https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/whats-holding-up-the-chief-of-defence?s=w

What’s holding up the Chief of Defence Staff?

Narendra Modi’s ‘deep selection’ travails

The latest set of military appointments has been announced. So, what’s holding up the announcement on the most-awaited appointment: the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)? News reports have it that it is axiomatic that the officiating Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC), General Naravane, will be made its Permanent Chairman, being appointed CDS, and in his place Lt Gen Pande, will step up from being Army Vice Chief to its Chief.

Since General Naravane retires month end, there is no hurry; both Naravane and Pande already being familiar with their briefs. Naravane wears one of the CDS’ three hats – the other two being CDS itself and Secretary Department of Military Affairs; while Pande was brought in to Delhi on retirement of the then Vice Chief, General Mohanty, end January. Therefore, there is little sense in speculating on the next incumbents of the two posts. Even so, this begs the question why does the government wait longer, when it can wrap up the mystery right now?

There were reasons – at a stretch - for it to wait for the announcement this long when it could well have made the announcement mid-December itself when Naravane was appointed officiating CCOSC – filling one of the three pairs of shoes of General Rawat, who died in an unfortunate helicopter accident mid December. However, reports have it that it was not interested in making any of the three senior most army officers then – Generals Mohanty, Joshi and Shukla - Army Chief, if it pushed Naravane up to take over Rawat’s chair.

Not that the government need have waited out these three generals to retire before making its moves. It has reportedly adopted a policy of ‘deep selection’ for higher military appointments and was, in any case, within its rights to appoint anyone following due procedure. Its hesitance could mean it has ditched the deep selection policy, bandied about to cover up the distasteful manner Rawat was made Army Chief over heads of two of his perhaps more able seniors – Bakshi and Haris. There was a vile whisper campaign launched prior to undermine the frontrunner – General Bakshi.

The controversy over the superseding perhaps dissuaded the government this time round from rocking the boat. Therefore, it has held its horses this long, even though keeping the nascent CDS chair vacant for some four months does little for the institutional credibility of the CDS office. In fact, it shows the government undercutting yet another of its policy moves – creation of the CDS – that it likes to take much credit for. Since policy consistency does not appear hallmark of the government - well known for its policy twists and surprises - it is not impossible that the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet – that incidentally has all of two members (prime minister and home minister) - can yet pull a rabbit out of its hat.

That it has not been able to pull out the rabbit so far owes to its sensitivity to the political inclinations of prospective incumbents to higher military office. A case to point is that of General Rawat. Rawat’s proximity to National Defence Advisor Ajit Doval not only owed to a shared ethnicity, but also to like-mindedness. Rawat repaid the faith the regime reposed in him by dutifully mouthing its ideological wares, besides obediently implementing the military side of its policies. The latter is only superficially the way things ought to be. Obedience is fair, but ‘haan mein haan milana’ (“Yes sir, three bags full, Sir!) at the policy-making stage is seldom good. Such obedience springs from the former, like-mindedness. The problem is that there is then a tendency to fall in line with the drift of the deliberations, or worse, modifying one’s input by guessing what’s the expectation is and aligning with it.

Rawat’s falling in line with the government’s Kashmir policy is illustrative. Not only did he set the stage for the voiding of Article 370 by a diligent conduct of Operation All Out prior, but also ensured the military’s participation in strangulation of the Kashmiri voice thereafter. It is easy to see that the Kashmir problem has merely been kicked down the road. True, the explosion expected has not occurred, but that does not mean – as information war will have it – that all will remain hunky dory in Kashmir. Such a consequence should have been input into the government’s decision. The government’s assumption that it has ‘solved’ the Kashmir problem should have had to reckon with input from the army to the contrary. As head of the lead counter insurgency force and repository of expertise on military security, Rawat should have taken recourse to a democratic exercise of his advisory function. The costs of this are not merely in the future in Kashmir, but already apparent in China’s walking into Ladakh and our interminable counter deployment there. That Rawat fell in line with the government’s ideological agenda in Kashmir owed to his political predisposition, evidenced – as pointed out earlier – by his several interventions backing the regime on matters essentially political and out of the military remit.

