India's NFU: The Political Advantages of Sticking with it  

http://www.claws.in/1663/indias-nfu-the-political-advantages-of-sticking-with-it-ali-ahmed.html

The defence minister has given voice to at least two constituencies that are not comfortable with India’s ‘No first use’ (NFU) pledge. The first is a segment of the strategic community, some of whom believe - to quote a stalwart - the pledge is ‘not worth the paper it is written on’. The second is a segment of military opinion which is averse to the threat of fighting under what is perceived as an adverse situation developing in case of Pakistani first use against conventional forces. This article deals with the latter concerns.

Analysts have been at pains to point out that the Pakistani brandishing of the Nasr tactical nuclear weapon system is chimerical. It cannot stop an Indian conventional attack in its tracks since far too many would require to be used. Neither does Pakistan have such numbers, nor can it spare the many required for a tactical level strike with uncertain results. Further, it has no doubt intimately watched Indian strike corps exercises with their accent on fighting through nuclear conditions and is advisedly unlikely to tie down its limited fissile material in overkill with TNW. It is also aware that India’s economic liberalization enabled platform acquisitions have the capability of conventional degradation of TNW platforms and sites.

Consequently, Pakistan will more likely milk TNW for their deterrence benefits, one of which in Pakistani nuclear thinking is to extend the nuclear cover to also cover the conventional level. It also has political use of TNW for in peace time projecting South Asia as a ‘nuclear flashpoint’ and in conflict to catalyse external conflict termination intervention. In conflict, in light of limited numbers of both warheads and short range missiles, it could employ TNW as a tripwire, to project that its threshold has been breached so as to affect the trajectory of India’s conventional operations. In other words, though employed at the operational level of war, TNW use would be with a strategic purpose of nuclear signaling, indicating imminence of escalation, and thereby the necessity of war termination.

An opening nuclear salvo by Pakistan of a strategic attack to include counter military, counter force and counter city targeting is unlikely in light of India’s credible second strike capability. Pakistan would not delude itself that it would be able to decapitate India in such a strike or that India lacks the gumption for sound retaliation. To hit Indian strategic targets would be akin – to borrow Thomas Schelling’s words – lobbing their bombs at their very own targets, for it would be only a matter of time before India’s retaliation would take these out.

Also, the case for lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan is enhanced by the discussion on the lack of credibility of India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine promising higher order (massive) nuclear retaliation. Pakistani nuclear numbers are sufficient for putative second strike capability. Even a broken-back response by the balance of its nuclear forces after an Indian ‘massive’ nuclear retaliatory strike as promised, will set India back inordinately. While the assumption that India will survive even as Pakistan will not is a fair one, the kind of India that would survive is a consequential political consideration in staying India’s retaliatory hand in the manner promised by its official nuclear doctrine. Therefore, if higher order Indian nuclear retaliation acquires a question mark over it in case of lower order Pakistani first use, Pakistan might just chance reaching for TNW.

The greater likelihood of TNW as the form of Pakistani first use places India’s conventional forces under added nuclear threat. As seen, the TNW would unlikely impede the conventional forces inordinately, even if they may help Pakistan stymie an adverse situation developing by deft employment in conjunction with counter maneuvers by Pakistani ground forces. They can at best help wrest the initiative in a combat zone or two from India’s forces pursuing operations under the Proactive Operations doctrine. The depth in quantum and quality to India’s strategic reserves – and its partially on-road Mountain Strike Corps – lends confidence that such reverses would not unduly deflect the army from its objectives and India from its war aims. In other words, the TNW threat must be met by leadership and planning capability, i.e. operational art. The equipment profile of offensive formations must continue to measure up to attendant demands. 

Enhancing the conventional forces’ capability to cope with nuclear conditions would ease the premium on nuclear level retaliation considerations. Since these are currently predicated on strategic nuclear attack, and - as seen above - this might be inadvisable from an escalatory point of view, reducing pressures for recourse to such retaliation is sensible. Doing so enables in-lieu resort to conventional degradation options against the TNW threat. These include conventional tipped short range ballistic missiles, high accuracy cruise missiles, long range artillery, area saturation rocket artillery, Special Forces’ operations, allied proxy forces and air power. The ability for continued conventional operations in a nuclearised environment has multifaceted benefit. A host of political and diplomatic tools can be employed to take advantage of Pakistani breach of the nuclear taboo for gaining the political and moral high ground. Consequently, there is no compulsion to bottom-up demand that India rescind its NFU.

