https://southasianvoices.org/the-escalatory-risks-of-indias-integrated-battle-groups/

The Escalatory Risks of India’s Integrated Battle Groups

In recent years, changes in the Indian military have made escalatory risks and the nuclear factor loom larger in the event of any military confrontation. These changes are threefold: a shift to integrated battle groups (IBGs) from corps-sized formations, a military pivot away from the Pakistan front and towards China, and under-the-radar nuclear modernization. All these changes lend themselves to fueling escalation between India and its adversaries during a conflict.

The impact of these changes suggest three escalatory steps. The first step on the escalation ladder is the availability and utility of IBGs as of next year (2022), by which time they will be “carved out of existing formations.” IBGs are small, agile units with offensive tasks within both “pivot” (ground-holding) and strike corps that lend themselves to joining battles earlier and can enable a swift transformation of a crisis into a conflict. The second step of escalation involves secondary support for IBGs. As IBGs have a lighter footprint, they may require reinforcement in the face of an adversary’s response, resulting in increased intensity of a conflict, higher levels of force commitment, and possible horizontal escalation at the conventional level. Finally, the third step risks escalation to the nuclear level, made more likely by the preceding conventional escalation.

Escalatory Impulses

While IBGs were initially envisioned for India’s western-front on the Pakistan border, as the threat of salami slicing on the Sino-Indian border comes to the fore in India’s defense planning, IBGs are now being operationalized on both fronts. While their development on their own does not provoke nuclear thresholds, the employment of IBGs is likely to foreshadow greater escalation, both vertical and horizontal, that in turn brings the nuclear equation into play.

Against Pakistan

For Pakistan, India’s shift to IBGs appears in line with the deterrence compulsions of the nuclear age. If Pakistani deterrence messaging on tactical nuclear weapons is to be believed, corps-level operations flirt dangerously with the nuclear threshold—placing achieving reasonable political aims through conventional force at an unnecessary level of risk. Though India conceptualized Cold Start in 2004, military leadership acknowledged that operationalization of the doctrine was still pending as of 2017. Now IBGs will provide Cold Start with teeth, enabling the launch of pivot and strike corps limited offensives. However,  in response to terrorist attacks, the presence of ready-to-mobilize IBGs can shorten the fuse between crisis and conflict, enabling India to go beyond the surgical strikes pitched as the dividing line between subconventional and conventional levels. Surgical strikes, which may be aerial or involve a few dozen troops, have not pushed Pakistan down the conventional escalation route so far. However, IBGs—potentially entailing several thousand troops—are decidedly breaching the subconventional-conventional divide, thereby likely to provoke further conventional escalation.

Furthermore, India’s divided attention between China and Pakistan may make Pakistan more capable of responding to IBGs, allowing escalation to occur more quickly. India is slicing up its third strike corps against Pakistan to create an additional mountain strike corps for use against China. The 1 Corps has reportedly been stripped of much of its infantry and some of its armor. Under the circumstance of seeming equivalence—two of Pakistan’s strike corps versus India’s two plus the newly downsized corps—Pakistan may react more successfully to IBG offensives under its “new concept of warfighting” doctrine. Pakistan has reportedly engaged in extensive war gaming and exercises and repositioned its response forces to negate any advantage India seeks from its Cold Start doctrine. Since this preparation may give Pakistan the confidence to take on India’s Cold Start IBG-executed offensives, Pakistan could proceed to do so, generating adverse operational circumstances for the Indian military. A few years on, when India has regained the fighting elements of the strike corps for the plains, it will be back to square one, but with an increased capacity for being quicker off the blocks.

A military setback by Pakistan would have both internal political and reputational costs for India, perhaps pushing it to over-compensate and go beyond the scope of limited offensives by IBGs. Should symmetric conventional escalation tend towards India gaining an upper hand, either through territorial gains or degradation of its military assets, Pakistan could uncover its well-advertised conventional-nuclear “full spectrum deterrence” doctrine, predicated on the strategic effects of tactical nuclear weapons, bringing the nuclear factor into the equation.

Against China

The dynamics of the situation on the India-China front also lend themselves to accelerating the impetus to horizontal escalation, outside of the military contest on the Himalayas. The Himalayan terrain on the border makes IBG-sized forces deployable, maneuverable, and easily switched between theaters of conflict. Since IBGs imply small portions of territory being captured, rather than territorial chunks, escalation may incorrectly be presumed to be manageable.

However, IBGs make military options figure more readily into the menu of political choices. In the fall prior to the Ladakh crisis, the IBGs intended for use in mountains were only used in exercise HimVijay, on the other end of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), in Arunachal Pradesh. A second IBG related exercise was Pakistan-front centric. As a result, the military option in Ladakh was defensive and restricted to “mirror deployment,” though there were also other reasons, such as the onset of the pandemic, that caught India flatfooted and impacted its decision-making on Ladakh.

Although India did not deploy IBGs during the Ladakh crisis, the likelihood of military escalation will be higher next time as IBGs are primed for conflict. The early position by the Indian government that down played the crisis and asserted that there was no intrusion that merited a military reaction in Ladakh will no longer be an option. A political need to “do something” may lead to upping the stakes in Ladakh. India played down the crisis last year, in part because it did not have the force readily available for a military reckoning in Ladakh. In the next crisis, with IBGs on hand, India has the ability to be responsive to domestic political pressures and compensate through military action.

