https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-army-and-hindu-rashtra-through?utm_source=twitter&sd=pf

The army and Hindu Rashtra through a cultural lens

The Indian Army is in throes of radical change. The most significant changes are the office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), theatrisation, the organizational rejig in favour of integrated battle groups (IBG) and the Agnipath scheme. Of the three, the last – Agnipath – is a new feature attributable to the Narendra Modi government. The others – CDS, the theatre concept for jointness and IBGs – date to over a decade.

The CDS – an office variously termed and mandated - has been in the pipeline for long, only to be shied away from by earlier governments on political grounds. From the successor to the first incumbent not being appointed as yet, it is apparent that the Modi government grabbed at the jointness agenda in order to differentiate itself from the previous governments. In the flush from a politically – but not quite operationally – successful surgical strike – and an aerial one at that – it wanted to capitalize on its strong-on-defence image. A more prosaic explanation is perhaps that it merely wished to provide a billet as CDS to a general otherwise to retire the day the appointment was announced, as reward for his political leanings.

The radical aspect of the appointment – integration of the Services in the Ministry of Defence - was hollowed out with the CDS also reduced to being head of a new department, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). This entity had not been thought up in the preceding debate on defence reforms. An outhouse for the military - but within the compound wall - was not how integration of uniformed bureaucrats was ever envisaged. This should detract from the political dividend from the reform – that the Modi regime is so strong-on-defence that it even breached the citadel of bureaucrats in a ministry the  lead bureaucrat stands pompously styled as in-charge of ‘defence of India’.

News is that another assault is in the works. From the record, it can be expected to be launched as a surprise package: a new CDS delinked from DMA, itself redefined. ‘Better late than never’ and ‘better a tortoise than a hare’ will be the accompanying din, to obscure the anomaly in which the military (DMA) sits in judgment on its own case. That is by way of illustration of what to expect of the regime in relation to the military (‘army’ and ‘military’ used interchangeably) in New India.

New India has been announced, with the ‘Old’ transited out of in the observance of the Azadi ki Amrit Utsav. The distinguishing feature of New India is the triumph of Hindutva in its political dominance and dictation of political culture. Old India was a creation of the left-liberal, Khan Market/Lutyen’s gang that right wing political forces behind New India have been at pains to displace. New India is best exemplified with the fierceness in the freshly-minted Simha atop the under-construction parliament building. The head of the Executive unveiling the symbol on the grounds of the legislature in a Hindu religious ceremony, with other religion representatives being notably absent, add to the symbolic break with Old India. If the ground-breaking ceremony is indicator, the inauguration of the Ayodhya Temple on the site of the illegally demolished Babri Masjid, will mark the unmistakable passage of Old India.

A New India requires a matching military. The professional military of Old India would not do. The makeover of the military is intrinsic, symbolic of and critical to the success of the New India project. It is of a piece with major changes in States. The British Indian Army took some 150 years to stabilize after the Battle of Plassey, with the merger of the three presidency armies. Independent India also experimented with reordering the profile of the military, domesticating it from a colonial force furthering interests across three continents to one befitting a post-colonial, democratic state. It is only right that if the Second Republic in the offing has an army in its own image.

The structural aspects of this – modernization, jointness etc – are a product of doctrine keeping pace with strategic developments. Instead, of greater consequence for the incipient Hindu Republic (borrowing from the term ‘Islamic Republic’) is the accompanying cultural change. Whereas, from a cultural perspective, a shift to modernity in keeping the higher technological and educational indices of the army may appear the obvious route to go, that cannot be the trajectory taken, modernity being at odds with the reverse march of history in New India. A dharmic Republic requires an army suitably imbued with the wisdom of ancient philosophies, carted down through generations safe from marauding invaders out to extinguish Hindu civilization, by a hardy upper caste. A return to the Kshatriya ethic is necessary, its principle characteristic being its location in the caste hierarchy. It is no wonder the introduction to the nation of the newly sworn in president, the symbolic head of the armed forces, was through a photo showing her sweeping a temple floor.

