An Assessment of Strategic Options post Uri Attack[1]

Background

The Uri attack in September 2016 resulted in some 19 deaths to soldiers, most of which were in a possibly accidental fire as part of the melee rather than direct terror action. “Four suicide terrorists had blazed their way through our base at Uri, very close to the LoC, and caused heavy casualties. During the firefight, a cookhouse also caught fire, which increased the death toll (Satish Dua, India’s Bravehearts, p.1).” This point is important to bear in mind to keep the incident in perspective and not allow emotions to cloud strategic judgment. This is emphasized at the outset here since the attack is being played up in the media by interested political forces, including those supportive of the government, and diplomatically in the usual India-Pakistan joust in the UN General Assembly, making for pressure to ‘do something’ on the government, and therefore, needs cautioning against. 

Military Options

The military options are across the conflict spectrum and the armed forces are available for execution of any chosen by the government. Starting from the minimal end, the options are discussed below:

Status quo. Continue as of now with an active Line of Control (LC) and administering punishment across it by firepower. This has been tried before and has not worked as the Uri attack might show. 

Surgical strikes as hitherto. Surgical strikes have been conducted across the LC on a case by case basis and can be employed to target both Pakistan (Pak) army, sponsors, and the terror proxies as necessary. These can either be kept confidential as hitherto or in a shift publicized. The latter enables deniability and is cognizant of jus ad bellum, while the latter – being different - conveys a public message to the Pak military, government and public.

Surgical strikes upgunned. Surgical strikes can be conducted across a wider space and compressed in time. These will be unmistakable and retributive. Since they will be difficult to conceal, advantage can be taken by publicizing them. In terms of jus ad bellum, they can be argued to be in response to a series of terror attacks, including on Pathankot, at a time and place of own choosing and in line with Charter allowed self defence in response to armed attacks by proxies from the sponsor state. Any shortcomings in the operational execution or result can be papered over with information operations, internally and externally.

Cold Start (CS) lite. The CS doctrine has been firmed up since 2004. In this option, selected limited options across the front can be launched. This will keep the conflict limited – depending on Pak reaction – and liable to early termination, with the political message of Indian weariness with terror conveyed militarily. It may entail some additional preparatory mobilization, so as to deter Pak from an escalatory counter.

CS. This can be as per the CS doctrine, operational across the entire front. This has escalatory potential, but is cognizant of Pak nuclear redlines if any. Its advantage over CS lite is that we would have sufficient forces across for escalation control rather be subject to being defeated piecemeal as in CS lite. This amounts to an armed attack of the order of a war and therefore it debatable in international law whether the provocation argument of self defence can carry the day. Moral high ground is important to retain diplomatically. It has escalatory potential in that strategy is a two player game and Pak reaction cannot be determined prior. Catering for the worst case by our own preparedness and mobilization would make for a self fulfilling outcome in making Pak mistake our preparation for a larger attack and react accordingly at a higher threshold of violence, which if unleashed might jeopardize our limited aims necessitating our throwing in more than what we originally planned: thereby upping escalation and drawing closer to nuclear redlines, thus.

Mobilisation a’la Parakram II. As at Operation (Op) Parakram, the military could mobilize in a  display of coercive diplomacy and use diplomatic channels to exert pressure for Pak to deliver on a more credible Islamabad Declaration II (that it will not use its territory for terror). This has been tried and found wanting earlier. It has the advantage of assuaging public mood that ‘something should be done’. If diplomatically we carry the day, it has the potential to relegate Pak image as a power, that backed down in face of Indian aggressiveness.

Conventional war. The escalatory undertow of CS builds in outright war as an option. If and since escalation may occur, it may be prudent to be ‘firstest with mostest’ (Patton). The jus ad bellum aspect will be a difficult diplomatic sell. The mobilization, costs, damages and opportunity costs would require the political leadership to be clear as to what they wish. The nuclear factor will  be loom large and as experience of peer militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan show, there will be an irregular side to the war that will suck in India into a quagmire. Keeping such a war limited will be difficult. India may have to accept international community mediation and external interest in the resolution of the Kashmir issue at its end.

Non military options

Intelligence operations. This has its limitations in that it takes us down an interminable road with no guarantee of success. It opens us to a like counter, making us a surveillance state. It will generate a proxy war, which will internally empower intelligence agencies, without the due protocols of control in place as exist in other democracies. As is well known, intelligence agencies promise a lot, have a commendable media outreach and deliver little. Besides, their initiative is liable to overkill. Take the East Pakistan interference by India leading up to an insecure Pak committing genocide, which implicates India to an extent in that such an over reaction by Pak could have been anticipated and tempered India’s initial decision on interference. By this precedence, there is no call to follow up on ideas such as instigating and assisting the Baloch, since it would only open up a proxy war front in which the Pak can only be expected to come down hard on the Baloch. We should not wish this for friendly ethnic groups, even if it helps keeping Pak down. Recall the manner we let the Sri Lankan Tamils down by initial support followed by assisting the Sri Lankans later in a near genocidal excision of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Diplomatic offensive. This entails a diplomatic offensive. We rehyphenate ourselves to Pakistan by continually talking of their perfidy in Kashmir, which we have ourselves done little to address politically internally, to the utter boredom, if not amusement, of the international community. It is another matter if the small diplomat corps we have has the ability to deliver with a diplomatic offensive at all. If a diplomacy first option is chosen, India’s military restraint can be exploited to gain the moral high ground and use all international leverages to pressure Pak. The military aspect to this can include taking UN observers of UNMOGIP (not being done since 1971) to the LC and to Uri and showing them the support for terror and firing by the Pak army. The option has the underside of involving the international community, even if we wish them to side with us, and requires playing carefully as they may wish to take the Kashmir issue out of the bilateral forum in which we wish to keep it. The military implication is to stay alert lest Pak deploy terror to throw a spanner in the works and show up Kashmir as a flashpoint.

Political resolution. This entails taking the requisite political measures internally and if necessary externally in respect of Pak for conflict termination and conflict resolution. The conflict has gone on for some 25 years and has had ups and downs in intensity. As a flashpoint, the preceding paras suggest escalation in a nuclear backdrop cannot be ruled out. The nuclear factor must be respected. Doctrinally, once the kinetic part of militancy is under controlled, political measures must kick in and resolve internal conflict. Several such junctures have been ignored in Kashmir. A continuing internal security situation results in the army losing its primary focus on external defence and conventional operations, making its ability to carry out the military options discussed above less efficaciously. Using this juncture for addressing the Kashmir issue meaningfully has the underside of it being prompted by a jihadist attack, therefore, a gap in time is necessary to launch initiatives, which can be planned for now and implemented over the coming winter. Pakistan can be handled diplomatically with much to show on the political front keeping it in sync with the initiative. The military implication of this would be to stay alert but restrained. Diplomatically, a call can be taken on the appropriate use of UNMOGIP presence for observation and monitoring duties on the LC so as to prevent incentive for a terror attack.

