Saturday, 11 January 2025
What Moving a Painting From Army Chief’s Office Says About Indian Military's Hindutva Shift
Much ado over the Chief’s office annexe
Two images involving the army did the rounds of social media recently.
The first was the army chief with the raksha mantri propitiating a deity at a temple near Mhow, where the defence minister was on an official trip. The army chief was in the traditional devotee attire.
The second was a clip from the Southern Command X handle showing the army commander in a jeep ferrying the new Maharashtra chief minister. The jeep is driven by a brigadier, while, a major general in the co-driver’s seat is seen shooing away those coming in the way.
Trips to Amarnath cave and to the Vaishnodevi shrine being de rigueur, the first is unremarkable.
The second is equally unsurprising. The army commander in question has eminent right-wing pedigree.
Gossip has it that at the last promotional hurdle to three-star rank, a professional competitor commanding a consensus amongst peers as by far the most competent officer of his cohort, was tripped up by an intelligence agency interfering with the process. Consequently, per grapevine, the proverbial chain of succession list has this general sitting atop it. (Incidentally, the intelligence intervention is for the second time, the first being in the whisper campaign against the sure-shot chief-in-waiting, General Bakshi.)
Signs of professional fidelity taking a tumble are aplenty.
The latest instance is the shoving out the iconic image of the surrender at Dacca from its prime location in the Chief’s office annexe.
That the painting has found a ‘befitting place’ in the Manekshaw Center appears to be a post-controversy after-thought (the new painting was spotted on 14 December and the old one reinstalled on 16 December).
Dust having settled on the controversy, here one can only wish the painter, an infantry major, well.
Of interest instead is the figure of the Brahmin, central to the painting, waving the army on in Ladakh.
A critic has it that the painting depicts Indian occupation of the Kailash heights, putting the Chinese on notice.
The suggestion is that besides the posturing over four years on the heights, a Chanakyan policy of exhausting the Chinese got them to retract.
The proportion between the figure and the military symbols depicted tells as much.
The Brahmin standing tall, overshadowing all else in the painting is Chanakya.
In the context of the painting, the Brahmin could well be Jaishankar and/or Doval, both brahmins. Kshatriyas in the foreground scurry about as ordered; theirs’ not to reason why.
The policy they are implementing flows from the strategic vision articulated by Prime Minister Modi: ‘this is not an era of war.’ The latest iteration of policy phrases it thus: ‘Bhavishya yuddha mein nahin, buddha mein hai (The future lies not in war, but in Buddha.).”
In that sense, the painting shows the national security structure and process – the top to down flow of policy-grand strategy-military strategy and the military’s exercise of operational art giving teeth to policy.
The Brahmin can be taken for the brain: the apex of the national security structure, the national security council, serviced by the national security adviser.
The Karm Kshetra (Field of Endeavour) is the Himalayan heights. As in Siachen where the army got comfortable with time, so shall be the case in Ladakh, with high altitude service serving as the new locale for adding stars to epaulettes – quite like Kashmir was till recently.
Concerning however is the army’s perspective on the painting put out by a source:
It (the painting) portrays the Army as a guardian of Dharma, fighting not merely as a defender of the nation but to uphold justice and protect the nation’s values. This inspiration is complemented by the strategic and philosophical wisdom of Chanakya, whose principles guide the Army’s approach to leadership, diplomacy, and warfare (italics added).
That sounds familiar, redolent as it is of the Pakistan army’s one-time self-image as guardians of Pakistan’s ideological frontier. During the period of Islamisation under dictator, Zia ul Haq, the frontier was understood as Islam. The scope ranged from the Islamic Bomb to being defenders of the faith in thrice-partitioned South Asia, beginning with Kashmir. Consensus has it that the Islamist idea has been of little help to Pakistan and its army.
Missed by the Indian military also is Islamism has been violently rejected by most Muslim states, with militaries putting it down through active combat.