Further – as an aside here - while India’s nuclear retaliation to TNW may be useful for reinforcing deterrence by announcing India’s resolve and willingness for nuclear retaliation, there is also a counter-intuitive case for nuclear non-retaliation in case of lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan. The political benefits would be worth it. Whereas initial de-escalatory pressure would be on India to refrain from or moderate its nuclear retaliation, Indian nuclear non-retaliation will shift the focus on to Pakistan. This might help restrict further nuclear resort by it, enabling Indian conventional forces to wrap up what they might have set out to do, including conventional retaliation to TNW strikes. Post-conflict advantages would be in continued international engagement to roll back Pakistani nuclear capability. Internal to Pakistan, such reticence could provoke an accounting on the advisability on its military leadership’s decision that placed Pakistan untenably in harm’s way. This could serve to bring down the military to levels the Hamoodur Rahman commission report was unable to four decades back.

Rescinding the NFU for creating options against Pakistani TNW use is not worth it. NFU can be abandoned in the unlikely case if India is forced to preempt Pakistani first strike levels of attack designed to set back India’s retaliatory capability. Since in international law no state can be held to its international obligations in case national survival is at stake, India cannot be held to a unilateral pledge. India has no reason to ‘go first’ with nuclear weapons. This was written into the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 thus: ‘Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.’

Cumulatively, these arguments spell that if at all the nuclear doctrine needs to be tweaked, it is not NFU, but the term ‘massive’ used in relation to India’s retaliatory intent that needs excising

http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/indias-no-first-use-does-the-defense-ministers-personal-opinion-matter/

India’s Defense Minister on No First Use: What Did He Mean?

Manohar Parrikar admitted he personally questions the wisdom of NFU.

November 16, 2016

Speaking at a book release function, India’s defense minister, expressing his personal opinion, questioned India’s No First Use (NFU) pledge. Manohar Parrikar suggested that it would be sufficient for India to maintain that it would use its nuclear weapons responsibly rather than being tied down by an NFU policy. This, to him, did not imply that India would use its nuclear weapons first, and further, he clarified, that his words did not amount to a change in the nuclear doctrine.

Parrikar is reported to have stated, “I am not saying that you have to use it first just because you don’t decide that you don’t use it first. The hoax can be called off.” His argument against NFU is not entirely clear. However, even if this is a personal opinion, given that he sits in on the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority in his capacity of defense minister, his is a consequential view.

India’s Political Council is charged with nuclear decision-making, the input for which is provided by the Executive Council headed by the national security adviser. The exact composition of the Political Council is not known, though it is believed to comprise of members of the National Security Council. The defense minister would be required to provide his considered view, one dependent on the coordinates of the developing conflict situation. This is unexceptionable since strategy is distinct from doctrine, and, though informed by doctrinal tenets, strategy is not necessarily dictated by doctrine.

In case India’s NFU pledge is in question, its doctrinal benefits and its effect on nuclear strategy should be differentiated to understand whether it serves India’s purpose or needs being abandoned.

In peace time, NFU has fulfilled the purpose of projecting India as a responsible nuclear power. Though there is a nuclear arms buildup in South Asia, the pace does not amount to an arms race; this can be attributed in part to the benign effects of India’s NFU policy. It is also useful in relation to China, since China is also pledged to NFU. For these reasons India has persisted with NFU despite periodic challenges from within India’s strategic community questioning its utility.

The primary argument against NFU is that in conflict it allows the nuclear initiative to be seized by Pakistan, thereby placing India and its forces in an adverse situation. Since Pakistan has not subscribed to NFU and has by acquiring tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) projected a low nuclear threshold, Pakistani first use could blunt India’s conventional advantage. To deter Pakistan and (in case deterrence appears to be failing) preempting Pakistani nuclear first use, India would need to abandon NFU.

