https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/anything-to-pakistans-nuclear-nightmares

Anything to Pakistan’s nuclear nightmares?

ali

24 hr ago

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A prominent member of Pakistan’s strategic community Professor Zafar Nawaz Jaspal recently shared a YouTube link of a talk by him at a seminar in which he concludes that Narendra Modi’s electoral compulsions in an election year in India could mean that a nuclear crisis is on the cards.

He reasons that Modi - whose finger is on the nuclear trigger in India - is ‘ideologically extremist.’ Jaspal considers this as increasing India’s propensity for nuclear first use in a counter force mode. Ideology-induced nuclear butterfingers could make a crisis go nuclear.

Jaspal’s only claim to fame is not his berating of his son intruding in on his online seminar appearance once. Instead, he has the authority of a professorship backing him. He has been on the strategic circuit for over two decades. He has engaged with Indian interlocutors earlier on issues of regional strategic stability.

He makes his case cherry-picking and knitting together nuclear aspects that have been aired in the strategic discussion over the recent years. A known hardliner – unexceptionably so since all kinds of perspectives make for a ‘happening’ strategic community – he, predictably, goes over the top in his findings.

India can hide from a debate, dismissing Jaspal’s scenario off-hand. It is also easy to show up Jaspal’s case as part of Pakistan’s longstanding deterrence strategy of projecting South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint, intended to attract external intervention in ‘the most dangerous place on earth.’   

However, clear is that among Narendra Modi’s ‘masterstrokes’ must figure India’s decline from its earlier self-satisfying perch as a responsible and mature nuclear power.

The good professor’s argument

Professor Jaspal’s argument has refrain of the Narang and Clary paper on India’s nuclear first use propensities. They discussed political pronouncements, nuclear and military doctrines, and nuclear technological developments to conclude that India is building in counter force ‘temptations.’

Jaspal believes Indian military doctrines are increasingly offensive in intent and content. Taken with the nuclear doctrine, the tendency is towards counter force and counter military targeting, in contrast to the official nuclear doctrine – unchanged since 2003 – that holds on to the unsustainable massive retaliation mantra.

Of nuclear technology developments, he alights on developments in target acquisition, accuracy, hypersonics, cruise missile and glider platforms, multiple warheads and missile defences. He makes much of India’s recent understanding on artificial intelligence and technology with the United States.

This indicates counter force intent, upsetting a strategic balance from mutual deterrence in a balance of terror resting on mutual vulnerability. A degraded nuclear arsenal of an adversary is further whittled by ballistic missile defences taking down any incoming missiles. With escalation dominance assured thus, there would be heightened ‘temptation’ for Indian nuclear first use.

Such use is made more likely due to the complexion of the Indian nuclear decision maker(s). As evidence, he refers to gung-ho declarations of political leaders, making well-regarded nuclear doctrinal pillars merely shibboleths. Two defence ministers have been lackadaisical in their nuclear musings. Thankfully, Jaspal does not allude to the prime minister’s reference to nuclear weapons as not quite Diwali crackers.

Packaging the technological, doctrinal and political indicators, he opines that India’s nuclear use is more likely than not; and that it would be ‘flexible’; and, with No First Use a bygone, it would not only be in ‘response’.

Further - and damagingly - he holds that an ‘ideologically extremist’ decision maker habituated to warmongering rhetoric is more likely than not be persuaded to go nuclear first, and that too with a preemptive option of a decapitating first strike.

Is Jaspal right?

A dim view of the opponent is self-serving. But then the Economist in its turn of the year number styled Modi as ‘Jingo-headed zealot Modi Hindi Dominatus’. Modi, a self-confessed Hindu nationalist heads the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).  

The implications, that I discussed elsewhere, have not been followed up adequately. Jaspal provides an opportunity. Taking up Jaspal’s critique at peacetime leisure is better than under crisis compulsions.