This is learning of sorts for the regime as it consolidates its ideological agenda. It has transformed political culture. It is seeking to likewise influence strategic culture. Its cheerleaders have already announced that its surgical strikes by land and air and showing up China at Doklam and in Ladakh have duly transformed strategic culture. Organisational culture of the military is next in line. The prime minister has required a turning to ancient texts and traditional wisdom for organizational inspiration. Sanskritic lexicon from shastras, signifying the switch from India to Bharat, India to New India, is abroad, with the foreign minister leading the way devoting a chapter in his book for the learning from Mahabharata. The prime minister’s call has been dutifully echoed by the Army Chief and formerly uniformed strategic community members, with none asking for inclusion of the entire spectrum of historical inheritance to figure, including the medieval period – which the prime minister presumably wishes is wholly appropriated by Pakistan. The modern period – even if colonial - also has its value for the military, considering its institutional roots lie in the period. From this is clear the government does not need a professional going about his business nor one merely pliable, but a believer in its project transforming India in a particular, majoritarian way.

Does this hold up the prospects of Naravane and Pande? Not that it should matter 50 years on, but Naravane’s schooling was in a right wing affiliated school. However, Naravane has elsewhere expressed his belief in Constitutionalism, unremarkable at any other time. The media was quick to pick a gap between his approach and that of Rawat, when it probed him on Rawat’s implied criticism of the anti Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) protestors. As is his wont, Naravane was correct in his answers. He has most recently in his Army Day Message emphasized the Army’s ‘secular credentials’, foolhardy in the context of the times.

As for Pande, he has nothing to show by way of virtue signaling in terms of right wing affinities for the government to pick him. He also is an Engineer, a combat support arm that has not managed to run the gauntlet all the way to the Chief’s post so far. Its most eminent product, General Bhagat, was pipped at the post by Indira Gandhi, tweaking the Army’s proverbial line up so that an ethnic kin Kashmiri Pandit, General Raina, would be better placed to take over. Should the government to pick Pande – having seen three seniors of his seniors off into retirement – it would make him beholden to it. This is a useful gimmick, quite like when it persisted with its predecessor-government appointed Chief, General Dalbir Singh, despite his feud with a predecessor army chief and ruling party stalwart, VK Singh.

If the government has not exercised its choice as yet, it is possible that it is still at deep selection of sorts, looking out for virtue signaling, not only from the brass but from the retired lot as well. It is easy to spot a trend on this. The military adviser it appointed in the National Security Council Secretariat is a general who in service made the right noises on the CAA protests. This is of a piece with the nature of its non-military appointments as well, valid also for retired officer receipients of its patronage. One way to ascertain this is to see the cringe-worthy Youtube mouthings of recipients of largesse. Not that these officers are not capable, but the nature of the regime is such that capability and achievement is insufficient to land a sinecure to continue in public life.

A simpler reason could be that the government is looking out for another CDS, putting paid to Naravane’s chances. This rules in a non-Army CDS. The popular view is that the initial couple of holders of the CDS post should be Army men since the military is Army centric. Riding for the Air Force is that since the principal task that Rawat has left unfinished is the way ahead on jointness, an Air warrior might be best for the post since he would know how to cope with the Air Force’s reservations on jointness. Those plugging for the silent Service might have it that being neutral between the Army and Air Force argument on jointness, an admiral might best fit the bill. For those recently retired who fancy their lot, Youtube and Twitter are the right spaces to spot virtue signaling on this count.

However, to wait into the fourth month is inordinately long. If Naravane was not to be CDS, the government did not really need to be so sensitive to his reaction, withholding the announcement. At best he would have resigned, causing a momentary embarrassment for the government without a dent in its electoral chances in Uttar Pradesh, then beset with election fever. So the holdup seems to be not so much for professional or pliable incumbents, but committed ones. It’s to the military’s credit that there is no virtue signaling going on as was the case earlier, when Rawat as Chief and CDS set the tone. It’s not known if Naravane has cracked a whip, but it has made a difference enough to make problematic the regime’s deep selection.

That it is taking this long only goes to prove the premium put on deep selection, understandable in the run up to 2024 national elections. Hypothetically, the incumbents of the two chairs might willy nilly end up momentarily the most significant men in India if those elections were for some reason to go wrong for the regime.

Maybe the regime needs reminding that it need not be so careful. The military ethic was best articulated by General Bucher, Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, at the Indian Military Academy in May 1948, when he said: “No Army which concerns itself with politics is of any value…It follows, therefore, that the slightest right to question the policy of the Government. Implicit obedience to the orders of the Government is essential and only in this manner will the interests of the country be fully served.” Since this is a colonial legacy, does the regime wish it be discarded? Just as Indira wanted a committed bureaucracy, maybe New India’s military needs a change to the apolitical ethos of its military to one suitable for a Hindu India?

