Friday, 10 September 2021

 https://www.milligazette.com/news/Opinions/33915-no-terror-under-modi-a-reading-list-for-the-defence-minister/

A reading list for the defence minister

The defence minister, Rajnath Singh, speaking at a meeting of the state Bharatiya Janata Party in the shadow of the gigantic statue of the original Iron Man of India, said that ‘terrorists were afraid of the Narendra Modi government at the Center and there had been no major terrorist attack in the country since Mr Modi assumed office in 2014.’ The defence minister went on to say that by conducing surgical strikes (wrongly dated to 2018 in the news report, unless the defence minister faulted on the date), India had sent a message to terrorists that they were insecure even in their safe havens, in Pakistan.

Since the defence minister is the senior member of the cabinet and sits on the cabinet committee on security (CCS) and the national security council (NSC), what he says matters. This is even more so since we know his fellow members on any of the three forums are not particularly consequential. Therefore, Rajnath Singh’s utterances have some import.

In the same breath saying there have been no terror attacks, the minister also referred to surgical strikes. This appears a self-contradiction since the surgical strikes were presumably in response to terror attacks, at Uri and at Pulwama respectively. But then – as this columnist has earlier argued here and elsewhere – these were not incidents meriting the escalatory response of surgical strikes.

At Uri, in the skirmish with the intruding terrorists a tent in which our soldiers were sleeping burnt down, accidentally increasing the casualties. This is brought out in the then corps commander’s memoirs, thus: “During the firefight, a cookhouse also caught fire, which increased the death toll (Satish Dua, India’s Bravehearts) (emphasis added).” 

As for Pulwama, it is unthinkable that the perpetrator was in and out of police stations, after having been apprehended earlier in a firefight in which two of his fellow militants died, for some six times thereafter and did not catch anyone’s eye as a potential suicide bomber. Besides, the infamous Davinder
Singh – allegedly but credibly associated with the parliament attack - was posted in Pulwama till a couple of months prior to the attack. Today, Davinder Singh is being spared investigation on both counts in the name of national security, since to do so would see plenty skeletons spill out of the cupboard.

The upshot is that the minister is indeed right – there have been no terror attacks since the prime minister took office. But is the reason he gives accurate: that this owes to a policy of ‘zero tolerance towards terrorism’?  

Counter-intuitively, let’s begin with Kashmir. The police there required the media reporting on violent incidents to use the term ‘terrorism’ rather than their preferred term, ‘militancy’. This does not necessarily make the violence there terrorism. This author has argued that the term insurgency should instead be used since this is a phenomenon amenable to political resolution, whereas using the term terrorism makes political compromises intrinsic in negotiated settlement problematic. This advocacy is in keeping with the ground situation in which over 90 per cent of those killed these days are Kashmiri youth. The weapons recovered are at best a couple of pistols with an odd Kalashnikov thrown in. Not to forget, some of the terror attacks are liable to be black operations, such as possibly the one that won Davinder Singh a gallantry medal. The dividend is to help a safe landing by Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force grey list.

That brings one to the terror attacks elsewhere that according to the minister stopped because terrorists - and Pakistan - went chicken. Terrorism is no child’s play. Perpetrators have pathological features and are hardened by ideologies of violent extremism. They often put their lives on line. Some are mercenaries whose families are amply materially compensated. Therefore, the minister’s reasoning is self-serving.

As for the anti-terrorism strategy itself, let’s revert to Kashmir. The recent burial of the political stalwart, SAS Geelani, was done under a considerable security blanket, testifying to the government knowing well that the place is poised on a brink. Kicking the can down road is never a good strategy. The belief that the political solution – invalidating of Article 370 – constituted a political solution shall face its severest test yet. Commentary on fallout from Afghanistan has it that Kashmir will likely be singed. A ‘wait and watch’ policy, arguably valid for Afghanistan, is hardly apt from a prevention point of view in Kashmir. 

As for the counter terrorism strategy of zero tolerance, elevating alleged terror participants - against whom the case is in court - to parliament on a ruling party ticket is not good strategy either. Assuming Muslim perpetrators were behind terror prior to 2014, it challenges reason that such radicalized individual have been rather inactive over the last seven years. During the period, the right wing has gone out of its way to not only lynch innocent Muslims victims periodically but upload the visuals from these beatings on to social media. The idea has been to provoke a Muslim backlash for polarization purposes. Such strategic patience on part of the Muslim terrorists begs the question why are they keeping their powder dry.