Any such appraisal can never be enough since nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the planet. Most strategists have their nationalist thinking cap on so self-censor. ‘My nation, right or wrong,’ can prove a fatal start point.

The leftists have been disarmed (witness the fate of Gautam Navlakha). The political opposition does not want to let another front been opened against it as either anti-national or weak-on-defence. The agenda of the strategic community is set by the national security minders. In any case the ‘community’ is divided, reflecting societal polarization, evidenced by regime’s bellboys gathered as Concerned Citizens for shooting down the Constitutional Conduct Group.

A structural anomaly makes Jaspal plausible

The nuclear doctrine of 2003 is not in the open domain in full. Merely eight points from it have been shared in a bout of transparency designed to distinguish India as a responsible nuclear state from its nuclear neighbour, Pakistan.

The Political Council is peopled by ideological firebrands and political nobodies. The latter cannot be expected to keep a check on the former, reliant as they are on the largesse of the former to be in the room in first place. Only the foreign minister can be credited with strategic sense, though living up to his ‘rockstar’ image has been messed up by the Jaishankar’ism: “small economies don’t fight big economies.”

Ajit Doval, as National Security Adviser (NSA), heads the Executive Council charged with implementing nuclear decisions. All the perception management over the past nine years has not papered over his iffy strategic acumen.    

Besides, India nuclear decision-making structure is not so clear as commentators have made out. A text on India’s national security structures has not more than a sentence each on the only two pages it finds mention.

The 2017 Joint Doctrine has it that, “the tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC), is the NCA’s operational arm, having its own Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) reporting to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) as well as National Security Advisor (NSA).” That this arrangement continues into the tenure of the second Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the Permanent Chairman (PC) of the COSC, is an unrecognized anomaly.

Even the cooption of the national security structures into governmental repertoire in the Allocation of Business, makes no mention of a nuclear role for the NSA. The CDS himself is merely military ‘adviser’ to the NCA.

In other words, the SFC reports to two advisers. The term ‘adviser’ ordinarily implies absence of executive authority, having at best a coordination role. This cannot be mistaken for nuclear command and control (C2).

India’s nuclear C2 does not come within the NSCS but is under Prime Minister’s Office, that provides ‘secretarial assistance to the Prime Minister.’ Variously-named the Nuclear Strategy Staff was revealed to exist in a talk a decade back by the chair of the National Security Advisory Board. Working under the NSA, who is the ‘Principal Adviser on National Security matters,’ it serves the NCA.

The missing military

That the PC COSC is not in the chain of command is clear since he, in his capacity as CDS, is ‘principal military adviser to the defence minister.’ Incidentally, the defence minister these days also has another ‘principal adviser,’ a former Military Adviser (MA) to the NSA.

The appointment of CDS has come with an explicit rider that the incumbent is without any command authority other than over three putative joint forces: cyber, special forces and space. That CDS is dispensable is clear from India not having one for a year and not missing him any.

The NCA set-up relegates military advice by not having the PC COSC included in the Political Council as an invitee, on par with the NSA. He is instead elbowing for a place with other relevant-agency heads in the Executive Council, at which incidentally also sits his nominal subordinate, the C-in-C SFC. Though ‘first among equals’, in reality his voice is liable to be over-layed by that of the Service Chiefs also present.

Worse, absent unity of command, the military’s input might suffer from dissonance. This dissonance can only deepen with the MA to the NSA – equivalent to the three NSA deputies in the NSCS - having the NSA’s ear. While the first two MAs were nuclear experts, the last two had no such expertise. As of today, there is no MA, the last incumbent wrangling a double promotion from a three star retiree to four star general.

Nothing is purely political or purely military. The political deliberations in the Political Council are unleavened by the military’s direct input or advice. Evidently, India is still on a strategic learning curve; and it can prove infinitely costly.  