This fits well with the turn to a majoritarian democracy, since the Kshatriya is subordinate to the intellectual class. Theory on a democratic military subordinates the military to the political level. While theory veers to the military professional standing outside – if not above - the political fray, in a relationship of ‘objective’ civilian control of the military by the political level, the cultural shift requires instead ‘subjective’ civilian control of the military, in which the military is – eventually - Hindutva-inspired. This explains the ‘deep selection’ model adopted by the Modi regime for military commanders, which in its latest iteration has the CDS being picked from a catchment including all serving and recently-retired three star officers; counter-intuitively, including those from the ‘staff’ stream. It also explains the delay in the selection of the second CDS. The first CDS has set the example, precedence and standards in opening up the military to Hindutva inroads. Deep selection involves looking out for such inclinations in candidates.

Teething troubles appear to have stalled the selection of a successor. There is perhaps a spillover of modernity-induced skepticism in the military to Hindutva overtures. The Old Republic is apparently not dead and the New Republic yet to be born. The prerequisite is to shift to subjective civilian control, easing the process of birthing the New Republic. It is not without reason that the process has a certain subterfuge attending it. The New Republic is presented as an evolution. It is almost as if a muscular version of the Old Republic is being manufactured, understandably, with a Hindu veneer. The talk of a Hindu Rashtra is not yet mainstream, confined to supportive formations that can be discounted as ‘fringe’ when convenient. Since plausible deniability of verbiage by the head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is not credible, the cat is out of the bag – as is indeed the game plan. Inject the Hindutva discourse through an intravenous drip into national consciousness.

The military has alongside to be dismantled as a credible, internally-cohesive and mandate-driven institution. Its strengths as an institution have to be dissipated. This is a horizontal lesson from other institutions that have been subverted from within, sister institutions in the security field leading the pack: intelligence, police and accountability bodies as one dealing with human rights. In the Army’s case, a dismantling and reassembling is doubly necessary. At some point in the India makeover, it might be necessary to use it against the un-persuaded. Advancing subjective civilian control is facilitative. Minimally, even if objective civilian control is to be retained for purposes as credibly managing an external security environment, then it has to be preserved from the backlash that a makeover prompts. Having a like-minded military helps.

The hold of an image as a modern, self-regarding professional military needs dilution. The contours of this are not fleshed out. To what extent the Islamisation of a neighbouring military, Pakistan, serves as a potential model is unknown. How Mujahid compares to Agniveer is uncertain. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence of intent along such lines. What is certain is a difference from the neighbour in terms of purging of any praetorian tendencies through the Kshatriya model of internalised subordination.

For now, dismantlement suffices. Take for instance the tinkering with the Beating Retreat. But beginnings of reassembly can also be discerned in surprising changes within the military, such as, in one case, incorporation of the aarti into a military parade. The military not being an island, this is the tip of the iceberg. Furor that departures from the traditional practices invoke will wane as exhaustion sets in. Part of the brouhaha includes trotting out of Hindutva-adhering brass-hats with their own public missive disparaging dissent. Opportunist commentators offer their services in a gratis tongue-lashing of traditionalists. Just as an opposition-mukt Bharat is aimed for, the discourse space is to be rid of disruptive echoes from dissidents. The army's gatekeepers are to be deep selectees to unlock its gates from the inside.  

What might an army of a Hindu Rashtra look like? It will certainly continue with professional preoccupations currently engaging it: jointness, IBGs et al. These are intended in part to keep its head down while the makeover progresses. It will also be kept out of trouble; securing India taken over by more Hindutva-friendly instruments as intelligence (Pakistan), home minister-answering security forces (Kashmir) and, increasingly, under Minister Jaishankar, foreign policy (China).

Modi has learnt his lessons from earlier prime ministerial ambushes: Emergency and Golden Temple in case of Indira and the military misadventures of Rajiv Gandhi. While posturing at Brasstacks and at Sumdorong Chu proved useful to project an assertive India, the latter recklessly went a step ahead with his Sri Lanka foray (as Jaishankar best knows). This partially explains the limited-aims ‘showing of eyes’ to Pakistan, including through the much-vaunted surgical strikes. Thus, despite Galwan, Indian military merely engages in talks, though deployed in strength along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) enabling other options too. From the 16 rounds of talks even this deployment has proven futile, showing ineptness even in demonstrating muscles to undergird one’s position on the table. War avoidance is dressed up as supreme strategic footwork, so much so that Jaishankar elbows Doval as India’s national security mastermind. The grand strategy is to gain time and space for consolidation of Hindutva rather than being sidetracked by traditionally-conceived national interest. To distract are volleys – including by use of the outgoing president’s shoulders for this - on the parochial impulses behind opposition’s caviling about selling of national security silver.