Can a bout of mimesis this this side of the border prove any more useful?
More pertinently, if and since the army cannot autonomously determine what’s righteous, that is to be set for it by the ‘Brahmin’ – the national security apex.
The presence of Garuda and Arjun’s chariot in the backdrop show the values to be defended are to be drawn from ancient Indian philosophy and culture.
That the civilizational extent of ancient Bharat coincides with the Akhand Bharat imaginary is left unsaid. The painting depicts what was once part of the Tibetan near abroad. The religious geography of Bharat can someday go beyond the Kailash range to include the Kailash massif itself. A case has already been made that a statue of the conquering warrior general of a feudal lord grace Ladakh.
Votaries say it would be more appropriate than a recently installed one, with no connection with Ladakh. However, the Chhatrapati’s statue appearing in Ladakh is not mere coincidence. Recall the Chhatrapati had to undergo purifying rituals before being anointed. The surfeit of Kshatriyas in Ladakh must be subtly conditioned.
More troubling is the army’s internalization of the notion that the wellspring of heritage is only ancient India.
It must register the subversive point in today’s context put out by the United Services Institution at its well-curated Indian military heritage festival that Indian value systems have significant breadth and depth to draw on. Perhaps the syncretic Moghul period needs to await the decolonization train getting to the Durand and Radcliffe lines.
In the interim, selective decolonization is visible in the removal of the plaque carrying the inspiration for successive generations of army officers: the quote from Field Marshal Birdwood’s inaugural address of the military academy.
The substitute board reads:
The more forgiving you got, the more the Kauravas assumed you were a coward. The glow of modesty lies hidden in the quiver and those the victors can expect his truce and treaty offers to be respected.”
The army’s logistic feat in an energetic adoption of the defensive posture in Ladakh is laudable in itself. But did it get the Chinese scurrying?
The poem itself was quoted first after the non-surgical strike at Balakot, to cover the pussyfooting around then and later after the Pakistani counter strike. Its recurrence makes for an alibi, both signifying and reinforcing self-delusion.
Further, it is in Hindi and without an accompanying translation. This perhaps because the army chief thinks that Hindi is the ‘binding’ language in the army. If so, it oughtn’t to be thus.
Hitherto the regimental language was the internally binding glue. Part of bonds of ethnic and cultural affinity, a shared language enhanced primary group cohesion.
Officers interfaced with outside counterparts in English, ensuring cultural affiliations do not intrude. Professional intercourse should be in English, placing the same disadvantage on all. ‘Professional’ in the Huntington sense is restricted to matters of the officer cadre, the soldiery equated to a trade or craft.
This may not stand the test of the Agnipath scheme. Besides, majority of the officer intake from north-Indian lower middle classes has led to pervasive use of Hindi by default.
Hindi is the trojan horse to open up the army’s innards for the grand reordering by Hindutva, the verities of which have been bought into by the army – such as, it appears, the caste responsibilities represented in the painting.
The problem with Hindutva is that unity will be under a Brahmanical yoke. Brahmanists have weaponised Hindutva and we know Brahmanists are to Hindutva as salafis are to Islamism.
PM Modi’s latest reference to Buddha and Ashoka is dead give-away on this score. The principal challenge to Brahmanism though the ages has been Buddhism.
It is now up for appropriation. Similarly attempted in regard to Ambedkar, the jury will remain out on the project’s success.
History as guide, a scrum is in the offing. The army would do well to not list over.
Else, the project failing, the army will end up as an ‘army without a country’ – in contrast to a neighbouring ‘army with a country’.
Tuesday, 7 January 2025
https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/mms-and-indias-swing-to-the-right?r=i1fws
MMS and India’s swing to the Right
Obituaries emphasise Manmohan Singh (MMS) was a good man.
His achievement was as remarkable as that of Nehru, the making of India 2.0.
