http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=92061

AT THE DOORSTEP OF INDIAN MILITARY POLITICIZATION

It would appear that the air chief, who is to retire this September, is auditioning for a job. While angling for a post retirement job is not unusual for those in uniform, khakis or safari suits, the air chief is likely lining up for a kick upstairs, as no less than India's first Chief of Defence Staff equivalent. This can be made out from his claim that the Pakistani air force did not cross the Line of Control (LC) at Rajauri-Naushera on 27 February, the day after India delivered its reprisal at Balakot for the Pulwama terror attack. 
Media reports on his statement at a function at Gwalior air base commemorating the Kargil War's twentieth anniversary draw attention alongside to the Indian statement on Pakistani aggression and air intrusion into Indian air space that day. Explaining this away later, sources in the air force reportedly suggested that intrusion was not by Pakistani air planes but by ordnance used by the Pakistani air force in its stand-off attack on Indian military installations along the LC, which, in the event, missed their intended targets. 
Perhaps the air chief - being himself a hero of the Kargil War - got carried away at his motivational talk to airmen at Gwalior air base. He was pointing out that while Indian pilots hit their target a Balakot - a controversial claim - the Pakistanis did not. For their part, the Pakistanis claim to have deliberately missed their Indian military targets, quite like the Indians - according to the Pakistani military spokesperson - missed theirs. 
Only a couple of weeks back, the army let on that its two senior commanders in the sector, the army and corps commander, had escaped targeting at the tactical level headquarters that was targeted in an air raid by the Pakistanis. Media reports that the army is in the midst of shifting air defence units to the LC. For its part, the air force, staking a claim to shooting down an F-16 had provided evidence in the form of missile parts that had been recovered from the Indian side of the LC. It is apparent that till the air chief rewrote history, the version on which both sides agreed was that the Pakistanis did come across, even if they exited equally speedily chased away by intrepid airmen led by redoubtable, bewhiskered, Abhinandan Varthaman. 
Admittedly, contemporary versions of events are an information war battleground and military history is collateral damage in conflict. However, for the air chief to go overboard in the manner he has must have something more to it. Of the two possible explanations above - the air chief wanting an extension and playing to the gallery at an air base - the former unfortunately may hold more water, and there lies the trouble.
Rumours are rife of an impending defence structural reform. Many commentators are making a pitch for these, arguing that the renewed mandate with an enhanced majority allows the government to do more for defence, in particular implement the reforms left over from the post Kargil era when these were first put down in the recommendations of successive review panels. The chief of defence staff equivalent appointment is a holdover from the period. The intervening governments did not have the political heft. 
The current government set up a defence planning committee (DPC) under its national security adviser (NSA) early last year. It is amply clear that two of its four sub-committees, namely, on policy and strategy and plans and capability development, cannot but have a chair higher than the three chiefs. Neither can the chairman chiefs of staff rule against the other two, nor, without a conflict of interest, rule favourably on his service position sent up by him as its chief. No civilian can substitute since the defence secretary is of an inferior rank to the three chiefs. The NSA, though a man-for-all-seasons, being head of the DPC, cannot also head the two subcommittees, howsoever much he may like to play the role of the chief of defence staff. While he displaced the cabinet secretary from the strategic policy group headship, he cannot also displace a military man from heading the two sub-committees. So the government is likely to be considering elevating a military man at long last to the post of chief of defence staff equivalent.
Since the government has the option of deep selection, having set a precedent in doing so with the selection of the army chief last time, who it will appoint - if it does - is a matter of speculation. The Americans once reached down some thirty slots to elevate Colin Powell to head the joint chiefs panel there. Even so, there are two lead contenders: the air chief who hangs up his wings in September and the army chief who hangs up his boots in December. 
It is no secret for readers of this publication and in this part of India, that the army chief has endeared himself to the government in his leading the army. The army chief has constantly piped up on the government's Kashmir policy. The personal interest is in his justifying to himself - as much as to others - his controversial elevation to the job based on his counter insurgency expertise, and also the government's line through its first term resulting in over 600 youth dead. The army latest play of music for the ears of its political master has been the rejection of any notion that surgical strikes were also carried out by the opposition when in government. These - to the northern army commander and its operations branch - were patented by the Modi-Doval combine. This appears to be a bit of dual positioning - the northern army commander for the army chief's baton while the army chief has the chief of defence staff chair in his sights. 
The maneuverings have acquired competition. The air force has gone out of its way to bolster the ruling party head's questionable claim that some 300 terrorists perished in its aerial surgical strike. The claim turned the tables on the opposition that had till then seemingly clawed its way back based on the traditional issues as unemployment, farmers' suicides, rural distress, economic mismanagement etc. With Pulwama and its riposte at Balakot, the narrative changed. 
If only the fight had stayed at the political level. Engineering a false flag operation - such as at Pulwama - cannot be put beyond the intelligence agencies. It is already clear that they were the first converts to the cultural nationalist ideology of their political minders. However, for a service to pitch-in unmindful of the traditional stipulation on being apolitical is concerning. True, the tradition has taken a beating of late. The last air chief while demitting the appointment trashed the narrative of 'strategic restraint' - the strategic doctrine of the predecessor government he had once served - in line with the then newly minted Modi government's redefining of India. Such revisionism is of a piece with the writing of a military history of South Asia's wars by a former air marshal, which at the very outset reveal cultural nationalist inspiration in his take - shared with Hindutva ideologues - that Moghuls who once ruled and lived in India were foreigners. 
In the instant case, the air force - presumably miffed by the opposition's calling out the government's grandstanding - jumped into the fray. Not only did the air force serve up ammunition in support for the government's position on the curious Rafale deal, but also pushed inordinately for taking the government's word on Balakot. It lent its professionally authoritative status and credibility for political use of its political masters. 
If the air chief does not have an axe to grind - and he is by all accounts an honourable man - then can it be inferred instead that the air force was put to it? This possibility is the worse one, with implications for civil-military relations in terms of politicization of the military. It bespeaks of a military brass that is politically deaf, lacking spine, ideologically persuaded or all three combined. 
This is the outcome of the precedent set by this government in the army chief's appointment. The brass was served notice to speak what the government wishes to hear. This has set up the scramble. Whispers have it that a current frontrunner for next army chief has links with the new ruling party working head, dating to their juvenile friendship. The selection of a chief is a visible manifestation of potential politicization, politicization itself is what could follow: swallowing of the cultural nationalist bait by the military.
Over the coming term, the government may interpret its mandate expansively, believing that enhanced voting in its favour allows it to finally get down to the Hindutva project. This may entail constitutional changes 2022 onwards when it has control of the Rajya Sabha. If de jure changes are arrived at in a legally valid procedure - and do not fall afoul of the Supreme Court's jealous guarding of the doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution - the army has absolutely no role or say. Therefore, the government would be well-advised to sensibly keep the military at professional distance. It can do without overkill in trying - in the interim - to shape the military's political understanding in line with its thinking by an unnecessary bear-hug in its civil-military relations. 