Be that as it may, under the circumstance, both Naravane and Pande are the front runners to respective post, as should be the case. Therefore, it is beholden for the government not to play musical chairs and get on with the announcement without demur. That is continues to be hesitant only serves to unhinge the brass from the straight and narrow, to not only being but also  broadcasting their availability for the regime’s purpose. This is anti-institutional and to the extent the government is responsible, it is cutting the branch it sits on. A military in disarray cannot be put back by regime favourites. 

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/taking-kashmiri-pandits-for-a-ride

Taking Kashmiri Pandits for a ride

Dissecting Mohan Bhagwat’s mouthings

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) head honcho, Mohan Bhagwat, intoned, “I have a feeling that the day is very near when the Kashmiri Pandits (KP) will come back to their homes and I wish that day comes soon.” Coming to grips with feelings and wishes is a first step in diving into details how to return KPs to the Valley. One way is by unsustainable force majeure, and the other, durable returns with dignity to a meaningful welcome.  

It is possible that Bhagwat has in mind the ‘chronology’ being rolled out in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Having voided Article 370 of any meaning, Amit Shah is inclined to hold elections to the toothless assembly. The delimitation exercise is done with, elections are slated for autumn. A detailed written critique by the opposition – the Gupkar Alliance – has it that the delimitation was designed assist with ushering in, for the first time, a Bhartiya Janata Party run government to Srinagar. This end can be assured by tacit and timely hints by Shah of a return to statehood but only once a Jammu origin, preferably Hindu, chief minister is in place. Article 371 protections, popular with the Jammu support base, can be offered. Once the new dispensation is there – democratic by all appearances – Bhagwat’s feelings and wishes can be materialized.

Bhagwat was speaking in reference to the film, The Kashmir Files. The film reportedly depicts not only peoples’ participation in the forcing the exodus of KPs from the Valley, but also shows the terrorists, including Kashmiris, evicting those who stayed, or returned, through massacres. Therefore, any durable returns of KPs would involve defusing the threat from these two interlinked quarters.

The first – people – is relatively easy to tackle. Even at the outset of the militancy, there was considerable Kashmiri public support for KPs. That the film elides this shows that it does less than justice to truth. In fact, it merits Bhagwat’s praise precisely for this deliberate omission. Kashmiris of all political hues – mainstream to separatists - have been consistent in wanting the return of KPs. Islamists may have reservations, wanting homogeneity for the Valley to buttress their position on a Pakistani affiliation for Kashmir. Some may tactically link the return of KPs to the State easing up or making political concessions. But there is no shade of public opinion directly opposing returns.

 This can be suitably leveraged for societal backing for the initiative. In any case the Kashmiri ‘bluff’ needs being called. If and since conditions for returns do not obtain, it is easy for Kashmiris to pretend to be holier-than-thou and voice sweet nothings on wanting returns. If so, then this bluff can be called in rolling out the initiative. Even so, it is infeasible that the movie’s depiction of Kashmiris is designed to endear them any to their KP brethren. In fact it makes returns problematic, deliberately scratching at scabs to place reconciliation out of reach.

The second – terrorists – comprise two entities: local homegrown militants and foreign –Pakistani - terrorists. The statistics on incidents reveal that for the past three years local militant deaths outstrip those of foreign terrorists. Alongside, infiltration levels are acknowledged - by no less than the Army chief - as negligible. Thus, foreign terrorists present are at best residual and are being wrapped up by and by. Pakistan is internally beset currently, besides has not quite stabilized Afghanistan in the way it might have hoped on the departure of the Americans. For now, the Pakistanis and Indians are in the same boat that fortuitously sailed by with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Thus, the threat perception – though flogged out of force of habit and to buttress vested interests – is benign. It has been further defused by the two sides, India and Pakistan, reportedly maintaining back-channel links. That the Line of Control ceasefire remains robust and Pakistan passed up an opportunity to embarrass India over the recent non-event of the misfired missile, indicates that the back-channel is effectual. It has given India the reassurance to transfer elements of a strike corps facing Pakistan, and of Rashtriya Rifles formations in J&K, to Ladakh for enabling its mirror-deployment there against China. 

As for the local militants, the statistics reveal their short life-spans. When their bodies are picked up after brief firefights in which they do little damage to security forces, very little hardware is recovered. This further proves that Pakistan has been behaving itself of late. Earlier Pakistan did so to see the backs of the Americans from Kabul in face of Indian persuasion of their strategic partners, the Americans, stay on. Now, Pakistan continues the policy of disengagement from Kashmir, in part to stabilize its northern front and placate India to do well by Kashmiris.