This rising political view is in part due to criticism of India’s failure to exercise a counter-grab option and thereby increase its strength at the post-Ladakh crisis negotiations. China has therefore proved only partially responsive to a negotiated disengagement and de-escalation. Such learning from the crisis may entail greater Indian reliance on IBGs in an offensive role, since IBGs are customized for agility in mountainous terrain. While this capability and intent has deterrence utility—forcing China to think twice before any military adventure—deterrence is never cast-iron. Deterrence has a dark side: actions required to maintain credibility might require suitably positioned and tasked IBGs to launch quick offensives.

In a future crisis, while IBGs of defensive formations would as part of “offensive defense” replicate maneuvers like the Kailash range occupation in August 2020 in real time, India could also deploy offensive IBGs to push into China’s side of the LAC and counter-grab the Moldo garrison or Rudok. Either proactively or in response, China may capture Daulat Beg Oldie—India’s well-known Achilles heel—clinching its advantage in the Depsang area. The localized border war may expand under compulsion from a nexus of military factors and nationalism to include air raids and missile exchanges against other regions in both countries. In an adverse circumstance developing on the Himalayan front, Indian maritime strategies have already mapped out horizontal escalation to the seas near the Malacca Strait.

While the nuclear aspect has historically not played into India-China confrontation in the same ways as India-Pakistan crisis, it is nonetheless a crucial aspect to consider as India’s force options expand. Both India and China commit to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons and have other motivations to not deploy the nuclear option, however the vagaries and uncertainties of conflict may stretch doctrinal commitment.

Preventing Escalation

The likelihood of escalation brought on by IBGs and the increasing focus on China has grim indications. The nuclear factor in an India-Pakistan context is well acknowledged. Pakistan’s possession of tactical nuclear weapons makes this stark, as does India’s shift—discerned by some experts—towards jettisoning NFU. Against China, any public rescinding of NFU in face of tensions on the border, would likely be read as nuclear messaging—adding great uncertainties to conflict dynamics on LAC. By embarking on IBGs India is making its military power usable. However, India would do well to acknowledge the resulting escalatory dimension and take prior precautions.

There are already functioning channels of communication with all sides. These channels need to be formalized for escalation control and early conflict termination. India has ongoing military talks and a diplomatic working group with China. With Pakistan, the intelligence channel is already functional, with the recent ceasefire on the Line of Control to show for it. Such conversations, alongside preventative diplomacy, will partially help enable India to overcome escalatory tensions.

Preventive diplomacy is also essential in mitigating escalatory risks. Kashmir continues to be a flashpoint for nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan, India must seek further back-channel negotiations and DGMO talks. This is admittedly easier said than done, but the escalation prospects of military developments suggest that while in the past escalation was avoidable—as the non-availability of IBGs made moving to the first rung of the escalation ladder more difficult— now, with the capability at hand, India is likely to have greater pressure to address the political problem that might give rise to their use.

Against China, India must temper the impossible-to-achieve aim of restoring the status quo ante in Ladakh by countenancing the mutual give-and-take necessary in border negotiations. While there may be some domestic costs of this approach for Indian policymakers, the alternative risks straining limited resources and keeping the border primed for more serious clashes or conflict. Even while military moves, such as strengthening deterrence by denial, are afoot and a strategy of hedging by toting up strategic partnerships, such as the Quad, are underway to strengthen India’s response to salami-slicing on the LAC, India must diplomatically ensure that in a future relationship of “antagonistic cooperation,” cooperation rather than antagonism dominates.

https://thekashmirwalla.com/2021/07/kashmirs-militancys-reorganisation-act-post-august-2019/

QUOTED IN RAYAN NAQASH'S 'KASHMIR MILITANCY’S REORGANISATION ACT POST-AUGUST 2019'

 Ali Ahmed, a former infantry officer in the Indian Army who has served in Kashmir and later served as a senior political affairs officer with the UN, said that for Pakistan, Islam had always been “a very useful tool to attract people to go across [to Kashmir] and do mischief. There is money in it and there are volunteers.”

“Its not all about Islam,” Ahmed said. “They may have these terms that sound Arabic but they are not necessarily Islamic. The Hizbul Mujahideen is not necessarily Islamist, they have as much nationalism and sub nationalism and Kashmiri nationalists in it. That [name] maybe a term to perhaps attract money from Pakistan or the Muslim world.”

Outfits like the TRF on the other hand, Ahmed said, “may not attract the funds that are required to keep the whole thing going. So even if there is a [later] reversion to Islamic symbolism that doesn’t necessarily mean Islamism is resurging [unless] if the Islamist energy is diverted to Kashmir by Pakistan.”

Pakistan at the moment is waiting as the events unfold in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal, said Ahmed, adding that these events could “encompass” Kashmir. “If the Indians play hardball, the Pakistanis have got this lever,” he said.