Mr. Rajnath Singh may like to have his speech writer peruse recent works on terrorism. Josy Joseph in his The Silent Coup shows how narco tests were abused to depict Muslims subjected to them as terrorists. Abdul Wahid Shaikh brings out voluminous testimony in his Innocent Prisoners on the torture he faced and his fellow Muslim prisoners to force false confessions for participation in terror acts out of them. He substantiates allegations former senior police man, Mushrif, makes in his Brahminists Bombed, Muslims Hanged. Even the flagship counter terrorism innovation of the regime, it’s cutting off of terror funding, has other impetus behind it – yet another instrument to throttle non-governmental organizations and whittle the civil society space.

Elias Davidsson in his Revisiting the 26/11 Evidence pokes holes in the Mumbai terror attack evidence. While the terror attack was Pakistan conceived and originated, it appears India profited by exploiting the terror attack to its purposes. Irrespective of supercop Rakesh Maria’s version to the contrary, in the drawing room Muslim narrative, saffronite extremists took advantage of the chaos to eliminate policemen investigating them for prior bomb blasts elsewhere. India’s inept security response – perhaps kept deliberately so to corner Pakistan - led to heightening the toll. The showing of the National Security Guard (NSG) was intriguing in this, with the NSG taking 48 hours to clean out the hotel near Gateway of India, especially when the naval Marcos and an infantry battalion’s ghatak platoon were on hand but denied a shot on the very first night itself.

The clinching evidence is from the courageous RB Shreekumar. A senior cop, Shreekumar in his Gujarat: Behind the Curtain depicts how the cover up was deployed post Godhra. The Gujarat model in which fake encounters were used to build up the image of a political worthy as Hindu Hriday Samrat thereafter went national in the false narrative of Muslim terrorism. A case to point is of the bombs being fortuitously found and defused in Surat after the serial blasts in Ahmedabad in 2008 when the current Delhi Police commissioner was in charge there.

This is no doubt a counter narrative, but deserves to be mainstreamed. Else the narrative sought to be propagated in courses on terrorism as in the new course introduced in Jawaharlal Nehru University, that terrorism is exclusively jihadi perpetrated will gain validity. While no doubt there was a Muslim backlash to events as Babri masjid demolition, Mumbai carnage and Gujarat pogrom, this pales in comparison in its temporality and impact to the terrorism attributed to Muslims by appropriation of the backlash by the right wing by covert means and its media hyperinflation. No wonder the defence lawyer of Umar Khalid described the police charge sheet as spill over from right wing trolls’ script. Revisionism as here will help strategic thinkers and the attentive public to evaluate the actual state of security and how a questionable security narrative is being employed to further political party goals at the cost of national security.


 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/911-anniversary-the-global-war-on-terror-has-done-little-to-help-india-tide-over-its-security-issues-7449541.html/amp?__twitter_impression=true

9/11 Anniversary | The global war on terror has done little to help India tide over its security issues


Periodisation of the recent past customarily ends the post-Cold War unipolar moment of United States’ hegemony at 9/11. Though the US response to 9/11 epitomised its power at its zenith, its strategic overreach has turned its strategic trajectory indubitably downwards, not so much in aggregate power but in relative terms to its peer competitors, as also the suitability of its power to the issues of the day. Nothing illustrates this better than the manner of its exit from Kabul last month.

The observance of the 20th anniversary of the terror attacks in the US on September 11 is an appropriate moment to likewise appraise as to where India’s power is poised.

The anniversary finds India hemmed into its regional space, with the two-front challenge feared for more than a decade now a manifest reality. An economy under strain from missteps even prior to the onset of COVID-19 is stretched to find the necessary resources for the corresponding defence outlay.

India is coping by movement doctrinally (integrated battle groups) and structurally (integrated theatre commands), though its efforts to return to equable relations with China continue as a work in progress ever since the Chinese intrusion in Ladakh. Its strained equations with Pakistan are likely to heighten in wake of Pakistan seemingly stealing a march over India with the movement it backed, the Taliban, taking over Kabul in one fell swoop from the India-supported Ashraf Ghani government. The apprehended fallout has India gearing up for instability in Kashmir.

The clock appears to have rewound some 20 years.

Immediately prior to 9/11, India was stocking up for giving Pakistan a sock in the nose for its being unheeding of India’s outreach at the Agra summit and upping of its proxy war in Kashmir, then raging at a higher note since the Kargil War. The plan was called Operation Kabaddi and involved taking a few posts along infiltration prone routes on the Line of Control (LoC). In the event, 9/11 intruded and so rudely did the US into the region with the operation hastily renamed Operation Enduring Freedom from its earlier hubristic moniker Infinite Justice.

The impact of the global war on terror (GWOT) swirling in the close vicinity led to Pakistan’s deft footwork in reacquiring strategic capital from its location as a frontline state a second time round. This enabled it to wiggle out of a tight spot after the coincident terror attack on India’s Parliament. India’s military reaction — slow off the blocks — allowed Pakistan to rely on the US to bail it, then and in the next peak of the twin-peak crisis.