https://countercurrents.org/2019/06/the-india-we-want-what-would-a-military-of-hindu-india-look-like

What would a military of Hindu India look like?

In Modi 2.0 India is liable to be transformed from a secular republic to Hindu India. The opportunity of an enhanced mandate is likely to be put to good use in furthering the Hindutva project. The ruling party will prefer to view its renewed lease on power with a larger vote share as voter endorsement for the project.

A strategically assertive India is a facet of the cultural nationalist project. Voters were swayed by the image of a tough New India, demonstrated by the Balakot episode in the last India-Pakistan crisis. The government will therefore use their verdict as excuse to continue being strong–on-defence. This will determine the place of the military in the larger scheme of the creation of a majoritarian state.

Currently, the military is professional, apolitical and secular. The facet of professionalism is one that the government would certainly like to retain in the military since India is in a tough neighbourhood and India’s military is critical to the government’s national security showing, particularly since it wishes to be bold in the tradition of Balakot and Doklam against adversaries, Pakistan and China, respectively.

Of the two other facets, secular is an irritant that the government may like to have the military jettison. In the interim till secular figures in the preamble of the Constitution, the government may redefine the term. Since in its view India is secular because it is predominantly Hindu, the term can be taken as reflecting secularism inherent in Hindu ethos and away from any pseudo-secular and western constructs that it may have been hitherto associated with.

As for apolitical, the government can do with the military being held at arm’s length from politics. Since this is a proud tradition of the Indian military, this is the easy part. The military would continue its engagement in Kashmir and vigilance against Chinese intrusions.

The army is in the midst of reform, in which it is to implement the organisational changes that were validated in the recently concluded exercises of its western command. The air force is upgrading its inventory and firepower, receiving the Rafales by year end and having invested in new purchases of stand-off weapons. These professional preoccupations of the military will keep it introspective and away from any eddies from the making of New India.

Even so, if precedent is any guide, the government is likely to continue deep selection of service chiefs. The last army chief selection served it rather well in implementing its Kashmir strategy, that currently accounts for over 600 youth killed there, over 100 of which only this year.

The army and air force chiefs are up for retirement. Even if one of the two is kicked upstairs into tenanting the chief of defence staff equivalent position – in case the rumours of defence sector reforms implementation sometime soon are true – in choosing their successors the government would reasonably wish to have either pliable or likeminded chiefs. This measure would render the military inert and liable to look away if the creation of New India turns out turbulent politically.

The effect on professionalism of appointing a service chief as per a subjective consideration – dubbed in the case of the selection of the army chief last time as the criterion of ‘ease of working with’ – can be expected.

However, the dilution of professionalism, if any, would not be overly dangerous. On the China border the Wuhan spirit can be expected to continue under tutelage of a China expert as the new foreign minister. Against Pakistan, not only has India a preponderance but Pakistan is also in doldrums economically.

In a way, the manner of civil military relations in India can be expected to shift partially from objective civilian control to subjective civilian control. Objective civilian control is in keeping the army to the professional till and away from politics, while subjective civilian control is to ensure like mindedness at the military apex in order that the military keeps out of politics. The nature of impending selection of the two chiefs would indicate the direction the government wishes to proceed on this score.

The creation of New India will proceed apace. The military has no role in this nor is there any call for it to have a view on the new destination for India as a majoritarian democracy. The shift from civic to ethnic nationalism is not within the military’s purview, even if military members may have a personal opinion the direction of change.

That said, the military believes it has a constitutional obligation to defend the Constitution. So long as the government proceeds with its changes in the national identity down a procedurally valid parliamentary route – one that does not run afoul of the judiciary that sees itself as the last bastion of the Constitution’s basic principles – the military has no say in the matter. It would be at ease with defending Constitution revised by fair means.

This anticipatory analysis suggests that it is in the best interests of all – the ruling party, the military, the opposition – to keep the military out of the politics that are likely to loom over the question of turning India into a Hindu India. The government would be wise to stick with objective civilian control to the extent it is comfortable, even if it wishes to appoint a chief by avoiding once again the traditional seniority principle.

As for the military leadership, it is sufficiently politically savvy to know that turbulence can attend the political project of foisting of New India as defined by cultural nationalism. It must keep the military low profile and away from politics, if need be by being prickly to even its political masters. It must regularly water the three facets it is reputed for – professionalism, apolitical and secular – as they come under pressure in the second term of Narendra Modi.

http://www.milligazette.com/news/16701-questioning-afresh-indian-militarys-social-representativeness

Questioning afresh Indian military’s social representativeness

 The Milli Gazette Online

Published Online: Jun 12, 2019

The latest evidence of the political marginalistion of Muslims in India is that a mere 25 Muslims figure in the lower house parliamentarians, up by 3 from the last one, from among some 172 million Indian Muslims.

An equally concerning figure, but less remarked upon, is that of the 291 cadets of the passing out course from the National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakvasla, in the Spring Term 2019, only five were Indian Muslims; all of 1.7 per cent. The figure is from the NDA’s magazine, Trishakti, covering the events of the just-elapsed Spring Term. In contrast, seven cadets are from foreign countries, including friendly Muslim, mainly central Asian states. 

This is not a statistic easily found in the open domain, since the military – the army in this case – once famously said that it does not record the religious affiliation of its members. Its reticence is easy to understand since such a figure would be embarrassing.