Recommendation

The last option, a political resolution of the Kashmir conflict, is recommended.

The government has the parliamentary majority to undertake political initiatives of devolution, autonomy and self-governance. Not doing so and deferring it indefinitely as has been the case over quarter century, has exacted a price on the Kashmir people who are Indian citizens, which Indian governments are duty bound to respect, protect and assist. Not doing so keeps open the door to worse political options as reducing the state to a union territory, which amounts to a non-option at best, since it shall keep the conflict alive indefinitely. Keeping the conflict going, has political dividend for some political forces in terms of polarization within India, but this is at a cost to the national fabric. There are also military costs to an unending conflict, such as preventing a much needed and timely pivot militarily to the China front. It keeps alive the two front worst case scenario, which is prohibitive to address militarily in light of constraints on the defence budget from other national priorities and the compulsions within it from the pensions etc.

Consequently, our recommendation is that the government be doctrinally compliant and deploy its political capital by taking requisite political measures to end the insurgency/militancy/proxy war.

The Ceasefire Option

This is not so outlandish as it sounds, limited imagination makes it appear so. When the outreach to Nawaz Sharif took place in end 2015, it was a reasonable end state. Even so, we allowed the Pathankot attack by spoilers derail the initiative, that should really have been resilient enough to withstand such spoiler interference. (This assumes that Pathankot was not a black operation, which it was, intended to derail the peace initiative and drive a wedge between Sharif and the military – Sharif the target of the peace initiative and the army that, through the black op is depicted as derailing Sharif’s Nobel prize opportunity).

A political dominant approach to the twin India-Pak and Kashmir problems would require a ceasefire along the LC and internally in Kashmir. The India-Pak track would entail taking the comprehensive bilateral dialogue forward. Within Kashmir, it would mean an outreach to the Hurriyat and the mainstream political parties. The internal ceasefire would require to be followed up by confidence building measures, using the Hurriyat to get the militants over ground. There could be an adjunct agreement with Pak to take back the Pakistani terrorists, with a safe corridor being given over a limited timeframe through Kashmir to a few exit points for the terrorists to make their exit, where after they would remain open to Indian offensive operations outside of the ceasefire. Handling of the militants coming overground would follow the Nagaland model best practices.

Conclusion

The alternative of a military option has escalatory overtones. This can be mitigated, but may result in ‘mowing the lawn’ periodically indefinitely till a political resolution is sought as it must some time down line. Consequently, instead of postponing the inevitable, it is best to go in for the political solution now, not instigated or intimidated by the Uri attack but on our own volition in our self interest. This can be done after a suitable gap, in which we have exacted some retribution on the Pak army for the attack and can begin as early as the winter. This will settle the post Burhan Wani disturbances, as well as our Pak problem for the long term. It will remove the polarizing feature in our polity that political forces and formations are taking advantage of to unhinge Indian democracy. Saying this in a military paper is not unfounded since the military is not an island and in its input at the strategic level has to be mindful of the contextual and political factors. Therefore, this plainspeak. 

 

 

 

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[1] Note: This is an internal memo that should have been written but was not written in wake of the Uri attack and as they say, rest is history.

 

 http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=109754

Try UN peacekeeping in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been on this cross road before. At least four times the US has been stupefied over how it should exit Afghanistan. With the war becoming its longest in history, this time round it is determined to leave by the twentieth anniversary of the event that brought it to Afghanistan, 9/11. As earlier, the question as to what after the US-NATO intervention ends remains unanswered and as earlier has the potential to prolong the war, if in a different form without the US present.

The answer here to the question is a UN peacekeeping. Instead of leaving a vacuum behind with potential to unravel the gains of the last twenty years, the UN could insert a multidimensional peace operation. The peace operation would assist the interim Afghan government, presumably overseeing the transition, with elections and continuing of peacebuilding, while the force component of the operation provides a modicum of security to the people.

To see if the idea is feasible, lets envisage a possible post US future in Afghanistan. The two sides, the government and the Taliban, are yet to get talking in earnest. If Turkey’s intercession does not take off – the trip to Istanbul for talks between the two sides having been postponed recently – then the two would likely carve out their respective spaces and spar across these. The vacuum in governance and authority will allow the Islamic State and assorted terror groups space and they may strike deals to reenter the picture. People will be imposed on unduly, especially women, girls and children. A civil war like scenario be recur as was in the nineties. The turmoil will make Afghanistan a magnet for proxy war by interested regional and outside players.

Such a scenario needs preventing. The UN has been in peacekeeping for over seven decades. It has experience of scores of peace operations, including those with complex mandates in highly unsettled conditions. Its efforts through this century have professionalized peace operations considerably, making the instrument adaptable to difficult conflict and post conflict settings as Afghanistan. Its peacekeeping doctrine is fleshed out, covering as it does peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – peace enforcement not being relevant here.

Adequate appetite can be expected for the UN Security Council to back the idea. The Chinese and Russians would be happy to see the US exit the region. The US itself appears to be set to leave. The other two P5 members, UK and France, have had a presence in Afghanistan as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and would also be leaving with the US. International peace and security requires that Afghanistan does not provide sanctuary for terror groups. The peacebuilding effort in Afghanistan needs preserving.

Missing so far is a regional organization to step up to the conflict resolution table. The UN prefers to act alongside and in support of a regional organization. Afghanistan is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and an observer with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), drawing its membership from mainland Asia including Central Asia. The two organizations can broker the UN’s role in Afghanistan and provide the necessary regional heft and ballast to the peace operation. China has already urged the SCO to take a view of the coming change in Afghanistan. The SAARC for its part has been moribund for long only an out-of-the-box idea, as here, can challenge it to step up its act as a regional organization.

Is the idea doable? This very valid question can be examined in the peace operations framework made famous in Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’: peace-making, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. Currently, there is a special political mission in place, which will have to convert to a peace operation with the addition of peacekeepers into its format.