Some might have it that a ‘missing military’ is a good thing. Substantially military considerations are not necessarily the best drivers of nuclear decisions. Such input may be avoidably injected with institutional interests (whats good for the army is good for the country), military biases (such as in favour of offensive options) or militarism (when the instrument is a hammer everything appears to be a nail). 

However, if the NCA is – as Jaspal has it – is a forum commandeered by ideological extremism, the military’s balancing input will be sorely missed. It is a myth that military men are given to bellicism. Instead, temperamentally predisposed civilians are equally likely to be bellicist.

Whether the Executive Council can be held up to a rational-legal standard and can remain mandate-driven is questionable. India’s modernity trajectory today is pronouncedly towards the negative.

Though no data is available, upper caste bureaucrats and technologists are just as likely subscribers of Hindutva thinking as not. Agency heads, hand-picked by a two-person Appointments’ Committee of the Cabinet, are unlikely to compensate vagaries with advice against the grain. Group think might debilitate considerations, Jaishankar’s fawning description of cabinet meetings notwithstanding.

The military at the table can chip in with the necessary sobriety and expertise. It will counter act Modi’s inclination to ride rough shod over procedural aspects, as was the ignoring the Reserve Bank of India in the demonetization decision, or pertinent to the military, the rushing through of the Agnipath scheme of uncertain provenance.

If there is a counter force or counter military thrust in the nuclear domain, then all the more reason for the military coordinates of the situation to be on the table. There is no such thing as ‘political weapons’, as India holds nuclear weapons to be. They have real world implications that cannot be shied away from.

How much worse can it get?

Advocacy for the military's inclusion presupposes that the military remains uncontaminated by Hindutva, by now all pervasive in the social space and dominant in political culture.

Hindutva’s verities are not professionalism friendly, anachronistically dipping into wellsprings 2000 years old. It has gone out of its way to trammel on institutions. Deep-selection of the military leadership is one conduit for getting to a Hindutva-compliant military. This has debilitated the CDS post, evacuating all promise of the ‘most notable reform’ since Independence.

Hereon it can only get worse. When the baton is passed there is no choosing between prospective receivers, that has a monk as frontrunner.

A warped structure and one struggling with pathologies cannot but materialize Jaspal’s three scenarios of nuclear weapons’ discharge: accident (remember the errant Brahmos); miscalculation (remember demonetization); and desperation (remember Pulwama).

But Jaspal’s is an over-kill

Even so, to hold that Modi might nukes to pull off an election victory is rather a stretch. True, Modi used a security incident in the run up to the previous election to his advantage. He has also tasted blood – gaining another four per cent voters.

However, on strategic matters involving use of force against nuclear neighbours, Modi has been remarkably circumspect – noise on surgical strikes notwithstanding.

Even as the last surgical strike operative got back across the Line of Control, the Indian military operations’ Chief was on television assuring Pakistan that operations had ended. Only filibuster attended Indian response to Pakistan’s Operation Swift Retort. Against China, India’s reticence has been called out for ‘cowardice.’

Jaspal is not the only commentator impressed by information war on India’s turning a new strategic leaf. This writer too initially thought there was a strategic shift from restraint to proactivism. Events have proved otherwise.  

Modi will not use the nuclear card to fetch him another term because of the uncertainty that surrounds such recourse. India’s efforts at force reconfiguration into integrated battle groups has suffered setback recently, showing up its unreadiness – the Himalayan frontier taking priority. Though prioritized, Jaspal is entirely wrong in holding that post-Galwan, India’s nuclear proactivism extends to the Northern front too.

Besides, for an election victory, there are other rabbits to pull out of the hat, for instance, the Khalistan factor or another outrage on Muslims. Purging Mughuls from history curriculum not enough, perhaps a Uniform Civil Code could be trotted out using Modi’s brute majority.

Taking Jaspal seriously

Taking Jaspal’s critique up front, his is a plausible scenario. India could go for counter force strikes - even preemptively - in case Pakistan readies nuclear weapons for battlefield use, with a strategic purpose.