The figure has been worked out by counting the Muslim names amongst those of the passing out course, leaving out those from friendly foreign countries. Among the 132 names below photos of the faculty, only one was Muslim. Two junior commissioned officer-instructors were Muslim, both unsurprisingly in the equitation section since the only horsed cavalry regiment, 61 Cavalry, from which the instructors are deputed, traditionally has had some Rajasthani Muslims.

Browsing similarly earlier through some three mid-decade years of commemorative magazines put out by the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun, the figure worked out to two per cent of those commissioned from that academy being Muslim.

Since the IMA commissioned some 70 odd foreign officers, including 50 per term from Afghanistan under a training assistance programme, foreign officer commissions are over six times the number for Indian Muslims, though the Indian Muslim population is six times that of Afghanistan and its neighbouring states.

The figure for Other Ranks is different, but inflated. A figure dating to the controversy over the number of Muslims in the army that attended the Sachar Committee seeking out the same was 29000 Muslims, about 3 per cent. The numbers are higher as Kashmiris are enrolled into the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry regiment. These days some are in the territorial army’s home and hearth units, who unfortunately periodically figure among Kashmiri dead owing to being targeted by militants since theirs is an intelligence function. For their pains, this year one of their number got the nation’s highest honour, the Ashok Chakra. This should not detract from the wide absence of Muslims in the organization. 

Should the missing Muslims be concerning? This is a question Defence Minister Rajnath Singh needs answering as he beings his new innings.

To be sure, the meager number of Muslims in the security forces is not limited to the period of ascent of cultural nationalism. Little was done to remedy matters in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) period.

While the UPA took steps to increase numbers of Muslims in the central police forces and the police, the figures declined over the succeeding years. Of late the government has discontinued publishing the figures having disbanded the records bureau that put out such statistics. This is of a piece with the government’s allergy to unflattering - if revealing – statistics. While numbers of toilets constructed and gas cylinders distributed are kosher, numbers such as that of unemployed and the gross domestic product are a state secret (at least up until elections are over and done with).

Given the bleak numbers for Muslims, it can be confidently asserted that the numbers for members of the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in India’s officer corps is equally if not more abysmal. Under-representation in the professionally consequential officer corps cannot be compensated by higher numbers in the soldiery. In their case, the scheduled castes are represented in the Mahar regiment, with Ambedkar’s father being a prominent member; while the scheduled tribes are in the Bihar regiment. Even the numbers in the soldiery cannot push their representation to a decent contrast with their proportion of the population.

In effect, by extrapolation it can be seen that some 40 per cent of India’s population – roughly 14 per cent Muslims, 16 per cent scheduled caste and 9 per cent scheduled tribe – have a presence of about 4 per cent in the officer corps – short by 10 times in proportion to their numbers. With New India appraising the 75 years mark in independent existence, the competitive capability of disadvantaged communities is stark.

It can be argued that in an all-volunteer military only merit prevails. However, that the regimental system is an unacknowledged bit of affirmative action for the ‘martial races’ needs airing to, first, bust this myth, and, more importantly, to act as precedence for increasing numbers of unrepresented communities in the military.

During election run-up, commentary surfaced on certain political parties wishing for new regiments to increase the numbers of their constituents in the military. Given the military largesse in terms of a bloated revenue budget, cornering a piece of the pie for respective communities is unexceptionable. Conversely, this also accounts for the defence of the status quo by votaries of the regimental system.

The defenders have it that India should ‘not fix what ain’t broke’. Cohesion is taken as a force multiplier and not to be compromised by politically motivated meddling in the recruiting system. This is an operational level argument that could do with superseding by a political level consideration.

Firstly, the cohesion argument is dated. The seventy-plus years of a shared national life has leveled out differences considerably. There is sufficient mutual comprehension and empathy between Indians from different ethnic groups to generate the cohesion necessary for operational effectiveness. Incidentally, cohesion is liable to being cemented by the rigour of military training and the dangers of combat, as routinely obtains in the all class units across the armed forces and paramilitary. Is it the military’s case that there is a deficit in such units? 

Significantly, a military that does not reflect India’s diversity belies the principle of unity-in-diversity underwriting India’s democracy. The defence minister is of a party that takes pride in flattening out differences. The prime minister believes that the minorities have been taken for a ride by the Congress over the past seventy years. The employment and developmental indices, such as lack of representation in the meritocratic officer corps even seventy years after independence, show this up starkly. While the ‘sabka vikas’ slogan if fine, it would yet take two generations before these communities measure up to the competition.

More needs doing, not in terms of affirmative action, but in terms of targeting their best to sign up for a life in uniform. This could include targeted advertising, more National Cadet Corps (NCC) units in their areas and funding coaching academies through universities in areas inhabited by them. Only then will ‘sabka vishwas’ come on the horizon. Since such a measure would be targeting the 40 per cent disadvantaged population and not 14 per cent Muslims alone, it would amount to yet one more measure to pull up by the boot straps the lower of the two castes – the poor – mentioned by the prime minister in his reworking of the caste system into two castes – one of the poor and the second who help them out of poverty. It would thus not suffer the ‘appeasement’ tag.

The ball is now in Rajnath Singh’s court. Armed here with the arguments necessary he can reclaim his ministerial space, denied earlier in the first round of distribution of cabinet committees. He can undo at long last what Ambedkar described in his inimitable exposition on caste: ‘Some closed the door: Others found it closed against them.’ 

http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=91653

KASHMIR: AS THE ARMY SURVEYS THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