Consequently, militancy has little to do with Pakistan, but much to do with what locals perceive as India’s suppressive template. Managing the aftermath of the Article 370 required tens of thousands of additional central police deployed. Besides, the pressure mounted by Operation All Out and its successor operations - that since Burhan Wani’s death account for some 1000 militants – generate backlash. This is the outcome of disenfranchisement and humiliation felt by youth, and not quite result as the info-war spin emanating from Badami Bagh has it: that youth are being motivated by influencers colourfully phrased as ‘white collar terrorists’. Collective trauma cannot but find expression in such pushback to actions of a suppressive State.

In Bhagwat’s imagination, the speedy return of KPs in such a milieu may be through appropriate upping of the security template. The democratic veneer will allow for harsh measures. The central police forces are already in place. That militants are able to mount sporadic militant actions, such as grenade throwing and selective killings as of off-duty policemen, suggests that a return to original habitations within the Kashmiri populace may not be possible. The targeted killings last year of Kashmiri Pandits can be taken as messaging on this count.

Even if threat of murders keeps KPs from their original habitations, there is a second model of return: to separate colonies constructed for the purpose. Those that have been constructed have proven that this is a failed experiment. Some who returned to stay over were unable to access work places and sustenance last year after the targeted KP killings.

This brings to fore the third option: that of a separate enclave for KPs within the Valley. This is the Israeli model of settlement. Now that land purchase has been thrown open to non-Kashmiris from the mainland – apparently 24 purchases have already been made under the scheme – this policy can be upped with more land usurped in protectable enclaves. KP numbers would require boosting since KPs are unlikely to want to return to a conflict zone. Only those in refugee colonies may chance it; not so those who have resettled placidly elsewhere. The Sainik colonies rumoured can potentially populate these enclaves. It borrows a page from the Pakistani book wherein Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Northern Areas have been subject to an invasion of settlers, including recipients of government largesse for services rendered in the military. The West Bank model can then be expanded at will by the elected government in place. This will put paid to any Article 371 dreams.

Thus, Bhagwat’s feelings and wishes can yet see light of day. As to whether this is helpful to KPs is another matter. What is certain is that the only manner in which KPs could have returned much earlier and could yet return is not on the cards. When even the liberal oriented Manmohan Singh government, carrying forward the legacy of the Vajpayee government, on both the internal and external fronts, did not succeed over its two terms, it is impossible to visualize the Narendra Modi government changing its spots. Modi has already taken the first steps in this direction by using the Ukraine War to suitably distance himself from the Americans, whose anticipated criticism of forthcoming initiatives can be suitable ignored.

Peace studies literature and successful practice elsewhere has practicable ideas on how to bring about returns. These can be adapted to conditions in Kashmir. Kashmir itself has the spiritual and moral resources that can be deployed in effecting reconciliation as prelude to a return with dignity for KPs. Transitional Justice and Conflict Transformation are two subject areas that have ample scope for application in Kashmir. The reopening of the case against Bitta Karate is precursor. However, this cannot be one-sided. It would require landmark cases of human rights violation on part of the State to also be probed. Reconciliation through mutual truth telling, catharsis from forgiveness, reparations, compensation etc need being operationalised.

This would require appropriate change in security arrangements. The removal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the North East is a model for J&K. The security indices south of the Pir Panjal are stark. Sporadic incidents such as last year of a set of terrorists getting lucky and accounting for 10 members of security forces is a threat, but a manageable one in terms of putting protocols in place for army aid to civil authority. However the center of gravity is in the Valley. Here the visually oppressive presence of security forces will have to be removed. The under-supervised central police and the over-empowered special operations group of the police would have to be suitably tempered.

Portents of the latter are not in sight, seen in the resignation of the former policeman who headed the notorious force from his billet as adviser to governor for contesting in the upcoming elections. If the ideas is to install him in power, given his pro-ruling party affinities and being from the Jammu region, this puts paid to both the political outreach necessary and the supportive security rejigging recommended.

Clearly, if the boosting of box office prospects of The Kashmir Files by powers-that-be is any indicator, all that alone can see KPs reinstalled in the Valley with dignity is not quite on the cards. Earliest, it will have to await the national elections of 2024, when and if Modi is dethroned. Till then, the regime will play the KPs along, for their electoral worth, using them also as another stick to beat Kashmiris and India’s Muslims with.