The quantum of nuclear ordnance used will determine attitudes and steps up the ladder. Proportionality – preferably mutually defined prior - and discrimination can act as useful brakes. If and since the two already maintain discreet contacts, these could be upped at the crunch.

Escalate to de-escalate strategies of the two sides need to be exchanged directly between the two. This is a counter-intuitive point, but a nuclear bang can even make the deaf hear. Ideological propensities might go out of the window, though late but hopefully not too late.

The two sides must not rely overly on their respective benefactors. A lesson from the Ukraine War is that patrons usually have their own geopolitical best interests in mind and at heart. In this case, the two superpowers will try to test and wear down the other. South Asia can do without a home-grown Zelensky.

Jaspal is only partially right

Even if Jaspal’s was merely India-baiting, his case will surely gladden hearts in India’s nuclear weapons establishment. They would believe that India deterrence based on a strategy of irrationality has succeeded.

The logic is that if Pakistan fears reaching for its nukes - notwithstanding its full spectrum deterrence doctrine - Indian deterrence would have succeeded.

However, that was true for the period of Indian conventional advantage. Ever since Galwan, no such conventional advantage exists. Pakistan does not need nukes to stave off India.

Instead, in a two-front scenario, India might need nukes to get to a quick verdict on the Western front, in order to be able to concentrate on the other more threatening foe. First use, counter force and counter military ‘temptations’ are more pertinent then. Its in such a scenario, bigotry in the NCA might clinch the nuclear decision.

Jaspal is wrong in believing that such decisions might owe to electoral compulsions. India may yet get to a stage when elections don’t really matter, which is when his scenario will truly kick in.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-regimes-misuse-of-the-army-chiefs?sd=pf

https://m.thewire.in/article/security/is-the-army-chief-allowing-himself-to-be-used-to-make-political-points-on-china/amp - shortened version

The regime’s misuse of the Army Chief’s broad shoulders

Whereas in the popular perception Rahul Gandhi is being hounded for inquiring after the relationship of Narendra Modi with Gautam Adani, the regime wishes to also silence him for another reason. He recently set the cat among the pigeons, bringing up the ‘C’ word on China: ‘Cowardice!’

A regime boasting a 56” chest has had to reassert its masculinity. Its spin master, Dr. Jaishankar, had done a hit-wicket with his egregious contribution to strategy – that would’ve drawn a frown from his strategist father – with his ‘small economies don’t fight big economies’ theory. The damage resulting needed to be rectified.

It has trotted out the Army Chief four times since to stall the breach. The Army Chief has obliged by mastering his talking points.

The first of two choreographed interviews was with a regime favourite, who - though son of a military strategist – maintained twice over that ‘the nature of war has changed’. The latter two were appearances of the Chief at invited talks.

The Chief’s landmark take on China

The latest of the four was a landmark talk on China. Strangely, the Army Chief pitched the talk at the political level, which ordinarily should have been covered by a political leader or a senior diplomat, or perhaps by Dr. Jaishankar himself, whose identity is conflicted between the two.

It is not self-evident how these topics fall within an Army Chief’s brief: ‘predatory economics, weaponising resource supply chains, financing large infrastructure projects with little consideration for environmental and safety standards, burdening countries with unsustainable debt, IPR theft, stealing trade secrets and technology from foreign companies and unfair trade practices.’

The General waited 35 minutes to take to the podium for his 40-minute talk. It took the Chief some 15 minutes to get to content that can be – expansively viewed – taken as in the Army’s remit; getting to the strategic meat at the 25^th minute; and taking another 12 minutes to get to military specifics, with its 4 minutes were so wrapped up in jargon as to be abstruse.

It is a step forward that the Army Chief is taking on subject matter that had hitherto been placed above his station. With a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) back in chair, expansive dilation as this could reasonably be taken as his mandate, but the deep-selected CDS, being compromised, has largely been silent, seen last speaking at a birthday commemoration of his predecessor, regimental-mate Bipin Rawat.

