http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=110800

Counter insurgency is not a policeman’s job

One of India’s leading civilian experts on counter insurgency, Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan,[2] has recently articulated a cogent case on handing over of the Indian army’s counter insurgency commitment to the central armed police forces (CAPF). He argues that the two-front threat having materialized over the last couple of years in Chinese belligerence on the Line of Actual Control, the army, that is primarily meant for tackling external threats, cannot continue to be tied down by counter insurgency commitments. It must focus on the conventional threat to redress the power asymmetry with China. Consequently, it needs to disengage from its internal security commitments and concentrate on its primary task of deterring and when necessary militarily tackling the nation’s external foes.

This is not a new idea, dating as it does to the NN Vohra task force report to the Group of Ministers’ (GoM) that was formed after the Kargil Review Committee suggested a review in its eponymous report after the Kargil War. The task force, stated: “The ultimate objective should be to entrust Internal Security (IS)/Counter Insurgency (CI) duties entirely to CPMFs and the Rashtriya Rifles, thus de-inducting the Army from these duties, wherever possible.”[3] Over the years, this has been largely operationalised, with the army-led paramilitary forces, the RR and Assam Rifles (AR) deployed in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and North East (NE) respectively and the CAPF operating in Central India. Some army formations also operate in both theaters and the paramilitary – the RR and AR - is under the operational control of the army at both locations.

CAPF are central armed police forces that are officered by their respective cadre officers and have representation of the Indian Police Service in their higher echelons. Central Para Military Forces, a term used by the Group of Ministers, include the CAPF and the RR and the Assam Rifles. Whereas army officers tenant all appointments in the RR and the force answers to the army chain of command, the AR has its own cadre of officers, with army officers also in the echelons of command, company upwards. It is operationally under the army, but administratively under the Ministry of Home through the Director General AR located at Shillong.  The army prefers to use the term CAPF, that includes border guarding forces, but does not include the AR and RR, preserving the term ‘paramilitary’ for the latter two in light of the army officer representation in their hierarchy.

Whereas Prof. Rajagopalan plugs for the RR to take on a conventional role in light of the increased threat, the GoM had only envisaged the CAPF – specifically the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) – taking on counter insurgency, being trained and upgraded accordingly. Pulling out of the army implies the RR and AR would come under the police framework, reporting to state authorities and the home ministry. Army formations in a counter insurgency role would be substituted by the CRPF, for which the force has been under training for the last two decades.

The RR was raised in order to tackle Pakistan’s proxy war and rear area security. The intensity of the situation having considerably subsided, attributable in part to the RR, it is possible to hand over the situation to the police and reassign the RR for conventional tasks, for instance in the communication zone or relieving regular troops deployed in less threatened sectors and in depth. This is practicable and is being done to the extent possible with reports having it that some formations, equivalent to a RR Force, have already been deployed in Ladakh. Reports also have it that some 200 CAPF companies have been inducted into J&K, though these have been played down as companies returning from election duty.

As to whether the RR can thin out from other areas, it is a question of threat perception. Currently, the operations are at ebb as Pakistan is calibrating its proxy war to its aims in the Afghanistan end game. It has therefore refrained from its usual summer campaign of infiltration. However, the post Afghanistan peace process period is uncertain. Since the RR has a well-consolidated presence in Kashmir, it may be prudent to see if the potential ‘first step’ in the India-Pakistan peace process is liable to birth a credible India-Pakistan peace process. It would not do to disturb the grid prematurely.

Though the two-front threat is live, the two-and-half front threat cannot be discounted too soon. This is particularly applicable for the NE, where in case ‘push comes to shove’ with China, the potential for instability in the NE – the ‘half front’ - could be exploited by China to activate the rear areas. In such a circumstance, whereas there would be a need to pull the army elements deployed out for a conventional role and substituting these with the CAPF, the command and control will need to continue under the army in keeping with the Vohra task force recommendation that reads: “where the Army is involved, the senior most Army officer should have the clear responsibility and authority, for all operational planning and execution).”

Significantly, the CAPF do not have the appropriate operational ethos for counter insurgency. Counter insurgency – to paraphrase the quip regarding peacekeeping – is in principle not an army task, but only the army can do it. One does not need to look further than the recent ambush in Bastar of the CAPF in which some 25 troopers were lost. The ambush was virtually a repeat of one a decade back in which some 75 policemen lost their lives. Whether this professional deficit can be mitigated by training is debatable considering that the lessons learnt from the 2010 ambush mentioned appear not to have made a difference a decade on. Recall also it’s taking over of duties from the Border Security Force in the Valley in the mid 2000s, in compliance with the GoM recommendation that border guarding forces revert to their respective borders and roles, had caused considerable turbulence.