Notably, the movie is not so much about the past in its Kashmir bashing, but is to condition the audience to the forthcoming depredations on both Kashmiris and Muslims. The Kashmiris will be subject to Bhagwat’s unarticulated model of return of KPs, while Muslims elsewhere in India are put on notice of a like fate as KPs for yet-to-unfold, Covid-interrupted initiatives as National Register of Citizen’s and National Population Register. It’s going to be a rough ride till 2024 in which KPs must reckon with Kashmiris and India’s Muslims as fellow, beleaguered travelers.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/armed-forces-special-powers-act

Armed Forces Special Powers’ Act

AFSPA is part of the problem

The Home Ministry makes a virtue of a necessity in the withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers’ Act (AFSPA) from some areas of its extant across North East. That this is a response to the Oting killings in Mon District of Nagaland last December is self-evident. Had that botched operation not taken place, periodic routine extensions to AFSPA would have continued, just as was the case in Assam only last month. Since AFSPA is part of the legal landscape in the North East and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the Act is center stage when there is some or the other egregious violation of human rights. The remainder of the time it whirrs away in the background, covering up violations that do not clutter headlines.

It is not as if AFSPA has not been consigned to the dustbin when warranted. The legislation for Punjab was jettisoned when it outlived its utility sometime late nineties with the passing of the Khalistani insurgency. The one in Tripura was wrapped up in mid 2010s by the Left administration there when its enlightened policies brought peace to tribal areas. However, it has continued unabated in the North East and J&K, even where the indices of insurgency have been negligible. This has been the case not only in areas in J&K, such as south of Pir Panjals, more or less all through, and also in Assam since the insurgency there abated in the early 2000s. That AFSPA continues in place by mere genuflection to an unsettled situation, rather than any rigourous due process by way of which it is extended, shows it up as a tool of centralized control over the periphery; a colonial instrument, if you will.  

The Courts have twice-over taken a deeper look at it. In the late 90s, the challenge to AFSPA on constitutional grounds was laid to rest in the Courts decreeing it as constitutionally compliant. The judgment was sugar-coated with homilies to be applied by the armed forces during operations, which in the event proved to be lip-service to a set of commandments, themselves revised soon thereafter. Then in the mid 2000s, there were the upheavals in Manipur, stemming from wanton disregard by some armed forces elements of the provisions that Supreme Court had required be kept in mind during operations. The government of the day - bearing a liberal orientation - sought to quieten the backlash by appointing a commission. As with most such reports, the Commission’s otherwise enlightened report was confined to dusty file cupboards. The then home minister later ruefully recalled – referring to another report by three interlocutors dealing with the effects of the AFSPA in Kashmir - that an opportunity was passed up to rectify matters.

The highest Court continues to be ‘seized of the matter’ – in ways typical to courts – following up with an investigation of some 1500 cases of disappearance in Manipur. Of the six sample cases investigated at its behest by a central agency, all deaths were found to be in fake encounters. Premises vacated by a departing military unit threw up human remains, testifying to an effort a clandestine disposal. In J&K, unmarked graves number up to some 3000, while the number of disappeared are pegged just short of 5-digit figures.

While wheels of justice clank on, their din has forced at least two counter insurgents to commit suicide. One Avtar Singh, on the run for killing a human rights activist in Kashmir, killed his family before shooting himself, way out in California where he was hiding out. A Pakistani author provides a fictional account of the murder-suicide. In the other case, the major allegedly involved in the alleged rape and murder of Manorama Devi allegedly died in a firearm ‘accident’ on the field firing range. This is not how it was envisaged in the AFSPA to deal with violations of its provisions. Poetic justice after a fashion, but this should have, first, been deterred by the State; and, second, it should have deployed its disciplinary powers instead.

Indeed, AFSPA does confer disciplinary powers. These have been remarkable only for absence of will to use them. The Act would have perhaps had less ignominy had the Article that confers these powers on the Central government been exercised as envisaged, when and where warranted. That power under this Article has been deliberately ignored, while powers under other Articles have been abused tells its own story. Not a single prosecution has been initiated since the Union government has declined to sign off on its approval for such action, even when warranted. Where the army’s judicial system has stepped up, justice delivery has been casualty. Machhil and Pathribal are cases to point. This puts the onus on the government, but with two ministries involved – Defence and Home – there is little chance of decisions emerging.  