Earlier such content would have been dished out through the chair of the National Security Advisory Board, an advisory body that has in the Modi era been decimated – like all other institutions. Using its aegis to launch broadsides had the advantage for governments to distance from taking ownership.

For the vehemence and higher order material way above the Chief’s pay bracket and outside his mandate, the National Security Adviser could have been considered, but that he was not deployed shows an avoidance. Though a Special Representative, Doval is out of his depth – restricted as his domain expertise is to intelligence and its murky underworld.

The Army Chief is a better bet to fire-off trenchant criticism of China - mostly echoing the Western narrative on China’s rise and nefarious intent.

The forthright hawkish line is an overcompensation, to rub out Gandhi’s words from sullying the image of the regime that – all evidence to the contrary – presents itself as strong-on-defence.

Characterising Gandhi as a ‘panda-hugger’, the regime needed to go out on a limb, without itself sawing off the branch it sits on. This explains the Army Chief’s sudden elevation as regime ‘smokes-man’ – breathing fire to obscure its timidity. 

So whats keeping the regime?

This abdication of responsibility to take up what is essentially a political task by the political leadership, shows Gandhi was right. If the political leadership needs the Army Chief to give voice to its sentiments and thought, what prevents it from doing so itself?

The ‘cowardice’ is in an inability and unwillingness to take ownership of policy assumptions on China given out by the Army Chief. By implication, the follow-on policy would be of a certain kind, which the government would be loath to be held to.

The assumption that India as an independent Pole in the international order would be able to withstand China’s rise is untenable, since India with its authoritarian turn has lost its way to any such Pole position. The economic promise of a capitalism-governance fusion in the Modani model taking off has also rudely come apart.

For the Chief to have it that India is a leader of the South only shows him taking a recent preliminary G20 conference, Voice of the Global South, rather too seriously.

Not getting to be a Pole means that India – in light of what the Chief says of China – has to either be part of the Western Camp or go it alone.

The Western Camp is welcoming, tactically using simulated umbrage at India’s human rights record to nudge India into subordinate status within its ranks. India is not averse, its leaning towards the other side in the democracy-dictatorship dichotomous image of the world order notwithstanding.

Even so, India projects a ‘go it alone’ Pole positioning, through keeping up a din on multilateralism and on Atmanirbhar Bharat. This allows the regime the cover of the very plausible internal balancing argument to continue with the crony capitalist model, though coming apart at the seams. It helps to keep out of global stakes and quietly consolidate Hindutva.

What is clear is that, properly, this is not the Army Chief’s territory. So, is this an Army Chief's push for a particular policy direction? Is this an Army Chief held hostage by an anti-China lobby? Is the Army Chief just an unwitting obedient camp follower or is he a willing participant?

Or is this a stratagem on part of the regime to show China India’s policy choices, so that China is suitably conditioned in changing its policy of subordinating India for its rise? Is it pleading on India’s part with China to allow it space in Asia and South Asia?

Using the Army Chief for making such a strong case helps with plausible deniability of sorts. The government cannot be held to the implicit messaging, allowing it to step back and away if needed.

Not to forget, trial balloons also serve the purpose for domestic kite-flying.

The Chief in his lair

The Chief made his military-relevant case generally along the lines: wars are not quite history; nations indulge their hard power for raison d'état; wars could last long; technology is a great leveler; Atmanirbharta is the need of the hour; and the Agnipath scheme is a game-changer.

In the tradition set by the olive-green-hearted, General Rawat, General Pande (who as a one-star operations staffer at the Army’s Kolkata headquarters was a subordinate of a two-star Rawat) prioritized the Land Domain in the next war.

Rawat had once conceptualized the land-centricity of the next war, famously having the Air Force playing the role of extended artillery, even as he – typically Infantry and a Gorkha-to-boot - waded into the carrier-submarine debate of the Navy.

