https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/coup-proofing-foregrounding-the-motivation?sd=pf

Coup proofing: Foregrounding the motivation behind Agnipath

This article is not about Agnipath. The issue has been flogged adequately in the media and has attracted sufficient commentary, both enlightened and apologist. At this juncture, while an opposition politician predicts withdrawal of the policy, as was the case with the farmer laws, the policy itself appears to be firming in with criticism tempered by recommendations on how to improve it taken onboard. A relieved military has given the policy a cloak of a work-in-progress pilot project. To its credit, the brass has watered down of the policy, leaving room enough to modify/retract it along the line. The usual botched rollout of policy – by now typical of the Narendra Modi regime – has distracted from the more dubious features of the policy: its dismantling of the Indian Army as-we-know-it.

The wide-ranging interview of National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval - the heavy artillery deployed by the regime as palliative to the protests by aspirant Agniveers - carries a clue on the motive of the regime behind the scheme. In his spirited showing in the non-obsequious interview, Doval makes a comparison between the Indian Army and the Indian National Army (INA), to the detriment of the former. To him, the INA stole a march on the Indian Army by being inspired by nationalism, whereas the Indian Army was a creation of the British as part of their policy of ‘divide and rule’.

To him, the regimental system was introduced by them - bedrock of the infantry that is the major component of the Army - to array India’s ethnic groups against each other, facilitating over-lordship of the British. The Indian Army that retained its institutional integrity on the transfer of power, therefore, has an overhaul long overdue. The Agnipath scheme’s shift to an All India All Class (AIAC) composition draws on the strengths of the Indian National Army (INA), based as it was on an ethnically amalgamated regimental model (Doval recounts the regiments, namely, Rani Jhansi and (sic) Mahatma Gandhi), shows that the shift would not impact combat effectiveness. To him, nationalism will substitute for ethnic affinities that hitherto provided battle-winning cohesion.

This bit of persuasion by Doval to allay fears over dilution in combat effectiveness of the Agnipath- inoculated Army need not detain us. Let’s leave it to military historians whether the casualties suffered by the INA owed to their warrior spirit, as attributed by Doval, or neglect by the Japanese. Instead, of consequence in his favourable reference to the INA while putting down the Army is the regime’s effort to discredit the continuity that makes for the institutional integrity of the Army in order that the Army is recreated along lines preferred by the regime.

It’s no secret that Hindutva informs the regime’s worldview. Hindutva ordains a Hindu Rashtra. There is already a New India in place awaiting conversion to Hindu Rashtra at some point in the middle term. The conditions for this conversion are already in place. Constitutional pillars and institutions have been so hollowed out that when the Constitution is given a final nudge towards Hindu Rashtra, there would be none still standing up for it.

The Parliament is an empty shell. The parliamentarians of the ruling party owe their membership of the house to the Modi wave, if not tsunami. The province-specific opposition is too narrowly-focused to count, while the opposition party with a national spread is internally beset. The Judiciary has been kneaded into plasticine, the Gogoi tenure testifying as much. To a chief justice prospect, its recent cognizance of the dozer raj amounts to acting on ‘priority’. The Executive has long had a deep state spirited away by the right wing into its innards. Doval’s reference in his interview to a spate of terror after and self-congratulations that this has not recurred since 2014 is yet another attempt at hiding provenance of the terror India was subject to then. Whereas the Sanatan Sanstha has been fore-grounded partially as perpetrators, it is only to obscure the others, at least one of which sits saffron-clad in parliament. The remainder of the executive has – to borrow an imperishable phrase in the context of Indian organizational culture - crawled when merely asked to bend. If the military, represented by General Rawat and his clique are to go by, how the civilian bureaucracy and police have been suborned can only be imagined. The few but notable exceptions proving the rule, the fourth estate – the Media – is rightly regarded as a disgrace.

Though the Army has been subject to conditioning since Rawat’s elevation to its helm over the heads of two of his seniors - who retrospectively can also easily be seen as being superior professionals than him - it has thus far not been entirely crippled as other institutions. It has managed to remain partially unscathed since the regime had utility for a modicum of its professionalism while it was settling in. The redoubtable Pakistan Army had to be overawed, which - to the regime - the two surgical strikes succeeded in doing. The untimely intrusions by the Chinese twice-over – at Doklam and Ladakh - also lent pause. Given its innate strengths and relative isolation, the military (here ‘military’ and ‘army’ are used interchangeably) also requires a longer duration to unsettle.

However, it cannot be indefinitely spared, since the Hindu Rashtra has to be rolled out in a finite timeline, dependent as it is crucially on longevity of the Modi spell over the electorate. Consequently, the Army has to be taken down prior to the final nails in the coffin of Old India, lest it - taking its unwritten constitutional obligations seriously - grandstand against New India going the Hindu Rashtra way.

The possibility of the Army ending up a road bump on the road to Hindu Rashtra is counter-intuitive. Its historically apolitical character, the progressive dilution of its professional ethic in the regime years, the magnitude of the Hindutva-inspired regime and the power gap between it and the opposition suggest that enforced subordination of the Army – grinding its nose into the dust as it were - is inessential to the Hindutva project. Even so, the endeavour of getting to Hindu Rashtra is too important to leave any stone unturned, lest it turn out a bridge too far. Taking 100 years to get to this point, the Hindutva enterprise cannot be allowed to be tripped up at the final hurdle.