“Then you would need Islamism because it gives you the kind of energy to take on a state as powerful as India. If Islamism has seen the back of the Soviet Union and the United States, it will be possible to think that it will at least tie India down in Kashmir.”

 https://www.claws.in/civilian-faculty-at-professional-military-education-institutions/

Civilian faculty at Professional Military Education institutions

While technical training institutions, as for instance the College of Military Engineering, and pre-commission training institutions, such as the National Defence Academy, have civilian faculty members, the directing staff (DS) at professional military education (PME) institutions is largely uniformed, such as at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC). At the former set of institutions, civilian staff members and officers of the Army Education Corps teach subjects aligned with the mainstream military professional remit, such as military history, geopolitics etc.

However, there are subjects of professional interest at PME institutions which can be taken on by qualified civilian staff and service veterans, for example strategy, defence policies etc. There are also requirements associated with the award of academic degrees to graduates of PME institutions, the course requirements for which mandate turning in of dissertations, such as for award of a Masters degree at DSSC. Arguably overseeing of such requirements can be better done by civilian faculty members.

Therefore, there is a case for a proportionate civilianizing of the faculty of PME institutions, as the DSSC, War Colleges and National Defence College (NDC), limited to subjects that civilian experts imported from the academia, strategic community and media can address equally competently.

Thus far, exposure to civilian experts at PME institutions has been through a regimen of discrete expert lectures on topics relevant to the military, for instance nuclear deterrence etc. Subjects as strategy are covered by uniformed faculty members, some of whom are earlier graduates of the institution or of equivalent foreign institutions. Such institutions have been well-led, with the commandant appointment being tenanted by renowned names such as Manekshaw, Sundarji, Menon etc. Gauging from the quality and reputation of India’s military leadership, this arrangement has stood the military well so far. The steady stream of students from foreign countries testifies that the standing of these institutions is well deserved. So it is prudent to leave well enough alone and ‘not fix something that ain’t broke’.

Even so, enhancing the scope, content and depth of understanding of higher order subjects that provide a context to the profession of arms is warranted. India is standing on the cusp of greater military responsibilities accruing from its upward power trajectory. It is also staring down adversaries in a two-front situation and taking on key security provider duties on behalf of the international community out of its traditional areas of footprint. It is making the requisite structural changes, for instance going in for theaterisation, associating extensively with militaries of strategic partners, acquiring over-the-horizon capabilities, being on the vanguard of the national bid for self-reliance etc. Alongside, cultural changes are on fast-forward, as a technology orientation and jointness.

Creating a military leadership that can take up the challenges requires innovation. Some measures undertaken so far include increasing the numbers of officers undergoing training at PME institutions. The numbers of foreign officer students have also expanded in keeping with India’s outreach to neighbours, extended neighbourhood and friendly developing countries. The expansion of PME institutions implies a larger DS body, which per force has to come from and at the cost of frontline formations.

Relying on civilian faculty may ease the officer management situation somewhat. Being high profile career officers, instructors are usually off to fill some or other command and staff billet sooner than later. Civilian experts can lend continuity in institutions that otherwise see a rapid turnover in the DS body. They can also take on time-intensive tasks as dissertation supervision, freeing up the DS body to undertake self-development activity standing them in good stead in future leadership positions. Students on course will perhaps access civilians more for academic input, since the perceptual hierarchical barrier will be less obtrusive. The benefit of such interaction is not ones-sided. The civilian staff will also grow as intellectuals, contributing to national strategic culture keeping pace with India’s advance on the world stage.

A mega-step along this direction, the National Defence University (NDU), is pending. In the interim, smaller steps can be taken. Expert civilians can be hired initially as consultants and perhaps with time, as the innovation settles in, as visiting and adjunct faculty. Those already holding down full time jobs can be brought on board on sabbatical, eased by the ministry of education facilitating. A period of quicker turn-over of civilians will get the word out on the military’s inner spaces in the academia. Over time, say by mid-decade, civilian faculty can be hired either through the Union Public Service Commission route or through competitive advertisements on faculty positions as normal in the academia. When the NDU is up and running, an arrangement for inter-posting can be arrived at, to include with defence studies faculties in universities and civilian and military-affiliated think tanks.

In a time of post-covid constrained defence budgets, over the short term, compensation need not necessarily be more than that for consultants hired by ministries these days in the national capital. The novelty of associating with the military can serve as incentive, since the insight from an intimate look can prove useful for cross-fertilisation. Chairs of eminence, as with some think tanks and faculties, can be instituted to attract those with international renown. Temporary scholar-in-residence program for the duration of a course or term can be started.

Fear of security breach or adverse observations from scholars may serve as dampner arguments. The security argument is liable to be overblown since all training institutions work with information in the open domain. Elements in the curriculum of war colleges are confidential, dealing with actual, but protocols attending these can continue in place. As for criticism, the military is no stranger to this and informed criticism is in any case welcome. The military has the mental and public relations social capital to counter it and the moral resources to course correct where necessary.

Civilian faculty inclusion in PME institutions is an idea whose time has come. The national discourse on defence and security is sufficiently advanced, with several universities running security, international relations and peace studies Masters level programs. Veteran officers are increasingly delving into complex subject areas of their earlier professional interest, such as military history. There is thus a plentitude of talent out there, allowing for competition and a quality intake. It can, as bonus, also help lend gender balance to the faculty.

Subject areas where the civilians, including retirees from civil services as defence accounts, can do justice include defence economics, defence industrial sector and policies, military sociology, strategic thinking, Indian strategic discourse, area studies, budget and procurement procedures, organizational management and change, etc.