To Pande, unsettled borders could set-off War, one that could last long. The observation is gratifying for this author, having first made the point some 15 years ago and following up a decade on.  

But the major point the Chief makes is land centricity of future wars in light of landward outcomes – territory changing hands. The assumption that any such losses unacceptable, the Land Domain gets privileged and - as a convenient corollary – so does the premier Service for the Land Domain, the Army. Jointness notwithstanding, QED.    

Given the absence of a national strategy document - evidence of competence levels of the national security establishment nine years into Ajit Doval’s overlordship - Pande cannot be faulted for using the opportunity for some bureaucratic politics.

Not waiting for either the national security doctrine or a follow-on joint doctrine (though the elapsed five years since its second iteration meriting an update), the Air Force unilaterally updated its doctrine, ten years to the date. Since there is also vocal strategic advocacy for looking to the seas for coping with the China challenge, the Army has had to stake out its Himalayan turf – with the Chief slyly torpedoing the Navy in his reference to the Moskva taken down with low-cost munitions.

Interestingly, the Chief in his elaboration of the regime’s China policy assumptions does not refer to two significant points he made elsewhere (which on account of their salience could reasonably have figured in his China talk): the first on the strategic deterrent and the second on conflict resolution.

His cryptic reference – since unelaborated - to the strategic deterrent at the technology seminar, was put forth as, “It is important to recognise that infirmities in border management can lead to wider conflict. Therefore, the first imperative that comes across is that ‘possession of strategic deterrence instruments is essential.’” The term ‘full spectrum conflict’ (a derivative from the Pakistani term Full Spectrum Deterrence) can only include nuclear conflict.

The second is his mention of ‘conflict resolution’. He said, ‘it is only through dialogue and talking to each other that we can find resolution’. While this would not be out of place for a peace studies professor to declaim, an Army Chief pushing for talks as the preferred strategy is to throw in the towel.

The Chief outlined India’s strategy as being settlement of the remaining friction points through talks, while in the interim keeping up troops deployed and at a high level of alert. It is only correct to give talks a fair chance and keep our muscle honed, in the interim.

This presumably presupposes that should talks not make a dent, then India has other options. Apparently, some 20 rounds of talks at the military and diplomatic levels over three years don’t suffice. Amazingly, the Chief has ruled out the military option, even as a notional threat-in-being to influence further rounds of talks.

Taking the two together – readiness of the strategic deterrent and conflict resolution – indicates the usual reticence of professional militaries countenancing war. The Indian military is playing its advisory role in highlighting that wars escalate, making the strategic deterrent loom larger. Consequently, it makes sense to settle matters without resort to war through conflict resolution.

This contradicts the lesson learnt alighted on by the Chief – that wars are pursued in the national interest. These could be long duration and could nudge the nuclear threshold. Militaries use such escalatory possibilities to deter the other side, thereby – through tacit bargaining - building in limitations in a conflict. Surely, the Indian military is no less adept at this than any other.

Even if an unsettled border might provide a spark, the house need not burn down in a border war. It is easier to keep a war limited, since the site of the fighting allows for this. The Army is well versed with Limited War theory, which presumably is also well war-gamed.

Indeed, the Cold Start doctrine it had put out in wake of Operation Parakram, building on the lessons of both the Kargil War and Parakram, was Limited War theory compliant. It had taken care to modulate its offensive so as not to offer any nuclear provocation to Pakistan.

The Chief’s land-centric notion of victory shows that limitation informs plans. Else, the advocacy for horizontal expansion into the high seas of a Himalayan-origin conflict might have caught traction by now.

Also, so would have the Air Force’s parallel war of an Indian version of ‘shock and awe’. The assumption is that India has the edge in the air since we have a technological advantage as also capacity, operating as it is from airfields that allow higher payloads of fuel and weaponry.