The upshot of the crisis was benign in the two countries able to work their earlier plan of engaging each other on issues of discord. Meetings followed, marked by ceasefire on the LoC and quietude in Kashmir. However, internal politics playing spoil sport, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf was deposed and then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s latitude eclipsed in the aftermath of Mumbai 26/11. In retrospect it is easy to espy a lost opportunity.

Having shot its bolt on peace initiatives, Pakistan turned its attention to its northern neighbour, nursing the Taliban back to insurgent good health while encouraging US President Barack Obama’s peace surge. It withstood US President Donald Trump’s fulminations by delivering the Taliban to the table at Doha. Strategic patience through some 10 rounds of talks since 2018 enabled it to finally see the US pack up and leave Afghanistan last month. A small price to pay for this strategic gamble was in playing down India’s surgical strikes, refraining from proxy war and its reluctant inaction on India’s dilution of Article 370 in Jammu & Kashmir.

For its part, India snuggled up with the US, starting with the nuclear deal and participating in Obama’s pivot to Asia, that has lately culminated in its co-option into the Quad. It hopes to balance against growing Chinese power, but the effect has arguably spurred China to through its intrusion caution India against proximity with the US, despite personal ministrations of the ties by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in successive summits with China’s Xi Jinping. The Ladakh intrusions, prompted in part by the changed political map of J&K, signify India’s current day strategic predicament.

The US having departed Afghanistan and poised by year end to leave Iraq, the GWOT has run its course. The GWOT in the backdrop did little to help India tide over its security issues that predated 9/11. The lesson is that India must be Atmanirbhar Bharat, a term popularly associated with economic regeneration, but also relevant for strategic autonomy. Self-reliance, interpreted as a return to non-alignment rather than external balancing, must be leitmotif of strategy hereon

Thursday, 2 September 2021

 Publications in 2020-21 - 35

Eschewing and not manipulating escalation

Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) 12 May 20


Why India Did Not Go to War with China

EPW Vol. 55, Issue No. 35, 29 Aug, 2020

The India-Pak escalation dynamic

Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 55, Issue No. 9, 29 Feb, 2020

Why India Did Not Go to War with China

 

EPW Vol. 55, Issue No. 35, 29 Aug, 2020

  30 August 21 - India’s Afghanistan policy explained in regime security terms, thecitizen.in

2.      24 August 21 - Afghanistan Crisis | India must deploy its economic soft power, moneycontrol.com

3.      16 August 21 - Reform intelligence agencies in the national interest, milligazette.com

4.      11 August 21 – Afghanistan Civil War fallout on Kashmir – thecitizen.in

5.      11 August 21 - What a civil war next door means for us, Kashmir Times

6.      6 August 21 - The Escalatory Risks of India’s Integrated Battle Groups, South Asian Voices, Stimson Center

7.      11 July 21 - A peace strategy for Afghanistan

8.      18 June 21 - Counter insurgency is not a policeman’s job, Kashmir Times

9.      16 June 21 - Cohesion in the army: The battle winning factor, Center for Land Warfare Studies

10.  8 June 21 - An assessment of new ‘strategies’ for Pakistan and China, Kashmir Times

11.  6 July 21 – A case for ceasefire in Kashmir, Kashmir Walla

12.  18 May 21 - Try UN peacekeeping in Afghanistan, Kashmir Times

13.  28 Feb 21 - Securitisation of cultural nationalism, Kashmir Times

14.  7 July 21 - In Kashmir, the GD Bakshi way, Kashmir Walla

15.  5 Jan 21 – A fake encounter yet again?, Kashmir Times

  1. 17 August 2020 - Why the déjà vu over the Shopian killings, Kashmir Times

17.  5 Oct 2020- The long-term implications of India’s do-nothing response in Ladakh, Newsclick

18.  19 February 2020https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/18337/Whose-Army-is-it-AnywayWhose army is it anyway?

 6 February 2020http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=98998 Modi must sack those misadvising him on national security

  5 February 2020http://www.milligazette.com/news/16872-what-should-shaheen-bagh-stalwarts-do-now What should Shaheen Bagh stalwarts do now

  27 January 2020http://www.milligazette.com/news/16869-india-the-coming-anarchy India — The coming anarchy

22.  Jan 2020 https://www.indianewsstream.com/a-suggestion-for-india-on-the-afghanistan-peace-talks/ A suggestion for India on the Afghanistan peace talks

 16 January 2020https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/18172/The-Crisis-in-the-Indian-Deep-State; http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=98483 20 Jan 2020; The crisis in the Indian deep state

 15 January 2020http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=98358 An Army Day resolution for the new chief

  13 January 2020https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/politics/politics-the-iran-us-spat-has-resonance-for-the-region-4810501.html/amp The Iran-US spat has resonance for the region