Peacemaking is ongoing and would need to eventuate in an agreement on an interim government to see the transition of Afghanistan into the next government. This may entail elections down the line. Peacemakers in Doha would require staying engaged, with the UN mission keeping them informed and advising as necessary.  A precedent is in the Doha peace process in Darfur being assisted by the hybrid UN-African Union Mission in Darfur in which the joint mediator of the two organizations worked intimately with the peace backers in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The transition would require securing with peacekeeping troops on ground under a Chapter VI mandate. Chapter VI is emphasized since the militarised template has been tried and roundly failed in Afghanistan over past forty years. The country will likely be seemingly divided initially with the sides controlling their respective areas of dominance. Peacekeepers will have to maintain the ceasefire, intercede in localized mediation to restore breaches and support the protection of vulnerable civilians by the dominant party in areas of their deployment and within their capacity.

The forte of SAARC members is peacekeeping and it is here that SAARC can consider contributing. Both India and Pakistan can be represented in the force, with their areas of deployment being India majorly in the areas of the erstwhile Northern Alliance and Pakistan largely in the Taliban controlled areas, with other SAARC member contingents deployed alongside.

Peacekeeping deployment also has an overlay of blue beret monitors. These can be provided by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Since Iran is a member its monitors can be deployed in Hazara inhabited areas. This point on having states with a legitimate interest in some areas being deployed in the area of interest is to give each a sense of reassurance and preclude proxy wars that might arise if states get a perception that their agenda is being undercut. It also helps with security of the deployed elements, deploying as they would be areas welcoming their presence.

Since terror groups may target the UN, the two main sides – the government and the Taliban – would require curtailing the power of terror groups. The peace operation may have a hammer element within it, Chapter VII empowered, to deter and respond to terror attacks such as by the Islamic State Khorasan chapter. This could be SCO provisioned, since the SCO has undertaken exercises on counter terrorism as part of its cooperation over the past few years. The peace enforcement element can assist the two sides in controlling ungoverned spaces.

Afghanistan secured by peacekeepers thus, peace building will taken on significance. Elections and run up to elections will be the most crucial. There may be constitution making support to be provided, depending on what the agreement in Doha comes up with. Even after the new government is in place a couple of years on, peace building support will have to continue in areas as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The post conflict management including incorporation of some Taliban into the Afghan National Security Forces will have to be done. Demining effort will be colossal. Capacity building across all sectors – education, health, corrections, justice etc – will be covered by the UN Country Team, with the UN Peace Building Commission stepping up as necessary.

A replication of the Bonn meeting, in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, may have to be called so that the resources underwriting peace building are made available. The US and the European Union (EU) should contribute to Marshall plan levels of contribution, if only to compensate for keeping the country in turmoil for two decades. China’s Belt and Road initiative’s extension into Afghanistan would also help.

The buck for the operation will of course rest with the Security Council. However, with the regional organizations extensively involved – SCO, SAARC, OIC, GCC - the command and control set up must reflect their interest and include the regional players in the mission leadership. For instance, the head of mission can be from the OIC, to give the mission a Muslim profile. Her political affairs deputy could be from GCC, since GCC would continue to be involved with peacemaking, and the deputy overseeing peace building from EU. The force could have force commander in rotation from SAARC member states, with the deputy from SCO.

Whereas national and religious orientation is not a criterion in the peopling of positions in UN missions, all appointees under oath not to act in parochial interest but only to further the UNSC given mandate, the issue finds mention here only to make the idea of the mission more palatable for the two sides. It reassures the people of their security and interest being catered for. It also will further cooperation between the regional organizations, making them stakeholders in a positive outcome. It also helps further the UN idea of a regional solution to regional conflicts.

What’s in it for the region? The region, including India, is Covid ravaged. It cannot continue into a post Covid future as though nothing has changed. It has to reconfigure its national security policy to privilege human security. This would entail forging ties of cooperation with neighbours, in this case principally India and Pakistan. Afghanistan, that has served so far as a site for regional rivalry if not proxy war, can serve instead as an opportunity. Pakistan has already voiced its interest with its army chief talking about geo-economics. India can take this forward using SAARC to secure the peace operation and integrate Afghanistan into the regional economy through connectivity projects involving Pakistan. The interface with both China and Pakistan in securing peace in Afghanistan can throw up habits of cooperation, reduce mistrust and help the three sides tackle their bilateral issues better.

 

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 eBook

https://www.academia.edu/45439493/eBook_KASHMIR_BY_MY_LIGHTS

KASHMIR BY MY LIGHTS

By

ALI AHMED

Ali Ahmed, PhD (JNU), PhD (Cantab.),

is a former infantry officer and has been an academic and a UN official.

He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.com and tweets at @aliahd66.

  

For Kashmiris, fellow citizens

Preface

I have compiled here my occasional long form writings on Kashmir since the high tide in the affairs of Kashmir in the early nineties.

To begin with the earliest, which is at the fourth and last in order in this compilation. It was written when on leave in Srinagar as a subaltern. During my stints in Punjab, where my infantry unit was deployed in an anti-infiltration role along the Pakistan border for some time and later in Sri Lanka with the Indian peacekeeping force there, I grew an interest in the contextual factors of insurgency. In the period, I spent my leaves in Srinagar where my parents were, my father posted at Badami Bagh first as chief of staff and later as the corps commander during the outbreak of troubles in Kashmir. This meant I was more or less in conflict zones, when with my battalion, that went on to Assam and participated in Operations Bajrang and Rhino there, and even when on holidays.

As all officers of my generation, I got adept at the tactical side by participation in three counter insurgencies – Punjab, Tamil in Sri Lanka and the Bodo and ULFA in Assam – and during leave I was exposed to the operational level of it, watching keenly from the sidelines. My interest at the operational levels was whetted by occasional visits to my uncle who was commanding general of the corps my battalion was part of in Assam.

Thus, I was somewhat uniquely positioned to have a view of the tactical and operational levels, while my reading habit enabled me to keep up with the political - contextual – factors through devouring strategic literature well beyond my rank. In effect, rather early on, I had a somewhat unique view of the tactical, operational and the political levels. Writing alongside honed this interest. The inclusion placed at the end here – ‘Kashmir: A Study in Insurgency and Counter Insurgency’ – is a product of that period.

The second, and first inclusion in this volume, is my MPhil chapter written at Cambridge University in the mid-nineties. By then I had like my fellow course mates seen enough of insurgency environments, but unlike most, had had a ringside view of events in Kashmir when on leave thorough the nineties. I also had, atypical for most young officers, an exposure at the national capital, at its very heart, living for two years in Rashtrapati Bhawan, as aide to Rashtrapati Shankar Dayal Sharma. My free time – and there was more of it than warranted – was spent in the libraries at the United Services Institution (USI) and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), where I also spent my time occupying backbenches at seminars in the national capital, including at the India International Center. The time evidently not entirely wasted, enabled me a space in the master’s program at King’s College London, followed by MPhil at Cambridge, for which the army – uncharacteristically - afforded me sabbatical. I mention this since I used the effort put into my dissertation to try and understand my own experience better. Thus, my Cambridge dissertation had chapters on the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgency and on Kashmir. The Kashmir chapter – ‘Pakistan’s involvement in Indian Kashmir’ - is reproduced here.