Both have escalatory portents, which are not discussed by the Chief in his elaborate talk on China, showing a noteworthy instinct for limitation.

So why the reticence, Chief?

True that it takes two to tango and that not only is territory at stake, but - progressively - so is ‘face’, leading to an implacable upping of the ante.

However, there is no prior certainty of which side finds a conflict - that is getting more painful by the moment - less sustainable. The side wanting out does not necessarily have to be India.

India’s leading the table of weapons purchasers over the last five years, shows India has the wherewithal to take on China. The Ukraine War shows that more can be expected when the balloon goes up.

Conversely, China could well feel that India has been put to a diversionary war by the United States and might want out. It has vicariously learnt from Putin’s experience in the Ukraine War. 

Consequently, there is no call for the Army Chief to pronounce that there is ‘only’ one way for conflict resolution: dialogue. Leave such language to leftist intellectuals, peace activists and writers as this one in the Asokan tradition.

That similar homilies (‘Not an era for war!’) were mouthed by the prime minister on the Ukraine War shows that India continues to be uncomfortable with accepting ownership of use of force. It remains strategically inept.

Red-flagging for the Chief

This begs the question why is the Chief weighing-in on the side of prudence by overcautiously putting his eggs in a negotiator’s basket? Is the regime using him doubly – to back-up its spin master, Dr. S Jaishankar’s skittishness? Is the regime using the Chief to cover up its pusillanimity, fully on display at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s meet of National Security Advisers at which Doval brought up ‘territorial integrity’?

The Chief needs cautioning that the regime could use advice publicly transmitted by him to claim that this is what holds it back from asking him to militarily deliver up an end-state restoring Indian territory.

The Chief might merely be voicing elements of policy but is opening himself to being double-crossed – with the policy being laid at the military’s door.

Afterall, the nation still does not know why Fire and Fury Corps held back, even if surprised by the Chinese. Was the Northern Command reined in or did it lack ‘go and gumption’ in first place?

By no means does an operational corps or command have the authority to set off a war, but if it has an Area of Responsibility and resources at its disposal for safeguarding it, there is no question of waiting for orders. Setting off a border scrap is within its ambit. It is for the ‘whole of government’ to ensure that this then remains limited.

If the Army was willing, but the regime held it back, the nation would like to know.

Is the army being kept in the doghouse or in the corner, up indefinitely in high altitude with nowhere to go, as scapegoat? The Army Chief’s rationalising of the policy choice is less than persuasive.

The only redeeming thing about the Chief’s conflict resolution push is if it turns out to be strategic deception at a grand scale, lulling the Chinese while the military quietly turns the table at Depsang and Demchok.

But that is not going to happen in election year. Not only is India hosting two multilateral summits in its national capital, but the capriciousness of war cannot be allowed to interrupt Narendra Modi’s run up to a hattrick in national elections.

Penultimately, the Chief needs being made wary of being used as the stalking horse on Atmanirbharta. The Modani controversy shows a proportion of the thrust for indigenization comes from profits to accrue to the regime’s cronies. The now-defunct windfall from Rafale for Ambani Jr. is a salutary case.  Indeed, there is concern wherefrom Rs. 20000 crores were used to underwrite the Adanis, Sr. and Jr.

Whereas the Air Force elided the controversy over Rafale, General Sundarji had to face up to the fallout of Bofors, being open to an investigation. General Pande must learn his lessons but not the hard way, lessons from the Ukraine War not being the only relevant ones these days.

Finally, the preparation of Agniveers for corporate security duties post-release by when capitalism will be in a hyper riot in Modi’s third term – plus as potential recruits as right-wing storm troopers - shows up agendas the professionally-oriented Chief is unwary of. An uncritical ‘positivity’ needs to cease.  

The Army Chief’s talk has had the plus point of allowing him feedback. It should make him more possessive of his broad shoulders here on.