There is no doctrinal pamphlet of the CAPF on counter insurgency. Little is known as to the policy planning division in the ministry of home affairs that the Vohra task force had asked be rekindled. It is well known that the parachuting of the Indian Police Service (IPS) officers with no ground experience into the higher echelon of the CAPF is its Achilles heel. The CAPF are liable with their usual highhandedness to worsen the situation, resulting in army deployment at a later, much-vitiated stage.

There is the indelicate matter of command and control and turf. In the North East, the AR would require giving its Shillong headquarters an operational role, and the headquarters answering in its operational avatar to the Eastern Command, and in due course to the theater command to come up facing China. Since the CRPF can at best supplement the RR in Kashmir, rather than substitute it, the operational control of the RR would continue with the army. There is a requirement to disengage the corps headquarters from counter insurgency role, as had been done on an ad hoc and controversially unsuccessful basis in the Kargil War. The RR headquarters has moved out of Delhi and is now an appendage to the Northern Command. It can take on an operational role, under Northern Command, but collaborating extensively with the state police and CAPF under the unified headquarters framework that was earlier chaired by the chief minister, and now, presumably, is headed by the lieutenant governor of the union territory.  

Finally, as the leading realist theoretician in India, Prof. Rajagopalan, rightly sees the power asymmetry in a two-front situation necessitating the army hand over the half-front to the CAPF, including the AR but without the RR. In case of an active two-front situation, there could potentially be two half-fronts, together making for three fronts. While the professor calls for responsiveness through upgrading the CAPF, prevention may be better.

Prevention entails a doctrinally-compliant political ministration of insurgency problems now that the kinetic indices in all three theaters – Kashmir, North East and Central India - are relatively negligible. The Nagaland ceasefire framework needs to be taken to its logical conclusion, while in Kashmir the applicability of the Nagaland template can be explored. The numerous ‘suspension of operations’ agreements in the North East must be speedily wrapped up and the outreach to the outlier Paresh Barua faction to culminate in an agreement soon.

 

The professor is right, that India cannot have its cake and eat it too. For him, the conventional threat merits a disengagement of the army. The problem is that the CRPF cannot be relied on to substitute the army, particularly when the threat of proxy war can be expected to heighten in a conflict situation. Consequently, the new threat environment entails India end its interminable insurgencies applying political imagination and the political capital from its parliamentary majority at the government’s disposal.

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[2] Prof. Rajagopalan is author of the well regarded, Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, New Delhi: Rouledge, 2008.

[3] Quotes are from National Security Council Secretariat, Group of Ministers’ Report on National Security, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf, pp. 50-51.

 https://www.claws.in/cohesion-in-the-army-the-battle-winning-factor/

Cohesion in the army: The battle winning factor

In military sociology literature, the Standard Model on military cohesion can be envisaged as a set of concentric circles, with the inner circle housing the primary group. The primary group is the section/platoon, with the secondary group, comprising the company and battalion, enclosing it. These are nested within the organization that can be equated with the formation, which is, in turn, ensconced in the institutional embrace of the army. Finally, though not in the model per se, an outer, societal circle is worth adding.

Theory on cohesion has it that cohesion within the primary group – referred to as horizontal bonding - contributes to combat effectiveness: greater the cohesion, greater the combat effectiveness. The vice versa is also true – greater the combat effectiveness, greater the cohesion – when the primary group is vertically integrated with the hierarchy through the leadership channel. The chain of authority aligns the task of the primary group with the operational mission. The leader is thus at the intersection of horizontal bonding and vertical integration.

The outer circles can be visualized as the shaft of the spear in their support to primary and secondary group cohesion with the battalion and its subunits at the spear tip. In additional to being supportive of the secondary and primary groups, the outer circles – society, army, formation – have also to forge and sustain cohesion within respective self, since they also have to withstand the test of conflict. If they disintegrate, then cohesion at the lower levels are liable to dissipate likewise. Therefore, cohesion has to attend the nation, the army and its subordinate formations.

Here, cohesion at the upper levels is not covered, since the focus is on cohesion in the lowest level: secondary and primary group. Suffice it to mention that cohesion enhancement measures at the higher levels must not be at the cost of or impinge on cohesion of lower levels. Only the supports to cohesion covered here.

Supports for Cohesion

Societal support for the army is evident in the regard accorded to the military. Culturally, the kshatriya (warrior caste) has always had a pride of place. India’s renowned epics narrate tales of martial prowess and daredevilry. The continuing regard is easy to see in the turn out at the funeral of martyrs at their home stations. The institution of the war memorial at New Delhi and the museum coming up close by are expressions of support.

The institutional support is evident in the operational focus of the military, its provision of the weapons, equipment and material necessary for prosecution of war. The military has not only consistently proven up to the demands of national security, most recently in stalling Chinese designs in Ladakh, but is currently in a substantial reorientation from the western to the northern front. This operational churn translates downwards in a renewed emphasis on the primary role, the conventional role of preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty, largely through deterrence. Such a focus imparts an immediacy that is supportive of cohesion.

