Indian soft power as the missing ingredient in returning peace to
Afghanistan
A LONGER, UNPUBLISHED VERSION OF THE ARTICLE IN THE PREVIOUS POST
While at the beginning of this
month, apprehensions of civil war were extant, President Ashraf Ghani’s
throwing in of the towel
at a great reputational cost, appears to have averted the contingency for now.
However, even though Taliban is now in control of Kabul and Afghanistan,
prospects of instability persist.
At this delicate juncture with
regional security poised to go either way, India, the gentle regional giant,
can play a critical role in averting insecurity by moderating the Taliban through
exercise of growing economy-based soft power.
Dangers of continuing military
tryst in Afghanistan stem from the traditional holdout at Panjshir
being revived by the former regime’s deputy, Amrullah Saleh, tying up with the
son of the former Lion of Panjshir, Ahmed Shah Masood. Panjshir held out in the
Soviet era and in the subsequent Taliban 1.0. Consequently, it’s reversion to a
hold out status serves today to pressure the Taliban to be magnanimous in
victory.
The call
by Saleh that he will fight on can potentially attract the thousands of well
trained Afghan National Army forces who were seemingly let down by their
political and military leaderships. The Taliban have also been faced with
spirited protests
in multiple cities. As Taliban depredations increase the gap between their words
and deeds, the
resistance is set to acquire momentum.
Currently, all players await the
outcome of peace making deals on at the presidential palace, Arg, between the
incoming Taliban, buoyant from their sudden victory, and an ad hoc coordination
council of the former regime heavyweights. International pressures are for
an inclusive interim government, even if under Taliban over-lordship.
How accommodative Taliban prove
will determine the levels of support from the international community and the
legitimacy of the arrangement in eyes of Afghans. The Taliban may settle for
such an arrangement if it enables access to funds for development by way of
which they can legitimize their taking over Kabul in a military victory. The
former regimes accounts – frozen for now by the West – can be unlocked by
Taliban good behavior.
The Taliban’s uninspiring record
so far lends pause
to any guesses as to how the situation will pan out. Having won a seemingly
decisive victory and deliriant from downing a superpower, hubris might get in
the way and they may encash their cheque too soon. Triumphalism
in Pakistan, their major backer, might also derail their applecart since
Pakistan has consistently demonstrated a deficit in strategic good sense.
Being strategic at this juncture implies
acknowledging limitations by the Taliban in running a modern state and their
need for assistance. Reconciling to the gains of the last 20 years and keeping
their promises on good behavior in relation to women
and minorities can stabilize them in power. The Taliban have made the right noise
so far and an outreach to employees of the former regime to run the government.
They have already made a
believable promise to keep Afghanistan free of presences of international
terrorism. In fact, it is not impossible to imagine that since it is the
Taliban that alone had the ability to rid Afghanistan of international
terrorists of various hues – Al Qaeda, Islamic State and those bedeviling
neighbours the Stans, Russia and China – the US may have played a strategic, if
covert, game in midwifing the return of the Taliban to Kabul.
While a tall order in itself, now
that the Taliban has been strengthened by the war material left behind by the
West and acquired from the Afghan National Army, it can with characteristic
ruthlessness deliver on this promise. They have invited back the Afghan air
force members – who have not fled to the Stans with their planes – so that the
vaunted air force can be revived.
The Taliban has the potential backing
of China,
Russia and Iran.
Should it play its cards well, even the US will fall in along-side. The UN in situ is already on standby to lend a
hand with the peacebuilding to follow. Pakistan
is well aware that it does not have the heft to sustain an Afghanistan that is
not at peace with itself.
Therefore it is not inevitable
that Afghanistan will end up in another civil war, as succeeded the fall of the
Najibullah regime. This best case scenario can be made a self-fulfilling
prophecy if one key player, India, steps up and lends a hand, but by extracting,
in collaboration with its international partners, a quid pro quo in the Taliban moderating itself and more
self-centeredly also going after anti-India terror elements in its campaign
against international terror outfits.
Having temporarily pulled out its
diplomats
from Afghanistan on the basis of security concerns, India is sensibly in a wait-and-watch
mode. Even so, India is warily trying
to keep Pakistan from prematurely anticipating gaining of strategic depth and
turning back the tide towards normalcy in Kashmir. It has been tough in the
Security Council, of which it has the presidency this month, by keeping
Pakistan out of the two deliberations this month at that high forum, even
though procedurally it could have obliged Pakistan – being a stakeholder in the
region and developments – to be invited to make its pitch.
India can hold out a plausible
threat that it will reciprocate Pakistani proxy war resumption in Kashmir with
support of resistance forces in Afghanistan, thereby denying any gains Pakistan
sought in supporting the Taliban’s return. That Pakistan will find this
believable is evident from its vociferous objections over the last two decades
to the presence of Indian consulates in Afghanistan.
Since the worst case is not in India’s
interest either – since it returns instability to Kashmir and perhaps in the
mainland – it is a scenario best avoided. So instead of a wait and watch
approach at this critical juncture, India could instead diplomatically step up
to the table with an offer neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can afford to
ignore.
It can incentivize its outreach
to the Taliban by offering market access by Afghanistan, economic upturn being
an indispensible factor in post-conflict peacebuilding. Connectivity through
Pakistan can be negotiated since Pakistan also stands to make geo-economic
gains, its army
chief having dropped hints early this year. While the meager land trade in
dry fruits on between India and Afghanistan through Pakistan is stalled for
now, it can be magnified several times over when it resumes.
An Indian peace offensive can
preserve India’s interests in Afghanistan and make good its sentiment in regard
to the plight of the Afghan people. It will preserve Kashmir
from the feared blow-back if Afghanistan dissolves into civil war and becomes a
site of proxy war. It can turn the breeze of a peace outbreak, witnessed early
this year on the Line
of Control, into a gale. This will not only allow India a breather from its
two-front predicament, but ease arriving at a fresh arrangement with China on
the Line of Actual Control, since the two – India and China – will be
collaborators in returning peace to Afghanistan.
In this option, Afghanistan can
be seen as an opportunity. Politics being the art of the possible, so is
external politics. Collaborating with its two neighbours with whom India has
strained bilateral relations over a non-bilateral issue has potential to inject
eddies of cooperation into the bilateral relationship. Needless to add that
diplomats will need to work in some simultaneity between India easing up on
Afghanistan to enable Pakistan and China take their pickings, while the two
oblige by easing up likewise on Kashmir and in Ladakh. Pakistan must be held to
zero infiltration and China to settle for an agreement on the other frictions
points in Ladakh.
Consequently, instead of hard
power that finds mention in the commentary on its options, India must
instead seriously consider staking out its interests by deploying its economy-based
soft power. An emerging great power cannot be a free-rider indefinitely.
Wait-and-watch is a policy for those without options and cards, which does not
behoove a regional power.
The case for proactivism made, a
word on its feasibility. That this soft-power option has not found mention so
far bespeaks less of the commentariat being stupefied by developments than
aware that the option will not find traction with the right wing Indian
political leadership. India’s strategic minders have ceased to assert national
interest in face of the regime’s parochial self-interest of self-perpetuation
in power and furthering the Hindutva political project. These twin goals
require India to be at odds with its Muslim neighbours, so that the resulting
media-induced polarization within polity can be used for electoral purposes.
Coming as it does the Afghan crisis in the run up to crucial polls, it is not
national interest that will determine India’s response, but which option is
best for electoral dividend. Even so, it is important here to place the option
‘out there’ in order that if it is a road not taken and India’s security
predicament deepens, we know where the responsibility squarely lies.