As its deep state tentacles have no doubt kept it informed, the threat of the Army standing up against an abrupt change of character of the Constitution that it is sworn to protect - albeit miniscule and remote - cannot be wished away entirely. The eulogies that attended Rawat’s funeral flattered to please. His Padma award cannot paper over skepticism in the Army over his Republic Day award, the only serving chief to be pinned with one. That the Chief of Defence Staff appointment was meant to accommodate him in a higher chair stands confirmed by the post remaining unfilled six months into his untoward departure. The cynicism with which the moving of the goal posts on the CDS appointment eligibility has been received is another pointer that the infatuation with the regime - and its protagonist - is not universal. Consequently, the element of the doubt has to be addressed by Hindutva project minders within the regime and outside it in its support base in the mother-ship, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

Also, the transition to New India cannot exclude military ‘reforms’. Notwithstanding the hype, Modi’s showing in the surgical strikes has only limited value for his self-image. In any case, the Chinese have put a pin into the balloon. Moreover, Russia’s Ukraine War has shown up war as capricious and is best avoided. Diwali jamborees are insufficient substitute for an Indira-as-Durga-like image. Allusions to nuclear weapons as diwali crackers are counter-productive. Consequently, the next best thing to embellish a 56” chest is ‘reforms’, the more ‘transformational’ the better. Tweaking the manual of defence procurement does not have a ring to it, besides having been done by Manmohan Singh’s defence minister, the Pope, AK Antony. The image of Modi as ‘The Great Disrupter’ needs a boost in a non-trivial area. Bending the Army to his will is of a different order of magnitude as a political feat than getting the police to heel, though the latter is low-hanging fruit for the likes of once khaki-clad Doval.

Domination of political culture by Hindutva empowers it to move faster and further on this score. An Army can be created in its own image, consonant with the change in society and polity it wishes to usher. Vedic texts, ancient history, social mores and political practices of the Aryans as they populated the Gangetic plains are arbitrarily taken as civilisational wellsprings. The Army, even if modern and professional, needs to be imbued with Hindutva, lest it stand out as a sore thumb. It therefore needs to be unfastened from its current verities and ethos and reset in a new, fresher mould. The reforms therefore serve two purposes: by redefining the Army, remove any threat that it might pose.  

The reforms are timed to keep the Army chasing its tail while Hindutva goes about its sweeping up the debris of the Indian State-as-we-know-it and beautifying what emerges with a Central Vista-like makeover. The response in Ladakh amounting to an LC-isation (Line of Control) of the Line of Actual Control keeps the military busy with professional matters. The situation in Kashmir, kept manageable by the peace on the LC, allows for the right wing political solution to unspool at a leisured pace, with the latest step being delimitation of constituencies for the Union Territory assembly elections due soon. The two operational commitments keep the Army tied down. Alongside is futuristic organizational restructuring in theaterisation, jointness and integrated battle groups. The former could have done with a CDS in place. His absence only proves the idea is to keep the Army bogged in facile reforms, while the wider India reset proceeds apace. This is the backdrop to view Agnipath.

Agnipath is designed to keep the military introspective. Even if the military does entertain thought of taking a stand, it would not have the vertical cohesion to do anything about it. Callow Agniveers don’t count, though they can have a surveillance value in case of infiltration by right wing-aligned recruits, as is apprehended in liberal and leftist circles where the refrain is that the Agnipath scheme is to covertly turn out militarized RSS cadre. The undercutting of regiment system and regimentation ensures there are no cohesive outfits readily at hand to spook New Delhi, as once allegedly deployed by then Chief, General VK Singh, using ethnic networks, in pursuit of his ‘date of birth’ obsession. The manner 7, Lok Kalyan Marg, is guarded with an armed trooper at every 25 yards, and reported construction of accommodation for some 3000 troopers for guarding the new accommodation of the prime minister in the Central Vista, show that unfounded fears exist. Such fears owe not to Mr. Modi’s past as much as what he intends for the history books.

As for the professional officer cadre, it is rent into bhakt and bhakt-skeptics camps. It is unknown if there are any anti-bhakts left. The cadre cannot have the confidence to mount a rear guard action to save the Republic-as-we-know-it. The officer class is involved in incorporating women into its mainstream. It might yet be subject to a similar Tour of Duty exercise, as reportedly was the original conception. Deep selection of its leadership has expanded the catchment to include recent retirees and all three-star equivalent rank holders, putting paid to the premium on command. Rumour has variously backed two brass-hats whose claim to fame was to discredit the precedence of surgical strikes lying in years preceding the Modi era. While one heads the Army think tank, the other is ensconced as military adviser under Doval. It is no coincidence that an Engineer officer heads the Army for the very first time. While welcome in itself, that he does not belong to the combat arms - traditionally the ‘core elite’ - is telling. That no one has resigned in dissent against Agnipath bespeaks of a well-conditioned military, liable to be receptive to the more nationally-damaging initiatives just ahead.

This setting-of-the-stage betrays the real reason behind the ‘reforms’. To beget a younger profile military, to be responsive to the changed character of war, to turn out Agniveers as nationally-oriented citizens etc. are but icing on the cake, a bonus that the extensive information war surrounding the Agnipath rollout more or less lets on. The traditionally-conservative bureaucracy keeping a safe distance is another indicator of a hot-potato of uncertain provenance. Amazingly the 254 meetings over 750 hours over a transformational initiative as this did not include stakeholder consultations that alone could have precluded surprise, protests and criticism. Intriguingly, both Doval and the general leading the chorus, the officiating Department of Military Affairs head, General Puri, have not reconciled how the AIAC entry squares with retention of ethnic regiments. Whereas being one with troops is fine with officers, only a test-bed result could tell if this is fine for soldiery too. To begin with it might stall criticism from Colonel Blimps valuing traditional regiments, but teething troubles will force more than a tooth ache. All this only shows there is more to it than meets the eye.