Organisational support is in translating this doctrinal shift into reality. Integrated battle groups are forming, attenuating the premium on the operational task. These are then practiced to perfection in exercises, field firing and training opportunities. This rigmarole of peace time is cohesion imparting since it brings the formations’ into joint and combined arms’ implementation of doctrine and its evolution.

While this privileges the operational task, formations also lend a social prop to cohesion, such as by observing the anniversaries of battles to reaffirm the martial commitment. Such measures along with their proficiency in the operational role, imparts elan to the formation. This has knock-on benefit for cohesion at the battalion and below levels. It bears underlining here that higher echelons leaning on the lower in a manpower guzzling manner detracts from cohesion forming at the lower levels on account of manpower turbulence leading to a deficit in forging of social affiliations necessary for bonding, especially in peace stations.

The consequential level?

The secondary group level – battalion level and its subunits - is usually taken as the consequential one, since it directly provisions the primary group with the social and operational necessities. The social props include observing of battle honour days, mandir parades, running langars, NCO clubs, family welfare etc. Such measures routinise the face-to-face meetings and informal interactions necessary for the primary group members to form affiliations and friendships. Significantly, the operational tasking also filters down from this level in the form of a mission for the primary group. Organised training supervised at this level helps deepen the social bonds by instilling trust and teamwork within primary groups.

Cohesion of the primary group thus has plentiful support within the army. Even if not present to necessary levels ab initio, the test of combat is such that cohesion is also forged on the job, with primary group members forging teams while mobilizing and under fire. The surfeit of cohesion at the primary group is self evident in the battle field showing, for instance on the Kargil heights. The battalions involved already had coherent primary groups, some having been brought over from the Valley floor and some when deinducting from Siachen. Where the army suffered initial knocks, such as at Golden Temple, the early phase of the Jaffna battle, in the initial probing action at Kargil and in the early years of the Rashtriya Rifles’ raising, primary group cohesion was up and humming at the crunch.

Primary group bonding is critical. Combat effectiveness this generates translates into cohesion for the upper levels. Unless the beaches are taken in an amphibious assault, there can be no success. Unless the trench line is not breached and the bunkers taken, the success signal cannot be sent up. Individual expertise and daredevilry spring from and anchor on a cohesive primary group. Nurturing it is a sine qua non for a ticking army.

Role of leadership

Tony Ashworth pointed to the possibility of cohesion having an underside in his subtitle to his book: Trench Warfare 1914-18: The Live and Let Live System. That cohesive groups can also subscribe to a counter narrative became obvious in the Vietnam War. Gabriel and Savage’s well known study of the war, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army, brings this out clinically in their references to shirking and fraggings. This brings to fore the role of the leader.

The showing of 16 Bihar at the onset of the Ladakh crisis is a case to point on what the ingredient cohesion does to and for the fighting man, making it a magic battle winning ingredient. A year on from Galwan, the manner Colonel Santosh Babu’s disparate outfit fought off the Chinese is instructive. Elements from the artillery and another unit were in his patrol, but that did not come in the way of their showing under his task-oriented leadership. His battalion’s response under the lion-like Lamb bears testimony to leadership being a key to cohesion, and what cohesive primary and secondary groups deliver even under sudden onset of contingency. Clearly, the unit looked after its men as a Kote NCO would the weapons on his charge.   

Not only is a leader to forge and sustain cohesion, but to also ensure that it is articulated positively in line with the mandate and mission. Broadly, while the non/junior commissioned officers may be charged with the former, the latter aspect can majorly rest with officers. Battalion level priorities must include creating of opportunities for the bonding enhancers: social settings and task-oriented training. The former instills the camaraderie and the latter uses this social capital for forging teams. Even if the opportunity for the former is limited in pressure cooker environments of cantonments, the latter is sufficient. Both officer and below-officer-level leaders’ participation in and supervision of such training, instills both horizontal and vertical integration.

Conclusion

Cohesion thus must figure in key result area slides of administration inspections and must be observable on training. Formations must instigate it and support it. This is relatively easier done when the threat environment is relatively high, for example during Operation Ablaze, the mobilization phase of 1965 War, or in the six month run up to the 1971 War. The situation is not as intense now, but the two-front threat environment is no longer merely a perception but an impending reality. The army has adopted a punitive deterrent posture on the Pakistan front and credible deterrence against China. The latter has compelled forming of two Mountain Strike Corps and the central sector is to get an additional division. All this tumult must not obscure that the primary group will finally be relied on for results. The training that reorienting operational roles entails must be used optimally to enhance cohesion at all levels.