The inter-relationship between political, strategic and organizational culture is a useful prism to view all this. There are two ways to visualize: one is as concentric circles with political culture at its center; and second is as a triangle, with the three being vertices. The concentric circles model is hierarchical. Of the intercourse in the two directions – inside-out and outside-in – the former predominates. The second model is more reality-depicting. It shows a degree of autonomy in the three: each impacted in its own way by inter-dependent factors. Thus, not only does Hindutva impact the political level, it influences organizational culture as well; only differently.

While Hindutva minders in the national security establishment might like to bend reality, it is proving difficult and time consuming. Deep selection and the search for a pliable CDS are proving short as means. New India does not as yet approximate the reality depicted by the concentric circles model. Hindu Rashtra would. Getting to that will entail shoving the relatively autonomous vertex of strategic culture in the triangular model into being the non-entity outer circle in the concentric circle model.

Hindutva dominance of political culture leaves an imprint on organizational culture: politics playing out in a society the military comes from – the military not being an island. The tricky part is the imprint on strategic culture. While political cultural dominance profits from a projection of strategic felicity, mistaking assertiveness for aggression is to invite trouble. This explains the posturing in parliament by Amit Shah that had it that he was ready to spill blood (presumably including his own) for retaking Aksai Chin. Taking him seriously would have seen a different response to Galwan than ‘mirror deployment’. In the event, deft strategic communication compensated for strategic ineptitude. The upshot of staking out the LAC on a long-term basis is in its keeping the Indian army from looking inwards to any mandate on the preservation of the Constitution. For its part, Pakistan continues to serve as a useful foil, with Rajnath Singh happy to refer to the Maa Sharda Shakti in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir while refraining in such imagery from a mention of Mansarovar in Tibet in his depiction of Hindu-sthan’s civilisational frontiers. Hindu Rashtra as a proto Akhand Bharat is bogeyman only for Pakistan. The strategic challenge is to strut one’s stuff without having to prove it. The risk from hollowing out of the army through the Agniveer scheme can thus be run since the strategic environment will not require strategic exertion. The army’s organisational culture is to be messed around with to keep if from tripping up changes in political culture. 

The army of Hindu Rashtra will be informed equally by India’s military record as its mythological past. India’s armies have always kept out of politics, though actively used in medieval times by contenders for power. Other than in colonial interest, they have seldom ventured abroad: the exertions of Ranjit Singh being mostly in territory not seen as alien. They have been largely used in placating India internally. Both mythology and epics testify to this predominant role of the army: if of the Chakravartin, ending strife, or, if of the rebel, precipitating strife. The army’s preoccupation in the Moghul period was similar.

Since these days, India is largely placid internally – and there is an extensive internal security force under the home ministry – the army can step back from this role too. Its role in external strategic management is eased by a strategic doctrine of war avoidance. In this the hollowing out of the military is messaging to adversaries that New India poses little threat, diluting any security dilemma that can detract from getting to be Hindu Rashtra. Subjective civilian control will keep the army from addressing any dilemma over its role in preservation of the Constitution. Agniveers are key national security providers getting to Hindu Rashtra.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/agnipath-infantry-no-longer-queen?sd=pf

Agnipath: Infantry no longer Queen of Battle

The Infantry prides itself as the Queen of Battle. The Ukraine War reinforces this image. No amount of missile strikes and tank maneuvers could manage to force the Ukrainians out of their strongholds. In fact one of the lessons from the Russian showing outside Kiev has been that its coup de main was short on Infantry. Later, the Infantry, stolidly fighting from objective to objective, has delivered results in the Donbas; no doubt, with the support of ordnance thrown prior at the objective to soften it up. The other lesson has been that even this Infantry thrown into battle has been debilitated by its poor quality.

This only proves a commonplace with the Indian army: that a high quality Infantry is both indispensible and imperative. India was conquered by the British largely by drilling Indians into cohesive Infantry. They used the regimental system, initially based loosely on ethnic lines, only to be firmed up over time into a regimental system informed by the ‘martial race’ theory. The idea was that cohesive infantry units fought better and cohesion was an outcome of bonds between members of the unit, anchored on shared ethnicity and culture. Though the martial race theory under-grid the regimental system, the ‘martial race’ aspect was informed by the 1857 experience. Its political intent was to restrict regiments to ethnic groups that could be relied on to support the British. It was otherwise militarily useful in leveraging cohesion for military power. The resulting force multiplication for the British Indian Army helped the Allies win the Second World War.