26.  8 January 2020https://www.newsclick.in/Many-Chink-India-Nuclear-Chain-Command Many a Chink in India’s Nuclear Chain of Command

27.  7 January 2020https://countercurrents.org/2020/01/gujaratification-as-the-foremost-national-security-threatGujaratification as the foremost national security threat

bBook Reviews 

1.      The Book Review India Volume Xlv Number 6 June 2021 Military Musings: 150 Years Of Indian Military Thought From The Journal Of The United Service Institution Of India Edited by Sqn. Ldr. Rana T.S. Chhina, MBE

2.      Shiraz Sheikh, Democracy and authoritarianism in Pakistan, The Book Review, Dec 2020

3.      TP Sreenivasan, Modiplomacy: Through a Shakespearean Prism, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2020; pp. 242; Rs. 800; ISBN 978-8193555446.

4.      HS Panag, The Indian Army, New Delhi: Westland, The Book Review, September 2020



B

Monday, 30 August 2021

UNPUBLISHED, REVISED VERSION OF THE PRECEDING POST

India’s Afghanistan policy in regime security terms

Foreign minister Jaishankar informed the recent all-party meeting on the Afghanistan situation that India’s policy is one of ‘wait and watch’. Whereas a policy-in-the-works is justified, a regional power should instead be pushing for an outcome it prefers in Afghanistan.

Diplomatically, it has at the two Security Council meetings joined the international chorus calling for moderation on part of the Taliban and to ensure a broad representativeness in the new government. As incentive, the mid August reference to Taliban among the armed groups has been removed in the late August Council resolution. Sticks to extract good behavior of the Taliban in power remain in the form of diplomatic recognition and sanctions’ lists procedures, on which India will likely fall in line with the Western powers. On the ground, having pulled out its diplomatic staff, it has limited possibilities of influencing the situation. This action willy-nilly acknowledges the preexisting deficit in India’s Afghan policy that resulted in India being kept out of the plethora of forums – the troika plus and quadrilaterals - that have come up as the peace process wound its way over the past two years.

While India’s intelligence moves are not known, these can be expected to include an outreach to the Afghan resistance shaping up at Panjshir holdout. By reassuring the resistance leadership of India’s continuing support, India can strengthen their hand. At the table currently with the Talban, they have the confidence to wrest their due in terms of representation in the new Taliban-led dispensation. If the Taliban’s ongoing tactics of coercion-with-talks fail to persuade their challengers at Panjshir, it provides India a leverage it could exploit depending on how the situation pans out.

An intelligence dominant Afghanistan policy

It is likely that the intelligence prong of strategy, even if invisible, is more active than its diplomatic one, since India’s Afghanistan policy has been intelligence-led. There have been multiple exchanges between the intelligence establishments of India and the former regime, especially since mid 2017, when President Trump decided to wind down the American commitment in Afghanistan. India’s Afghanistan policy is entwined with its Pakistan and Kashmir policies, making it a subset of its national security policy and therefore, the domain of the national security adviser.

However, despite this privileging of the intelligence prong of strategy - and perhaps because of this - not unlike most other states, India was unable to gauge the rapidity of collapse of the Ghani regime. Limiting its outreach to the Taliban eventuated in India being marginalized. Consequently, India surveys uncertain national security prospects in case the Taliban return to power. The threat is not so much from the Taliban, as much as from the unreformed and triumphalist Pakistan, that would be able to return its attention to its traditional preoccupation, Kashmir.

Kashmir returns as a conflict trigger

In Kashmir, it appears to be lull before the storm. There is enough tinder in Kashmir only waiting for the proverbial match stick. The recent outreach of the prime minister to the mainstream parties has not resulted in a breakthrough. Absent a promise of return to statehood prior to the elections, this remains unlikely. Such as reversion to statehood, albeit minus the earlier autonomy, would likely only be in case the elections are won by the ruling party at the Center. Consequently, the developments in the neighbourhood have potential for instability for national security, if and when the Pakistani state and non-state elements currently absorbed in returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, turn their attention to Kashmir.

In case unrest revives in Kashmir and presence of battle hardened Pakistani mercenaries resets the insurgency back to terrorism, India is liable to take harsh actions in Kashmir, besides being militarily firm with Pakistan. The current hiatus of relative stability, such as the Line of Control ceasefire reiteration in February, will likely unravel.

Prospects of wider insecurity

The fallout may not be limited to Kashmir. From the overdrive of the pro-right wing media on contrived linkages between Indian Muslims, Pakistan and Taliban is evident that already-frayed social harmony is set to suffer. Resulting polarization can be taken political advantage of by the right wing. ‘False flag’ terror operations implicating Muslims as perpetrators- as was the case in several terror incidents in the 2000s - shall heighten the political dividend from insecurity for the right wing.