As a final word, while considerable theory on cohesion exists, it is Western. In keeping with the prime minister’s exhortation on indigenous knowledge generation, the firewall between academia and the military must be lowered for a look through the military sociology lens at the military to answer the question: How does cohesion make the army tick?

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

UNPUBLISHED LETTER TO THE EDITOR

WRITTEN SOMETIME IN MID NINETIES

This letter addresses a point of grave import inadvertently and tangentially raised by Capt Vishvasrao in his article ‘The Pouch’ in the June’95 issue of the INFANTRY.

 

The substantive point in his article is laudable- that the officer for the privilege of ‘leading men’ must validate his commission into the position of command through selfless action.

 

The point is also not the obvious one, which the Ordnance Corps remains oblivious to,- that of the requirement to relegate the present day pouches and allied equipment to the museum.

 

The point at issue is also not the wisdom of employment of ‘agents’ i.e. the encouragement of sahayaks to report on the goings on in the company. Such a manner of keeping a ear to the ground may be a matter of personal leadership style. Suffice it to mention that it may have an adverse impact on mutual trust and, therefore, on cohesion.

 

The point is in the morale related nature of the ‘blood splattered pouches’, referred to by the author. Surely we are beyond the Wild West stage of ‘notching’ the barrels with their respective score of human lives. We must be cautious in abetting false machismo- especially with the blood of fellow citizens. Brutalisation is a phenomenon that creeps in on the unwary to corrode professionalism. Let us remind ourselves of the message of the Gita- to act in a detached and impersonal manner. ‘Personal victory over a militant’ being ‘symbolised’ in any form is a manner of involvement in internal security situations that engenders the attitude of regarding the militant as the enemy- which has historically been proven as being a prelude to disaster.

 

The American experience in Vietnam is instructive in that one of the symptoms of disintegration of the American military was the collection of ‘trophies’, some so inhuman as the ears of the dead Vietcong. By no means is this meant to be a comparison with the elan with which soldiers as the author are performing a distasteful if necessary task. It is merely to alert us to the potential of losing our sensitivity, the precursor to loss of professionalism, in such situations characterised by the author as ‘real operations’. Therefore the apposite nature, though unintended by the author, of the subtitle of the article - ‘Vietcong to Bravo Company’.

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=110455 

An assessment of new ‘strategies’ for Pakistan and China

A report in The Print informs citing sources that the Indian army has come up with new strategies for Pakistan and China that it respectively calls ‘punitive deterrence’ and ‘credible deterrence’. The new posture is result of the rebalancing on since last year after China’s foray into Ladakh from the western front to the northern front.

Deterrence is prevailing on the adversary against taking action that it would either be punished for or find relatively costly. Punitive deterrence would imply deterrence by punishment, in that India would retaliate heavily in case of Pakistani military misadventure. Whereas for the China front, credible deterrence is based on deterrence by denial predicated on India making it prohibitive for China to bite of territory by effective defence, besides retaining the capability to make equivalent gains elsewhere to neutralize any Chinese designs on Indian territory.

The tumult involves restructure of the infantry elements of a strike corps in the plains into a second mountain strike corps (MSC), the first MSC having witnessed its raising truncated through last decade. Also, the concept of integrated battle groups (IBGs), having been tried out over last few years, is to be operationalised across both fronts. Alongside, there is a bid for more monies for defence, with the army asking for some 1700 tanks and the artillery that there is no disruption to artillery modernization.   

The ‘sources’ who put out this significant change into the open domain have taken care to preempt any possibility of a course correct that the pandemic and our tepid response provided. To them, ‘more of the same’ is necessary to emphasise in order to undercut any thought of doing things differently post pandemic. That India’s health and social security infrastructure was revealed as hollow by covid wave II necessitates a rethink on India’s priorities, which such reinsertion of militarized discourse into the national cognitive domain prevents.

There is little that has changed in the supposed military changes underway.

On the western front, it remains unclear how over the short term, punitive deterrence will be exercised with the third strike corps. The advantage of being one-up on Pakistan had enabled the conventional asymmetry (ours three to their two strike corps). With the infantry elements reassigned to the northern front as part of the MSC, the infantry would require to be recreated. Over the long term it is predictable that the army will recoup the infantry elements of the strike corps. Precedence can be seen in the army filling in the gaps that arose due to the raising of the Rashtriya Rifles by poaching their numbers from the regular army. As a result it now has 60 battalions of infantry reserve. The central police forces having been extensively deployed in Kashmir since mid 1999, occasioned by the disembowelment of Article 370, are in a position to relieve the Rashtriya Rifles, which can in turn relieve the infantry from the Line of Control, thereby creating the infantry needed by the third strike corps when warranted. The temporary short term premium on infantry is thus chimerical.