Sociological theory from the two World Wars partially bore out the theory arrived at through a racist lens in India. Scholarship reckoned that a battle-winning factor was cohesion of primary groups. Cohesion sprung from inter-member affinity, which could of course be forged against the odds but was greatly facilitated by preexisting primordial affiliation. The organization facilitated the intended outcome, combat spirit. The outcome itself was a function of horizontal integration in subunits, which with vertical integration - added by the military leadership in the command chain – made for formidable fighting units and formations.

A prominent reading suggestion in any military sociology leg of an undergraduate degree in military studies makes this finding explicit. In her book on the Falklands War, Mates and Muchhachos, Nora Kinzer Stewart, contrasting the operational performance of the two sides, British and Argentinian, alights on cohesion as making the difference. To her, the regimental strengths of the British Infantry carried the day, while the Argentinian side was handicapped by their reliance on conscripts who proved uncertain of their mates at the crunch.

The Indian experience validates theory. Whats App forwards – though rightly denigrated as a source of information – provide a clue. Ostensibly written by a former officer of one of the units that vacated some of Kargil’s peaks off Pakistani occupiers, a post recently had it that the battalion had been launched into a conventional operation directly from the Valley floor where it was engaged in counter insurgency operations. Apparently, the commanding officer got together one of the battalion’s games teams – in this rendering, Basketball – and tasked it with dislodging the Pakistanis off a holdout. Likewise, another commanding officer once told me how he used the battalion’s towering Kabaddi team players in squaring off against the Chinese in the jostling characteristic of the game of one-up-manship on the Line of Actual Control, a game that had tragic results at Galwan. Basically, the two units unwarily relied on preexisting bonds between the members of groups tasked – in this case their games-imparted mutual regard for fellow teammates. This is in subconscious acknowledgement of cohesion as a combat-winning ingredient.

Post-Independence, the regimental system stood the army in good stead since it was often involved in operations at short notice. The 1947 operations, the Indian Peacekeeping experience in Sri Lanka, the Kargil War and the response to the Ladakh crisis are examples. In such instances, camaraderie presaged by the regimental system helped the army adapt to the emergent circumstance. At other instances, there was considerable preparedness through extensive training, as in the run up to the wars in 1965 and 1971. Tactical training enhanced cohesion, making for operational effectiveness. The 1962 War loss was from poor planning, leadership and neglect of training, while the regimental system-based cohesion can be credited with mitigating the rout somewhat.

The centrality of the regiment to the Infantry is evident from the formative experience of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR). Put together in short order in face of a severe proxy war challenge in Kashmir, the RR added fuel to the fire by its upping the suppressive template. Personnel turbulence lent anonymity to members of primary groups, enabling shirking. The difficult man management problem was bypassed by resort to questionable measures as pseudo-gang operations at the operational level and, at the tactical level, culling of high-caliber outfits from the mass into Ghatak platoons tasked with the role of the hammer, while the mass provided the anvil. Over time, when RR units were affiliated to a set of units within a regiment and contributing arms and supporting arms, the strengths of the regimental system became operative even in RR and helped bail it out. The RR has since taken charge of the counter insurgency grid and can credibly claim to have curtailed the proxy war. The take-away is that the regimental system can only be trifled at risk of a poor operational showing, while being conscious of what makes the Infantry tick might redeem ‘transformational reforms’ – as is touted the Agnipath scheme.

Agnipath’s implications for the regiment-based Infantry must be viewed in light of cohesion in the Infantry. The Infantry is critical for an army’s showing. Regiments by their provision cohesion for Infantry fighting units are consequential for what the Infantry delivers. The impact of Agnipath on the regimental system is thus the criteria to examine what the scheme means for the Army and its Infantry.

For now, the Agnipath’s roll out has been accompanied by the reassurance that the regiment system would not be trifled with. Regiments - presumably their ethnic-based intake - is to be kept out of the All India All Class (AIAC) turn that Agnipath promises. Even so, there are two internal contradictions in the scheme.