A trial balloon at the very outset of the new innings of the Modi sarkar had it that his newly ensconced home minister and right-hand man, Amit Shah, was contemplating delimiting constituencies afresh in Jammu and Kashmir. It drew the expected reactions on either side of the Pir Panjal. The good part is that the statist cat is now out of the bag, helping civil society strategise for what follows over the next five years.
A prospective scenario that could unfold begins with the delimitation exercise. It would provide a more plausible cover to postpone elections than the currently-pending postponement, attributable to the Amarnath Yatra taking precedence over returning the state to democratic governance. The exercise can be expected to turn in constituency boundaries and identify constituencies for scheduled caste/tribe candidates that will foist the Hindutva vanguard, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), to its Mission 44. A little help from those waiting in the Valley for a dividend dating to their participation in spiking, last November, a promising move to return to an elected government. 
This would enable Amit Shah to fulfill his campaign promise of being rid of Article 370, Article 35A having been wrapped as an outstanding issue by then by either judicial verdict or ordinance. This is a well trodden route having been adopted to dilute Article 370 ever since compliant legislatures were deployed after incarcerating Sheikh Abdullah in the early fifties. 
This will have predictable security fallout, warned of by the mainstream parties in the Valley. The last time the right wing had bestirred itself in Jammu, led by their icon Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, even the Lion of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, had feared for the future of Kashmir. Fearful of the steps he was taking such as an outreach to the Americans - as per intelligence input - the government put him away and out of the way. Now the right wing is at the door-step. With mainstream parties outflanked, the field is left to the separatists and the insurgency. 
Anticipating as much, Rajnath Singh - who functioned as the soft face of the government in its last innings - has been displaced from North Block. Amit Shah, who reputedly has a photo of Chanakya behind his desk, has advisedly been made de-facto deputy prime minister. In one description, the musical chairs has turned up a 'fearsome four' - strongman Modi, hatchet-man Ajit Doval, good-cop Rajnath and a political novice Jaishankar. The 'fearsome four' thesis has it that they are to collectively put the fear into Kashmiri backers, Pakistan, with Kashmir then falling dutifully into the bag. The pieces are in place to face the outcome. 
What does such a scenario signify for the army? The answer is predicated on the validity or otherwise of the three assumptions behind the yet-to-unfold Kashmir strategy. The first is that security forces having obediently put away some 600 militants, including a proportion of Pakistani terrorists, over the past three years, they would continue with same gusto into the future. This year's figure is already into the lower three digits. The second is that having administered a telling blow to Pakistan at Balakot, it is almost pleading to be let off the hook, so much so that its military has already started disbanding itself, with a budgetary cut this year as a good beginning. The third is that the current tenure will see Amit Shah positioning to take over from his mentor and earning his spurs to do so by coming up with the 'permanent Kashmir solution' that his predecessor promised but was too empathetic to deliver on. 
Taking the second assumption first, that Pakistan is on the ropes is read from its second missive to India begging for talks. Taking no chances, India is buying another 100 spice bombs to hurl across safely from own side of the border. It has speeded up mating the Brahmos to the Su-30. Since the last crisis ended on the note of missile exchanges, that in the event were aborted by American intervention, India is shopping for an American air defence cover to complement its Russian one, over and above the missile shield its own defence scientists have 'conferred' on it. Seeing all this, Pakistan is liable to extend the Bajwa doctrine, placate the financial action task force, be bailed out by the international monetary fund and have the conditionalities of the loan rein in the military. Besides, the Pakistanis have been served notice by the Americans that the onus to repair relations with India is on them. Not to forget, the Americans have already given India the green signal on the right of reply by military means to terror threats. 
With the wind stolen from Pakistan's sails, the Kashmiris would be left high and dry. Their replenishment rate for lost youth is stalling. The Zakir Musa funeral witnessed a lower turnout than it should have, even if Musa had a falling out with his compatriots over which ideology to die for. Admittedly, the state was better prepared this time to preempt a turnout. The rate at which youth participating in the militancy are being dispatched bespeaks of considerable information flow networks, for which the army takes care to credit the intelligence agencies and the police. It is no wonder then that - 'in frustration' is what we are told - militants are going after 'informers', including the territorial army's home and hearth Kashmiri soldiers visiting families and possible love interests of militants. 
As for the radicalization afoot, it is not all bad since it provides India with alibi to continue the killings, human rights coming a distant second to the Islamist threat in the era of populism. Nothing else can be inferred from the release of the 560 page long human rights report listing some 432 cases by the two do-gooder organizations in the Valley and India's turning a blind eye to 58 communications and 20 requests for visits from UN special rapporteurs in relation to their mandates there.
The third assumption is that voters have retained Modi to have him implement Hindutva. Since HIndutva is intelligible only in relation to its position on the Other - internal and external - Muslim. Besides, putting the national minority in its place - a task already done over the past five years and demonstrated tellingly in election results having no trace of a Muslim vote - this entails a hardline in Kashmir and against Pakistan. With liberal voices left dumbfounded in wake of the election victory, the home-front stands taken care of.
The army can therefore be unleashed. It need no longer be bothered as traditionally with a hand being tied behind its back. A BJP government in Srinagar run by a Hindu from Jammu will keep soft separatists off its back. One of the reasons the previous government was shown the door - in one reading of events recounted in the book Majoritarian State - was because it was somewhat unsettled by the unending killings. Apparently, the decision to withdraw support was foisted on the Jammu based ruling party honcho after meetings in Delhi which included one with Doval. (That the high official was moonlighting in a political capacity is no surprise. He was at it yet again late last year, reportedly briefing the ruling party at its headquarters immediately prior to the national elections being called.)
What is the army to make of this strategy and its role in it? Traditionally conceived civil-military relations would have it that it must take its orders and populate the martyrs' graveyards. The politics surrounding its orders are not within its ken. The unspoken advantage of sticking to the traditional is that it keeps the army at the forefront, enabling turf protection and protecting privileges that are otherwise threatened such as the put/let downs just received over limits to cars purchased under the canteen arrangements and the denial of non-functional upgradation. 
Can the army's role over the coming five years be appreciated differently? As the primary security agency, it has a duty to input decision making. Its professional advice must be tendered forthrightly. In a circumstance in which the political level is creating the conditions for instability - and looking to the army to clear up the mess - the army needs pushing back on the inadvisability of the situation being unhinged in first place. It has only recently returned the situation to a modicum of stability since its deterioration after the Burhan Wani killing. It would be back to square one - for perhaps the fifth time since troubles began - in case the politics in the scenario plays out. 
As for whether the second assumption holds, it must remind its civilian bosses that nuclear weapons are not meant for Diwali. Crisis can go to conflict in short order. Militaries in the nuclear age are better used for deterrence and not the real thing. Power drunk security minders believing their own propaganda pose a greater threat to national security if the army plays truant.
Finally, the third assumption is entirely false. The ruling party has not been returned to power to wage war against Indians. In any case, the army is patently not an instrument of Nagpur. It must insist on procedural rigour in policy and decision making. It should not be cowed by the 'fearsome four', but play the bureaucratic politics game deftly, perhaps relying on Jaishankar's wise counsel from within to moderate decisions. It can so prove that the army remains the only institution still standing. 