Against China, the preexisting posture of deterrence manifestly failed, though the IBG concept had been proven in an exercise in Arunachal Pradesh by the time the Chinese and covid intervened early last year. It was a force in being that could have been used at the outset of the crisis for offensive options as counter grab, but remained unused. Therefore, it is not for want of capability as much as a deficit in political will that saw a slovenly response in Ladakh by India. The intensity of perception management that has followed only proves that much needed to be hidden. Therefore, it is not accretion in force capability that is necessary. It is no one’s case that India can bridge the gap in comprehensive national power between the two sides. 

The IBGs are being projected as game changers. These are task oriented forces tailored to specific objectives, in a move away from operations of corps levels formations. This rethink had been forced by the nuclear overhang on the Pakistan front and on the China front by the difficult terrain configuration and the long frontage. On the Pakistan front, IBGs are to make gains offensively, whereas on the China front they are to be suitably poised to react to Chinese nibbling by reinforcing the sectors threatened as also slicing off elsewhere for trade off later. Does this secure India?

Against Pakistan, the last military make over was with the roll out of ‘cold start’ doctrine (CSD). CSD had it that swift retribution would be exacted in case of a terror attack breaching India’s famed tolerance threshold, but keeping in mind the nuclear awing Pakistan quickly drew down over the conventional asymmetry. However, now that the conventional asymmetry is relative less (one strike corps losing its infantry elements), Pakistan, through its new concept of war fighting doctrinal innovation, can putatively take on India’s forces exercising its punitive intent.

In the doctrinal shadow boxing over last decade, it had reconfigured its conventional forces to blunt India’s conventional advantage, even while threatening - for the sake of form – India with nuclear redlines. This had deterred India with following through with cold start, even in case of Pulwama levels of terror attack, and restricted it to ‘surgical strikes’. Therefore, it is unlikely India can do more with less; so ‘punitive’ is an unnecessary bit of macho jargon. Recreation of the asymmetry that allows for a punitive strategy is therefore necessary and certainly on the cards, once the current day pivot to the China front stabilises.

As for the China front, ‘credible deterrence’ makes little sense as a phrase, since deterrence is meant to be credible, based on three characteristics: capability, intent and communication. Through two MSCs divided up into IBGs, India has given itself the capability. Its mirror deployment in Ladakh and action on the Kailash range in late August is meant to convey implacable intent, while communication is through an overt pivot to the China front, unmistakably serving notice to China against further salami slicing.

Against China, the Line of Actual Control is strongly held, though not at Line of Control levels. Reports are of an additional division sent into Ladakh that is likely to stay put long term. IBGs are to be stationed along the LAC length, to respond with alacrity to any future incursions, not only defensively - as was the case along the Kailash range - but offensively in a shorter time frame, both to cover the gaps, vast frontages and the large forward zones in some sectors, plus partaking of counter grab where feasible. This is reminiscent of deterrence by denial, making not only biting off prohibitive, but the likelihood of losing a morsel alongside elsewhere.

Whereas earlier the Panagarh MSC was being readied for this, now there are two MSCs for the role. Against a credibility yardstick, besides covid onset, commentary last year had it that India restrained from exercising offensive options as counter grab, since the comprehensive national power imbalance weighed against this. Recall practiced MSC reserves were at hand but used only for the ‘mirror deployment’ undertaken. It is not axiomatic that doubling the IBG capacity enables political will any. In fact, contrarily, the ability to carry the conflict to the enemy shall make the CNP factor kick in more significantly, reinforcing preexisting self-deterrence against escalation. In short, ‘more of the same’ is not necessarily better.

Importantly, since deterrence by definition entails influencing the adversary’s mind, it presumes that the adversary is out to do something that needs deterring. This needs interrogation in light of China restricting itself to its 1959 claim line, when it could have done more having caught Indians off guard last year. If Chinese interests are not expansive, then the good part is that there is little to deter. The bad part is that building up China as a threat which can only be militarily deterred, reduces a focus post covid on other options that could reasonably present themselves as efficacious.

The principal aspect of the new Indian strategic posture is a bid to frame the post covid possibilities. The manner the new strategies are being put out in the public domain, through sources rather than officially and upfront through the chief of defence staff mechanism or the defence ministry, makes for a surreptitious move. While the newsworthiness of the military at the time of covid wave II may seem anachronistic and intended to distract from the mishandling of the crisis, it is worth interrogating if the moves in the military sphere are the direction to go post covid.

Covid is a juncture at which India needs reappraising its strategic direction, in terms of continuing in a dangerous neighbourhood by doing the same things differently or doing something different. A shift to human security predicated on privileging the education and health sectors is warranted, implying self-evident knock-on diplomatic initiatives with neighbours and corresponding dilution in strategic postures. The new strategic posture must therefore be debated with vigour as India’s covid hit economy does not permit it to have its cake and eat it too. More than a pivot from the west to the north, India needs a pivot from traditional national security thinking to the human security paradigm.  