Professionalism involves a degree of convergence in practices with peer militaries. If and since advanced militaries have long had civilians and military veterans taking classes in PME institutions, can the Indian military afford to lag behind anymore? With the Department of Military Affairs in charge of PME, piloting the idea, allocating the monies, implementing and expanding the scope with time can be easier done. Increasing receptivity to an idea that is certainly not new or original in the government’s privileging of change, encapsulated in the prime minister’s annual address to the military brass, needs exploiting in quick time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=111521

http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=4 

A peace strategy for Afghanistan

Afghanistan is currently poised at a critical juncture. Apprehensions of a civil war abound in the contestation underway between the government, the Taliban and ethnic militias formed in anticipation of an impending civil war. The deteriorated security situation owes to the earlier than anticipated pace of departure of the United States (US) and its allies, with the former exiting its ‘longest war’.

The uncertainty results from the planned sequence of exit not having materialized. In late February last year, the US had entered into an agreement with the Taliban in which it had promised to leave Afghanistan by 1 May this year, in return for Taliban’s guarantee of securing Afghanistan against any threat to the US from its soil. The Taliban was also to undertake talks with the Afghan government on a ceasefire and the future roadmap for Afghanistan.

In the event, the transition from the Trump to the Biden administration led to the departure date of the US being set back by a few months by Biden, who announced that they would leave by the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks, that had prompted their intervention in first place.

The hold up and prospects

For its part, the Taliban has played hard ball and procrastinated on the intra-Afghan talks at Doha that were to have resulted in a ceasefire. It did not turn up for the Istanbul meeting intended to lend momentum to the talks. It has nevertheless stuck to its side of the agreement with the US to talk to the government, there having been two rounds of talks so far – in September last year and in mid June.

The Taliban has indicated that it has a written-out plan that it would be conveying to the government at the next round of talks. The government is amenable to an interim arrangement of sharing power, with elections thereafter. A comprehensive agreement would also require covering a review of the 2004 Constitution, informed by Taliban’s view that the Constitution must reflect Islamic values. To what extent these values will draw on extremist versions of the Sharia is the major concern. The government and its backers would like to preserve the gains made over the past twenty years of peace building, in particular advances in the space for women and protection of minorities.

That the US has been emboldened to depart at a faster pace – best exemplified by its sudden vacation of the Bagram air base -  suggests not so much an indifference on its part to what might follow, but a tactic to get to the two sides – in particular the one it backs, the Afghan government – to get serious on intra-Afghan talks. The Afghan government has been reassured that it and the Afghan military would continue receiving US support, a message conveyed most recently during the visit of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to the US.

The Taliban is reliant on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and can potentially be influenced by these countries, all of whom are friends of the US. Saudi Arabia is in midst of a makeover from its earlier adherence to puritanical religious norms, and therefore can be expected to help moderate the Taliban.

The other interested regional players – Russia, Iran, China and Central Asian neighbours – have pitched in favour of a peace process and would stay engaged with both the ongoing peacemaking and inevitable peace building to follow. There is a consensus against an Islamist Emirate emerging in Afghanistan, including within Pakistan, the major backer of the Taliban, which cannot but register with the Taliban. Russia recently received a Taliban delegation out to reassure it that the Taliban has turned a new leaf.

A role for the UN?

Some building blocks are in place for managing the aftermath sufficiently to preclude prospects of civil war. The UN has a special political mission in place dating to the implementation phase of the Bonn agreement in late 2001. The mission has been largely engaged with lending coherence to peace building efforts so far.

The UN is no stranger to conflicts in Afghanistan, having assisted with peace processes earlier with special envoys and political missions. The Geneva Accords resulted from some six years of UN engaging with the Soviet Union, the Mujahedeen and parties supportive of the latter. It deployed the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late eighties to oversee implementation of the agreement.

From 1993 onwards - till 2001 - it had a political mission of support in Afghanistan, interfacing with the belligerents, Taliban and the United Front. Lakhdar Brahimi, who was the personal representative of the secretary general for a time in the period, had been instrumental in an early and positive conclusion to the agreement that emerged in Bonn post 9/11.

The UN has now appointed a special envoy, in preparation for assisting with the peacemaking at the intra-Afghan talks to complement the work of the Gulf States acting as facilitators of the intra-Afghan talks at Doha. This means that the infrastructure for supporting negotiations is in place, as also the UN capability to help implement any agreement that might emerge in the political mission, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), enhancing its peace building role.

Given that the major players are contending militarily, there would be necessity for a military adjunct to  UNAMA. A comprehensive ceasefire arrangement necessarily implies measures for monitoring and dispute settlement, logically entailing third party assistance such as from the United Nations (UN) or a regional organization as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This may change its current complexion from a political mission to a peacekeeping one.

The SCO has a security role best evidenced from the recent meeting of national security advisers (NSA) of its member states – attended by India’s NSA, Ajit Doval -  that no doubt considered the situation in Afghanistan. It can whistle up either a peacekeeping force or monitors in case an intra-Afghan agreement emerges from Doha.

Implications for India

India, albeit tentatively, stepped up its engagement as the situation has clarified on the US end game in Afghanistan. While it had reluctantly sent two retired diplomats to talks in Moscow in the initial stages of the peace process in 2018, reports from UAE have it that it has met this year with Taliban interlocutors in Dubai.