The Book Review

https://thebookreviewindia.org/recontextualizing-the-escalation-debate/

Recontextualizing The Escalation Debate

Book Name: LINE ON FIRE: CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS AND 

INDIA-PAKISTAN ESCALATION DYNAMICS

Author name: Happymon Jacob

Book Year: 2019

Publisher Name: Oxford University Press, New Delhi

Book Price: 995

Book Pages: 432

Happymon Jacob is a rising-star, academic and journalist, a columnist with The Hindu and anchor of a web series on strategic affairs at The Wire, besides teaching at a leading international relations faculty at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. His book justifies the preceding sentence. He has taken pains in using escalation theory to interpret the data gathered on ceasefire violations since 2003 to reveal that India and the surrounding regions are sitting on a seemingly dormant, if not active, volcano. The data collation and analysis work was undertaken as part of a project he spearheads, India-Pakistan Conflict Monitor that has his doctoral student, Tanvi Kulkarni, assisting with the research.

Happymon makes the case that the ceasefire violations (CFV)––ever so routine as to be easily dismissed as inconsequential––not only have an inherent escalatory potential, but also serve to exacerbate crisis. Escalation is along three dimensions––political, diplomatic and military. In a key contribution, he reveals that CFVs are largely generated by ‘autonomous military factors’ (AMF) internal to the two militaries engaged in eye-ball-to-eye-ball confrontation on the Line of Control (LoC). He makes the case not only by looking at the data he has culled but also from eight case studies demonstrating the impetus to escalation stemming from CFVs.

Jacob’s finding is that the escalatory potential of CFVs can no longer be neglected since media-fanned nationalism may tie down a crisis decision maker’s hands, forcing a choice that may not be the rational and preferred option. His recommendation as a corollary is that an institutionalized regime along the LoC and the international boundary (IB) needs to be put in place.

The book had a timely release, hitting the shelves just prior to the recent India-Pakistan crisis. The crisis witnessed India’s trans-LoC aerial strike at Balakot, followed immediately by Pakistan’s vertical escalation along the LoC in the Rajouri-Naushera sector in military targeting by its air force, both for the first time. While a terror attack three years back at Uri that is close to the LoC resulted in surgical strikes, this time the crisis was sparked by a terror incident away from the LoC. It only partially played out on the LoC in heightened CFVs and the use of Pakistani aerial firepower astride it. (The precedent for an aerial attack on the LoC was in the Indian use of air power on the LoC in 2002 during the long-duration crisis, Operation Parakram.)

Reportedly, as the crisis ratcheted up, India readied missiles for retaliatory strikes to any Pakistani counter attack to its Balakot aerial strike, with Pakistan promising to respond in kind. Belated intervention by the Americans stayed yet another round of missile exchanges. What the crisis suggests is that a future crisis may be set-off at a higher threshold of blows, making it more difficult for either side to step off or step back. Happymon’s book is a timely reminder that the next crisis may not be triggered by a terror incident, but is as likely as not to spring from situational dynamics along the LoC itself.

Jacob implacably reveals the policy shortcomings of the two neighbours, into their eighth decade of sharing a common border. While for the militaries on the LoC to be in an operational active state may be understandable, it cannot be condoned on the basis of there being no common ground rules along the length of the international border. Apparently the last meeting to work out mutual border guarding standard operating procedures was in the early sixties. He is entirely right in characterizing this state of affairs as an unacceptable abdication of political responsibility and bureaucratic inattention that requires urgent fixing.

While known within strategic circles, Happymon spills the beans for the lay reader that the ceasefire along the LoC is not based on a written document but is ‘an understanding’. This was supposedly arrived at in a telephone conversation between the two military operations chiefs, with some parleys preceding it. Happymon ascertained in his interviews (he did 80 interviews of practitioners and members of the strategic community) that diplomats continue to be hesitant to put down the agreement in writing. This lack of institutionalization of the ceasefire two decades into its informal existence makes the LoC a fertile site for a spark to light up the tinder that the two sides have gathered on either side in their neglect of conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.

Both sides seemingly prefer an active LoC. To the Pakistanis it enables infiltration by terrorists, while to the Indians it enables retribution across it. This setting is conducive for what Happymon identifies as Autonomous Military Factor (AMF) and their independent contribution to escalatory dynamics. These range from relatively mundane factors as personality traits and regimental reputation to an impulse for revenge and gaining moral ascendancy over the other side. AMFs are anchored in the institutional culture of the military, as also in military subcultures. Happymon unpacks this factor over a chapter, with a cautionary finding that AMFs need the attention of security minders, and especially since these days what happens at the LoC seldom remains there. The effect of body bags returning to district towns across India illustrates the political fallout.

Another useful chapter comprises eight case studies of three types of cases: one, where CFVs drive escalation; two, where they contribute to exacerbate crisis; and, lastly, in which CFVs are the vehicle for conventional military escalation. In the first case study of Operation Parakram at its mid-point when terrorists struck at army families staying in the rear, he shows how the resulting crisis played out in heightened CFVs along the LoC rather than eventuating in war. The LoC provided a venting ground. A case study of the CFVs in summer 2013 provides evidence of the second type of escalation, in which an incident in which five army men died on the LoC resulted in aggravating the political and diplomatic situation between the two countries. The third type of escalation––of which the recent aerial strike by Pakistan is an example––is possible to envisage in light of Operation Kabaddi that Happymon covers at the beginning of his book. Operation Kabaddi was a reverse Kargil operation that was to be undertaken by India in late 2001, but was aborted by the intervention of the Americans in the region in pursuit of bin Laden, the perpetrator of 9/11, then hiding in Afghanistan.

If expansive aims are not attributed to the Kargil War––it being intended to cut off Ladakh and Siachen––the war can be seen as resulting from an escalation of the confrontation in the mid-nineties. India was having the upper hand along the Neelum Valley, interdicting Pakistani supplies along that route. Pakistan wanting to reverse the score, decided to intrude into the  Kargil sector in order to similarly interfere with Indian supplies along the route to Ladakh. The rest as they say is history, with Pakistani mission creep and India’s stern reaction making for a minor war. Though the two sides are at the second decadal anniversary of the war, the situation on the LoC remains equally fraught.