It is by now well known that electoral advantage is sought by the ruling dispensation from India’s security showing. This remains true for how India will view its Afghanistan policy.

Since Kashmir remains delicate and a potential site for resumption of proxy war, India would perhaps prefer a like handle on the other side of Pakistan, not only to deter it but to get back at Pakistan in case of proxy war revival. Therefore, India may not be averse to instability continuing in Afghanistan. This explains lack of energy and dexterity in its diplomacy – exemplified by the term ‘wait and watch’ - in working for the presumed preferable outcome of returning stability and security to Afghanistan over the uncertainty of civil war.

The regime security calculus

In other words, not only has an intelligence-led Afghanistan policy failed India already, but is set to fail India once again in an impending unraveling of its Kashmir policy. That this has domestic political advantage for its political masters makes for ambiguity as to whether this is at all seen as a failure. On the contrary the powers-that-be may see an intelligence success through their parochial-political lens. Contending externally with the Taliban and its supposed sponsors, Pakistan, has internal political dividend in keeping up polarization. With the crucial Uttar Pradesh elections due soon, and their outcome’s implications for national elections in 2024, they primary prism for gauging national security policy is how any such policies influence political fortunes.

When national interest is defined as perpetuation of the right wing electoral majority for sustaining the Hindutva project in the unmaking of India as we know it, national interest articulation in traditional and conventional terms is futile. India is thus poised to move from being a free-rider to a spoiler for regime security and at the cost of national security.





 https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/20835/Indias-Afghanistan-Policy---Wait-and-Watch-With-An-Eye-on-Pakistan

India’s Afghanistan policy explained in regime security terms

UNEDITED VERSION

Foreign minister Jaishankar informed the recent all-party meeting on the Afghanistan situation that India’s policy is one of ‘wait and watch’. It is an admittance of a policy in the works, depending on how the situation turns out in Afghanistan when the ongoing evacuation by the international community from Kabul airport ceases on 31 August and the Talitan installs itself in power soon thereafter. The complexion of the new regime – essentially whether and to what extent it is inclusive - will presumably determine India’s next steps.

Even if the current stance is dubbed ‘wait and watch’, the government should be pushing for an outcome it prefers in Afghanistan. Diplomatically, it has at the two Security Council meetings joined the international chorus calling for moderation on part of the Taliban and to ensure a broad representativeness in the new government. On the ground, having pulled out its diplomatic staff, it has limited possibilities of influencing the situation. This action willy-nilly acknowledges the preexisting deficit in India’s Afghan policy that resulted in India being kept out of the plethora of forums that have come up as the peace process wound out over the past two years.

While India’s intelligence moves are not known, these can be expected to include an outreach to the Afghan resistance shaping up at Panjshir holdout. By reassuring the resistance leadership shaping up of India’s continuing support, India can strengthen the hand of the challengers. At the table currently with the Talban, they can have the confidence to wrest due representation in the awaited dispensation. In case they are unsuccessful, then India can create leverage through continuing support that it can exploit against its traditional rival, Pakistan, depending on how things pan out.

An intelligence dominant Afghanistan policy

It is likely that the intelligence prong of strategy, even if invisible, is more active than its diplomatic one, since India’s Afghanistan policy over the recent past has been intelligence-led. There have been multiple exchanges between the intelligence establishments of India and the former regime, especially since mid 2017, when President Trump decided to wind down the American commitment in Afghanistan. Its Afghanistan policy is entwined with its Pakistan and Kashmir policies, making it a subset of its national security policy and therefore, the domain of the national security adviser.

However, despite this privileging of the intelligence prong of strategy - and perhaps because of this - not unlike most other states, India was unable to gauge the rapidity of collapse of the Ghani regime. Limiting its outreach to the Taliban eventuated in India being marginalized. Consequently, India surveys uncertain national security prospects in case the Taliban return to power. The threat is not so much from the Taliban, as much as from the unreformed and triumphalist Pakistan, that would be able to return its attention to its traditional preoccupation, Kashmir.

Kashmir returns as a conflict trigger

Rattled by President Trump’s 2017 focus on Afghanistan in order to bring the troops back by end of his presidency, India had appointed special interlocutor to seek a way forward in Kashmir. It upped the then ongoing Operation All Out so as to take advantage of Pakistan turning its attention to the end game in Afghanistan and dwindling down infiltration to negligible numbers. Emboldened by the earlier surgical strikes on land, India also launched aerial surgical strikes on Pakistan to drive home the point that it was now a New India and would be militarily proactive in its response to terror strikes of the magnitude as conducted at Pulwama. This contributed to the electoral fortunes of the ruling party at the Center, enabling its control of parliament to levels that made the constitutional reengineering on Kashmir’s special status possible. As of now, the statistics spell an insurgency at an ebb and infiltration at ‘zero’.