Though it has denied a meeting of Foreign Minister Jaishankar with Taliban representatives in his recent visit to UAE, a credible outreach at an official level is certainly on since it has attracted derisory attention of no less than the Pakistani national security advisor, who, apropos little, declaimed that India should be ‘ashamed’ of such contacts.

India feels free to engage with the Taliban as the Afghan government is itself in talks with the group. The advantage of such engagement is that India can get a direct feel of the attitude and intention of the Taliban and through the talks can influence it to respect India’s interests and investment in Afghanistan. It could also promise to support the interim arrangement and the elected government that follows with peace building support, incentivizing Taliban to moderate its postures.

Positive fallout of the emerging situation in Afghanistan on the India-Pakistan equation has been the let up in firing on the Line of Control since the late February. Even so, there are dark clouds forming. The apprehension is not so much from Taliban directly, as much from Pakistan. Once its northern flank is secured by Taliban in a power sharing arrangement in Kabul, Pakistan may resume its proxy war in Kashmir.

If the allegations by the two sides – India and Pakistan - are to be believed, then they have just engaged in a tit-for-tat exchange attended by plausible deniability. India has been blamed by Pakistan for the bomb blast in Lahore and Pakistan has been held responsible for the drone attack on Jammu air field. Pakistan has said that the reported contacts between the two sides, that had eased the situation, have since ceased.

India has two strategic options: one, fuel the Afghan civil war through a proxy war in Afghanistan with Pakistan and thereby keep Pakistan bogged down; or, two, lend its shoulder to the peace process in Afghanistan. The former is hardly a friendly gesture by an avowed friend of the Afghan people that is India. While the latter seemingly favours Taliban and, in turn, its backer Pakistan, it is a collaborative approach can see ripple effects in Kashmir.

Way ahead

Even though Taliban claims to have take 85 per cent of the area, civil war is not inevitable. Action must not be taken making civil war a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, mediation support should be enhanced. The current period of instability must be reframed as one in which the contending sides are last-minute trying to get to a position of strength, a typical pre-negotiation strategy.

Viewed thus, there is scope for military support of the government to hold its own. India has trained over 100 Afghan officers every year at its commissioning academies since its strategic partnership agreement in 2011. Holding the Ghani government’s hand will redress any asymmetry, making it clear to Taliban that it cannot take on the battle field what it can instead get on the negotiation table.

The Indian foreign minister has rightly held that legitimacy is a concern today. The ‘secret’ visit of the head of the Afghan High Peace Council, Abdullah Abdullah, to Delhi implies a role in returning sustaining peace for India. This can be by helping reduce the asymmetry on the negotiation table against the Afghan government.

To assume such a role, India must display self-confidence in its soft power to influence the Taliban to settle with the Afghan government and in its hard power to negate any consequences on Kashmir. The Afghan end game provides an opportunity for collaboration between India and Pakistan (and, indeed, also China) on restoring sustainable peace.

The building blocks for peace are already in place: peacemaking facilitation by the Gulf States supported by the UN; all actors on standby for peace building assistance coordinated by the UN; and ceasefire monitoring peacekeeping forces easily whistled up  on culmination of Doha talks.  

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] The author thanks the Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, for the opportunity of a lecture at which he made the observations in the article.

 http://jmi.ac.in/hn/upload/publication/pr1_English_2021July7.pdf

July 7, 2021 

Press Release 

JMI organises Extension Lecture on "Current Juncture in the Afghan Peace Process: An Appraisal from the Lenses of Peace Theory” 

The Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (NMCPCR) organised a virtual Extension Lecture on July 6, 2021. The theme of the Extension Lecture was "Current Juncture in the Afghan Peace Process: An Appraisal from the Lenses of Peace Theory". The keynote speaker was Dr. Ali Ahmed.. He has been a United Nations Official, Academic and Retired Infantry Officer of the Indian Army. Prof. Kaushikee, Honorary Director, NMCPCR welcomed the speaker and all the participants. She also briefly introduced the speaker.

 

Dr. Ahmed began his lecture by highlighting two important issues: that the current juncture in the Afghan Peace Process is to be understood in the backdrop of the pullout of US troops from Afghanistan. Secondly, the terms of the ongoing Afghan peace process are primarily based on the Taliban’s undertaking to not allow the Afghan territory to be used against US interests and that the US will proceed to exit from Afghanistan by September 2021. He mentioned that the implementation of the peace agreement reached between the Taliban and the US government in February 2020 is currently underway and there is a three-way contest going on within Afghanistan between the Afghan government, the Taliban and the ethnic and local militias which may lead to civil war in the future if not handled carefully.

 

In the second part of his lecture, the speaker focused on the Peace Theories and Models such as the Hour glass model, the Agenda for Peace framework etc. He then gave a snippet view of the Afghan Peace Process and emphasized in detail on the peacemaking and peace-building aspects. As part of the peacemaking initiatives, he spoke about the Geneva Accords, the UN Support Mission in Afghanistan, the Bonn International Conferences, the efforts made by the Obama and the Trump administration, culminating in the peace deal arrived at in Doha in February 2020.