Happymon calls for focus on the dynamics of the front lines. He recommends a clear and detailed agreement on the ceasefire along the LoC and on ground rules for the IB. The AMFs and the role of military cultures in CFVs require being contained by escalation control measures such as flag meetings, as also military glasnost such as exchanges of delegations, institutional level visits, attendance at seminars and so on. Happymon ends on a realistic note, writing: ‘The exercise of ensuring stability in the subcontinent lies in routine and mundane measures, not in the sublime and grandest of moves.’ However, to this reviewer, the book serves to underline that the best conflict prevention is in addressing root causes, problems of which CFVs, aggravated CFVs and border wars are merely symptoms.

Reframe the Kashmir conflict from terrorism to insurgency

https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/politics-reframe-the-kashmir-conflict-from-terrorism-to-insurgency-4069191.html

The latest set of the periodically released statistics from Kashmir indicate that some 75 per cent of those killed in military operations there are locals. Last year, the figure for Kashmiris killed of those killed in operations was 62 per cent. This figure compels a rethink on how India approaches the problem in Kashmir.

Currently, the understanding that India is contending with terrorism in Kashmir is based on the presence of Pakistani proxy fighters and the understanding that the local fighters are doing Pakistan’s behest.

However, the numbers of locals among those killed in military operations indicates that there is a considerable indigenisation of the conflict. Is it time, therefore, to rethink the tag of ‘terrorism’ that continues to be applied?

There is no doubt that terrorism has been incident in Kashmir, seen in the killings of unarmed soldiers while on leave and relatives of policemen, political workers and civilians who are ‘informers’.

Even so, most encounters are a result of proactive operations by security forces, with militants cornered fighting in self-defence. A disaggregation of the military engagements in Kashmir would indicate that incidents that can be subsumed under the definition of terrorism are considerably less than those more appropriately covered by the term insurgency.

This indicates that the broad-brush appraisal of the conflict as terrorism does not best capture its reality. Insurgency may instead be the appropriate frame to view the conflict.

This trend in the military sphere of the conflict is reinforced by the developments on its political strand. The separatists have taken pains to point to indigenous roots and interests of their political struggle.

Zakir Musa, the recently killed head of an Al-Qaeda affiliated group, was upbraided by the separatist leadership for his advocacy of Islamism. Likewise, late last year, the separatists were quick to condemn a mob’s agitation in favour of the Islamic State in the premises of Jamia Masjid in Srinagar.

Their most recent statement lends support to any political talks contemplated by the newly re-elected central government in relation to Pakistan’s reaching out for talks going back to its elections last year.

The political context to the conflict finds resonance in the positions of the mainstream political parties in the Valley on issues such as sanctity of Articles 35A and 370, application of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the relevance of Pakistan as a stakeholder in the conflict.

The military and political dimensions of the conflict in Kashmir taken together dilute the reading of the conflict solely as terrorism in favour of militancy or, more accurately, an insurgency. Where it is not a defining feature of a conflict, terrorism can be subsumed as part of an insurgency.

It is arguable that proxy war has been a dwindling feature of the conflict in Kashmir in its phase after the killing of Burhan Wani. In its definition of insurgency, the army’s subconventional operations doctrine notesthat insurgencies often rely on external support (p. 64). It also notes that terrorism is in evidence within subconventional conflicts.

Such a reframing of the conflict in Kashmir is useful. It provides scope for a peace process kicking off. While there is little appetite in governments to engage with ending terrorism politically, it is widely regarded that ending insurgency is only possible through political means.

Thus far, treating the conflict in Kashmir as a proxy war by Pakistan and a war of terror against India, New Delhi has refrained from a peace process both internal and external. However, if a reframing of the conflict is done as to have it re-interpreted as an insurgency rather than terrorism, then a peace track to India’s strategy both towards Pakistan and within Kashmir is possible to envisage.

The timeliness of such reframing also owes to the government beginning its second innings. As its new Union home minister, Amit Shah, takes stance and surveys the field, he could consider if the statistics from Kashmir bespeak of changes on ground permitting a policy gearshift.

If this is deemed premature for now — reports from the Line of Control have it that infiltrators are in 16 camps across it — Shah could well hold course till a trend manifests over time.

Shah should not hold on to election-time rhetoric. He could instead use the summer to test the thesis that the conflict in Kashmir qualifies as insurgency. The security situation over the Amarnath Yatra and the upcoming elections in autumn will provide ample evidence either way.

In the interim, his newly-sworn in counterpart, external affairs minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, while reiterating the traditional India position, could signal that India could shift gears since it now has activated surgical strikes as an option to tackle terrorism. Pakistan had earlier indicated its preference among the political parties during elections, believing a Right-wing victory can help deliver on talks better.

A reframing of the conflict provides the government an opportunity to open a line internally, to begin with. This would be a doctrinally compliant political track to complement the military prong of strategy in countering insurgency.

https://www.orientblackswan.com/pressreviews/978-81-250-5853-3_1.pdf
Book review of my book India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia, Routledge 2014