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 https://thekashmirwalla.com/2021/06/afghan-conundrum-india-pakistan-and-kashmir-ceasefire/

 

A case for ceasefire in Kashmir

A political dominant approach to the twin India-Pakistan and Kashmir problems would require a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) and internally in Kashmir as well. The Indo-Pak track would entail taking comprehensive bilateral dialogue forward while within Kashmir, it could mean an outreach to the dissident and mainstream political parties.

The Indo-Pak track – the ceasefire along LoC – is now past the 100 day mark, drawing appreciative comment from the Army chief as the “first step” in a process of normalization with Pakistan, the second step then logically should be a ceasefire within Kashmir.

This is perhaps on the cards, with India giving itself another summer campaign to mop up the Valley floor off militants that it calls “terrorists” and assuring itself of Pakistani good behavior during the peak infiltration season, summer. The two sides, with an eye on the Afghanistan peace talks unfolding in Dubai, have till September to see how things turn out.

If positive in and for Afghanistan, then it is likely that the remainder steps the Army chief tacitly alluded to may roll out over the coming winter. Here an advocacy is made for a ceasefire in Kashmir to build pressure on both sides to take this route not tread so far due to lack of imagination, force of habit and sheer cussedness.

In the liberal scheme, force has a place as a means to an end, bringing a violent situation under control in order that the political track of strategy is employed for conflict termination. This is in line with the sub-conventional doctrinal thinking in the Indian Army — iron fist in velvet glove — which has it that the role of the security forces is to bring the violence down to levels in which governance is unimpeded and is conducive to political initiatives.

Force is used to gain a position of advantage from which talks are initiated towards conflict resolution.

In Kashmir, by the indicators that are put out periodically by the police, the security situation is well under control. Not only are gunfights fewer but fewer youth are signing up to militancy, as admitted officially. This is outcome of relentless joint operations and innovative, if debatable means, such burials of killed militants in a faraway place using Covid-19 as an excuse against gatherings.

The current juncture is potentially the right time for transition from kinetic to non-kinetic means. A ceasefire with Pakistan, reiterated in February, suggests that the proxy war factor is at ebb. Internally, sub-conventional operations are now being handled largely with the police supported by the Rashtriya Rifles and the Central Armed Police Forces. In fact, one division worth of Rashtriya Rifles has been redeployed to Eastern Ladakh against the Chinese, indicating that the situation is considerably under control in Kashmir.

Externally, there are reports of the two sides, India and Pakistan, meeting in Dubai. While these were in relation to the Afghanistan peace process towards which there is much activity on in the Gulf, the end February ceasefire is a result of such talks. Besides, there were feelers from no less than the Pakistan army chief on wanting to change course on Kashmir. The Imran Khan government too did its own messaging. It has also appointed a National Security Adviser who can take the thread of talks forward. 

The internal political track has unfolded in district council elections in Jammu and Kashmir. The political track of strategy has not culminated in that there is a constituency delimitation exercise underway, where after there would be legislative elections. A reversion to statehood is possible to visualize, as indicated by the home minister once. This suggests that the political track has a viable end state, an elected legislature of a state in place over the coming couple of years.

The realist case for a ceasefire may perhaps be more appealing for the Indian state that has lately cultivated an image of being tough and resolute on matters of security. Realist believe in a few verities, such as that there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. This thinking under-grids outreach to Pakistan, including the semi-secret talks in Dubai between the two security establishments. The realist case is that India cannot afford a two front security problematic. Therefore, with the China front heating up since last year, it has had to let up on the Pakistan front.

If a ceasefire within Kashmir is not offered alongside, then Pakistan will be incentivized to continue its infiltration to reduce the asymmetry opened up by continuing Indian operations. A ceasefire within enhances scope for ceasefire continuing on the LoC, besides creating enabling conditions for the militant groups to come over-ground.

Pakistan can tacitly influence the Kashmiris militants to lay down arms and prevail on their proxy fighters and nationals to surrender. There could be an adjunct agreement with Pak to take back the Pakistani terrorists, with a safe corridor being given over a limited timeframe through Kashmir to a few exit points for the terrorists to make their exit.

From a realist perspective, ensuring that Kashmir does not serve as a magnet for foreign fighters would be useful once the Afghan peace process kicks in. In case Afghanistan reverts to a civil war condition, then proxy wars by regional states may be witnessed. A spill over from such a proxy war into Kashmir is feared. Preventing this requires that India and Pakistan arrive at a modus vivendi prior and as tacitly being urged by friends in the Gulf and the United States. Taking forward the process begun with their LC ceasefire in a ceasefire in Kashmir is a major confidence building measure between the two.    