 

Dr. Ahmed was optimistic about the prospects of peacemaking in Afghanistan. He emphasized that the initiative at this juncture is dependent on the condition set by the Taliban that they would engage in talks with the Afghan government once the US and its allies have left Afghanistan. He maintained that by engaging with the Taliban it may be influenced to be more moderate especially with respect to human rights in Afghanistan. The speaker was hopeful that from the Peace Theory perspective, it would be beneficial to continue talking to the Taliban as this may result in a political solution.

 

Speaking about peace-building, the speaker highlighted some of the major issues like credible elections, a likely review of the Constitution especially in relation to the question of women’s rights, minority rights etc., the Security Sector Reforms, the implementation of Rule of Law, interim arrangements before holding elections and transitional justice mechanisms and last but not the least the critical issue of development. He concluded by saying that military solutions have limited efficacy and it is important to go in for a political resolution by engaging with all the stakeholders through negotiation and dialogue. He was appreciative of India’s recently reported outreach to the Taliban.

 

The lecture was followed by an engaging Q and A session wherein students and participants raised several critical questions. The event concluded with a proposal of a vote of thanks by the Honorary Director. The lecture was attended by faculty members, students and research scholars of the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and by students of other centres  and departments of JMI.

 http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=110800

Counter insurgency is not a policeman’s job

One of India’s leading civilian experts on counter insurgency, Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan,[2] has recently articulated a cogent case on handing over of the Indian army’s counter insurgency commitment to the central armed police forces (CAPF). He argues that the two-front threat having materialized over the last couple of years in Chinese belligerence on the Line of Actual Control, the army, that is primarily meant for tackling external threats, cannot continue to be tied down by counter insurgency commitments. It must focus on the conventional threat to redress the power asymmetry with China. Consequently, it needs to disengage from its internal security commitments and concentrate on its primary task of deterring and when necessary militarily tackling the nation’s external foes.

This is not a new idea, dating as it does to the NN Vohra task force report to the Group of Ministers’ (GoM) that was formed after the Kargil Review Committee suggested a review in its eponymous report after the Kargil War. The task force, stated: “The ultimate objective should be to entrust Internal Security (IS)/Counter Insurgency (CI) duties entirely to CPMFs and the Rashtriya Rifles, thus de-inducting the Army from these duties, wherever possible.”[3] Over the years, this has been largely operationalised, with the army-led paramilitary forces, the RR and Assam Rifles (AR) deployed in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and North East (NE) respectively and the CAPF operating in Central India. Some army formations also operate in both theaters and the paramilitary – the RR and AR - is under the operational control of the army at both locations.

CAPF are central armed police forces that are officered by their respective cadre officers and have representation of the Indian Police Service in their higher echelons. Central Para Military Forces, a term used by the Group of Ministers, include the CAPF and the RR and the Assam Rifles. Whereas army officers tenant all appointments in the RR and the force answers to the army chain of command, the AR has its own cadre of officers, with army officers also in the echelons of command, company upwards. It is operationally under the army, but administratively under the Ministry of Home through the Director General AR located at Shillong.  The army prefers to use the term CAPF, that includes border guarding forces, but does not include the AR and RR, preserving the term ‘paramilitary’ for the latter two in light of the army officer representation in their hierarchy.

Whereas Prof. Rajagopalan plugs for the RR to take on a conventional role in light of the increased threat, the GoM had only envisaged the CAPF – specifically the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) – taking on counter insurgency, being trained and upgraded accordingly. Pulling out of the army implies the RR and AR would come under the police framework, reporting to state authorities and the home ministry. Army formations in a counter insurgency role would be substituted by the CRPF, for which the force has been under training for the last two decades.

The RR was raised in order to tackle Pakistan’s proxy war and rear area security. The intensity of the situation having considerably subsided, attributable in part to the RR, it is possible to hand over the situation to the police and reassign the RR for conventional tasks, for instance in the communication zone or relieving regular troops deployed in less threatened sectors and in depth. This is practicable and is being done to the extent possible with reports having it that some formations, equivalent to a RR Force, have already been deployed in Ladakh. Reports also have it that some 200 CAPF companies have been inducted into J&K, though these have been played down as companies returning from election duty.

As to whether the RR can thin out from other areas, it is a question of threat perception. Currently, the operations are at ebb as Pakistan is calibrating its proxy war to its aims in the Afghanistan end game. It has therefore refrained from its usual summer campaign of infiltration. However, the post Afghanistan peace process period is uncertain. Since the RR has a well-consolidated presence in Kashmir, it may be prudent to see if the potential ‘first step’ in the India-Pakistan peace process is liable to birth a credible India-Pakistan peace process. It would not do to disturb the grid prematurely.

Though the two-front threat is live, the two-and-half front threat cannot be discounted too soon. This is particularly applicable for the NE, where in case ‘push comes to shove’ with China, the potential for instability in the NE – the ‘half front’ - could be exploited by China to activate the rear areas. In such a circumstance, whereas there would be a need to pull the army elements deployed out for a conventional role and substituting these with the CAPF, the command and control will need to continue under the army in keeping with the Vohra task force recommendation that reads: “where the Army is involved, the senior most Army officer should have the clear responsibility and authority, for all operational planning and execution).”