Firstly, pre-existing AIAC regiments (in the combat and support arms) have had an equally credible showing in India’s wars. This owes to cohesion in such units being instilled by elitism or role-based regimentation and enabled by personnel stability. Primary group bonding and wider horizontal integration in secondary groups comprising subunits and units does not necessarily need primordial affiliation, as obtain in ethnic-based regiments, but can be forged in the crucible of training, crisis environment and combat.

Take for instance the Galwan episode. Whereas 12 of the gallant men who died were from one battalion, the other 8 were from affiliated outfits. Yet their collective showing was remarkable, indicating the cohesion can be injected by the circumstance, but with a caveat that there has to be a preexisting cohesion-enabling factor such as cohesive groups: primary, secondary or tertiary making for organisational integration.

The reverse is also possible, as the American experience with cohesion in Vietnam – recounted in the must-read study by Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel - indicates. Shirking, irresolute and indisciplined behavior is also possible. Such an outcome owed to personnel turbulence within the ranks, preventing the forging of intimate bonds of friendship and camaraderie. Taking cue, the Americans in their wars that were part of their Global War on Terror resorted to sending in cohesive units that were to together stay the course through their tour of duty, restricted to one year on ground. Cohesion was sought through training prior to induction and by the threat environment compelling its regeneration on ground, enabled by the primary group knowing they have to stick it out together against the odds.

On the other hand, Agnipath compounds this problem by introducing alongside its promise of an AIAC shift, personnel turbulence at the spear tip – through a continuing turn-over with a vast majority of a cohort (75 per cent) leaving every four years. Since the intake is faced with a continuing necessity of being found worthy of retention among the 25 per cent slated to stay on, the competition engendered potentially places out of reach the primary group bonding based on mutual trust, love and confidence. The finding from Roger Little’s work on the Korean War - that the ‘buddy groups’ helped soldiers navigate the rigours of war – and of Charles Moskos from the Vietnam War on intra-squad relationships  - appear to have been neglected.

The extreme administrative pressures this puts on junior leaders – who have to continuously evaluate their charge on their suitability for retention - has been dwelt on in the criticism of the scheme. Job security concerns might lead to a fratricide of sorts. Catching the eye of the commanders might end up the sole aim of Agniveers, leading to a crab-like melee. Absent training opportunities and an operational setting in which to gauge the wheat from the chaff, units might tend towards retaining gladiators for being better at games or other avoidably subjective criteria – in which the typically-Indian sifarish might play a role. (While there is a notion that ‘gamers’ – those with better mechanical coordination of the body that makes them better at games – make for better soldiers, this is just a fond peacetime notion. No study has underwritten it, though it is easy to prove or disprove just by finding out how many - if any - of the gallantry award winners were proficient at games.)

In short, not only primary groups but secondary group formation also suffers. Horizontal integration absent, the premium will be on vertical integration. Absent any role of the organization in aiding integration, there is every chance of the weak link giving way, and with untold operational consequence.

Though the scheme appears nonchalant on these counts, there are two features that argue in its favour. The first is a finding from studies in the aftermath of World War II. The famous Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz study on cohesion and disintegration in the German Army through its years of retreat had it that, counter-intuitively, the primary group sustained its fighting ability through the series of defeats. This is credited not only to the leadership capability of the junior leaders – its non-commissioned officers – but also to the youth conscripted into the ranks. The latter is significant. The youth grew up in the years Hitler rose to and held power in Nazi Germany. They were imbued with the Nazi spirit in varying degrees and bore the imprint of Hitler’s authoritative image. Some were from the Hitler-Jugend. They were partly instilled with Nazi-style nationalism. This, when positively articulated by the Wehrmacht professionalism embodied by their leaders, allowed them to stay the ranks and put up a spirited defence of the Fatherland on both fronts. That it was an existential fight, especially on the eastern front, helped. Cohesion could thus be output of both their showing on the line, while simultaneously - in a mutually reinforcing cycle - adding to their showing in combat. In any case, the psychological underpinnings cannot be elided.

So, does the Agnipath scheme rely on a Hitler-Jugend of sorts, Indian youth who have come of age as Narendra Modi and Hindutva have been ascendant and in power?