In terms of timing, a ceasefire this summer can see the militants concentrated by the winter. Acceptance by the major indigenous groups will ensure that the remaining groups, that are inspired by jihadism or having sponsors across, would be marginalized and amenable to surgical action.

Militant group members would require persuasion by political leaders, civil society and by their families. This needs emphasizing since the youth taking to arms are exercising a natural right to rebel against perceived oppression. A ceasefire call by the state is therefore a necessary initial step and sustaining it an essential next step establishing the bonafides of the state in their minds’ eye as a sincere actor. The state for its part does not lose its authority, primacy or aura, and can project that its initiative is part of its social contract obligation of being responsive to its citizens.

As in the north east, the groups coming over ground can be cantonmented suitably or allowed back into communities under surveillance and guarantee by the community for desisting from militancy. A ceasefire monitoring group exists in Nagaland that provides precedence and a framework for a similar set up. It could comprise eminent peace practitioners from the rest of India along with Kashmiris, including Pandits, and governmental representatives.

Perhaps over the coming winter modalities can be worked out for return of Kashmiri militants on the other side of the LoC to progressively rejoin the mainstream over the following year. The winter can see the political activity necessary in the run up to legislature elections sometime next year after the constituency delimitation exercise, or the following year.

Advertising the elections as meant for a state, rather than a Union Territory, assembly will incentivize militants coming over-ground, enthuse political participation and see public support. This has an appeal for political decision makers in Delhi, who could then go in to national elections with peace in Kashmir with its statehood restored prior to elections.

Prior to national elections and with the support of the state government in Srinagar, a dignified return of Kashmiri Pandits will certainly be an indubitable marker of return of passable normalcy to Kashmir. The elected state government can then proceed with substantial matters as negotiating with Delhi coverage of Article 371 for the state — in a return to the Article 370 status under a different route.

For Pakistan, it can claim to have contributed to restoration of statehood to Kashmir. It would also gain some political space for its ally Taliban in Afghanistan. There are reports of Pakistan contemplating rationalizing the status of Gilgit-Baltistan, critical to the security of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The advantage for India is in its engagement in Afghanistan continuing and enhancing with Taliban reciprocating its outreach. For allowing space to Pakistan in Afghanistan and easing its two front security predicament, deft foreign policy footwork by India would require extracting from it a commitment to desist from internationalizing Kashmir and reverting to the Simla treaty-ordained bilateral and peaceable framework.

A timely ceasefire now in Kashmir thus has potential as a win-win option for all sides: India, Pakistan, Kashmiris. It is mindful of geopolitics unfolding in the region, sensitive to the potential of geo-economics to further peace, alive to internal political compulsions in Delhi and empathetic to the pain of Kashmiris, including Pandits. It is plausible in both liberal and realist security paradigms, and therefore can be sold to the government in India that operates within the latter. It heralds and is in sync with a post Covid environment when human security shall assume priority. It is responsive to the United Nations secretary general’s global call for ceasefires in prevailing conflicts made at the onset of the pandemic, but better heeded late than never. 

 

 

 

VOLUME XLV NUMBER 6 JUNE 2021

An Archive of India’s Military History

MILITARY MUSINGS: 150 YEARS OF INDIAN MILITARY THOUGHT FROM THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

Edited by Sqn. Ldr. Rana T.S. Chhina, MBE

Speaking Tiger, New Delhi, 2021, pp. 439,

`899.00

The United Service Institution (USI) describes itself as the oldest think tank in Asia. Set up by the British, it opened in Simla in late nineteenth century. Soon after Independence, it moved to New Delhi. Though under considerable pressure from lack of resources in the early years, it managed to nurture successive generations of Indian military leaders into military matters and mores. Its journal, the USI Journal, claiming to be the oldest military affairs journal in Asia, has been a ubiquitous presence in military stations across the country, with this reviewer once spotting it in a tent of the company commander at a remote United Nations peacekeeping operating base in Gumruk, Pibor County, Jonglei State, South Sudan. (As an aside, the company commander received a paralysing wound in a rebel ambush the following day but recovered enough to command his infantry battalion, though propped up by two crutches.)

This is only to illustrate the USI Journalas a popular professional journal, supplementing the USI’s efforts at imparting professional military education, a military culture and a more widely, a strategic culture. A collection of articles from the Journal at its 150^th anniversary is thus a thoughtful commemoration of its sesquicentennial year.

The USI sensibly chose Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retired), head of the Center of Armed Forces Historical Research, that is lodged in the USI, to undertake the mammoth task of sifting through the 150 years of the quarterly publication (monthly for a brief period some 125 years ago) to cull out the articles that best captured their respective age and its concerns. Rana as an expert on colonial military history, with an award of an Honorary Member of British Empire to boot, was best placed to pick out the articles in the pre-independence era. Having been a crack helicopter pilot with the Indian Air Force (‘crack’ because in the mid-eighties he held the world record for the highest landing for his class of helicopter, probably in Siachen),he was also well placed to spot articles that shaped the post-independence period.