Significantly, the CAPF do not have the appropriate operational ethos for counter insurgency. Counter insurgency – to paraphrase the quip regarding peacekeeping – is in principle not an army task, but only the army can do it. One does not need to look further than the recent ambush in Bastar of the CAPF in which some 25 troopers were lost. The ambush was virtually a repeat of one a decade back in which some 75 policemen lost their lives. Whether this professional deficit can be mitigated by training is debatable considering that the lessons learnt from the 2010 ambush mentioned appear not to have made a difference a decade on. Recall also it’s taking over of duties from the Border Security Force in the Valley in the mid 2000s, in compliance with the GoM recommendation that border guarding forces revert to their respective borders and roles, had caused considerable turbulence.

There is no doctrinal pamphlet of the CAPF on counter insurgency. Little is known as to the policy planning division in the ministry of home affairs that the Vohra task force had asked be rekindled. It is well known that the parachuting of the Indian Police Service (IPS) officers with no ground experience into the higher echelon of the CAPF is its Achilles heel. The CAPF are liable with their usual highhandedness to worsen the situation, resulting in army deployment at a later, much-vitiated stage.

There is the indelicate matter of command and control and turf. In the North East, the AR would require giving its Shillong headquarters an operational role, and the headquarters answering in its operational avatar to the Eastern Command, and in due course to the theater command to come up facing China. Since the CRPF can at best supplement the RR in Kashmir, rather than substitute it, the operational control of the RR would continue with the army. There is a requirement to disengage the corps headquarters from counter insurgency role, as had been done on an ad hoc and controversially unsuccessful basis in the Kargil War. The RR headquarters has moved out of Delhi and is now an appendage to the Northern Command. It can take on an operational role, under Northern Command, but collaborating extensively with the state police and CAPF under the unified headquarters framework that was earlier chaired by the chief minister, and now, presumably, is headed by the lieutenant governor of the union territory.  

Finally, as the leading realist theoretician in India, Prof. Rajagopalan, rightly sees the power asymmetry in a two-front situation necessitating the army hand over the half-front to the CAPF, including the AR but without the RR. In case of an active two-front situation, there could potentially be two half-fronts, together making for three fronts. While the professor calls for responsiveness through upgrading the CAPF, prevention may be better.

Prevention entails a doctrinally-compliant political ministration of insurgency problems now that the kinetic indices in all three theaters – Kashmir, North East and Central India - are relatively negligible. The Nagaland ceasefire framework needs to be taken to its logical conclusion, while in Kashmir the applicability of the Nagaland template can be explored. The numerous ‘suspension of operations’ agreements in the North East must be speedily wrapped up and the outreach to the outlier Paresh Barua faction to culminate in an agreement soon.

 

The professor is right, that India cannot have its cake and eat it too. For him, the conventional threat merits a disengagement of the army. The problem is that the CRPF cannot be relied on to substitute the army, particularly when the threat of proxy war can be expected to heighten in a conflict situation. Consequently, the new threat environment entails India end its interminable insurgencies applying political imagination and the political capital from its parliamentary majority at the government’s disposal.

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[2] Prof. Rajagopalan is author of the well regarded, Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, New Delhi: Rouledge, 2008.

[3] Quotes are from National Security Council Secretariat, Group of Ministers’ Report on National Security, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf, pp. 50-51.

 https://www.claws.in/cohesion-in-the-army-the-battle-winning-factor/

Cohesion in the army: The battle winning factor

In military sociology literature, the Standard Model on military cohesion can be envisaged as a set of concentric circles, with the inner circle housing the primary group. The primary group is the section/platoon, with the secondary group, comprising the company and battalion, enclosing it. These are nested within the organization that can be equated with the formation, which is, in turn, ensconced in the institutional embrace of the army. Finally, though not in the model per se, an outer, societal circle is worth adding.

Theory on cohesion has it that cohesion within the primary group – referred to as horizontal bonding - contributes to combat effectiveness: greater the cohesion, greater the combat effectiveness. The vice versa is also true – greater the combat effectiveness, greater the cohesion – when the primary group is vertically integrated with the hierarchy through the leadership channel. The chain of authority aligns the task of the primary group with the operational mission. The leader is thus at the intersection of horizontal bonding and vertical integration.

The outer circles can be visualized as the shaft of the spear in their support to primary and secondary group cohesion with the battalion and its subunits at the spear tip. In additional to being supportive of the secondary and primary groups, the outer circles – society, army, formation – have also to forge and sustain cohesion within respective self, since they also have to withstand the test of conflict. If they disintegrate, then cohesion at the lower levels are liable to dissipate likewise. Therefore, cohesion has to attend the nation, the army and its subordinate formations.

Here, cohesion at the upper levels is not covered, since the focus is on cohesion in the lowest level: secondary and primary group. Suffice it to mention that cohesion enhancement measures at the higher levels must not be at the cost of or impinge on cohesion of lower levels. Only the supports to cohesion covered here.

Supports for Cohesion

Societal support for the army is evident in the regard accorded to the military. Culturally, the kshatriya (warrior caste) has always had a pride of place. India’s renowned epics narrate tales of martial prowess and daredevilry. The continuing regard is easy to see in the turn out at the funeral of martyrs at their home stations. The institution of the war memorial at New Delhi and the museum coming up close by are expressions of support.