Even so, this appears to be lull before the storm. There is enough tinder in Kashmir only waiting for the proverbial match stick. The recent outreach of the prime minister to the mainstream parties has not resulted in a breakthrough. Absent a promise of return to statehood prior to the elections, this remains unlikely. Such as reversion to statehood, albeit minus the earlier autonomy, would likely only be in case the elections are won by the ruling party, and, therefore, are unlikely to change the political complexion soon. Consequently, the developments in the neighbourhood have potential for instability for national security, if and when the Pakistani elements – both state and non-state - currently absorbed in returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, turn their attention to Kashmir, which can be as early as the traditional last minute infiltration push before snows set in.

In case unrest revives in Kashmir and presence of battle hardened Pakistani mercenaries resets the insurgency to becoming terrorism, India is liable to take harsh actions in Kashmir, besides being militarily firm with Pakistan. The current hiatus of relative stability, such as the Line of Control ceasefire reiteration in February, will likely unravel.

The fallout may not be limited to Kashmir. From the overdrive of the pro-right wing media on contrived linkages between Indian Muslims, Pakistan and Taliban is evident that already-frayed social harmony is set to suffer. Resulting polarization can be taken political advantage of by the right wing. ‘False flag’ terror operations attributable to Muslims, as was the case in several terror incidents in the 2000s, shall heighten the political dividend from insecurity for the right wing.

It is by now well known that electoral advantage is sought by the ruling dispensation from India’s security showing. This remains true for how India will view its Afghanistan policy. Whereas its ‘wait and watch’ policy is good optics, it hides what is to follow. Since Kashmir remains delicate and a potential site for resumption of proxy war, India would perhaps prefer a like handle on the other side of Pakistan, not only to deter it but to get back at Pakistan in case of proxy war revival. Therefore, India may not be averse to instability continuing in Afghanistan. This explains lack of energy and dexterity in its diplomacy – exemplified by the term ‘wait and watch’ - in working for the presumed preferable outcome of returning stability and security to Afghanistan over the uncertainty of civil war over the remainder of the decade.

In other words, not only has an intelligence-led Afghanistan policy failed India already, but is set to fail India once again in an impending unraveling of its Kashmir policy. That this has domestic political advantage for its political masters makes for ambiguity as to whether this is at all seen as a failure. On the contrary the powers-that-be may see an intelligence success through their parochial-political lens. When national interest is defined as perpetuation of the right wing electoral majority for sustaining the Hindutva project in the unmaking of India as we know it, national interest articulation in traditional and conventional terms is futile. India is thus poised to move from being a free-rider to a spoiler for regime security and at the cost of national security.


Thursday, 26 August 2021

 

Indian soft power as the missing ingredient in returning peace to Afghanistan

A LONGER, UNPUBLISHED VERSION OF THE ARTICLE IN THE PREVIOUS POST

While at the beginning of this month, apprehensions of civil war were extant, President Ashraf Ghani’s throwing in of the towel at a great reputational cost, appears to have averted the contingency for now. However, even though Taliban is now in control of Kabul and Afghanistan, prospects of instability persist.

At this delicate juncture with regional security poised to go either way, India, the gentle regional giant, can play a critical role in averting insecurity by moderating the Taliban through exercise of growing economy-based soft power. 

Dangers of continuing military tryst in Afghanistan stem from the traditional holdout at Panjshir being revived by the former regime’s deputy, Amrullah Saleh, tying up with the son of the former Lion of Panjshir, Ahmed Shah Masood. Panjshir held out in the Soviet era and in the subsequent Taliban 1.0. Consequently, it’s reversion to a hold out status serves today to pressure the Taliban to be magnanimous in victory.

The call by Saleh that he will fight on can potentially attract the thousands of well trained Afghan National Army forces who were seemingly let down by their political and military leaderships. The Taliban have also been faced with spirited protests in multiple cities. As Taliban depredations increase the gap between their words and deeds, the resistance is set to acquire momentum.

Currently, all players await the outcome of peace making deals on at the presidential palace, Arg, between the incoming Taliban, buoyant from their sudden victory, and an ad hoc coordination council of the former regime heavyweights. International pressures are for an inclusive interim government, even if under Taliban over-lordship.

How accommodative Taliban prove will determine the levels of support from the international community and the legitimacy of the arrangement in eyes of Afghans. The Taliban may settle for such an arrangement if it enables access to funds for development by way of which they can legitimize their taking over Kabul in a military victory. The former regimes accounts – frozen for now by the West – can be unlocked by Taliban good behavior.