Rana has put together a historical volume, a collector’s item as such, covering 150 momentous years of military history in South Asia. His was a challenging task, since there is so much that has happened in the years the journal has kept a meticulous watch on affairs military in the region. Not only did the army get institutionalised in the early part of the period but is sister services joined it soon thereafter. Not only did Indian military fight in the two world wars, but has participated in four wars, two high intensity military engagements (the Indian Peace Keeping Force and Kargil War), UN peacekeeping and several counter insurgency operations since. Rightly, Rana does not restrict his collation to the operational part, but defining military history widely, he also includes a sociological picture of the manner the services have evolved, embedded in the wider flow of national security. Capturing the grand sweep of history witnessed by the USI in 439 pages has been remarkably done. Alongside, he has taken care to reproduce in an unexpurgated form the articles as originally published to convey the essence of a particular period.

Some articles resonate through the years. For instance, the second article in the anthology, written in 1972, talks of the strategic value of Kashmir declaiming: “’Cashmere’ then may perhaps be regarded as the great N.W (North West) bastion of India; and, lying, as it does within the general frontiers of Hindustan, its defensive resources should, I hold, be absolutely subordinated to those of the state in any grand imperial scheme of defence for India (p. 20).” In the question and answer session at a talk by Captain Francis Younghusband, the legendary traveller who surveyed routes into Tibet from India, Younghusband talked of find Russian goods at all the towns he visited in China during a 7000 km long journey. His testimony that “Russian goods had even been brought into Leh, Ladak and Kashmir (99),” suggest potential for revival of the old Silk Route connections across what is currently a rather troubled Line of Actual Control.

The credibility of the journal is evident from Captain Liddell Hart sending it the paper, ‘A re-definition of strategy’, in 1929. The paper lays out his famous strategy of indirect approach and is a marvel in strategic writing. Presciently he anticipates developments over the coming decades, writing: “The civil conditions give the strategist not only an alternative channel for action but an additional lever towards his military aims. By threatening economic objectives, he may…  dislocate the enemy’s military dispositions… slip past the military shield and strike at them with decisive results. This potential development of strategy is greatly favoured by the development of the air weapon… (p. 187).”

Included is a lecture by Sardar KM Panikkar, as the chair referred to him, in which the great strategist dilates on the nature of war changing in the twentieth century to Total War, thereby making peacemaking an impossible task. The question and answer session at the end of his talk is a must read on the quality of the strategic discussion in the mid-fifties and has insights into the manner India approached security in the years leading up to the infamous debacle in 1962. The 2018 national security lecture delivered by Amb. Shivshankar Menon while bringing the reader up to date, also bespeaks of the continuity in India’s security concerns through the decades.

The military emphasizing jointness these days, the growth and concerns of all three services are evenly represented. The journal had way back in 1912 highlighted the importance of the air planeinvention. Two further articles on air power punctuate the anthology, one of which was authored by the legendary Field Marshal Arjan Singh early in his retirement. For even handedness, maritime history has an equal place, with three articles enabling a rough sketch of the navy as it developed, including one by its former chief, Tahiliani. The only war covered explicitly is 1971 War, while articles on campaigns such as in West Asia in World War II and the Naxal problem are included. 

Perhaps the most significant theme of the anthology is on the moral element. A British officer leaving for home after service in World War II, pays tribute to Indian soldiers he served with, writing: “I remember a Sikh sepoy plucking a drowning P.M. (Punjabi Musalman) out of the mud in a large pond in Bihar, Pathans carrying Sikh wounded to the Regimental Aid Post on the bullet swept slopes of Kohima, P.M.’s bringing in a wounded Pathan in the Arakan, Sikhs of the 1/11 Sikh Regiment giving their all to break a Jap block in Sittang Bend to aid the hard-pressed Battalion of the 8^th Gorkhas… In a first class battalion, a man’s religion is his private affair, but he fights and dies a proud member of the Indian Army. What an example to others!” The last perhaps in reference to the Partition clouds that were then building up. The baton of legacy is passed on by Brigadier HS Yadav in his ‘Tips from a Subedar Major’, by Brigadier NB Grant on the soldier’s honour code in his ‘An Officer and Gentleman’ and Brigadier Sardeshpande, in his ‘Passing it on’, passes on ethics and the joy of soldiering. 

Finally, it can only be said that Rana has succeeded in his aim of presenting the reader with a “flavour” of the contents of the journal. The journal is indeed an archive of India’s military history and record of its security consciousness. Rana’s is a but sampler, with only illustrative examples, that should serve to lead readers to the rest of the corpus in the USI’s Pyaralal library, where this reviewer for one has spent his most absorbing time.