The institutional support is evident in the operational focus of the military, its provision of the weapons, equipment and material necessary for prosecution of war. The military has not only consistently proven up to the demands of national security, most recently in stalling Chinese designs in Ladakh, but is currently in a substantial reorientation from the western to the northern front. This operational churn translates downwards in a renewed emphasis on the primary role, the conventional role of preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty, largely through deterrence. Such a focus imparts an immediacy that is supportive of cohesion.

Organisational support is in translating this doctrinal shift into reality. Integrated battle groups are forming, attenuating the premium on the operational task. These are then practiced to perfection in exercises, field firing and training opportunities. This rigmarole of peace time is cohesion imparting since it brings the formations’ into joint and combined arms’ implementation of doctrine and its evolution.

While this privileges the operational task, formations also lend a social prop to cohesion, such as by observing the anniversaries of battles to reaffirm the martial commitment. Such measures along with their proficiency in the operational role, imparts elan to the formation. This has knock-on benefit for cohesion at the battalion and below levels. It bears underlining here that higher echelons leaning on the lower in a manpower guzzling manner detracts from cohesion forming at the lower levels on account of manpower turbulence leading to a deficit in forging of social affiliations necessary for bonding, especially in peace stations.

The consequential level?

The secondary group level – battalion level and its subunits - is usually taken as the consequential one, since it directly provisions the primary group with the social and operational necessities. The social props include observing of battle honour days, mandir parades, running langars, NCO clubs, family welfare etc. Such measures routinise the face-to-face meetings and informal interactions necessary for the primary group members to form affiliations and friendships. Significantly, the operational tasking also filters down from this level in the form of a mission for the primary group. Organised training supervised at this level helps deepen the social bonds by instilling trust and teamwork within primary groups.

Cohesion of the primary group thus has plentiful support within the army. Even if not present to necessary levels ab initio, the test of combat is such that cohesion is also forged on the job, with primary group members forging teams while mobilizing and under fire. The surfeit of cohesion at the primary group is self evident in the battle field showing, for instance on the Kargil heights. The battalions involved already had coherent primary groups, some having been brought over from the Valley floor and some when deinducting from Siachen. Where the army suffered initial knocks, such as at Golden Temple, the early phase of the Jaffna battle, in the initial probing action at Kargil and in the early years of the Rashtriya Rifles’ raising, primary group cohesion was up and humming at the crunch.

Primary group bonding is critical. Combat effectiveness this generates translates into cohesion for the upper levels. Unless the beaches are taken in an amphibious assault, there can be no success. Unless the trench line is not breached and the bunkers taken, the success signal cannot be sent up. Individual expertise and daredevilry spring from and anchor on a cohesive primary group. Nurturing it is a sine qua non for a ticking army.

Role of leadership

Tony Ashworth pointed to the possibility of cohesion having an underside in his subtitle to his book: Trench Warfare 1914-18: The Live and Let Live System. That cohesive groups can also subscribe to a counter narrative became obvious in the Vietnam War. Gabriel and Savage’s well known study of the war, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army, brings this out clinically in their references to shirking and fraggings. This brings to fore the role of the leader.

The showing of 16 Bihar at the onset of the Ladakh crisis is a case to point on what the ingredient cohesion does to and for the fighting man, making it a magic battle winning ingredient. A year on from Galwan, the manner Colonel Santosh Babu’s disparate outfit fought off the Chinese is instructive. Elements from the artillery and another unit were in his patrol, but that did not come in the way of their showing under his task-oriented leadership. His battalion’s response under the lion-like Lamb bears testimony to leadership being a key to cohesion, and what cohesive primary and secondary groups deliver even under sudden onset of contingency. Clearly, the unit looked after its men as a Kote NCO would the weapons on his charge.   

Not only is a leader to forge and sustain cohesion, but to also ensure that it is articulated positively in line with the mandate and mission. Broadly, while the non/junior commissioned officers may be charged with the former, the latter aspect can majorly rest with officers. Battalion level priorities must include creating of opportunities for the bonding enhancers: social settings and task-oriented training. The former instills the camaraderie and the latter uses this social capital for forging teams. Even if the opportunity for the former is limited in pressure cooker environments of cantonments, the latter is sufficient. Both officer and below-officer-level leaders’ participation in and supervision of such training, instills both horizontal and vertical integration.

Conclusion

Cohesion thus must figure in key result area slides of administration inspections and must be observable on training. Formations must instigate it and support it. This is relatively easier done when the threat environment is relatively high, for example during Operation Ablaze, the mobilization phase of 1965 War, or in the six month run up to the 1971 War. The situation is not as intense now, but the two-front threat environment is no longer merely a perception but an impending reality. The army has adopted a punitive deterrent posture on the Pakistan front and credible deterrence against China. The latter has compelled forming of two Mountain Strike Corps and the central sector is to get an additional division. All this tumult must not obscure that the primary group will finally be relied on for results. The training that reorienting operational roles entails must be used optimally to enhance cohesion at all levels.

As a final word, while considerable theory on cohesion exists, it is Western. In keeping with the prime minister’s exhortation on indigenous knowledge generation, the firewall between academia and the military must be lowered for a look through the military sociology lens at the military to answer the question: How does cohesion make the army tick?