The third entry is when I got back to the army. I still had a yen for study and writing. I could not sublimate it by taking up a doctoral seat in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) that I was selected for on my return since I had run out of sabbatical time. I then took up a non-resident fellowship at the USI holding the Ministry of External Affairs Chair for a year, extended by a year as Operation Vijay intervened, in which we were deployed in the desert sector in anticipation of and to deter horizontal escalation. The Kashmir insurgency, that I had followed closely through the nineties, was then at its height. I devoted a chapter of my fellowship paper to the insurgency, writing up while serving on staff on the Line of Control in Kashmir during the period. The study was not published since it would have required military intelligence clearance to do so and I suspect that would not have been possible since the study was critical of the Indian handling of the insurgency, besides, in another chapter, questioning India’s move to nuclear status that had just been attained then.

The last paper included here is a book chapter I did for a book on terrorism after retiring from the army. I had by then another stint in Kashmir, on the Pir Panjal ridgeline with the Rashtriya Rifles. Thus, a worm’s eye view of Kashmir supplemented the bird’s eye view I always had, and informed my thinking and writings, a rare advantage. Whether I used that advantage to good effect I leave it to readers to judge.

I was then with the IDSA as a research fellow, while also doing a doctorate with the JNU alongside. I got selected a second time round for the latter and was able to undertake the same finally since work with a Delhi based think tank alongside a doctoral position is permissible by the rules. In the period, there as respite in Kashmir, enabling revisiting the issue with little less urgency and allowing for a more reflective approach. The book chapter – ‘Countering insurgency in Kashmir: The debates in the Indian Army’ – captured the debates ongoing within the army between the two schools – hardline/kinetic and softline/WHAM. I was of the latter school and often sparred with those of the former on the pages of some in-service publications. Often my letters to the editor failed to make it to between covers of publications since they went against the dominant narrative. I have compiled these into a volume of ‘Unpublished Writings’ on my blog. I took the opportunity of a book chapter contribution to have the last word.

The four taken together cover the first two decades of the militancy in Kashmir. I actively covered the last decade in Kashmir writing extensively in online publications and in the Kashmir Times on how not handle Kashmir and how it should instead be managed. Some 100 op-eds in the latter comprise a complementary volume, Kashmir: Strategic Sense and Non-sense, also available at my blog and on academia.edu. I leveraged my developing interest in peace studies that covered peaceable approaches to violence, acquired in my academic avatar as a university teacher and later as a United Nations official. These commentaries and articles from my quarterly column in the second half of 2010s in the Economic and Political Weekly, are available at my blog, www.ali-writings.blogspot.com. I suspect the quality of these was such that my alma mater, Cambridge University, under its PhD by special regulations program considered by candidature favourably, awarding me my second doctorate.

 Acknowledgements

Over the last three decades there have obviously been some very significant influences on my thinking. I wish to thank them but at the risk of being accused of name dropping. The ones not listed here are left solely on account of space. Even so, the usual caveats apply in that this is an unaided work, the sole responsibility for errors in facts, inference and reasoning being entirely mine and institutions the writings were submitted to have no responsibility for these. 

Let me begin with my father, General MA Zaki, the ‘saviour’ of Kashmir for India in the nineties (an apt observation by Manoj Joshi), whose appending of comments on the first essay mentioned (visible in the pages at the end of this volume in his neat hand), constitutes fuel that keeps me going thirty years later; my uncle General Jameel Mahmood, who took time off to converse with me, a young officer, on affairs higher than my pay grade; Generals SC Sinha and Dipankar Banerjee, old boys from my school, mentors while I was in Delhi; the Rashtrapatiji Pandit Shankar Dayal Sharma, of the great generation of freedom fighters, for without his shadow over me I could never have acquired academic grounding; my first company commander Colonel CP Muthanna; my battalion commanders – Brig. ‘Jerry’ Gonsalves, Brig. SP Sharma, Brig. Ranjeet Misra, Col. SV Chaudhry, Col. Amit Sehgal, Col.  Bhupinder Singh - who allowed me to moonlight from my duties; my subedars who kept a hawk eye on my company and battalion when I was physically present and mentally absent, including Hony Capt. Bharat Jadhav; Shri. NN Vohra for suggesting to the concerned bureaucrat not to sit on my study leave file in the ministry; Prof. Kanti Bajpai, who accepted me as a doctoral student only to see me falling out even before joining; General Satish Nambiar for taking me up for the MEA Chair and doyen of strategists, late Shri. K Subrahmanyam, for guiding that study; Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s leading realist theoretician, who tolerated my ambling along on a liberal tangent; Prof. James Mayall who went through my life’s work, so to speak, including writings on Kashmir, to pronounce it, along with Dr. Vipin Narang, worthy of a Cambridge doctorate; General Prakash Menon, who allowed me access to his doctoral work my generous editors Anuradha Bhasin, Seema Mustafa and successive EPW teams; and my peers, General Hariharan Dharmarajan, who I mention hoping it won’t jeopardise his career, since his only fault was we were cadets together; General Virk, who as chief instructor at Staff College Wellington let me off the hook when some Hindutva inspired brigadier (my retrospective judgment) thought my unorthodox writings merited a march up; General SS Dhillon, a Rimco, for letting me off this time for interception by military intelligence of a letter home from the Line of Control, else it would nipped both my careers, as a military officer and writer; and finally, Polly, our pet parrot, that sitting on my shoulders did the spell check, fact check and grammar.

As is lot of partners of writers, Farah finds mention last. More so because there is no vocabulary my cadet school equipped me with nor do I know Urdu, the language in which what needs saying can perhaps be best expressed in. Maybe my next book will comprise letters to her from Kashmir on faded red service inland letters, preserved by her for no reason I can fathom. 

 

 

CONTENTS

 

A.   

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY – 1995-96

MPHIL DISSERTATION –

INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BY STATES IN SOUTH ASIA

CHAPTER III : CASE STUDY II

PAKISTAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN INDIAN KASHMIR

B.   

USI PROJECT: MEA CHAIR 2000-01

INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST:

A STUDY OF INDIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

CHAPTER III - CASE STUDY II

THE ARMY AND KASHMIR

C.   

BOOK CHAPTER

COUNTERING INSURGENCY IN J&K:

DEBATES IN THE INDIAN ARMY

Maroof Raza (ed.): Confronting Terrorism,

New Delhi Penguin Viking India, 2009

  D. 