The Taliban’s uninspiring record so far lends pause to any guesses as to how the situation will pan out. Having won a seemingly decisive victory and deliriant from downing a superpower, hubris might get in the way and they may encash their cheque too soon. Triumphalism in Pakistan, their major backer, might also derail their applecart since Pakistan has consistently demonstrated a deficit in strategic good sense.

Being strategic at this juncture implies acknowledging limitations by the Taliban in running a modern state and their need for assistance. Reconciling to the gains of the last 20 years and keeping their promises on good behavior in relation to women and minorities can stabilize them in power. The Taliban have made the right noise so far and an outreach to employees of the former regime to run the government.

They have already made a believable promise to keep Afghanistan free of presences of international terrorism. In fact, it is not impossible to imagine that since it is the Taliban that alone had the ability to rid Afghanistan of international terrorists of various hues – Al Qaeda, Islamic State and those bedeviling neighbours the Stans, Russia and China – the US may have played a strategic, if covert, game in midwifing the return of the Taliban to Kabul.

While a tall order in itself, now that the Taliban has been strengthened by the war material left behind by the West and acquired from the Afghan National Army, it can with characteristic ruthlessness deliver on this promise. They have invited back the Afghan air force members – who have not fled to the Stans with their planes – so that the vaunted air force can be revived.

The Taliban has the potential backing of China, Russia and Iran. Should it play its cards well, even the US will fall in along-side. The UN in situ is already on standby to lend a hand with the peacebuilding to follow. Pakistan is well aware that it does not have the heft to sustain an Afghanistan that is not at peace with itself.

Therefore it is not inevitable that Afghanistan will end up in another civil war, as succeeded the fall of the Najibullah regime. This best case scenario can be made a self-fulfilling prophecy if one key player, India, steps up and lends a hand, but by extracting, in collaboration with its international partners, a quid pro quo in the Taliban moderating itself and more self-centeredly also going after anti-India terror elements in its campaign against international terror outfits.

Having temporarily pulled out its diplomats from Afghanistan on the basis of security concerns, India is sensibly in a wait-and-watch mode. Even so, India is warily trying to keep Pakistan from prematurely anticipating gaining of strategic depth and turning back the tide towards normalcy in Kashmir. It has been tough in the Security Council, of which it has the presidency this month, by keeping Pakistan out of the two deliberations this month at that high forum, even though procedurally it could have obliged Pakistan – being a stakeholder in the region and developments – to be invited to make its pitch.

India can hold out a plausible threat that it will reciprocate Pakistani proxy war resumption in Kashmir with support of resistance forces in Afghanistan, thereby denying any gains Pakistan sought in supporting the Taliban’s return. That Pakistan will find this believable is evident from its vociferous objections over the last two decades to the presence of Indian consulates in Afghanistan.

Since the worst case is not in India’s interest either – since it returns instability to Kashmir and perhaps   in the mainland – it is a scenario best avoided. So instead of a wait and watch approach at this critical juncture, India could instead diplomatically step up to the table with an offer neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can afford to ignore.

It can incentivize its outreach to the Taliban by offering market access by Afghanistan, economic upturn being an indispensible factor in post-conflict peacebuilding. Connectivity through Pakistan can be negotiated since Pakistan also stands to make geo-economic gains, its army chief having dropped hints early this year. While the meager land trade in dry fruits on between India and Afghanistan through Pakistan is stalled for now, it can be magnified several times over when it resumes.

An Indian peace offensive can preserve India’s interests in Afghanistan and make good its sentiment in regard to the plight of the Afghan people. It will preserve Kashmir from the feared blow-back if Afghanistan dissolves into civil war and becomes a site of proxy war. It can turn the breeze of a peace outbreak, witnessed early this year on the Line of Control, into a gale. This will not only allow India a breather from its two-front predicament, but ease arriving at a fresh arrangement with China on the Line of Actual Control, since the two – India and China – will be collaborators in returning peace to Afghanistan.

In this option, Afghanistan can be seen as an opportunity. Politics being the art of the possible, so is external politics. Collaborating with its two neighbours with whom India has strained bilateral relations over a non-bilateral issue has potential to inject eddies of cooperation into the bilateral relationship. Needless to add that diplomats will need to work in some simultaneity between India easing up on Afghanistan to enable Pakistan and China take their pickings, while the two oblige by easing up likewise on Kashmir and in Ladakh. Pakistan must be held to zero infiltration and China to settle for an agreement on the other frictions points in Ladakh.

Consequently, instead of hard power that finds mention in the commentary on its options, India must instead seriously consider staking out its interests by deploying its economy-based soft power. An emerging great power cannot be a free-rider indefinitely. Wait-and-watch is a policy for those without options and cards, which does not behoove a regional power.