The regime might have over-stretched. It might take loss in war to halt Hindutva in its tracks. The Kargil War lesson was that cohesive primary groups allowed young, junior leaders to do their thing. Absent integration – vertical and horizontal – as the Agnipath scheme portends, a loss is not an implausible outcome. It may yet have the liberty to wash away its action with a few crocodile tears, as with demonetization, or of placatory rollback, as with the land acquisition and farm laws. Alternatively, if Indians vote out Modi, the scheme of short-term volunteers can be trashed, though retaining its strengths as the shift to AIAC. Such outcomes are hypothetical. The scheme – to reiterate - is to put the military into a spin, while Hindutva runs amok.

To wrap up on a theoretical note, Elizabeth Kier, in her book Imagining War: French and Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), has it that ‘the intervention of civilian policymakers is rarely a carefully calculated response to the external environment. Instead, civilian choices between different military policies often reflect their concerns about the domestic balance of power.’ To her, ‘state actors seek to ensure that the military’s potential strength corresponds to the desired division of power in the state and society.’ This is especially so, ‘in states that have not reached a consensus about the role of armed services in the domestic arena (pp. 3-4).’

The extract is relevant to the Indian circumstance. The place of the military has been rudely shaken by the attempt by Hindutva of politicization of the military. The regime wishes a pliable, rather than merely a subordinate military. A regime out to reset the Constitution would logically deflate military’s power. Therefore, it is not external threat – including the so-called ‘two front’ threat that concerns the regime, as much as fixation with an internal power balance facilitative of move from New India, already wrought, to Hindu Rashtra, in the offing.

 

 

 

 

 

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/minimalist-expectations-of-the-republics?s=w

Minimalist expectations of the Republic’s institutions

Ambassador Talmiz Ahmed, speaking with Karan Thapar on the diplomatic ‘crisis’ brought  on by the ruling party spokesperson going ballistic on prime-time against Prophet Mohammad, said that the External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar, was an ‘instrument’ of the ruling formation comprising the ruling party and its support base, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. He implied that Dr S Jaishankar’s hands were tied, presumably by the government’s Hindutva-agenda driven. Seemingly letting Jaishankar off the hook, Talmiz Ahmed is playing the thorough diplomat he is.

Being decked by the Gulf States, followed by others in the Islamic world, suggests the crossing of the line by the BJP was unintended. The BJP was sanguine that Prime Minister Modi’s charm had worked to turn off any attention from those quarters for the plight of India’s Muslims. While the international reaction has predictably petered out, protests are being suppressed using tactics imported from strategic partner, Israel. This goes to show that alerted to red-lines abroad by the controversy, the saffron camp can continue its anti-Muslim crusade as precursor to Hindu Rashtra.

Under the circumstance of an onrushing future in a Hindu Rashtra, what is the responsibility of heads of institutions? Can the State mid-wife the birth of a Hindu Rashtra, even if it is decreed by the twice-elected ruling party? While apparatchiks as Jaishankar and National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, can be expected to have an ideology-informed reading of their functions, this only increases the premium on official level leadership in institutions.

For purposes here, the State is defined narrowly as an amalgam of instruments of governance answerable to political masters subject to rotating into and out of office by the democratic vote. Though ‘instruments’ in a technical sense, these are ‘institutions’ with a life of their own, outside of Constitutional legalese and bureaucratic Rules of Business. Institutions contribute to policy set by political masters. Their input to policy and decision making is thus informed by norms and precedence.

Given this, they are in a position to – and indeed are expected to - moderate political predilections of the ruling party, albeit democratically elected. In the Constitutional scheme, the ruling party-run executive is responsible to the people by opposition parties in parliament holding it accountable. The balance is further maintained by the courts keeping vigil. There are Constitutionally-mandated and empowered bodies and agencies as part of the system of checks-and-balances. To what extent are State agencies qua institutions part of this system?

State institutions are expected to improve a policy by their considered input and where a policy choice is afoul of Constitutional obligations, theirs’ is an enhanced moral and legal compulsion. Where orders are illegal, they are duty-bound to revert with their reservations. Institutions have the credentials to reflect on the constitutionality and legality of policies and have to exercise this faculty.  The premium on this is inversely proportional to efficacy of checks-and-balances system. ‘Yes, Minister’ is very serious business, as General Milley, the head of the joint chiefs, demonstrated during the fag end of United States’ (US) President Trump’s tenure by ensuring that Trump’s idiosyncrasies did not upend stability.  

The Indian democratic system allows for parties to go about implementing their manifesto-outlined policies when in power. Where a government has the majority, it has greater scope for delivering on campaign promises. However, given that a plurality has not voted it into power, but the first-past-the-post system has bought it majority in parliament, a ruling party does not have a blank cheque on policy. Ruling party ideological preferences have to be moderated by a responsibility for and accountability to those who did not vote for it and its policy plank. A ruling party must understand that its stewardship of government is not only in fulfilling the party’s campaign promises, but the governmental and national agenda. In case it falls short in understanding this, the institutions of State are to remind it, particularly those owing allegiance to the Constitution rather than an itinerant ruling party at the Center. The policy-relevant role of institutional heads is to intercede on behalf of their institutions in fulfillment of an institution’s Constitutional commitment.

Even if a government were to come to power with majority of the votes, in a democratic system it cannot override interests of the rest, leave aside be actively arraigned alongside antagonists of any particular section. If a government fails to aggregate interests of others makes it unrepresentative; therefore majoritarian. The term ‘majoritarian democracy’ is an oxymoron in a polity as diverse as India’s. However, over the past eight years majoritarian and authoritarian are conjoined with democracy. Democracy withered under the onslaught of the ruling party, a political front of the right wing. To resurrect democracy, a roll back of the right wing requires first the rescue of captive State institutions.