KASHMIR: A STUDY IN INSURGENCY

AND COUNTER INSURGENCY

(unpublished essay, 1990)

 

Cultural nationalism as a national security threat

An extended version of the KT op ed http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=108226

Former Vice President Hamid Ansari has yet again drawn attention to the Othering of Muslims ongoing in India and thereby the threat posed to Constitutional values. In discussing his newly released autobiography, By Many a Happy Accident, at various forums, he has reiterated that the drift towards a majoritarian democracy has a potentially adverse underside. It tends to marginalize India’s, and indeed the world’s, largest minority, India’s Muslims, thereby contravening two constitutional values, secularism and fraternity.

He had earlier made the same observation in lectures delivered prior to demitting office of vice president and later during his retirement. He has reverted to this theme since the situation appears to be getting worse in the second term of the Union government, marking its coming to power with an increased majority in the lower house a turning point on this score. The instances of Othering have increased, such as through legislation both at the Center and in Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) ruled states on for instance ‘love jihad’, and the street power exercised by supporters of the regime by violence against minorities.    

In national security discourse, a threat to national values is taken as a national security threat. To the extent Hamid Ansari is right, there should be a corresponding interest in the threat to national values in national security commentary. However, that is not the case. The silence over this national security issue owes to either the national security commentariat acquiescing with the phenomenon or being too overawed to start referring to it as a national security threat. 

Hamid Ansari observes a change in the complexion of the Republic and the resulting perception of insecurity in a significant section of the population, India’s Muslims. Does the threat that causes insecurity for the minority, comprising over 14 per cent of the population and with a geographical spread across the country, constitute a national security threat?

The minority figures in national security thinking only in terms of terrorism in Kashmir and in the hinterland and radical Islamism to which the terror threat is attributed. There is little reference to the threat from militant cultural nationalism vitiating the security perception of the minority. This article makes the case that militant cultural nationalism constitutes a national security threat and must be counted as such in national security thinking, discussion and strategy.

The recent invasion by hard right elements of the United States’ (US) Capitol is an example of how a threat can mutate and pose a national security challenge. A fallout was in the manner the swearing in ceremony of the new US president was conducted at the same location under conditions of heightened security. That former US president, Donald Trump, instigated the mob is now the subject of an impeachment trial. While the threat of white supremacism has been around for some decades in the US, best illustrated by the Oklahoma bombing in the mid-nineties, its security agencies have been cognizant of the threat and treat it as such.

Analogy from the threat from the extremist right wing in the US is not inapt. Whereas presently, when a right wing government is in power in India, right wing extremists may not pose a threat to the state apparatus as such, since in their mind’s eye, power is being exercised by a right wing government they support. This accounts for the symbiotic relationship between the government and right wing militant cultural nationalists. The government does not recognize them as a threat and therefore there is no action against them even in cases of violence, for example, for their role in the Bhima Koregaon violence of 2018 or the more recent role in Delhi riots of February 2020. Instead in both cases the onus for the violence fell on the communities subject to the violence, the Mahar and Muslims respectively, with the law additionally proceeding against some left wing activists in the former case. However, in case of a democratic change over, their increased power, visibility and reach under the current regime, may embolden them to pose a national security challenge, as have white supremacists in the example above in the US.

Whereas this is a potential national security threat that can manifest in future, they also pose a threat currently in their generating a threat for the minority. This is where the symbiotic relationship with the ruling party kicks in, wherein they serve as the militant foot soldiers for advancing the anti-minority agenda of the cultural nationalists. The resulting polarization furthers the political interest of the Hindutva espousing BJP.

Understandably then, in the national security thinking on internal security threats there is never a mention of the right wing as a threat. The three ‘usual suspects’ in this list are terrorism in Kashmir, Left Wing Extremism and militancy in the North East. This silence owes in part to national security being statist in orientation and dependent on the government’s input, expending much attention in rationalizing the government’s policies and actions. To an extent, the realists that populate the strategic community share the realist thinking of the government and many also subscribe to a Hindutva worldview. Consequently, this is an area of deliberate inattention rather than evidence of non-existence of a case for including militant cultural nationalism as a national security threat.

The threat is constituted along two lines. One is that potential of marginalization of the minority resulting in a militarization of its response. The terror taken as minority perpetrated is liable to go up. This has been on the crosshairs of analysts for long in their dwelling on the penetration of radical Islamists ideas in Muslim communities and deradicalization as a measure against it. Even in this commentary, missing has been a focus or reference to right wing perpetrated terrorism. Whereas it found mention early last decade in the home minister’s reference to saffron terrorism, those whose actions prompted the observation have largely been left off after the BJP came to power. This implies that the threat from militant cultural nationalists that could push a minority towards violence in rebound would not be registered among the causes. Therefore, the likelihood of persistence of the insecurity that might provoke such a response.

The second is more significant. Militant cultural nationalism is already changing the complexion of the Republic. Its pursuit of increased solidarity within the Hindu community through an attempt at homogenization overriding the diversity that constitutes the community requires an ‘Other’ to stand in contradistinction to Hindus and Hinduism. Having alighted on Muslims and Islam as the Other, it has reduced inter-community fraternity – a preamble articulated Constitutional value – within India. The ruling party has introduced laws such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which have imposed on the secular fabric of Republic.

They also build in inequality in citizenship to detriment of Muslims. If the sequence envisaged of a National Population Register (NPR) populating exercise is followed through with, along with perhaps the census exercise, then the CAA-NPR constitute a double whammy, with Muslims at the receiving end of the legislative stick. In light of such portents, the possibility of a Hindu Republic is not a theoretical one anymore. Since this shift in the constitutional moorings changes India as we know it, does what is behind the shift –militant cultural nationalism – constitute a national security threat that should be recognized and countered as such?

Whereas a threat causing insecurity for the minority can be proceeded with through implementation of rule of law, the shift in the Republic’s moorings is not so much from militant cultural nationalism as from cultural nationalism that is behind it. Since the ruling party is persuaded by cultural nationalism, it is unwilling to exercise its rule of law function of governance against the vehicle with which, as mentioned, it shares a symbiotic relationship. Therefore, any expectation of inclusion of militant cultural nationalism as a national security threat shall remain unmet.

Since cultural nationalism empowers militant cultural nationalism and is an ideological push against constitutional verities, can and should cultural nationalism be taken as a national security threat? Hindutva is now an entrenched ideology that energises supporters of the democratically elected ruling party. If constitutional values are substituted by Hindutva endorsed values in a democratic and procedurally legal manner, the challenge against such a shift can only be political and by a democratic counter mobilization for mounting a legitimate challenge.