There have been apt comparisons elsewhere of the similarities between Hindutva – the philosophy that Modi and his support base is unapologetic about - and Nazism. It is no secret that at inception Hindutva was enamoured of fascism. Hindutva wishes Hindus to reemerge from a history in which they were eclipsed for a thousand years by militarily-adept Muslim invaders. This interpretation of history instills an inferiority complex, in Hindutva adherents, of a deficient masculinity, prompting their effort to breakout. Regaining military prowess is a way to reestablish virility. Agnipath is a scheme designed to put youth through their military paces, dispelling forever the myth of the effete – if not effeminate - Hindu. The latter traits are attributed to the corruption of Indic thought by insurgent Buddhism and similar subaltern philosophies. It is no wonder that a scowling Simha has replaced the benign set of Asokan lions India had once chosen as its national symbol.

Agniveers inducted into the Army would thus be imbued with the ardour Modi has infused into New India. That they rioted on receipt of news of Agnipath is discounted as born in ignorance. Modi, reacting to the protests that greeted the announcement of Agnipath, gave out the aim of the scheme as, 'Certain decisions look unfair but will help in nation-building in long run.' To what extent has this placated youth is uncertain, since simultaneously, the army asserted that it would not select any protestor, leading to dissipation of agitations. Therefore, even if the establishment is reliant on Hindutva and Modi’s larger-than-life image to energise Agniveers, and to thereby compensate for the deficiencies of the Agnipath, prospective Agniveers have - in their burning trains – let on that they are not quite the Hitler-Jugend. The regime could take course correctives, such as by in a subterranean manner having right wing formations sponsor Agniveers. It could over time compel the military to use Hindutva-inspired motivational gimmicks, if not use it to propagate Hindutva itself. This will help the regime with its nation-building objectives, voiced by Modi.

If the aim of the scheme is nation-building, then the regime must insure in the interim that the nation survives any national security challenge. This it has set about doing by a policy of appeasement, best evidenced by Modi, firstly, denying any intrusion had taken place in Ladakh, and, subsequently, when it is evident that there is intrusion, keeping mum. The vacation of the intrusions at places has been at India’s cost. This is appeasement, an acknowledgement that India is militarily overawed. The strategic logic given is that it buys India time, such as by allowing India to get its act together by building arteries as the Char Dham highway that will enable it to bring its military power – being upped alongside - to bear. Since the power trajectory is not in India’s favour, it is uncertain how this power asymmetry can ever be bridged. But the strategic narrative buys Modi time, allowing for kicking of the can down road when he might have passed into history as a much mythologised and sanitised figure. Since the military will not be tested when a policy of appeasement is operational, that the Agnipath scheme defies received scholarship on military sociology will remain under wraps. This will enable Hindutva to gain its political objectives sought from the scheme.

What does this political-level digression imply for India’s Infantry? The ‘digression’ is necessary to understand the wellsprings of Agnipath. Clausewitz’s understanding that politics supersedes military considerations is not only valid for war time, but perhaps more so in peacetime. The political look here makes clear that the good health of the Infantry is not what informs the scheme. Good health is not essential, since deft foreign policy footwork can compensate. Therefore, operational effectiveness is not the criteria to gauge Agnipath. Scholarship also shows that the regimental system is dispensable. Cohesion can be acquired by other means, with the challenge of combat itself being one such. In any case, some military strategists have it that war will not be manpower-heavy as much as technology and firepower-centric.

Therefore, the Infantry can expect another makeover sometime down the line, when the feedback will be leveraged to realign Agnipath a half-decade on. The AIAC system can permeate Infantry. This will put paid to the regimental system and consign to history regimental history and pride dating to the British era. The Indian Infantry will be nourished by an Indian – if not quite Hindutva - nationalism. It will remain untested since on the frontiers it would be reduced to a border-guarding role and would have disengaged from internal security, outsourcing it to central police organizations, as evidenced already in Kashmir. (The latter insight stems from the fact that Agnipath was not thought up for organizations reporting to the home ministry yet. Instead, a small proportion of Agniveers are to be discharged into those organizations, implying that these are to stay unscathed (dispelling the snide thought that Agnipath will be extended to these too at some point later). To elongate this sidelight: that home ministry has not be tapped for Agnipath also shows the political impulse behind the scheme; it being to defang the military lest it entertain notions of coming to the aid of the Constitution when it is twisted into that of Hindu Rashtra. Another perspective has it that it is not so much to keep the military out, but to make of the military an accomplice that Agnipath has been thought up. The jury will be out on this till New India is transited to Hindu Rashtra sooner than later.)

