves force on to – foot-soldiers of the right wing ecosystem. Its militias parade in localities and join processions. With the State abdicating or absent, civilian protection is a community responsibility. 
 Inputs for strategising 
 Hindutva is working towards dealing Muslims a horizontal schism. ‘Divide and rule’ is a Chanakyan edict, adopted by colonialists with good measure. Ridding ourselves of colonialism – as the prime minister wishes - does not mean giving up on traditional practices of governance. The State is already busy with vertical slashes in Assam between indigenous Muslims and Bengali Muslims. Under the challenge, if events equivalent of those originating in the historical meeting in 1906 with the colonial power in Simla are to be avoided, due preparation is called for. 
 Firstly, Hindus have to wrest back their religion from its perversion by Hindutva, Hinduism appropriated for political ends. It is not a solely Muslim responsibility to save India. The hands of traditional and liberal Hindus have to be strengthened. Just as Muslims withstood Islamism, Hindus must reclaim their religion from political appropriation. 
Secondly, a minority cannot exercise a veto if the majority wishes India to go saffron. Muslims can only insist on their space. Minimalist aims are better than ambitious ones. 
 Thirdly, displacing it can only be through a joint front, formed in face of Hindutva efforts to undercut it. This does not necessarily have to be political party-based, and certainly not on a Muslim political party. People’s movements provide heart, the success of the anti-CAA agitation proving the point. Hindutva has ensured association with Muslims as political suicide. If the political opposition is to be resurrected, Muslims must finally form a vote bank to offset Hindutva’s creation of a Hindu one. 
Hindutva has had a head-start of a century. Its organizational capacity and capacity for subterfuge is unmatched. To believe that the supplications for discharge from jails by its icon, Savarkar, were out of funk of the colonial master is wrong. Instead, it was for propagating Hindutva, showing up the single-mindedness in the phenomenon Hindutva that does not balk even at murder, lies, ethnic cleansing and pogroms. To it, ends justify means. It has captured the State, seen in the State lending its foreign policy lately to Hindutva’s purposes. Internal contradictions alone can bring it down, such as a pracharak prime minister-gone-rogue, a Moghul-style fratricide or raitas wanting a piece of the action. When Hindutva is a spent force, such as from an economy in self-destruct mode, Indian Muslims are liable to be scapegoats. As cushion, a dialogue with Hindutva is useful, duly complemented by dialogue all round – within and with other stakeholders, political and civil society.

Thursday, 22 September 2022

India’s Journey to #NewIndia:

Through an Ashokan Lens

https://www.dropbox.com/s/0iky5djvouxdubo/Ali%27s%20Version%20-%20From%20India%20to%20%23NewIndia.pdf?dl=0

India’s Journey to #NewIndia:

Through an Ashokan Lens

By Ali Ahmed

This e-book – his 18th compilation – comprises his posts on

Substack – Ali’s Version

 In memory of Mother,

whworried about India’s future

Preface

India is being hauled through ‘interesting times’ by the regime led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Its political dominance and its capacity for abuse of power being such, there is little pushback. Therefore, the regime is publicly unfolding its plan for the remaking India into a Hindu Rashtra without facing any discordant notes.

Hindutva dominance of political culture has implications for strategic culture. The muscular image of New India is belied by India’s rather timid response to the challenge of China. Strategic culture is not quite what it’s made out to be by regime apologists.

The finding on these pages is that India’s war avoidance strategy - amounting to appeasement - springs not from strategic factors – as asymmetry in comprehensive national power as some might have it – but a political need not to rock the ship of State as it transits from New India to Hindu Rashtra. Consolidation of Hindutva is sought, otherwise liable to be truncated by strategic setback.

Therefore, the regime’s grand strategy is introspective. It is driven not by national interest conventionally defined but by Hindutva taken as the national interest. Thus, India’s strategy prongs – such as its military’s posturing, nuclear deterrence, approach to Kashmir and towards its largest minority - must be seen accordingly.

The implications for the military of this political shift have been dealt with piecemeal in strategic commentary. The Agnipath scheme, the beginnings of a cultural reset and leaving the Services rudderless show how Hindutva is whittling the military. To the regime, the military’s organisational cultural tumult is future insurance against a military pushback provoked by a Constitutional coup ushering in a Second – Hindutva-inspired - Republic.

The year has provided a turbulent backdrop in the thrust for a reshaping of the West ordained ‘world order’ by Russia, aligned with China. India has used the distraction of a conventional war in Europe - and the renewed global appreciation of its geo-strategic location - for its ends: limiting attention to its journey towards being an ethnic quasi-democracy.

These aspects of the strategic scene are captured in respective parts in this e-book: political, grand strategy, strategy, military sociology, Muslim India and global affairs. Over the past six months (March-September 2022), the 35 commentaries here figured as Substack posts on Ali’s Version. Collectively, they constitute a liberal critique of India’s journey to Hindu Rashtra.

Note: For Hindu Rashtra read Hindutva’s Rashtra, Hindu Rashtra being the legitimising term used by Hindutva for its political enterprise. Hindutva cannot deliver Ram Rajya, evocative as the latter is of equality and justice