However, as seen, militant cultural nationalism is a vehicle for cultural nationalism, enabling its polarizing sway over voters. This is an illegitimate practice. A state apparatus controlled by the ruling party and one rendered hollow by preceding years of political inroads and enervation cannot be expected to stand up for the law against its own misuse. Expert commentary has it that even the courts have to a large extent vacated the moral high ground. Therefore, while change may be ongoing and underfoot, to the extent militant cultural nationalism is at its vanguard, the change, albeit by procedurally legal means, is illegitimate.

To the extent militant cultural nationalism is used by cultural nationalism for its purpose of replacing a secular republic with a Hindu republic then it cultural nationalism is a national security threat. Cultural nationalism that plays by a democratic playbook is not a national security threat, even if it aims to question the constitutional schema, but turns into one in case the instrument and means it uses are illegal and illegitimate. Attempting to change the republic in its desired image democratically is expected to be countered by the checks and balances in the system such as the doctrine of basic structure. In so far as these check and balances are delegitimised by procedurally illegal and illegitimate means, such as mounting pressure on the judiciary that is custodian of the doctrine of basic structure, then cultural nationalism would turn into a national security threat.

Showing the national security card to cultural nationalism is important not only to deter its abuse of militant cultural nationalism as an instrument, but to ensure it sticks to the accepted political practices in its bid to turn India into its preferred image. Securitisation - labelling an issue as an issue in national security - serves the purpose of focusing minds, in this case on a political ideology, as invoking security, with its existential connotations, draws the attention. Whereas the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, that is the crucible of the ideology, has been banned on occasion earlier, the political fortunes of its political front, the BJP, have emboldened it and given it an impunity. The ideology has the acquired the advantage of political mainstreaming and furthering through the dubious instrumentality of the state. Therefore, it is unlikely to be called out or put back in the box by the state, that it now controls. The challenge to the cozy co-habitation of the state, that is meant to be impartial and neutral, with a political ideology has to come from outside. While the political opposition has on occasion spiritedly pointed to this, notably Rahul Gandhi who once named it while his party was in power as the principal national security threat, there has been little or no traction of this perspective.

The strategic community has been amiss in steering clear of discussing cultural nationalism and militant cultural nationalism in national security terms. Whereas cultural nationalism as a political ideology may be unexceptionable, it has long been inseparable from militant cultural nationalism. A problem area that emerges from such selective gaze is that the national security discourse then lends itself to manipulation.

An illustration is the inflation in the terror discourse of terrorism attributed to Muslim perpetrators. For instance, there are 22 pending cases of encounter deaths in Gujarat pertaining to the Modi period there as chief minister when supposedly terrorists out to kill Modi or commit terrorism were killed by the police. There are also questions over provenance of some terror bombings across the country in the first decade. These questions remain since there was little effort to uncover evidence that would point to other than a Muslim hand in such incidents. Lack of evidence was on account of lack of effort to collect such evidence rather than its absence. That most such incidents led to Muslims being incarcerated, many being left after years in jail, is suggestive not only of incompetence but also a cover up that cries out for investigation.

A captive media has dutifully magnified the police handed out versions. Polarisation resulted and has accrued in a political dividend for the ruling party. Thus, the electorate has in a sense been manipulated by fake news on black operations. While this is relevant to understand the first BJP election victory, the second one did not witness preceding terror incidents since terror incidents, other than in Kashmir, curiously ceased on the BJP attaining power. This is yet more evidence that the earlier mainstream reportage over instances amounted to fake news. The gainer being the BJP implies a complicity and casts a pall over the manner it attained power. When in power it has turned the other way as majoritarian mobs have carried out micro terror pushing Muslims to the ropes over the beef and love jihad issues.

This marginalization of Muslims is an assault on the constitutional values. Therefore, the resulting insecurity of Muslims, as pointed out by Hamid Ansari amongst others, is a national security issue on two counts: from the sway of militant cultural nationalism, to levels the state has lost monopoly over instruments of violence, and, second, but more importantly,  as it points towards the incipient make over of India from a secular republic to a Hindutva subscribing one. 

 

 

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=108226

http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/archives.aspx?date1=2/27/2021&page=4

Securitisation of cultural nationalism

Former Vice President Hamid Ansari has yet again drawn attention to the Othering of Muslims ongoing in India and thereby the threat posed to Constitutional values. In discussing his newly released autobiography, By Many a Happy Accident, at various forums, he has reiterated that the drift towards a majoritarian democracy has a potentially adverse underside. It tends to marginalize India’s, and indeed the world’s, largest minority, India’s Muslims, thereby contravening two constitutional values, secularism and fraternity.

He had earlier made the same observation in lectures delivered prior to demitting office of vice president and later during his retirement. He has reverted to this theme since the situation appears to be getting worse in the second term of the Union government, marking its coming to power with an increased majority in the lower house as a turning point. The instances of Othering have increased through legislation both at the Center and in Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) ruled states, such as for instance on ‘love jihad’, and so has the street power exercised by supporters of the regime in violence against minorities.    

In national security discourse, a threat to national values is taken as a national security threat. To the extent Hamid Ansari is right, there should be a corresponding interest in the threat to national values in national security commentary. However, that is not the case. The silence over this national security issue owes to either the national security commentariat acquiescing with the phenomenon or being too overawed to start referring to it as a national security threat. 

Hamid Ansari observes a change in the complexion of the Republic and the resulting perception of insecurity in a significant section of the population, India’s Muslims. Does the threat that causes insecurity for the minority, comprising over 14 per cent of the population and with a geographical spread across the country, constitute a national security threat?

The minority figures in national security thinking only in terms of terrorism in Kashmir and in the hinterland and radical Islamism to which the terror threat is attributed. There is little reference to the threat from militant cultural nationalism vitiating the security perception of the minority. This article makes the case that militant cultural nationalism constitutes a national security threat and must be counted as such in national security thinking, discussions on policy and strategy.

The recent invasion by hard right elements of the United States’ (US) Capitol is an example of how a threat can mutate and pose a national security challenge. While the threat of white supremacism has been around for some decades in the US, best illustrated by the Oklahoma bombing in the mid-nineties, its security agencies have been cognizant of the threat and treat it as such.

Analogy from the threat from the extremist right wing in the US is not inapt. Whereas presently, when a right wing government is in power in India, right wing extremists may not pose a threat to the state apparatus as such, since in their mind’s eye, power is being exercised by a right wing government they support. This accounts for the symbiotic relationship between the government and right wing militant cultural nationalists. The government, the gainer by their actions, does not recognize them as a threat and therefore there is no action against them even in cases of violence, for example, for their role in the Bhima Koregaon violence of 2018 or the more recent role in Delhi riots of February 2020. However, in case of a democratic change over, their increased power, visibility and reach under the current regime, may embolden them to pose a future national security challenge.