This owes to a division of labour in which the bureaucrat-assisted political level of military control has abdicated its responsibility of oversight altogether. The lessons of 1962 were over-learnt. Both doctrinal and operational aspects of military affairs are taken to be the realm of the military brass, while it is kept out of the higher order decision making. This is a symbiotic relationship, with the brass not unhappy to have a field-day operationally. Lately, cosmetic strides have been made to get the military on the high table, though mostly this is high on propaganda than substance.

As a result, counter insurgency has been largely unsupervised, with the military being only self-regulating only up to a point. The doctrinal cover it has is that a kinetic resort is only to bring down levels of insurgency to manageable levels. This is compounded by a definition of insurgency that has it that insurgency is only if unassisted from outside. This puts the troubles in Kashmir into a proxy war basket, whereupon militant action is taken as terrorism, inviting a liberally-dispensed wrath of the State.

Whereas the military has projected that it is loath to be involved in aid to civil authority in tackling internal security, the circumstance has been rather beneficial for the military. It has expanded its footprint across J&K in particular, raising a whole Force, the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), to enable it do so. Thus, when calls, impelled by ‘healing touch’ sentiment, come up for rewinding AFSPA, these are promptly shot down by the military, the custodians of expertise on insurgency and national security. No national level politician can second guess that, while provincial politicians can be derided as having an axe to grind. Thus, AFSPA acquired institutional stakeholders interested in its longevity.

There are institutional checks in place, such as a human rights cell at the headquarters level. Recently, a police officer stands posted to the headquarters with a remit to oversee processes dealing with violations. However, the interpretation of the mandate is such by the military appointees that they think their job is to preserve the military from external scrutiny. This is of a piece in a system where the apex human rights body organizes debates with topics such as: "Are human rights a stumbling block in fighting evils like terrorism and Naxalism"?

In such milieu, not only will AFSPA be willfully misinterpreted, but its tenets stretched. For example, it allows for destruction of hideouts. However, that was apt for when it was promulgated: when in jungles hideouts could be destroyed so that these were not reused. These days it is interpreted to mean any place militants are found, including houses they take shelter in. Thus, there is a virtual policy for destruction of houses in which militants are found. This replicates what Israel does, hardly apt for a country dealing with its own citizens. AFSPA provides benign cover for turning India into a softer copy of that Apartheid state.  

Though the government, known for milking military-related measures for its political purposes, will go to town over the retraction of AFSPA from certain areas in the North East, it is unlikely to be replicated in J&K any time soon. This could be done easily if violence indices are the only barometer. That it needs being done is not so much as to stay compliant with the Court’s requirements, but to be strategic. The AFSPA feeds resentment and high-handed actions under it, alienation. If partially withdrawn, it would serve as a useful confidence builder and gimmick to initiate a peace process. Retracting AFSPA can do more for J&K peace, than divisions-worth of RR. But the government, having shot its bolt with Article 370 voiding, is hardly likely to be looking at politically-driven conflict resolution. It is instead election oriented. It could well give indicators of turning back the AFSPA clock if the ruling party gets elected in the forthcoming elections. Reaping the harvest in installing a Bhartiya Janata Party-led government under a Hindu chief minister, it can rescind its promise at will or remove it selectively. AFSPA, thus, is plenty-faceted, to be juiced at will.

One thing it certainly does is to hand over – figuratively – the situation to the army. For the vast majority of counter insurgents doing a professional job of a distasteful responsibility - not an infanteer's primary job but only an infanteer can do it - they would soldier on regardless of the Act; so don’t quite need it. What the Act does is makes it business-as-usual for politicians and bureaucrats. There is thus no urgency to resolve matters politically. The Naga peace process is to observe its silver jubilee soon, with not comprehensive peace agreement in sight as yet. As a result India has been criticized – for instance by David Smith - for being a soft state, unable to wrap up insurgencies for decades on end. The critique, though taken amiss by the military and its veterans, bites.

What escapes the military is the cost it pays for maintaining the cover of AFSPA. It remains a ‘mass’ military – a grid-based counter insurgency being manpower heavy. This has impacted its financing; the revenue budget eating up the capital budget. It is also not conventional war oriented enough, having been caught flat-footed at Kargil and, most recently, in Ladakh. That courage has bailed it out is at best a back-handed compliment. Thus, AFSPA has a price the military is unwilling and/or unable to see.

Even so, AFSPA does serve the purpose of providing cover for deploying the army in circumstance of straitened internal security. That the enabling provisions are also available in other legal instruments has not made a dent on the army’s adamantine stand. Its powers could also be inserted into a revised Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Since the much reviled UAPA is applicable across India, it does not suffer arraignment as AFSPA does of being discriminatory.