State institutions have been overawed by right wing information warfare targeting a domestic audience that over-hypes the image of the prime minister. The decimation of the opposition twice-over makes the narrative credible. There are also shenanigans, such as appointing favourites, downsizing opponents, setting State agencies after political challengers etc. that are par for the course in the rough and tumble of politics. Some benign tactics are age-old, including sending off potential trouble-makers to sinecures outside the country, such as to the Asian Development Bank in one case.

However, these have acquired Mafiosi proportions, such as by inserting ‘evidence’ of anti-national activity into computers by hacking, and using this as evidence against ideological opponents and use of new age hacking means as Pegasus. Besides, there is knowledge of the manner of the rise of the prime minister in provincial politics, which witnessed the setting aside of Raj Dharma. A prominent female fan called this aspect of the persona of the prime minister, ‘viraat roop’. The unexplained deaths of former minister of Gujarat, Haren Pandya, and later of Justice BH Loya, are silent reminder of untold consequences.

Prima facie, to expect institutional heads to show spine in such a circumstance is delusional. This would be possible if the political opposition had some fight left in it. The dominance of political culture by Hindutva hardens the refrain on New India, the difference from the ‘old’ being departure from secularism in favour of a religion-anchored cultural nationalism, artfully propagated as Indic – and therefore authentic - civilisation. In this narrative, all other tributaries that have gone into this civilization only pollute. The reported quest for examining Indian racial purity is indicative. An apologist’s argument on ‘correcting of historical wrongs’ is another. Inclusion in talking points of all and sundry of terms as ‘geo-cultural’, ‘civilisational’ etc. and the recent intellectual brouhaha over the fount of nationhood are to shift the goal posts towards a primordial definition of nation predicated on Hinduism, as against a modern, rational-legal one consonant with the Constitution. The thrust for paradigm dominance is apparent. No institution can stay unscathed.

No institutional head can be sure of carrying the institution against the currents. Consequently, to look for well springs of a push back in these quarters is self-deceiving. However, to expect institutional heads not to further the Hindutva project by deeds of omission and commission is not too much to ask, since the Constitutional order has not quite changed as yet. Once the ruling party gets two-thirds of seats in the upper house of parliament and proceeds to do so, such expectations would lose any content. Till then, a minimalist expectation needs being in place, if only to decelerate the Republic headed downhill and hold incumbents of consequential chairs accountable. They cannot use the argument of force majeure to abdicate responsibility.

This yardstick should serve to guide institutional heads and judge their output. As illustration, the scrapping of Article 370 of any content is an example. While Ajit Doval has kept the Valley quiet – though aided by Covid in some measure – it is fairly self-evident that the problem has only been kicked down the road. Whether Doval should have exercised some moderation using a worsening national security in the long term as argument over the right wing’s eagerness to go about its long-standing position on merger of Kashmir with India is moot. The near-term effect in terms of Chinese intrusion into Ladakh was also not factored in by either Doval or Jaishankar. Persuaded by the logic of correctives to history need being applied, the two went along with the Constitutional caper.

To their credit, as political appointees to head national security institutions they have played their part as apparatchiks. But, can the apex of the official level that serves them be absolved? This level is by now staffed on the basis of like-mindedness. Consequently, there was nary a whisper of dissent. Agile consequence management in both union territories created on dissolution of the state cannot paper over that the jury is still out on the role of both political and official leaderships of national security institutions.

The yardstick of minimalist expectation can be usefully applied to the ongoing controversy. By tidying over the foreign policy fallout (Modi is expected to visit the United Arab Emirates soon to presumably woo it back) and continuing with brazen rule of law violations in suppressing Muslim protest (Israel-emulating house demolitions of Muslim protestors continue in BJP-ruled states), the Modi regime has yet again demonstrated its capacity for snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. Alerted to the red-lines of the Muslim world, it can now proceed post-haste and unconcerned by external fallout (it has already fobbed-off the US, knowing that the US needs it more in relation to China than it does the US) with continuing the conditioning of the minority to tamely accept its subordination in New India qua Hindu Rashtra.

What does the doctrine of minimal expectations of officials heading institutions call for in a circumstance of transition to Hindu Rashtra? Hindu Rashtra is the putative destination; it isn’t quite here. So, in the first instance, institutional leaders need reminding that they are office holders beholden to the Constitution as it exists, not one in the pipeline. They remain tied by their oath to it, so cannot act as if repeated electoral feats of the right wing imply that a new Constitution is already at hand (such as those taking decisions on dozer activity in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh seem to be doing).

Second, with power equations being what they are and spines being supple a via media of shirking-on-the-job suggests itself. Institutions need to pull their punches in face of orders contrary to the Constitutional straight and narrow: ‘Don’t say ‘No’, but don’t do it either.’ For instance, if the government wishes to underplay the Ladakh intrusion, the military does not need to ease its doing so. That the military understands this is evident from its watering down the Tour of Duty (Agniveer) scheme. However, that was in protection of its own interests. It had better take this approach also in Kashmir, where it has been amiss in being hand-maiden to Doval’s bid to project stability as another feather in his cap as a national security wizard.