So, how should the Infantry navigate the impending? India’s 1962 debacle can be attributed to quaint notions of foreign policy deftness back then. Today, any overreliance on interpid Jaishankar’s footwork will only replicate the 1962 result. The Army therefore must take its own call.

It would require keeping its Infantry honed, irrespective of the nation building mandate it now has as against a hitherto national security one. It must accept and embrace Agniveers. It must resist Hindutva-centric motivational pitches. Seeing the writing on the wall for ethnic-based regiments, it must prepare for such a future. Such a future also owes to the suspicion some ethnicities inspire in a Gangetic-centric nationalism of Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan. Substitution of the regiment symbolism with national artifacts must proceed apace. Agniveers must be kept out of the Rashtriya Rifles, lest in their nationalist zeal they mistake the subnationalism intrinsic to India as ‘anti-national’. Agniveers must be indoctrinated with inclusive patriotism, as against the hard nationalism the regime expects. This is a tall order since there is no shortage of Hindutva-inclined officers, with the vast majority coming from Hindutva catchment areas.

Every generation of officership has its unique challenge. The post-War one looked at demobilization; the post-Independence one faced obsolescence; the post-1962 one, reinvention; the post-1971 one, lethargy as a regional power, rudely shaken up by the Tamil Tigers; the post-liberalisation one, an insurgent periphery; the post-nuclearisation one, a redefinition of conventional power; and the post-Modi one, a crisis in professional credibility. The forthcoming challenge of a military makeover can expect to keep the Infantry busy into the decade. Its current day ethos can tide it over the period. What emerges thereafter must not be allowed to be laid at Infantry’s door.

 https://southasianvoices.org/operational-risks-and-societal-militarization-agnipaths-entrenched-challenges/

Operational Risks and Societal Militarization: Agnipath’s Entrenched Challenges

On June 14, India’s defense minister—flanked by the three service chiefs—rolled out the Agnipath scheme. The scheme is a “transformative reform” in the military’s method of recruitment and retention and was also a source of instant controversy and opposition following its abrupt announcement, with protests surfacing across the country along with vocal criticism from many including retired military officers. Beyond the immediate anger over the loss of a pathway to long-term employment and a pension plan for India’s youth, the scheme also creates two major long-term risks that may not be amenable correction. The first, is the potential for declining operational effectiveness as India faces potential threats two contested borders, the second—and more difficult challenge to address—is the long term threat India may face internally from a more militarized society as a majority of Agniveers re-enter society after four-years of service.

Agnipath: Content and Controversy

Since 1966, the Indian military has been comprised of volunteers for long duration service, who retire with a pension at the end of their period of service. The new scheme, Agnipath, has only 25 percent of those recruited continuing in service through retirement, while others are let back into the economy after four years with a golden handshake.

Recruiting will also now be on an “All India All Class” basis, implying that it would be merit based and open to all eligible Indians volunteering to serve as Agniveers. This does away with the earlier recruitment pattern based on province level vacancies, where those entering the army were impacted by “single class” and “fixed class” or ethnic based regiments. Though the government has promised to retain the time-tested regimental system, apprehensions remain over some ethnic groups advantaged by regiments comprising soldiery primarily from their ethnic groups standing to lose out if intake into regiments were to be thrown open to all.

The scheme got off to a controversial start. Youth who were waiting to take their chance at a job offering a lifetime job security took to the streets, venting their frustration by blocking rail and highway traffic at times for several days and damaging government property and clashing with police. Commentators, particularly knowledgeable military veterans, criticized the scheme, mainly on two counts: the impact on the regimental system and fears that the majority exiting the three services after their four-year contract may not find easy placement in an economy facing wide spread youth unemployment. In response to some of these criticisms, the government has catered for quotas to absorb Agniveers into other sectors such as central police organizations.

The protests eventually subsided following the military’s threat that it would not recruit those involved. The military also promised improvements to the scheme, and is currently engaging extensively with stakeholders to clarify doubts. For its part, the government put its political weight behind Agnipath, with the prime minister endorsing it. Corporate groups also stepped up, indicating that they would do their part in absorbing the military-trained and disciplined manpower released by the military.