Nevertheless, AFSPA is not going to go away. The only purpose it can perhaps serve someday is that it can provide cover for army deployment elsewhere. No, not in Maoist areas - though it’s discipline might protect the tribal communities there better than that afforded by the central police forces - but across India if and when right wing extremists - whose political violence is the primary threat to the Republic’s Constitution - are to be rolled up and wrapped away.

 

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/indias-china-predicament-and-no-first?s=w

India’s China predicament and No First Use

Engaging with Bharat Karnad

As usual, Bharat Karnad has set the cat among the pigeons. In his, ‘Ukraine in mind, India needs a nuclear option against China,’ he takes aim at India’s nuclear doctrinal pillar, No First Use (NFU), calling for it to be jettisoned in relation to China. His has been a longstanding recommendation that atomic demolition munitions (ADM) be emplaced along Chinese ingress passes, thereby deterring it. It would implacably demonstrate Indian resolve, since these would ab initio be embedded to deny use of those approaches either for intrusion or logistics support thereafter. At a minimum, the implicit threat that they could be triggered in face of a Chinese onslaught would keep China from chancing any invasion. For good measure, Karnad conjures up a Doom’s Day machine: the array of ADMs to be backed by a tier of Agni missiles, well forward enough to take out Beijing, the Three Gorges Dam, the Lop Nor weapons complex and China’s eastern seaboard.   

To Karnad, a differentiated doctrine is required on the Pakistan front, since Pakistan is a manageable foe. To him, it is at best an irritant, with which the power asymmetry between the two can be suitably leveraged to deter. His overall pitch has been that India proffer friendly overtures to Pakistan, weaning it away from China. This would make conflict recede, leaving India with only one front to take care of: China.

To him, India is in China’s weight, but adverse power equations require India to apply its nuclear capability in a different manner. While doing without NFU does not necessarily mean first use of nuclear weapons, Karnad does not merely want to instill dissonance in the mind of the adversary that these ‘may’ be used, but a surety that these ‘will’ be used. Karnad is no nuclear minimalist, believing in a tous azimuts nuclear capability, with warheads numbering in mid-three digits figures. What it does to the other doctrinal pillar, ‘minimum’, does not detract him, since for the capability to be ‘credible’ is more important.

Elsewhere, I made a case for a rescinding of the NFU in face of a crisis or in conflict in order to demonstrate that China either desist from crossing a threshold or retrieve. In my mind’s eye, this was not so much to avoid a fight than to keep from losing one. There was space in my visualization for a conventional tryst, even a bloody-nosed, broken-jawed one. It is only if and when Chinese aims are self-evidently over the top – such as a bid to take Tawang or make a break for the Chicken Neck – then India could, as a first step publicly step back from NFU. Though not advocated by me, if nuclear weapons are to at all to be introduced into a conflict, it’s best done at the lowest possible level of destruction, provocation or opprobrium.    

Thus, there are three nuclear use options: ‘maximalist’ (Karnad); ‘minimalist’; and, the in-between ones clubbed into a third, ‘graduated’ option.

There is little doubt that the maximalist option – Karnad’s potion - should make China think twice. However, the danger is, having given their prospective military actions a second thought the Chinese may yet undertake these. In short, the maximalist option might fail to deter. This owes to operation of self-deterrence. Whereas it might be reassuring to have the capability to see the rubble bounce on Chinese seaboard, it may take a while to get there. India does not have the reach for now or the numbers of warheads and missiles. Even when it does, self-deterrence will remain, since India and China would be in a state of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Self-deterrence will thus attend all nuclear decision making, given the inevitability of India suffering like damage.

Maximalists like to believe that resolve is all it takes to overcome self-deterrence. Resolve requires not only bolstering incessantly but demonstrating periodically. This is persuasive, but not wholly so. It does take resolve to commit suicide, but political decision makers in a democracy have no mandate to take a call on national suicide. No political aims or military objectives can be met by such an action. Preventing Chinese from taking Arunachal makes little sense if there is no India left to retain Arunachal. 

The maximalists argue that the aim being deterrence, it can be met by a convincing show of irrationality – after all only a mad (wo)man will chance a ‘MAD’ situation. ‘It can happen; therefore, it will, so let’s not provoke it,’ should go the refrain. The higher the provocation – such as a bid to take Ladakh or breakout from Doklam for the Teesta plains – the more likely the house will be brought down on both heads. Threat of an irrational reaction prevents an irrational action. However, this does not prevent – deter – the more likely Chinese military actions: salami slicing.