Finally, the pushback from institutions will sensitise the right wing that control of the levers of power is not enough to be able to push the country over the brink into Hindu Rashtra. The shift to Hindu Rashtra needs not only to be procedurally correct (unlike the vacating of Article 370 of content), but constitutionally compliant. Since the judiciary has been slovenly in adjudicating on the latter, institutional pushback assumes significance. An institutional ‘go slow’ serves to deter, providing time and space to help generate the political will in the opposition to take up cudgels. A ‘dissent channel’ within institutions and between institutions needs setting up, informally to begin with.

In the national security domain, official heads of institutions – such as military Chiefs – must not kowtow to political appointees. There is a political appointee as military adviser each in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Ministry of Defence. The latter has acquired significance since being military adviser was the job of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), an appointment in abeyance for now. Doval – a political appointee - has usurped ministerial and higher official functions by his stewardship of the Defence Planning Committee and the Strategic Policy Group. This has resulted in the CDS being reduced to military adviser to the defence minister, rather than for the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) as a whole. It is only in his nuclear role is he ‘military adviser’ to the Nuclear Command Authority, whose membership is akin to the CCS. If and since such arrangement would heighten the ideologically-driven content in policies, it is all the more reason for the military leadership to dig-in on its professional turf.

Deep selection-based military chiefs must be made wary of their limits of playing the party line by collegial pressure from within the brass. This preserves the military’s parochial interest, but must expand to include issues in its ken, such as policies in Kashmir and in relation to the North East on Bengali Muslims. In Kashmir, the military must act as a strategic level headquarters, rather than an operational level one. Its inability to discern the distinction has led to the Article 370 debacle. As regards the Bengali Muslims, it does not readily appear on the military’s radar, but the regime-friendly mouthings of the last CDS and the current military adviser in NSCS indicate otherwise. The impending national security mess in relation to the Bengali Muslims being engineered by the Assam chief minster’s messianism needs forestalling by the Eastern Command making its strategic-level presence felt. The national service of such a stance is in alerting the ruling party against venturing down the Hindu Rashtra route without due process and taking the country along.

The doctrine of minimal expectations here is a yardstick that can retrospectively hold institutional heads to account, both political and official. At a political juncture in which genocide and civil war have found uncharacteristic mention in the same breath, the importance of retrieving the State from capture by the right wing has increased. The prospects of shirking as a legitimate tactics come to fore and can help deter, preempt and prevent unconstitutional moves. Institutions may yet preserve the Republic as we know it, even if the four estates – parliament, executive, judiciary and media – have withered.

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Book Review

Vijay Singh, POW 1971: A Soldier’s account of the Heroic Battle of Daruchhian, New Delhi: Speaking Tiger Books, 2021, Page 236, Rs. 699/-, ISBN 978-93-5447-011-0

There are three special things about this book, the last two of which are interconnected. To begin with the first: its description of a battle for Daruchhian between its well-entrenched Pakistani defenders and an Indian infantry battalion of the Grenadier Regiment. Daruchhian is a hill feature across from Poonch on the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir side of the Ceasefire Line – as the Line of Control (LC) was termed then. Since Daruchhian, by virtue of its location posed a threat for the defences at Poonch, the Indian army decided to take it over to secure Poonch better. The Pakistanis, equally convinced of the importance of Daruchhian to their plans, were determined to put up a fight for the hill. This led to one of the fierce battles of the 1971 War.

Whereas the 1971 War is known more for what happened on the eastern front, arguably the more fierce encounters between the two sides were fought on the western front. The Pakistanis, defending their mainland as against their colony, East Pakistan, gave a better account of themselves on the western front. They had also promised the East Pakistan defenders that the defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan and therefore were more prepared on the western front. For its part, the Indian army had been directed to merely force the Pakistanis on the back foot on the western front, lest Pakistanis send in troop reinforcements to help their beleaguered uniformed brethren in East Pakistan. Therefore, in a way, the Pakistanis had the upper hand psychologically to begin with, with the Indians fighting with a limited purpose and the Pakistani putting up what to them may have appeared an existential fight. This partially accounts for the stalemate on the western front, which - of course - in no way detracts, from the blood and moral treasure that the frontline troops expended in gaining their objectives.

The battle of Daruchhian was one such battle in which fully motivated Pakistani soldiers expectantly awaited an Indian attack and when it did materialize, gave a fearsome reply. The Indian tactical level attack ended up a relative failure, though the Grenadiers compensated with gumption for the lapses in tactical planning and leadership that were revealed as the plan for capture of Daruchhian went awry. The book excels in its first part, dissecting what fell apart, with an unvarnished search for the truth. The details are of interest to men in uniform, especially the younger lot. No doubt, though 50 years since it was fought, lesson are being learnt from this particular battle since the author – son of the war hero Major Hamir Singh - currently heads the senior command faculty at the Army War College, Mhow, that trains the army’s prospective battalion commanders.

To the credit of the battalion commander who thought up the unconventional Indian attack plan, it seems the plan was ahead of its times. It was a precursor to the tactical innovation that dates to about the Kargil War some 20 years on: the multidirectional assault. It was therefore trifle premature, with the levels of training and resilience of junior leadership not being of the order as to operationalise it back then. But more so, as the book brings out, because the battalion commander was unable to step up to the leadership role compelled by his somewhat convoluted plan and the shameful ad-hocism by which the battalion was launched for an objective it had not previously practiced taking down. Conversely, the Pakistani commanding officer had either fortuitously or by design staged forward to the company position on Daruchhian, making at even more formidable nut to crack. As a result, the Pakistanis beat back the attack at severe cost to the Grenadiers, who nevertheless had raw courage to show for themselves in the casualties they suffered.