Currently, NFU requires a configuration of India’s nuclear forces in accordance with the retaliatory philosophy written into the official nuclear doctrine adopted in January 2003. India’s formulation is that retaliation would be “massive” and aimed at inflicting “unacceptable damage.” The phraseology is suggestive of counter value targeting. This implies a nuclear force configuration largely comprising strategic weapons. This leaves India with little choice but to escalate, even in face of the more likely manner of Pakistani nuclear first use with TNW.

Rescinding the NFU would enable an option of India nuclear first use in the form of preempting TNW use by Pakistan. Stalling Pakistan’s resort to TNW would require similar TNW use by India. This would enable both states to keep any ensuing exchange(s) non-strategic. Even if this implies a breakdown in deterrence, escalatory use can be prevented. In-conflict deterrence would remain in place, with the threat of higher-order, more hurtful, strikes held in reserve, akin to the “no cities” option of nuclear use advocated once by Nobel prize winning game theorist, Thomas Shelling.

This could furnish an exit point in the conflict, permitting nuclear exchange termination and conflict termination at a lower threshold of nuclear destruction than would otherwise be the case should India opt for default strategic strikes as currently envisaged in its declaratory nuclear doctrine.

The problem with this line of argument is that a non-strategic response does not require stepping away from NFU but can be better provisioned by instead tweaking the “massive” nuclear retaliation tenet in favor of proportional response. Thus it would appear that the NFU withstands scrutiny both in peace time and in conflict scenarios.

However, for the defense minister to worry over Pakistani nuclear first use and wish to preempt it is understandable. He is responsible for the defense services and the refrain within the military is that its conventional operations would be subject to asymmetric escalation from Pakistan. This may wrest the initiative away from the invading Indian forces and force them to fight under nuclear conditions, seen as favoring the defender. Given this, even as Pakistan readies to undertake TNW attack in a hypothetical contingency, Parrikar can be expected to be pressuring the Political Council to undertake a preemptive nuclear attack.

In case India distances itself from NFU prior to a contingency, it would have its nuclear forces duly configured to be responsive to such a nuclear decision by its Political Council. In case it has not already abandoned NFU, then the NFU would require being abandoned in conflict. This would tax the flexibility of India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC), unless it has already war-gamed the contingency and created the capability for the shift. It can reasonably be expected that the SFC has an operational doctrine envisaging such a contingency, even though it places the operational nuclear doctrine at odds with the declaratory nuclear doctrine.

From the discussion here, it appears that Parrikar might be engaging in nuclear signaling. He may be tacitly conveying to Islamabad that Pakistan’s proactive posturing of its first use intent and capability has serious implications for India’s nuclear doctrine. Though a trifle untimely amidst the current day-to-day instability in South Asia, brought about by the Uri terror attack and India’s reprisal via “surgical strike,” the positive aspect of Parrikar’s comments are that they serve to refocus attention on potential nuclear dangers in South Asia.

The nuclear doctrinal implications of 'surgical strikes'
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=60023

The nuclear doctrinal implications of 'surgical strikes'

Ali Ahmed By

'Surgical strikes' have now entered the vocabulary of the common man. However, in his cautionary observations on the 'surgical strikes' by the army in reprisal for the Uri terror attack, the former national security adviser, Shivshankar Menon, pointed out that strategic strikes are a misnomer. To him, the term is instead from the nuclear domain, such as the taking out of Iraq's nascent nuclear capability by the Israelis in a surgical strike. Even though the term has acquired a wider application and is used for military operations with little or no collateral damage, Menon's mistaken linkage of the term with nuclear operations is a useful start point to this article discussing the implications for India's nuclear doctrine of India's shift to 'strategic proactivism', heralded by the surgical strikes.

The lazy man's linkage between the two levels - subconventional at which surgical strikes took place and the nuclear level at which nuclear ordnance is exchanged - is in the seemingly easier slide into conflict, if strategic proactivism is taken at face value. A Kashmir-centric terror attack would warrant a surgical strike in retaliation; precedence having been set and an action-reaction cycle, presumably already underway in the (re) activation of the Line of Control. This is unlikely to stay 'surgical' next time round since both the Pakistani army and the terrorists would be better prepared. India consequently might require upping the ante, perhaps with greater force levels or additional vectors such as by use of air power. The result might be more messy than in the precedent, prompting the slide from crisis into conflict that has been staple for strategists over the past decade.