Achin Vanik, After the Bomb. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. 2015. 213 pages. `575. Ali Ahmed, India’s Doctrine Puzzle—Limiting War in South Asia. New Delhi: Routledge. 2014. 240 pages. `695. DOI: 10.1177/2321023017727993 These two books deal with India’s nuclear policy. Both appear sceptical of the security rationale of Indian nuclear weapons. Although both the books look doubtful about the security role of India’s nuclear arsenals, the two authors have adopted two different approaches to examine ‘Nuclear India’. Vanaik discusses the issue in a broad nuclear disarmament framework while Ahmed wants to resolve the puzzle of the evolving limited conventional war military doctrine. Vanaik has adopted the classical or orthodox anti-nuclear perspective in which a nuclear weapon is an unnecessary evil. Ahmed narrates the issue from a military perspective, and explores how the nuclear arsenal has added complexity to the making of the limited war doctrine. Vanaik has gone into some of the issues generating curiosity in the global security community in a somewhat incoherent and disjointed way. For example, the existence of India’s nuclear weapon is a big conundrum for the community. The author has ‘unravelled’ the nuclear elite of India; otherwise, the group is referred to as the small but powerful nuclear bomb lobby. The book has also dealt with 10 dilemmas of nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia. Several writers on nuclear issues have been writing on those dilemmas for years, and Vanaik’s book includes some of these discussions. The book touches on nuclear terrorism and has also proposed a plan of action. The plan of action has a number of fascinating unilateral, bilateral (India–Pakistan), multilateral and global measures. Ahmed’s book, somewhat more coherent, deliberates on different facets of the limited war doctrinemaking process. The book has a collection of different concepts/theories of limited war, but ironically, it ignores or overlooks the concept of limited nuclear war that was invented immediately after the advent of the nuclear weapon age. Indeed, both major issues—nuclear disarmament and limited war between two nuclear weapon countries located in South Asia—are dominating the nuclear discourse of India and the world. Vanaik’s book has given an overview of the global force structure and doctrinal and other factors that may fulfil the dream of a nuclear weapon-free world. Similarly, limited war between India and Pakistan is considered a possibility in the dominant discourse of the Indian strategic community, but Pakistan and the Western strategic communities appear sceptical that the conventional war may not escalate to the nuclear level. 298 Book Reviews India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine is a much talked about element of India–Pakistan nuclear deterrence. It is not an official doctrine, and this fact has been stated countless times. Yet, it is considered ‘official’ in some quarters. Ahmed in his book has casually treated the status of the Cold Start doctrine. However, officially, a policy/doctrine exists, which considers that there is scope for fighting a conventional war or conventional wars between two nuclear neighbours. The doctrine is supportive of limited war. Tired of Pakistan’s terror strikes, which get a nuclear shield, India wants to punish Pakistan in a conventional war. India enjoys conventional superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan and the duration of such a war could be shorter. Ahmed, in his book, elaborates this aspect when he discusses limited war in South Asia. Will there be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan? Will Indian doctrine of limited war be rendered useless by the Pakistani posture or policy of First Use and the use of tactical nuclear weapons? Actually, Pakistan’s posturing is aimed at deterring possible India’s conventional intervention after Pakistan’s provocation. The Pakistani regime is aware of India’s retaliation. If it is done quickly, Pakistan may suffer massive damage. International public opinion will be in India’s favour as no country after Japan has been attacked with nuclear weapons in the last seven decades. However, both books fail to highlight this reality properly. Of course, any war, nuclear or conventional, needs to be avoided. Unfortunately, both the authors see the Indian nuclear bomb only in the context of the flawed South Asia nuclear paradigm. Although Vanaik has given some room to the nuclear policies of countries outside South Asia, yet India and South Asia dominate the book. In this account, the South Asian region does not have more than two nuclear weapons states. Other countries in the region are not nuclear weapons states. Even the use of the term ‘India–Pakistan nuclear relationship’ instead of ‘South Asian nuclearization’ misses the real dynamics of nuclear India because China is overlooked. Nuclear China is a major factor in shaping India’s choice for nuclearization. If the term Southern Asia that includes China is used, any regional reference or regional discussion on nuclear issues may acquire some meaning. What is the role of the civil society in formulating India’s nuclear policy in general and the limited war doctrine in particular? Both the books have underlined the role of Indian civil society and even foreign individuals in contributing to India’s policy. Ahmed mentions that the origin of the idea of India’s limited war with its nuclear adversary may be traced to the seminar at the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Recently civil society is debating revising the nuclear doctrine. Some are arguing even to change ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons, the much cherished component of India’s nuclear doctrine. Ahmed has described various forces shaping the limited war doctrine. The book assumes significance in the light of the new voices for change in the doctrine. Both books allude to the Bharatiya Janata Party government’s contribution to introducing a new nuclear age. Ahmed uses ‘cultural nationalism’ to refer to aggressive nationalism indirectly. In fact, both the authors speak of changes either introduced in the nuclear policy or expected to come in it. Actually, the strong demand for the revision of nuclear doctrine comes from the strategic community and the organizations directly involved in India’s security management. A political party like the Bharatiya Janata Party has to balance and accommodate these demands and interests. Somehow discussions on strategic culture have also downplayed the strong support nuclear disarmament has in the Indian strategic community and in India’s strategic culture. Nuclear India has to accommodate global and universal nuclear disarmament. When the Conference on Disarmament concludes a Nuclear Weapons Convention, India will not surprise the world by staying away from it. Already, India had shown its strong support to disarmament treaties of two other weapons of mass destruction. India will not go for any regional disarmament measure like South Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, as Vanaik has explicitly stated that he is against unilateral disarmament of India or Pakistan. And for India, a regional disarmament means unilateral disarmament. Book Reviews 299 As the world has stopped even paying lip service to nuclear disarmament, Vanaik’s book may give some idea of the global security scenario after the bomb. In addition to it, discussions on the Indian nuclear elite provide a different perspective on the nuclear decision-making process of India. Needless to add, a strong counter-perspective to his understanding exists in the Indian strategic community. Similarly, Ahmed’s work may provide an insight into the puzzle of India’s nuclear and conventional war doctrines. He has used a number of documents and papers on India’s limited war otherwise not known to scholars. A nuclear war is a remote possibility. The nuclear world is stable, but of course, a world without nuclear weapons will be more secure and stable. Rajiv Nayan Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis New Delhi, India E-mail: raj.nayan@gmail.com

http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=91323#
Event management is no substitute for strategy