The book follows the hero of the battle, Hamir Singh, through his travails on that hill feature and beyond into Pakistani captivity. Hamir’s experience of captivity is evident from the extract from his son’e postscript, reproduced below:

It is also a fact that my father is alive today due to the honourable actions of some of the Pakistani officers and men and women who my father was fortunate to have encountered. Of special mention is the Pakistani major who prevented his colleagues from killing my grievously wounded father as well as Colonel Mehmood Hassan and other medical staff who treated him in various Pakistani medical establishments. Warfare is a nasty business but to show humanity during testing times is in accordance with the highest code of conduct of a soldier. On behalf of my family I convey our gratitude to those unknown soldiers.

Evidently, the best of Indian and Pakistani youth faced-off one dreary night on a remote hill side. Both were challenged by the other side to dig deep down and draw out the best within themselves. It’s to the credit of the two armies – from the same womb as it were – that gladiators of both sides emerged with their honour intact, each contributing another chapter to the glorious martial traditions of our shared subcontinent. Interestingly, the Grenadiers are known to number a proportion of Muslims in their ranks. Hamir Singh testifies to their wholesome contribution, singling out Major IH Khan, who received a Vir Chakra posthumously, and Subedar Taj Mohammad. 

Hamir Singh goes on from being wounded on the frontline to convalescing in Pakistani military facilities where he is treated with due courtesy to his rank and in line with the Geneva Conventions. This was perhaps in reciprocation to Indians meticulously observing the Geneva Conventions in treating their large-haul of some 90000 prisoners taken on the eastern front. It is another matter that the gentlemanly conduct in war and its aftermath did not end the antipathy. Hamir Singh, while being treated in Pakistani military hospitals, encounters common Pakistanis. He forges an affectionate bond with a female military nurse, who helps him lurch back to recovery. Later, being the senior prisoner of war (PoW), the book shows him leading the prisoners through their trials with their captors, a delicate role made familiar by World War II PoW movies, notably Bridge on the River Kwai.

This brings one to the third aspect: the ability to behave true to expectations in trying circumstances. It is product of upbringing in a household professing and practicing values, not all martial but sound family values. Hamir Singh’s two sons – their family’s fourth generation in the military - are both generals. The last three generations attained flag rank, while a fifth generation is under training at a military academy. Incidentally both brothers are at neighbouring faculties of the Army War College, Mhow, who amidst tactical training fare for the army’s tactical level commanders are conditioning them on human values and military leadership mores. This is in line with what a military eminence once rightly said: ‘the moral is to the material three is to one.’ (As an aside, given this example of how military men are honed, I wonder what it implies for the new fangled Tour of Duty or Agnipath concept – in which youth will be taken into the military for short duration stints. Has the military ethic ceased to matter in the post modern age or are we to believe that a dose of religious nationalism is all it takes to make a soldier?)

The book is a non-fiction page-turner. It has enough material for a Bollywood hit, including a pleasant interlude between a convalescent, dashing Hamir and an elegant Pakistani nurse; and the travails of his beautiful wife back home, getting to learn only after the war that he was alive and a prisoner. How the Major’s wife copes with bringing up two children while her husband’s fate is, first, unknown and, later, when he remains away till repatriation, is as much a story of fortitude as Hamir’s. Hamir was awarded the Vir Chakra after the interrogation formalities on return of PoWs were done with, another fraught period when all returnees are looked at with suspicion of having been turned by their captors.

Hopefully, when ties with Pakistan improve Hamir Singh will be able to meet up with the Pakistanis who people the book: his infantry opponents on Daruchhian; the medical staff at Rawalpindi and the Lyallpur PoW cage guard commanders. It will help him solve the mystery as to who was the ‘bade saab’ up the Pakistani hierarchy who took an interest in his well being when injured: was it General Tikka Khan, a colleague of his father, General Kalyan Singh; or was it the Pakistani brigadier, who Hamir had fortuitously encountered in his last posting before the war in Nigeria?

 

 

 

 

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/staking-out-space-for-india-in-the?sd=fs

Staking out space for India in the UN’s New Agenda for Peace

India is an emerging great power. The Narendra Modi government in decisively reshaping it as New India hopes to position so as to finally take up its ‘rightful’ place in the comity of nations. That India has always had a mind of its own is well-regarded. Even in the Cold War, when international maneuver space was rather limited for post-colonial nations, it had carved out a role for itself. Its continuing strategic autonomy was on show at the Security Council in its voting pattern on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The conflict is a potentially era-defining one, but what emerges cannot be allowed to become a ‘post-Charter’ era. The United Nations (UN) Charter has been the leitmotif since the UN’s formation in wake of the World War II. While historians can debate whether it was the concept of deterrence that kept the ‘long peace’ or if it was the embedding of Charter principles is moot. The Charter definitively came into its own with the ending of the Cold War. Though it has been buffeted since by international crises involving powers sidelining the UN as they went about asserting their power, be it at Kosovo, Iraq War II, Libya and Syria, the Charter provided a yardstick to judge matters by. That the Ukraine War has jolted the yardstick requires that it be steadied again by heavyweights as India to step up.

India can play a vital role, leveraging its fortuitous presence as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. While strategic voting has its utility for defending national interest, it is Indian national interest that the UN stands strengthened as the primary custodian of the legitimacy of and as a leading shaper of the world order. As a rising power, India needs a degree of stability in the world order. If a new order is to shape up, the leading powers would be its authors. India, tagging along, would have its interests given a short shrift. Therefore, lending a hand to the UN to maintain its preeminence in what promises to be an uncertain world ahead, gripped by great power contestation, is in Indian national interest.