However, that this is not necessarily how the future might play out is clear from the very careful wording of the military operation's chief's press statement on the surgical strikes. In effect, India might not have as yet transited to strategic proactivism, even if tuning in to the brouhaha in the political spectrum over the strikes suggests that the transition is not only underway but complete.

Clearly, India is a screwdriver's turn away from strategic proactivism. The transition from its long standing strategic doctrine dubbed 'strategic restraint' to strategic proactivism is well underway and has been so for almost half a decade. The shift is from the offensive-deterrence segment of the continuum of strategic doctrines that ranges from accommodation at one end, through deterrence of the defensive and offensive variants, to compellence at the other. India has in its period of strategic restraint moved from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence.

The usage of the term strategic restraint does not reveal fully the offensive content of India's strategic doctrine over the past decade and half. Instead, its continued usage appears to indicate intent to hide the offensive content and tendency in the strategic doctrine. This may be to genuflect to India's self-image as a responsible and mature power that has historically been reticence in the use of power and force. However, the fit of this with the working of its strategic doctrine in respect of Pakistan is questionable. In respect of Pakistan, India's movement from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence began with the shift in its military doctrine from a counter offensive posture to an offensive on a short fuse, the so-called Cold Start. Cold start has since been dubbed 'proactive war strategy' or some such variant of the term.

India's effort has since been to create the wherewithal to operationalise the doctrine. It has presumably finally succeeded in doing so, after a tripling of the defence budget over this century. This accounts for the confidence that induced the 'surgical strikes'. This government has gone on to allocate Rs 5000 crore for fast track ammunition purchases and a further Rs 80000 crores for arms purchases since September. This indicates a further shift along the strategic doctrinal continuum from offensive-deterrence to compellence. The remainder of this article examines the implications for nuclear doctrine.

At the subconventional level the shift in strategic doctrine has prompted the surgical strikes. The government's going public with the ownership of the surgical strikes that were in the period of strategic restraint left covert, with the military picking up the tab for decision making. Higher up the spectrum of conflict, at the conventional level, the defence purchases for enabling conventional reprisal capability are evidence. At the nuclear level, the first salvo has been fired by the defence minister in voicing his 'personal' opinion on India's No First Use (NFU) pledge, which the defence ministry spokesperson clarified were his personal opinion not amounting to a change in nuclear doctrine . 

Even though the defence minister has long lost personal credibility owing to his foot-in-the-mouth habit, as member of the National Security Council and of the Nuclear Command Authority, his opinion is worth a pause. He opined that the NFU need not bind India when all India needed to do was assure all that its nuclear use - whether in a first use or retaliatory mode - would be in a responsible manner. Leaving aside the nuclear abolitionist's critique that responsible nuclear use is an oxymoron and the retort that adhering to the NFU is how India has traditionally exhibited that it is a responsible nuclear power, it needs establishing 'going second' makes sense even in the age of strategic proactivism.

One nuclear first use option for India is for degrading the most likely manner Pakistan is likely to 'go first' with nuclear weapons. The option is of preemption of Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) force. Even Pakistan, which does not have an NFU, understands the conventional-nuclear level distinction even as it gets its TNW into play. Indian strategists are liable to mistake the TNW as aiming at addressing the conventional asymmetry. Consequently, they err in dismissing these as operationally ineffectual. They are right in terms of the effect on the battlefield of TNW, but the purpose of Pakistan is not so much to stop a strike corps in its tracks as to use TNW for strategic signaling, for indicating its threshold unmistakably and catalyzing external conflict termination pressures . Therefore, Pakistan's action is not so much a fraying of the conventional-nuclear level boundary, but a first - distinct and decisive - step from the conventional level to the nuclear level.

India by creating the option of preempting Pakistan's TNW use ignores the conventional-nuclear divide. India's nuclear first use in this manner would be to extend cover to its conventional operations by degradation of enemy fire power means that stand to disrupt these operations. Such degradation can well be done by conventional means including long range artillery, area saturation rockets, missiles and air power.