That it is being remade yet again – India 3.0 - this time by Narendra Modi, must be ascribed as much to MMS as Modi’s corporate benefactors and the saffron parivar.
Mourning done with, the MMS legacy needs a proper footing in this light.
A commentator has it that MMS “created the fertile ground for the nation to swing to the Right (emphasis added).”
Taken along with the deficits on national security in the MMS tenure, MMS delivered India not merely economically to the Right, but veritably handed it over to the Right wing.
Rightly, MMS is remembered as a good man, but was not quite a strong one.
Laying out the red carpet
MMS precipitated what he himself termed ‘disastrous’: Modi’s advent. He had the State’s resources to pull Modi up short, but for a whole decade did nothing.
To be sure, the remote to his administration was held by Sonia Gandhi and he was merely an accidental prime minister (PM). Therefore, blame for Modi’s striding to Delhi from Gujarat should rightly be laid at her door; but, wholly so?
MMS was the ultimate supervisor of intelligence agencies as PM - even if, as in the case of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) on occasion, mediated through ministers.
On his watch, Narendra Modi charted his way to Delhi with the covert help of right-wing subverted officials in State agencies.
The IB had a new head foisted on it by the right-wing ruling party just prior to and in anticipation of it’s losing the Shining India elections.
Whereas there was no visible reason to axe this gentleman on taking over, it was fairly evident early enough that the incumbent was answering to a different, right-wing drum.
The IB’s supposed provision of the intelligence that led to the killing of Ishrat Jahan and her companions is a case to point.
This was precursor to the spate of purported ‘terror’ attacks in Gujarat, attributed officially, and in the popular imagination thereafter, to Muslim perpetration.
Alongside, there was the suppression of truth emerging on the Gujarat pogrom. Mere noting that someone who "presided over massacre of citizens on the streets of Ahmedabad" shouldn't be PM couldn’t have been expected to trip up Modi.
Even if the judicial system was overseeing the cases, it behooved on the central government to ensure a level playing field for justice through able supervision of its agencies.
Not doing so was dereliction of duty, for which the PM - at the apex of the national security structure – is accountable.
The ‘terror’ attacks soon went national, resulting in hundreds of Muslims being incarcerated in full media glare. The release of most a decade on (longer for some) testifies to the complicity of central agencies, subverted and answering to a ‘deep state’.
A ‘deep state’ is hypothesized as existing in the period, there being no other way to explain away curious happenings, such as:
· the hobnobbing of the former director IB in question with the underworld;
· the killing of Hemant Karkare, in the Indian admixture to the terror attack emanating from Pakistan;
· the impunity of saffron terrorists of the Sanstha and Abhinav variety;
· the kid glove treatment for Amit Shah, though with evidence enough to temporarily incarcerate him;
· and, the lack of traction in the case against Modi on the Gujarat pogrom.
A deep state indicates a weak polity, which in the period was presided over, if in a titular capacity, by MMS.
Of his three national security advisers, the first died in harness fairly early.
Reputedly the second was a Sonia appointee and has much to answer for, particularly since what was churning in the intelligence sphere could not have been without his knowledge, if not imprimatur.
The third was too outward looking to be fully comprehensive of or engaged with internal security, which in his time was handled by a political heavyweight owing only nominal allegiance to MMS.
Consequently, even if Sonia Gandhi’s foreign origins and her need to pave the way for her son compelled her appeasement of Hindutva, MMS must bear responsibility for acquiescing in the outcome in a weakened State.
Right wing in-roads then are by now self-evident in eviscerated institutions. Its not a cross that only Sonia Gandhi must bear, even if her parivar’s is the substantial failure, fortuitously making Modi right on parivarvaad.
Further, Pakistan-origin terrorism was inflated also to take down initiatives with considerably greater and visible MMS investment: ties with Pakistan and Kashmir.
Any revival of the peace process with Pakistan after Mumbai 26/11 was put paid to by the out-of-uniform intelligence czar, Ajit Doval, who from his perch atop a right wing think tank orchestrated a backlash in the strategic community against any feelers.