An area in which India can leverage its capacities is in forwarding the precepts of the UN’s ‘agenda for peace’. The Ukraine War demonstrates that the Security Council’s role of preserving peace and security has taken a hit. Thankfully, it has not been a fatal impact, but has revealed its inefficacy yet again when the Council is a divided house – which it promises to remain over the foreseeable future. India, having proved that it is of neither camp, can create space for itself by recreating the space lost by the UN in dispute settlement and conflict resolution.

Towards this end, India’s tenure in the Security Council must not merely be as a ‘presence’ but to count as a ‘heavyweight’. It will continue its tryst with power politics in the Security Council over the balance of its tenure and in General Assembly, now and later. Alongside, an area where India can make a positive difference is in a proactive showing on its forte: UN Peace Operations.

Thus far, India has been known for its peacekeeping contributions. It needs to up its financial contribution to the UN’s peacebuilding effort, besides taking a greater interest in and playing a supportive political role in the several peace-making initiatives of the UN. In light of its military’s prowess, it could go further in shouldering troop-intensive UN engagement in conflict zones in support of conflict diplomacy, both conflict prevention and peacemaking. The former might involve preventive deployment and the latter, peace enforcement. In making itself available for addressing all dimensions of the heuristic made famous by Boutros-Ghali’s, An Agenda for Peace - conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding (to Boutros-Ghali, post-conflict) and peace enforcement - India will be acting a great power in anticipation of recognition as one.

Peacebuilding and peacemaking

Its economy on the mend after Covid should see India’s response to the UN’s humanitarian calls go up, besides an increase in channeling finances through the UN’s agencies, funds and programs chasing Sustainable Development Goals. It must break out of its developing country syndrome and view itself as an economic power in its own right, its highest growth figures for bigger economies in a post-Covid world suggesting as much. For that it has to put its money where its mouth is. India should slowly begin to lay aside the yardstick of .7 per cent of gross domestic product for overseas’ development assistance. It has an extensive network of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and a trove of intellectual resources on non-violent conflict resolution. It can supplement governmental activity by supporting NGOs wanting to acquire an international footprint. It has conflict resolution programs in universities that can be usefully geared to turning out practitioners in the field, internationally.

Importantly, given its political heft in multiple groupings, practice of plurilateralism and support of multilateralism, India must weigh-in on UN peacemaking initiatives, joining groups of ‘friends’ of concerned peace processes. Having upped its political and economic engagement with Africa, it must be increasingly visible in assisting ‘African solutions for African wars’. It must exploit the exponential growth in diplomatic ties with South West Asia over the last eight years to engaging with the endless wars (Yemen, Syria) and conflicts (Israel-Palestine) there.

Though its diplomats are enviably proficient, they are too few. An increase in interest in borrowing talent from outside the government can help. It could also rely on Foreign Service veterans for Special Envoy duty, with academics as consultants. Special envoy activity is now a common adjunct to mediation and facilitation processes. Indians are mostly missing in action, ambassadors otherwise busy. Researchers with regional and thematic expertise gained in Indian universities, can work out of headquarters, embassies and consulates, enabling inform and build consistency in India’s engagements. The foreign ministry is already recruiting consultants; such activity only needs broadening. The International Council on World Affairs has acquired a pride of place among think tanks at the national capital can spearhead the uptick. It can lead thinking on non-military aspects in the numerous faculties of international relations and defence studies, and the fledgling departments offering peace studies. Graduates can form the workhorses for India’s expanded assistance on sustainable development, humanitarian relief, other complex emergencies and peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Peace enforcement

India has been consistently averse to peace enforcement, and with good reason. However, that it has a world-class military makes this a potential thrust line of renewed UN engagement. This complements the proposal for an increased Indian tryst with peacebuilding and peacemaking. The latter two cannot be done in isolation of a return of peace to a conflict zone. In instances, peace may have to be enforced on recalcitrant parties or spoilers. Insuring a peace process and that benefits of peacebuilding are not washed away may compel going beyond robust peacekeeping to peace enforcement. India’s military has the capability to mid-wife peace in such instances and can be at the call of the UN for the purpose. Increased peacemaking effort on part of India will keep it abreast of where the shoe pinches and where its military capability can make a mark. In fact, increasing its military footprint would necessitate peacemaking visibility.

India is making the changes in its higher defence structures. It has a chief of defence staff system in place and has expanded the military-foreign affairs interface, not only in terms of additional military officers in the foreign ministry, but also military officers as part of the relevant sections on defence cooperation in the defence ministry. The National Security Council system has come into its own, with close proximity to the prime minister’s office. This should lend confidence in spotting and using opportunities for upping military contribution abroad, jointly with diplomatic action.

The usual caveats must apply, such as use of force in the national interest; in line with UN principles and the ‘Do no harm’ criterion; and informed by just war principles as right authority, last resort, proportionality and probability of success. Since the aim-plus is strengthening of the UN, such excursions must be under UN Security Council authority, even if the command and control arrangements are of a coalition. Though Chapter VII would be the cover, consent of the host state is preferable, which heightened diplomacy should be able to deliver prior.

India is no stranger to the use of force under the UN flag. It contributed a para-field ambulance in the Korean War. An Indian brigade was instrumental in ensuring the territorial integrity of the Congo in the early sixties. In its region, it has exercised force, most significantly in 1971 with humanitarian concerns uppermost. At Sri Lankan request it undertook peace enforcement in the north and east of the island. Alongside, it assisted the Maldives repel a terrorist coup. Be it in Somalia, furthering humanitarian access, or stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it has not been shy of robust peacekeeping. It has taken on rebels in Sierra Leone during Operation Khukri. However, it has been chary of going down the peace enforcement route, particularly if there is peacekeeping going on alongside as has been the case both in Somali (the UN Task Force under the United States) and the DRC, where there is a Force Intervention Brigade operating alongside.