Nuclear weapons to Using undertake what India can do with its existing and-In-the-pipeline    acquisitions is to collapse the conventional and nuclear levels. There is no compulsion to replicate the offensive shift of strategic proactivism at the nuclear level, since the nuclear level traditionally has a distinct - sacrosanct - place atop the spectrum of conflict. Ignoring this is to misread the uniqueness of nuclear ordnance as separate from conventional weaponry. It is only in case the conventional weaponry so deployed fails to deliver on keeping the conflict from going nuclear that India could consider resort to nuclear tipped Prahaar missiles. Though this has the underside of taking the conflict into nuclear warfighting domain, this is a lower order nuclear use cognizant of the nuclear level's two sublevels: non-strategic and strategic. The bright side is that such exchange ( s) are amenable to a conflict exit point while it is still in the 'No cities' (Tom Shelling) stage.

The second option of nuclear first use by India is in a wider counter force attack, including Pakistani nuclear ordnance outside of its TNW. Even if not of first strike levels or so degrading of Pakistani retaliatory capability that it is hard put to retaliate, it has every chance of escalating since collateral damage and a 'use them-lose them' logic will prompt like retaliation. This would unlikely leave India unscathed since Pakistan, through vertical proliferation, has the second strike capability, even if one not anchored on an invulnerable subsurface deterrent that is traditionally, though mistakenly taken as furnishing a second strike capability. The environmental and thereby political fallout of such a manner of nuclear first use will be such that India-as-we-know-it can not survive the consequences.

The defence minister in his frivolity has done the nation a favour. It enables a time window to educate him on nuclear nuances. Since strategic proactivism is sure to send the proverbial balloon up over the subcontinent sooner than later and the government having gotten used to 'surgical strikes' of various kinds, including demonetisation, it might just think that the nuclear level lends itself to such strikes. It is therefore only timely to disabuse a member of the Nuclear Command Authority of any such notion.

India’s NFU: Does the Defence Minister’s personal opinion matter?

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/nfu-personal-is-political/321875.html
Published under title - Personal is political

Speaking at a book launch in New Delhi, the defence minister is reported as having voiced his ‘thinking’ on one of the pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine, India’s No First Use (NFU) pledge. Though he reaffirmed there was no change in the nuclear doctrine dating to 2003, Mr. Parrikar reportedly said, ‘I am also an individual. And as an individual, I get a feeling sometime why do I say that I am not going to use it first.’ A defence ministry spokesperson clarified that alongside the defence minister confirmed that this was his personal opinion.

The defence minister’s questioning the NFU pledge appears to place him in the camp within the strategic community which advocates rescinding of India’s NFU pledge. The last time their argument came to fore was in the run up to last national elections when the BJP manifesto said that it would ‘revise and update’ India’s nuclear doctrine if it came to power. In the event, then prime ministerial candidate Mr. Modi put a lid on the matter saying that, ‘No first use is a reflection of our cultural inheritance.’

The argument in favour of junking NFU is that this would strengthen deterrence by dampening Pakistan’s nuclear ardour. Pakistan has advertised its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), conveying its intention to ‘go first’ with nuclear weapons. Pakistan hopes this would deter India’s conventional forces from making rapid and significant gains and in case deterrence fails, may help redress the conventional imbalance it views as favouring India.

In the argument against NFU, an India without NFU shackles could preempt Pakistani nuclear use, thereby preserving its forces and gains they may have made in conventional operations from Pakistani nuclear attack. An intention and capability for this would deter Pakistan from initiating steps towards nuclear first use. With Pakistan deterred, India would not need to ‘go first’ since it has the conventional wherewithal to gain its war aims. This would keep the war from going nuclear and expand the window below Pakistani nuclear threshold for conventional operations.

Those arguing for continuing the NFU opine that India’s readiness to ‘go first’ might have the reverse effect on Pakistan. Rather than deterring its TNW use, it might provoke Pakistan under ‘use them or lose them’ pressures. Its monitoring of India’s nuclear preparations might stampede Pakistan into nuclear first use.