Whereas this is a potential national security threat, they also pose a current threat in their threat to the minority. Since their polarizing actions furthers the political interest of the Hindutva-espousing BJP, there is never a mention of the right wing as a threat. The three ‘usual suspects’ on the list of internal security threats are terrorism, Left Wing Extremism and militancy in the North East. This silence owes in part to national security being statist in orientation and dependent on the government’s perspective, with commentators expending attention and effort rationalizing the government’s policies and actions. To an extent, the realists that largely populate the strategic community subscribe to a Hindutva worldview. Consequently, this is an area of deliberate inattention rather than evidence of non-existence of a case for including militant cultural nationalism as a national security threat.

The threat is constituted along two lines. One is that potential of marginalization of the minority resulting in a militarization of its response. Terror has been on the crosshairs of analysts for long in their dwelling on the penetration of radical Islamists ideas in Muslim communities and deradicalization as a measure against it. The threat from militant cultural nationalists that could potentially push a minority towards violence in rebound is not registered among ‘causes’. Consequently, the likelihood of persistence of the minority insecurity may provoke such a response.

The second is more significant. Militant cultural nationalism is already changing the complexion of the Republic. Its pursuit of increased solidarity within the Hindu community through an attempt at homogenization overriding the diversity that constitutes the majority requires an ‘Other’ to stand in contradistinction. This has reduced inter-community fraternity – a preamble-articulated Constitutional value.

The ruling party has introduced laws such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which have imposed on the secular fabric of Republic. They also build-in inequality in citizenship. If the sequence envisaged of a National Population Register (NPR) populating exercise is followed through with, then the CAA-NPR constitute a double whammy. In light of such portents, the possibility of a Hindu Republic is not a theoretical one anymore. Since this shift in the constitutional moorings changes India as we know it, does what is behind the shift – cultural nationalism and its vehicle militant cultural nationalism – constitute a national security threat?

Whereas rule of law can mitigate militant cultural nationalism, the shift in the Republic’s moorings owes to cultural nationalism. Since the ruling party is persuaded by cultural nationalism, it is unwilling to exercise its rule of law function of governance. Therefore, an expectation of inclusion of militant cultural nationalism as a national security threat remains unmet. Since cultural nationalism empowers militant cultural nationalism and is an ideological push against constitutional verities, can and should cultural nationalism be taken as a national security threat?

Hindutva is now an entrenched ideology that energises supporters of the democratically elected ruling party. If constitutional values are substituted by Hindutva-endorsed values in a democratic and procedurally legal manner, the counter can only be political and by a democratic mobilization. However, to the extent militant cultural nationalism is used by cultural nationalism for a stealthy purpose of replacing a secular republic by a Hindu republic, then cultural nationalism amounts to a national security threat. Cultural nationalism that plays by a democratic playbook is not a national security threat, even if it aims to question the constitutional schema, but turns into one in case the means – militant cultural nationalism - is illegal and illegitimate.

Attempting to change the republic in its desired image is expected to be countered by the checks and balances in a democratic system such as the doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution and upholding of it by the courts. In so far as these check and balances are undercut by procedurally illegal and illegitimate means – such as by pressure on the courts - then cultural nationalism turn into a national security threat.

Showing the red card to cultural nationalism is important to deter its use of militant cultural nationalism. Securitisation - labelling an issue as the subject of critical national security scrutiny - serves the purpose of focusing minds since invoking security has existential connotations. In this case, a political ideology, Hindutva, needs to be served notice. The ideology now has the advantage of political mainstreaming through the dubious instrumentality of the state. The challenge to the cozy co-habitation of the state and a political ideology has to come from outside.

While the political opposition has on occasion spiritedly pointed to this, notably Rahul Gandhi who once named it while his party was in power as the principal national security threat, there has been little or no traction of this perspective. The strategic community has been amiss in steering clear of discussing cultural nationalism and militant cultural nationalism in national security terms. Whereas cultural nationalism as a political ideology may be unexceptionable, it has long been inseparable from militant cultural nationalism.

While the threat militant nationalism poses to Muslims is easy to qualify as a national security threat, the steady movement towards a majoritarian democracy is not easy to classify. Even so, the illegitimate use of militant nationalism needs being deterred, for which examining cultural nationalism in national security terms calls for a start.  

 

 AN AIDE'S RECALL OF AN EPISODE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR

I don't remember the dates but another time, a unit in Uri had ambushed a very large column of terrorists with huge loads of weapons and ammunition. Several of them were killed. The terrorists dropped their bags, abandoned their dead and ran helter skelter and many were mopped up in search operations. A group of media persons from Delhi were coming to cover this operation. An IAF MI-17 heptr was arranged, the Corps Commander, Adviser Law and Order (Ved Marwah) and I accompanied this team from Srinagar to Uri. It was a remarkable operation by the troops and everyone was happy with the outcome. I sensed that your dad and Ved Marwah after complimenting the troops were very worried. It was for the first time that the scale of Pakistani proxy war was beginning to dawn on people. One win here in Uri but if enough large infiltration attempts are made, inevitable that some would get through. 

As we took off from Uri, Gen Zaki went to the cockpit and asked the pilot to fly along the LC towards Gulmarg and then to Srinagar instead of straight line back to Srinagar. The air force pilot said he had a flight route and would not be able to take a detour. Followed by a long death stare. The pilot then said he would do a small detour to avoid the cloud formation enroute and everyone agreed it was a good idea. 

After about 10-15 minutes Gen Zaki walked to the windows on the right side and then called Ved Marwah. He showed in a particular nala and said this is a probable infiltration route. Ved looked and nodded wisely. I looked though another window and wasn't able to find anything significant about this nala as there were many like this. We came back to Srinagar and on reaching the Corps HQ, he called BGS and Col GS to the ops room and after a discussion, he ordered a column to be moved to the nala. Over the next couple of months, more infiltrators were caught here than anywhere else in the corps! 

How and why did such things happen with him? Because he had a photographic memory. He would remember people, dates, places and events in graphic details 35 years later as if they happened yesterday. He also spent at least an hour every day in his study, studying maps of the corps zone. In 1: 1,000,000 then 1:250,000 and finally in 1:50,000 scale. Sector by sector, he recreated 3D terrain images in his mind. Basically a Google map before the idea of a Google map would have been ideated. It also helped that he had been GOC of the Baramula division and then had basically walked to most posts in the sector. An old style soldier who believed that for any sort of tactical or strategic planning in the mountains, understanding the terrain was most important. His knowledge of the land was extraordinary and freaked out his formation commanders and staff alike. Once during the daily morning 'sitrep' briefing in the corps ops room, listing out the over 100 instances of exchange of fire on the LC during the night, Gen Zaki suddenly said 'not possible'. Everyone literally jumped. Why was it not possible that X post of the Pakis had fired with AD guns in ground role at Y Indian Army post on the LC? Because he said, the posts are more than 7km away and there is no line of sight between the two posts! 