The lesson from the DRC however is that spoilers may require a tougher approach, political instruments falling short. India could consider also assaying enforcement roles in future. The Indian peacekeeper contingent in DRC has only recently had to discipline the M23 group with the use of force. If and since the security environment is not going to ease up, the Indian approach to peace operations should keep up with the challenges. It’s increased military capability and the UN’s ongoing-for-some-two-decades now professionalization of peacekeeping provides an enabling environment. The UN’s inclusion of the term ‘intelligence’ in its vocabulary and force protection-focus since 2017 show the difference in the UN’s approach. India could also provide force multipliers as surveillance and Special Forces capabilities, to join the club of member states that offers niche capabilities for UN use. India has numbered among the highest boots-on-ground provider, but that places it with others as Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh, a circle it could choose to break-out of.

Preventive deployment

The second area of expanding scope for a benign Indian intervention is conflict prevention. The UN has cried hoarse over the past two decades that this is a long-standing deficit in its peace repertoire. This has been ingloriously been brought to fore with the Ukraine War. It’s futile to hold that had UN’s conflict prevention faculties been up to speed, the War’s outbreak might have been stalled. However, notwithstanding the showing of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in eastern Ukraine, there is no denying that had the Minsk Accords been taken forward with promptitude, there would have been little reason for war. With a political settlement forthcoming, the threat of the advance of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s to Russia’s frontier could have receded.

It is a truism in international diplomacy that peacemaking stands enhanced in case there is military backing to peace efforts. While true for an inter-State context, it is arguably also pertinent for international peacemaking. Two counter-factual illustrations are hazarded to make the point.

The first is a counter-factual from 2011. Gaddafi was at the gates of Benghazi and threatening to annihilate his foes, by then melted into the populace. This led to ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concerns, which - as it turned out - were appropriated by the West to advance their strategic goals. The rest, as they say, is history. However, consider if the UN had the benefit of a member state offering it military muscle for preventive deployment in Benghazi - with Gaddafi’s consent or otherwise - blue helmets could have occupied a buffer position between the two belligerents. Precluding Gaddafi’s attack and provocation by the rebels, the subsequent regime change would have been staved-off. Not only would the Arab Spring not have been derailed, but the Sahel would not have melted into instability as it is today.

A second hypothetical case for preventive deployment is the Ukraine War. One prospective juncture was prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine War. UN monitors and troops could have complemented the SMM, with the consent of Ukraine. Russia could have been brought on board by upping peacemaking for getting the Minsk processes back on track. It being a European conflict, for neutrality sake, the military muscle could have been provided at a short notice by parties outside the region, such as India and China.

Conflict prevention is not only about preventing violence outbreak but is also meant to stop conflict from escalating, spreading and re-erupting. The second juncture was after the initial phase of the war, when Russia paused, its coup-de-main operations stalling. A way-out could have been an offer by the international community of ceasefire monitoring around Kiev, in eastern Ukraine and along the Donbass frontline and the frontlines inland seas. This would have meant a larger force, more ‘blue helmet’ than ‘blue beret’. Ceasefire negotiations that began around then could have acquired traction.

Even now, when both sides are at the cusp of ending the conflict, they are unable to do so though the War is past its 100th day. Conflict prevention includes containing a conflict and its spillover effects. Given the amount of armaments inserted into Ukraine from the West, there is every possibility that, like in Libya and Syria whence armaments proliferated into the region, the ending of the Ukraine War will see a spike in contiguous conflicts. Containing this requires more proactive measures than theory currently envisages. While a peacekeeping force can be visualized on ceasefire coming into effect, there is no preexisting conceptual handle for quick-insertion preventive deployment that can help peacemaking to bring about such a ceasefire. The UN timelines for whistling up a peacekeeping force necessitate the force acting outside of the UN’s routine processes. Such a force could then metamorphose into a peacekeeping force once the ceasefire gets going.

India has the surplus standing military capacity to undertake such rapid deployment tasks. It need not undertake these alone, but in tandem with likeminded troop contributors. The idea is not new, going back as it does to the mid-nineties when the stand-by arrangements’ system was much discussed, as well as enforcement. Sovereignty sensitivities precluded the ideas getting any headway. These need to be dusted. India can provide the doctrinal ballast. Though a votary of traditional peacekeeping and a reluctant subscriber to robust peacekeeping, it must flexibly switch gears to lead the doctrinal thinking on operational challenges ahead.

India must seize the moment

The Ukraine War has shaken up the Charter order. What cannot be countenanced is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. India, as a founding member and an aspirant Permanent member of the Security Council, can use the opportunity of a Council in disarray to lend credibility to the Charter-based world order. Reinforcing stability and continuity, it can markedly strengthen its case for the high table. In strategic terms, since both sides in the geopolitical face-off want India alongside, or do not want India lining up on the other side, India has scope of increasing its footprint. For this it needs to expect more of itself and to ‘do more’. This is in line with the foreign minister’s articulation of the government’s priorities for a ‘confident, caring country’.

A beginning can be in substantive input into the UN’s under-preparation document, A New Agenda for Peace. Its military capacity has received a boost lately in better national security coordination stemming from higher defence reforms and personality factors. While no doubt there are national security threats closer home, these are not of an existential order, allowing India to project surplus military energy away from its shores. A combined civil-military approach - necessitated by civilian-heavy peacebuilding and peacemaking and military-led enforcement and preventive deployment - can boost India’s UN profile, while keeping the UN relevant to the new age.