Nuclear first use might in such a case not be with TNW against invading Indian conventional forces alone, but might be in a counter force mode, targeting nuclear forces that India might be readying for its own nuclear first use. This would in turn amount to pressure on India for a wider opening salvo, taking out Pakistani nuclear forces mounting the preemptive strike. It appears that while the current threat is of Pakistani TNW use against India’s conventional forces, removal of its NFU by India prompts a wider nuclear threat.

Between the two arguments, while rescinding NFU helps with deterrence, maintaining NFU prevents an escalatory spiral. Even if India maintains its NFU in peace time, the Political Council of India’s Nuclear Command Authority would be presented with such a choice early in an India-Pakistan conflict.

With India’s conventional forces making headway and with Pakistan preparing to blunt them with TNW, the NCA would require deliberating whether to abandon NFU and preempt Pakistan. It might not be possible to in the fog of war to discern whether Pakistan restricting itself to only to TNW or preparing for a wider first salvo. This may push the decision in favour of preemption and that too in a wider strike taking out Pakistan’s nuclear capability. It is for this reason that some analysts dismiss No First Use pledges in general and Pakistan purports to find India’s NFU pledge less than plausible.

While this might stall the immediate and present danger of first use by Pakistan, it would open up India to a similarly violent strike. Whereas India may have done counter force targeting in its nuclear first use, Pakistan retaliating with a diminished nuclear force may include counter city strikes to inflict greater pain. The end of such exchanges would of course find Pakistan worse off, but the moot question is whether the knowledge would provide India any satisfaction in light of the blows it might itself have suffered.

This brief scenario building exercise suggests that while deterrence is useful, warding off tendencies towards escalation is better. Since maintaining NFU lowers escalatory likelihood, it is better than rescinding NFU even if the latter helps with deterrence somewhat. What this suggests is that not only must NFU be maintained in peace and all indicators towards that end projected for enhancing its plausibility, it must continue to hold even in face of the inevitable spike in Pakistani first use threat in conflict.

It is for this reason that the defence minister’s personal opinion counts. He is part of the Political Council of the NCA and in that capacity would require providing his considered input. Mr. Parrikar might like to revise his opinion prior to the contingency arising.  

My reviews 

in

The Book Review

Volume XL No. 10 - OCTOBER 2016, pp. 54-55

of

NEW SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY: SIX CORE RELATIONS UNDERPINNING REGIONAL SECURITY Edited by Chris Ogden Orient BlackSwan, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 196, R750.00 

INDIA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF SELECT SEMINARS HELD BY ASIA CENTER, BANGALORE, 2007–12 Asia Center Bangalore & Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 362, R895.00

The Book Review

Volume XL No. 10 - OCTOBER 2016, pp. 54-55

Chris Ogden (ed.), New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2016, pp. 183, ISBN 978 81 250 62615

Chris Ogden, a Senior Lecturer in Asian Security at the University of St Andrews, UK, has put  together a set of six essays from experts on the ideational edifice in bilateral relations between four protagonist states in southern Asia, namely, China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. His intent appears to be to probe the extent  to which regional security environment can be managed by regional states themselves in light of the long standing intent of withdrawal of the US led NATO from Afghanistan. Based on the contributions, he concludes that there is considerable incentive for China and India to step forward and manage regional security. The slim volume, perhaps on account of space, does not however go into how such cooperation can be brought about. 

Ogden stretches the definition of South Asia by including China. This complicates his understanding that China and India can and should work together to maintain regional stability, rather than continue as interested free boarders as they have been whilst the West set about state and nation building in Afghanistan. To him, both states have a shared interest in economic growth and projection of an image of a responsible image at the global level. This would be impacted in case of regional instability emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. While China has long standing ties with Pakistan and to a slightly lesser degree with Afghanistan, India has had a deepening relationship with Afghanistan over the past decade and half. These relationships can be leveraged by the two for managing regional security.Such an effort can be under-grid by the Panchsheel principles both states signed up to over half-century back.