A combination of knowing the terrain, very strong Instincts, ability to out think the Pakis: Gen Zaki was a very special Corps Commander for a very special Corps at a vital time in its history. The Governor, his Advisors, DG Police, IG BSF and everyone else in J&K listened to him and depended on him. In some ways, he was holding Kashmir with India with the Army when every other organ of state had failed utterly.

An ADC recalls his charge, Chinar Corps Commander

That was a man, an officer, a gentleman, a leader..... actually so many things rolled into one. My great fortune to have served with him, seen him in combat. 

Fd Marshal Manekshaw was wrong. I know for sure as a first hand witness. Saw your dad under fire and there was no fear. Not every soldier who knows no fear is a Gorkha and your dad certainly wasn't one. Bloody abnormal if you ask me. But then when was he ever happy being normal? Set his own standards and they were always higher than anyone else.

Every time we ended up going to a fire fight, he freaked me out. I was shit scared. Not for myself, but I was scared he would get hit and how would I face your mom? So I did everything I could possibly do to keep him safe while he did everything he possibly could to get involved in the fighting. He truly is a reincarnation of a fighting man. In his previous lives, he might have been fighting with Spartacus, or Alexander, Shivaji and the likes. In the front row.

Actually on the occassions we were in combat situations, everytime something really wierd would happen. I wouldn't be able to cook up these things even if I had a more fertile imagination. Real life around your dad was unusual:

- Once near Nawa Kadal, we had a cordon around a locality and a search was on. One guy in a feran was walking through the cordon. About 100 yards away. After he ignored our calls to halt, your dad asked me to fire a warning shot. A puff of dirt in front of his feet, he didn't stop. He said fire. I fired 5 aimed single shots and all missed him when he was at walking speed. Those days I had 100% hit rate at 300 m. That guy was meant to get away and live. 

- Another day, we were walking around in Rainawari when terrorists were firing on 20 SIKH columns from windows of upper floors. I heard some sound behind a building, went around and found a terrorist with an AK. I fired at him with my pistol and missed. He threw his AK down, jumped into the water and tried to swim away. I ran to the edge of the water and started to shoot. Got him with my 4th shot. Later when I was returning the weapon to kot, found that the last case had not ejected and was stuck. This guy was destined to die because if that round missed, he would have got away before I could fix the stoppage.

Whatever your religious beliefs (I was an atheist), around him, in combat situations, you would believe in destiny. Damn freaky 🙄😳

At this time I was engaged. Both families were very keen on early marriage. I kept giving excuses till we reached Dehradun. Didn't know when things could go wrong and didn't want to leave a young widow. I somehow believed then that if I survived the Srinagar ADC tenure and was able to get your dad out safe too, then for the rest of my service, I would be safe. Turned out like that.

- In Kokernag, when he got wounded, he asked me to go around the fire station building and coordinate the fire support when the assault party would move in. I went around and by the time I returned, he was crawling towards the fire station with a JCO and 6-8 men from his escort!!! Maj Gen Mallik of 8 Div was trying his best to control covering fire. Have you ever seen a Lt Gen crawling towards the enemy with a pistol in his hand (he would go towards the enemy bare handed too) and a Maj Gen trying to control 4 LMGs and giving him covering fire? Whole thing was bloody rediculous and both could have got hit. I asked Gen Mallik to stop firing to allow me to catch up with your dad, who by now was reaching the building. I just took my chances and dashed across the open ground and reached him when he was trying to get into the door which was latched from inside. I asked him what he was doing and he said let's go in and get them. The Corps Cdr wanted to lead the charge with a lousy pistol!! The he saw I was carrying 2 grenades and he asked me to hand them over. I gave him both grenades, then jumped up and smashed the glass on the ventilator above the door. He threw in both grens one after the other. I kicked the door open and went in. Behind me was one jawan with an AK and third to enter was your dad. We were going from bright light and snow to a dark and dusty verandah and we're initially blinded. From the other side of the corridor, about 20m away, a burst of AK, bullets going past me. One hit the jawan in his palm, went through, hit the barrel of his AK, splintered and these splinters went like a shower, upward, hitting your dad in his scalp. He collapsed and there was profuse blood from his head. The escort just covered his body with theirs and pulled him out of the building. I took position near the stairs to cover them. Then for the next hour, he was revived by doctor and refusing to be evacuated to Anantnag till I was brought out as well " he may need medical attention more than me". So at some point Gen Mallik and others assumed I was dead, started to bring down the building with RL fire. Truck loads of RL HE rounds were being fired into the building while I ran from one side to the other, ears not functioning after so much blast shock. Gen Mallik then told your dad that I was dead and he could leave. He did not. When I came out much later from the ashes of the building, he was as surprised to see me alive as I was to see him alive. We drove to Anantnag where a chopper was waiting to take us to Srinagar. He was taken to Base Hospital for patching up and I went to meet your mom at home. She had already been harassed by journalists asking her if it was true that Gen Zaki was no more. She had gone through this once in 1965 already so this time she was praying. When I reached her, the sight of me with soiled clothes and blood stains must have confirmed her worst fears. "Aap unke saath the AP, kaise hone diya?" Apparently her worst fear was the same as my worst fear: keeping Gen Zaki safe was not easy. Only an hour later when your dad reached home did she actually believe he was alright.

 Lots of bodies were recovered from the rubble, I was the last person to get out alive from the building. Couple of fire department employees had been killed by the terrorists. A school teacher sent in to talk to them to surrender was also killed by them. A Hav of the GR unit which was ambushed by these terrorists and had tried to sneak into the building at night to take revenge was also killed and there were other bodies under the rubble.

I think he shaped my mind more than he did yours. You were the rebel kid, questioning dad, assuming you knew better than him (you didn't then, but he was indulgent too, let you be). I was like a sponge, absorbing every word he said, never once questioning his words, actions or choices. In the end I became somewhat like him. Often in difficult situations, decision dilemmas, I would try to imagine what he would do in that situation. That was my answer. Still is.

When I came back to my unit, everyone assumed I had come back from a ceremonial ADC tenure. Few believed that I was mostly in combat fatigues and often under fire.