For this, Karnad has his ADMs in place. In a ‘graduated’ option, ADMs going off do not necessarily trigger off the Agnis. The Agnis are in case of retaliatory strike(s) which get ugly, or, if in the aftermath of ADM demolishing hillsides, China still proceeds downhill. In-conflict deterrence through escalation control should kick-in.

However, competent commentary exists that escalation control beliefs are wishful. At one time, Subrahmanyam, and lately, Prakash Menon, reflected on inevitability of escalation in their dissuading theology on escalation control. This implies that the graduated option has a higher probability of tending towards the maximalist option in short order. Even if a chimera of sorts, not having a graduated option makes a maximalist option the only option left.

This leaves one with the third - minimalist - option. This involve letting go of NFU at a crunch, to deliver an unmistakable message. Lack of NFU does not mean inevitable first use. However, a reluctant stepping up to the graduated option can be countenanced by climbing the ladder: nuclear tests, a green-field explosion, tactical nuclear strike(s) or taking out an operational level target. The assumption is that a nuclear weapon going off can even make the deaf hear. A war that’s gone nuclear has existential portents for the planet. It is liable to bring in unprecedented external pressure to bring home to belligerents the start of a wholly new ball game: use of nukes by both sides.

In his appraisal of the Ukraine conflict – that prompted his latest foray on his favourite nuclear hobby horse - Karnad observes that the Ukraine predicament was brought on by the fear in its supporters that their involvement in the conflict may make it go nuclear – a fear fed by Russia’s unambiguous nuclear threats. Consequently, Karnad thinks that states subject to attack by nuclear weapons powers have to resort to their own devices, unromantically expect no one to come to the rescue. This is true in the Russo-Ukraine case, but not tenable in a case of two nuclear powers in a MAD situation, such as India and Pakistan or, in due course, with progressive nuclear armament, India and China. Even in the interim, nuclear ordnance exchange between India and China would lead to curtains for Planet Earth.

Consequently, the maximalist option should not figure at all and every sinew strained to ensure that the graduated option does not tend towards the maximalist due to absent or ineffective escalation control measures and mechanisms. Compared with the graduated option, the minimalist option is sane. The logic that irrationality deters is undeniable, but sanity – nuclear weapons made thinkable by a reasonable doctrine - does equally well.

The minimalist option does not take Karnad’s fears of a conventional reverse to heart. Karnad - perhaps rightly - believes that the conventional equation is against India. China is indeed better positioned on the Himalayas in terms of geography, and is doctrinally and materially ahead. However, better armies have been checked all through history. We don’t need to go as far back as Alexander by Porus, but use the Ukrainian example itself. Ukraine has given a good account of itself in a situation of greater asymmetry than India versus China.

Therefore, recourse can be taken to the Draft Nuclear Doctrine that Karnad helped write up. It desired that a higher order conventional capability be maintained in order that Indian nuclear threshold is at a reasonably high level. Even if much improvement is needed, there is no call for substitution of conventional firepower with nuclear firepower.

Significantly, credible commentary – as by HS Panag – has it that when, in 2020, China spooked India, it was only asserting its claim to the areas up to its 1959 claim line. Having done that – and over stepped it slightly at an odd spot – I believe it is satiated in Ladakh. Though this does not hold for Arunachal, there is a consensus that 1962 cannot be replicated by China. This underscores conventional deterrence.

Therefore, NFU has continuing utility for India. NFU serves India’s purposes, since it incentivizes China to likewise maintain an NFU. It’s only if China gets too hot to handle conventionally, when a declaratory move away from NFU need be made. Whereas Karnad wishes for an up-front first use doctrine on the China front, he takes care to build in a buffer – having ADMs triggered by what China does, rather than having India hurl Agnis right away. So it’s a caveated first use of sorts, the onus on China. From his piece, it cannot be inferred that he is for raining down the Agnis at one go. Thus – much to his chagrin (!) - Karnad’s can also be taken as a nuanced, graduated option.

Even so, NFU rescinding does not necessarily mean first use. The ambiguity is enough to deter. I go so far as to say that even a conventional set back should not prompt first use. Even if playing with a weak hand, India must counter China conventionally. While a near-MAD situation compels this, it’s also because - to quote Barack Obama out of context - ‘Yes, we can.’