Event management that fetched Narendra Modi a second term was fully on display at the forecourt of Rashtrapati Bhawan during the swearing in of Team Modi 2.0, a perfectly unnecessary spectacle meant only to reinforce the Modi cult. Since it would not do to attribute Modi's second term to a manipulation of the voting machines or to an anti-minority animus among Modi voters, it can be charitably gauged that the voters were instead convinced by Indian crisis response, or better still, by the event management that attended the crisis response. As any information warrior knows, the internal public sphere too is target. Clearly, the information war effort was indubitably successful internally. 
It would not do to dignify the other Indian actions during the crisis with the label 'strategy'. The Pulwama episode has far too many questions tagging it to qualify as 'black swan' event. It set the stage for an air force riposte. Barely had the planes got back, Modi was off to Churu to attend a preplanned rally, comprising ex-servicemen to boot. That evening, he took a metro ride to another public engagement. Modi was clearly out to milk the opportunity, oblivious to Pakistani preparations for counter strike. His choreographers were apparently impressed by the sequence in the Oscar winning film Churchill in which Churchill character is depicted interacting with the people in the London underground after rendering in parliament the famous 'we shall fight them on the beaches' clarion call. It is another matter that Churchill escaped his security detail to mingle with the common man, whereas Modi's metro ride was patently for the cameras. Expectedly, Modi was nowhere on the screens the next day when Pakistan did strike back. 
A script cannot substitute for strategy. The air force had to go into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir airspace for a bit to get a better stand-off shot at their target in Balakot owing to cloud conditions. The stipulations on the air force were to not to cross over and to ensure against hitting a military or civilian target. A cloudy night forced the air force's hand, belying Modi's 'andar ghus ke maarna' boast. The cloud cover also prevented use of the missiles that could have recorded the destruction at the target end. There being no bomb-damage proof, 'success' of Balakot strike is better attributed to information warfare specialists. Since Modi by his own account based his decision expecting cloud cover to advantage the air force, the buck stops at his door. 
As for the other boasts (nuclear weapons not for 'diwali' and 'qatl ki raat'), these further put paid to any notion of strategy guiding actions. Modi - citing western sources rather than admitting to it - let on that missiles were readied to threaten Pakistan to force it to give back the Indian pilot captured in the Nowshera dogfight. This does not bespeak of strategy since the objective - getting back the pilot and preventing him coming to harm in custody - is not what missiles should be put to, especially against another nuclear armed state with like capability. Expecting Pakistan to abuse the pilot in its custody - after his captivity and conditions have been exposed in social media - is to be naïve of international relations and the place of the Geneva Conventions in it. Clearly, the rationale of readying missiles to pressure the release of the pilot is an after-the-fact one. 
So what was the original purpose of the missile readiness? Equally clearly, these may have been to deter the Pakistani counter strike, a measure that in the event failed. Pakistan was willing to chance its counter strike in real time, assuredly having readied its own missiles to prevent escalation by India in retaliation with missiles. This is a plausible strategic rationale for missile readiness. It is obvious that the follow through with the missile strike was not undertaken by India, using the excuse that Pakistan having chickened out and promised to return the pilot. 
Instead, the plausible reason for the lack of follow-up missile strike(s) is that India chickened out of countering Pakistan's gumption at Nowshera. In strategic terms, Pakistan's retaliation needed to be replied in a manner as to ensure India comes out on top, especially since India initiated the exchange with its Balakot aerial strike. This was necessary for moral and psychological ascendance, particularly since India claims that it has shifted the goal posts and more surgical and aerial strikes are to follow in the implementation of an Indian version of the 'mow the grass' strategy (a term attributable to India's strategic partner, Israel). Not following through with retaliation cannot be substituted with spin doctoring regards the controversial downing of the F-16 in the Nowshera dogfight. 
Strategically, India can be faulted for readying missiles as the next step in the escalatory ladder since their use is escalatory to a higher degree. The likelihood of their introduction into the crisis forced involvement of the Americans, who were up until then stand-offish and focused on Trump's talks with the North Korean dictator. Since missile readiness can be expected to trigger American de-escalatory contingency action, claiming missiles were on the blocks is meaningless. It can cynically be suggested that India provoked American intervention, hoping to be bailed out thereby. 
Limited land operations of the order of surgical strikes could have proven costly since Pakistan's army was surely hair-trigger ready. Conventional air power found wanting and surgical strikes by land not an option, limiting next steps to missile strikes - that would surely have forced international crisis management intervention - suggests the limitation of the template of military response to crisis. Therefore, rushing off to Balakot was not the best option, nor was the military option the only one. 
Another problem is in the legacy of the crisis for the next one. That India would be starting off with a deficit would instigate its overcompensation. Therefore, a higher threshold of Indian retaliation can be expected even if the trigger does not warrant it. The first set of Rafales is in by September. India tested a stand-off glide bomb from a SU-30 last month. Its Navy postured in the Arabian Sea for a long while even after the crisis. This included the aircraft carrier and the nuclear submarine (not the boomer). The latter can carry cruise missiles, which - incidentally - can also be nuclear armed. It is only by next year India would be in a position to impose on Pakistan. It is not without reason Pakistan fired off the Shaheen II missile even as Imran Khan congratulated Modi for his win on election results day. A crisis turning into conflict is therefore not unlikely, putting paid to the notion of willfully going across now and again in a mow-the-grass operation, à la Israel's occasional forays into Gaza and Lebanon. 
Though India might posture a willingness to escalate in order to deter better and acquire the ability, its ability to strategise continues to be suspect as the national security adviser has been carried forward. The same set of decision makers is in the cabinet's security committee, except for the foreign minister. While S. Jaishankar, the new incumbent, can be expected to live up to his tough image, the others will be informed by a political logic. They have the implementation of the internally-directed Hindutva project to attend to and cannot afford any setback. 
The balloon of national security toughness can dissipate in quick time, exposing their election time claims as hollow. Uncertainties surrounding military action are self-evident from the probable nullity of result of the Balakot strike; from the fratricide over Budgam that accompanied the Nowshera episode; and the fire aboard the aircraft carrier as it returned to station after its extended crisis-related deployment. If the friction that attends military action is this costly, the real thing is certainly nothing like the movie 'Surgical Strike'. It may well leave the 'emperor without clothes'. Besides, the event management surrounding the crisis having yielded results in a pocketed electorate, there would be little need from internal politics point of view to chance a crisis. 
The upshot is that the election time rhetoric is just that, rhetoric. India may not up-the-ante. This presumes Pakistani intent to provoke. The Security Council's noting Pulwama was through a press release. Pulwama did not find mention in the resolution arraigning the key accused, Masood Azhar. Knowing that Pakistan may not be provocative in first place, it makes sense for India to posture aggressively since it knows it would not be challenged to put its money where its mouth is. India can then claim its new line has checked Pakistan, even if Pakistan is not up to mischief of such levels in first place. It remains to be seen if India can have its cake and eat it too.