The case for proactivism made, a word on its feasibility. That this soft-power option has not found mention so far bespeaks less of the commentariat being stupefied by developments than aware that the option will not find traction with the right wing Indian political leadership. India’s strategic minders have ceased to assert national interest in face of the regime’s parochial self-interest of self-perpetuation in power and furthering the Hindutva political project. These twin goals require India to be at odds with its Muslim neighbours, so that the resulting media-induced polarization within polity can be used for electoral purposes. Coming as it does the Afghan crisis in the run up to crucial polls, it is not national interest that will determine India’s response, but which option is best for electoral dividend. Even so, it is important here to place the option ‘out there’ in order that if it is a road not taken and India’s security predicament deepens, we know where the responsibility squarely lies. 


Tuesday, 24 August 2021

 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/afghanistan-crisis-india-must-deploy-its-economic-soft-power-7379771.html

Afghanistan Crisis | India must deploy its economic soft power

While at the beginning of this month, apprehensions of civil war were extant, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani’s throwing in of the towel at a great reputational cost appears to have averted the contingency for now. However, even though the Taliban is now in control of Kabul, and Afghanistan, prospects of instability persist.

At this delicate juncture with regional security poised to go either way, India, the gentle regional giant, can play a critical role in averting insecurity by moderating the Taliban through an exercise of its growing economy-based soft power.

The dangers of a continuing military tryst in Afghanistan stem from the traditional holdout at Panjshir being revived by the former regime’s deputy, Amrullah Saleh, tying up with the son of the former Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud.

The call by Saleh that he will fight on can potentially attract the thousands of well-trained Afghan National Army personnel who were seemingly let down by their political and military leaderships. The Taliban have also been faced with spirited protests in multiple cities. As the Taliban depredations increase the gap between their words and deeds, the resistance may acquire momentum.

Currently all players await the outcome of peace-making deals on at the presidential palace, Arg, between the incoming Taliban, buoyant from their sudden victory, and an ad hoc co-ordination council of the former regime. International pressures are for an inclusive interim government, even if under the Taliban over-lordship.

The Taliban’s uninspiring record so far lends pause to any guesses as to how the situation will pan out. Having won a seemingly decisive victory and delirium from downing a superpower, hubris might get in the way and they may encash their cheque too soon. Triumphalism in Pakistan, their major backer, might also derail their applecart.How accommodative the Taliban prove will determine the levels of support from the international community and the legitimacy of the arrangement in the eyes of the Afghans.

Strategic good sense at this juncture involves acknowledging their limitations in running a modern State and their need for assistance. Reconciling to the gains of the last 20 years and keeping their promises on good behaviour in relation to women and minorities can stabilise them in power.

As it contemplates its decision, the Taliban has the potential backing of China, Russia and Iran. Should it play its cards well, even the United States will fall in along-side. The UN in situ is already on standby to lend a hand with the peacebuilding to follow. Pakistan is well aware that it does not have the heft to sustain an Afghanistan that is not at peace with itself.

Therefore, it is not inevitable that Afghanistan will revert to war. This best-case scenario can be made a self-fulfilling prophecy if one key player — India — steps up and lends a hand, but by extracting in collaboration with its international partners a quid pro quo: Taliban moderating itself.

Having temporarily pulled out its diplomats from Afghanistan on the basis of security concerns, India is sensibly in a wait-and-watch mode even as it speedily evacuates stranded Indians and Afghans wanting an Indian refuge. Even so, India is warily trying to keep Pakistan from prematurely anticipating gaining of strategic depth and turning back the tide towards normalcy in Kashmir by stubbing out Pakistani hopes of a UN Security Council appearance in the two discussions on Afghanistan this month with India in the chair. India could go further and if push comes to shove reciprocate Pakistani proxy war resumption with support of resistance forces in Afghanistan.

India would do well to avoid this worst-case scenario by stepping up to the table with an offer neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can afford to ignore. It can incentivise its outreach to the Taliban by offering market access by Afghanistan, economic upturn being an indispensable factor in post-conflict peacebuilding. Connectivity through Pakistan can be negotiated since Islamabad also stands to make geo-economic gains, its army chief having dropped hints early this year.

An Indian peace offensive can preserve India’s interests in Afghanistan and make good its sentiment in regard to the plight of the Afghan people. It will preserve Kashmir from the feared blow-back if Afghanistan dissolves into civil war and becomes a site of proxy war. It can turn the breeze of a peace outbreak, witnessed early this year on the Line of Control, into a gale. This will not only allow India a breather from its two-front predicament, but ease arriving at a fresh arrangement with China on the Line of Actual Control, collaboration elsewhere easing bilateral ties.

Instead of hard power that finds mention in the commentary on its options, India must instead seriously consider staking out its interests by deploying its economic soft power.