Even as the Supreme Court has agreed to list a petition against the scheme, the recruitment process is already underway. Since recruiting was suspended two years back due in part to the COVID-19 outbreak and in anticipation of the scheme that has been under discussion since then, the initial intake will help tide over the shortfalls that have developed from retirees leaving when their terms ended. By about early next decade the military’s make up would have changed as intended by the scheme to a youthful, technology-oriented profile of service members. Since most of those leaving would not be liable for a pension, the money saved is intended to be ploughed back into capital procurement. India’s substantial youth population is intended to have an employment opportunity, which in the short-term can boost life and work skills for India’s economy—on course to become a $5 trillion dollar one by later this decade.

The Long-Term Risks: Operational Costs and Militarizing Society

While the government and military have responded to some of the immediate doubts surrounding the scheme, Agnipath also presents two major long-term and more entrenched structural challenges that will need to be addressed for the scheme to be successful. The first is related to the military’s operational effectiveness and the second to the impact on society of those released by the military over the coming years.

On the operational-side, four years is rather short for turning out a trained soldier. While this time frame might be possible for an infantryman, force multiplication in the infantry rests on primary group cohesion—which cannot be formed amidst personnel turbulence. Further, the competition to be retained in the service as opposed to being laid off after four years might degrade horizontal bonding between Agniveers. A gap between the new recruits under the scheme and long-term soldiers will also require managing, placing an inordinate premium on junior leaders. In combat arms and support arms, the training on technical equipment requires more time and a necessity to retain trained manpower for longer. With two adversaries to contend with, each necessitating an active deployment along contested borders, India cannot afford to risk operational under-performance. Consequently, there are constructive suggestions that the scheme be adapted with a longer term of service for Agniveers, with one suggestion calling for a tenure of seven years of service. This might alleviate the problem, while retaining the youth profile. However, financial issues, such as gratuity becoming applicable for employees with over five years of service, will have to be tidied over.

The second criticism, though speculative, is the more consequential. The government had indicated that one of its aims was to turn out a generation of youth imbibed with a sense of nationalism as part of their military training and experience. This positive aspect will help incentivize the hiring of Agniveers within the Indian economy after they leave service. However, since this would be a cohort trained in military weapons and tactics, should Agniveers not being absorbed suitably into the economy—and even if a small proportion go astray—there would be a price to be paid by society.

Expectedly, a political critique has it that the main idea behind the scheme is to militarize society at a time when the right wing has come to dominate political culture in India. The right has been ideologically inclined towards social militarization, believing that India has been timid historically, resulting in it being repeatedly invaded. The emphasis on strength is perhaps best evident from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s training in groups called shakhas.

Agniveers would be available for indoctrination into right wing ideology and will add to the numbers and capability of foot-soldiers of cultural nationalism. Their potential participation in riots and intimidation, particularly of India’s minority Muslim community, could worsen intercommunity tensions. The State could potentially lose the monopoly over violence, making it difficult for it to control communal violence that periodically besets India.

Finally, Agniveers, who are relatively less trained and integrated into subunits, may be deployed in areas of internal conflict in India, such as Kashmir and portions of the North East. The lack of sufficient training and integration into units may heighten the violent suppression of dissent, manifesting as insurgency or greater unrest in such areas. Since the scheme is meritocratic, there is likely to be a higher representation from advantaged political and economic centers, which can add to malevolence between the military and the host populace. With those from the social and geographic periphery being under-represented, it will be difficult to balance against the suspicion through which counterinsurgency missions usually view the populace. Resorting to repressive tactics will likely heighten instability and grievances, making for a vicious cycle and make the conflict longer lasting or more intractable.

Can a Course Correction Take Place?

The military has affirmed that the scheme will be improved once feedback becomes available as it acquires traction. As the military will be particularly sensitive to the possible impact on operational effectiveness, it can be expected to take the relevant measures.

However, how society responds to the surfeit of Agniveers is an open question. While the government thinks a disciplined manpower will be made available for the economy, skeptics are worried.  Social fault lines have only deepened. Therefore, it is the social consequence of the scheme – in its adding fuel of manpower trained in violence to the divisiveness in society – that might yet prove its Achilles heel. An answer to this has to be found within four years when Agniveers start being released into society.