Even if the Pakistan talks stalled, there was little reason for the Kashmir peace process to end up as collateral damage. MMS lacked heft to see it through to a culmination of sorts in an internal settlement acceptable to Kashmiris, while Pakistan was out, hit-wicket. His home minister’s belated enlightenment on azadi is post-August 2000 entirely inconsequential.
For an unwillingness to stand up to jibes from the new Hindutva champion, MMS as PM must stand arraigned.
The nuclear deal
The only instance when MMS put his political capital on the line was in the Indo-United States’ nuclear deal.
That this has not resulted in any additional electricity suggests that the aim was narrowly to be ushered into the nuclear club by its principal gatekeeper and more broadly getting into bed with that declining power.
Neither seem to have done India a fat lot of good. For MMS to have expended his political capital and exhausted himself – he later had a heart procedure – for this meagre outcome shows a lack of judgment.
What it certainly did was to eliminate Leftists from the political spectrum, a keenly felt absence in the circumstance of India’s economic and political ‘swing to the Right’.
What it possibly did was to enhance India’s nuclear bomb making capacity, which some observers say has since transitioned offensively to contemplating first use that can logically only be in the form of first strike.
This capability in the hands of strategic simpletons that constitute the political council of the Nuclear Command Authority today is but recipe for firing these off in anger, panic or/and inadvertence.
Consider this, the Raksha Mantri, who occupies a chair in that council, recently required an assistant to nudge his recall of where he was: visiting the Army War College. Perhaps his trip was actually to a temple in Ujjain, under cover of an official visit.
Cognisant, MMS’ last official speech was at a national security think tank - now named after a forgettable predecessor of the defence minister (who could not have amounted to much given his health issues) - was to warn, not so much the world, but his incoming successor, not to breach the much hallowed, unenforceable and therefore incredible, No First Use pledge.
On his part, the successor in question once promised a neighbor, a Diwali night.
Military politicization
It’s not a delegative style alone that led MMS to leave critical issues to hands of ministers, but also lack of political punch.
Take the case of somnolent Pope Antony presiding over defence. The military proceeded to make the best of the doctrinal autonomy devolving on it.
Bequeathed with the Cold Start doctrine at the start of the MMS innings, the military transitioned to operationalising it. Even though it could not pull it off at Mumbai 26/11, confidence against Pakistan by the MMS second term allowed it to shift sights onto China and posit a two-front threat.
In respect of China, this set off a self-fulfilling prophecy, the results of which are with us today.
Against Pakistan it set up India to potentially a nuclear first strike – prompting fantasies in the then national security adviser of a second strike by India of splendid first strike proportions, thereby enhancing the threat of India receiving a preemptive splendid strike.
This grand strategic disarray was in keeping with the known policy paralysis of MMS II.
The insidious fallout was in the politicization of the military visible in an Army chief taking up cudgels with the government, to the extent of attempt to spook it using forces under a general related to him in a marriage alliance. Worse was the (deliberate?) leaking of his letter (designed to embarass?) to the government, promptly on his losing his date of birth case.
The lack of gumption to sack that general opened up the military to the Hindutva invasion of the its intellectual spaces, through veteran channels (remember a moustachioed general!) and use of then nascent social media.
The legacy then?
MMS obituaries observe decorum in recalling a good man. It does not take a Chanakya to know, its not enough to be good.
His successor’s tenure makes clear that it is important to be both good and strong.
The take away from the reprise of the MMS tenure(s) is that responsibility and accountability must rest on one shoulder.
Split, these serve as precedence such as for now, when the remote is held with unaccountable and – worse - unknown Hindutva zealots.
Finally, what’s true for the military is true for politics too. Good staff officers do not necessarily make good commanders. Good technocrats don’t necessarily make good political leaders.
Looks like Sonia Gandhi knew this all along.