This is certainly desirable, but for its feasibility, a closer look at the chapters is warranted, in particular the ones on bilateral relations between the two in first place and the bilateral relations of each with Pakistan. The chapter on India-China relations brings out the manner China viewsIndia’s deepening relationship with the US. To China, India is participating in US’ containment of China. India for its part appears to be engaged in external balancing, viewing China’s actions in the Indian Ocean and its relationship with Pakistan as containment by China of India’s rise in Asia and on the global stage. Simultaneously, there is also a broadening of India-China engagement ranging from economic to coordination on global issues such as climate change and WTO. It is not evident from the editor’s summation how these convergences would be able to trump the disruptions over territorial claims, divergences intrinsic in a power rivalry and, further, how manipulation by the US can be transcended by the two.

David Scott’s chapter on the relationship is much less buoyant. While Scott sees continuing incidence of geopolitical divides, these appear to elide Ogden, who thereby appears bent on situating his belief that the West can conveniently hand over the mess it has created in Afghanistan to regional state ministration.Michael Semple’s chapter on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, encapsulated in its title as ‘Torbor’ or the all-too-familiar cousin rivalry, further complicates Ogden’s thesis that a regional solution is possible.

The second set of relations – India, China, Pakistan – puts paid to Ogden’s optimism. India under a majoritarian nationalist government is unlikely to concede any space to Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan, with its India and Afghanistan policies handled by its military, cannot but see evidence of India’s attempt to prevail in the region by using Afghanistan as proxy. The military there sees its quest for strategic space whittled. The mutually hostile perspectives are well covered by Runa Das in her chapter that divides the post independence era into five phases, each with its distinct reinforcing of the self/other nationalist identity constructions in both states.To expect Chinese to temper Pakistan, consequent to a hoped for China-India convergence on Afghanistan, is wishful when the US has visibly failed in this.

Ogden makes reference to the SCO as a prospective body to play an expansive role in stabilizing Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and India joined the China dominated SCO only this year. Afghanistan is lined up as the next to have its observer status upgraded to full member. That there is scope for regional approaches through the SCO acquiring the dimension of an Asia wide architecture –the first such body – is useful to know. Its role can be thought through and broadened through the Heart of Asia conference series of the Istanbul process that bring together all stakeholders in the resolution. The other regional organization, the SAARC, gets scarce mention, though it was formed in the shadow of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. South Asia being the least integrated region in the world rules it out as a potential site for regional consensus – China’s observer status notwithstanding - of the order required to reconcile conflicting interests.

Ogden rightly rues that any win-win form of interaction is not a straightforward eventuality owing to the nature of regional relations and the core norms of competition that underpin these. To him, the ‘negative strains permeating the six bilateral relations’ act as ‘founts of instability’ (p. 143). However, the book makes a compelling case that despite this – or rather because of this – there is need for greater regional engagement with the main issue in regional stability.

Answering ‘How?’ would entail getting the Taliban come in from the cold; a return the US could not fathom owing to the reputational risk this posed the hyper power. Taliban’s return - as a moderated entity - is not impossible to envisage in case its demand of a US exit is met. An Afghan led and owned peace process is fine only in its peacemaking plane. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding would need to follow. The SAARC houses the world’s peacekeeping prowess. South Asian militaries have cooperated in bringing peace in Africa. An SCO-SAARC regional peacekeeping initiative, under UN auspices, may provide the mechanism for a return of peace. Afghanistan can serve as catalyst for an Asian regional order.

The book makes the constructivist argument on the ideational basis for foreign policy. Conflictual relations owe to negative mindsets. It makes the case that states can move beyond this by looking at the benefits of cooperation. China’s revival of Silk Road linkages can hardly be met with an unsettled Afghanistan. Its investment of USD 45 billion in Pakistan astride the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is hardly safe in case of an unstable Pakistan. India for its part cannot become a great power if it remains Pakistan centric. It cannot access Central Asia unless Pakistan plays along. The benefits of security cooperation appear obvious enough to prompt a makeover in adversarial thinking. Such Ogden-initiated thinking needs being furthered through creatively charting the way forward, including, as attempted here, by a South Asian peacekeeping operation to displace the US-led NATO’s peace enforcement in Afghanistan.    

The future of ‘full spectrum deterrence’

http://www.claws.in/1651/the-future-of-full-spectrum-deterrence-ali-ahmed.html

If strategic commentary in India in wake of the surgical strikes in retaliation for the Uri terror attack is to be believed, it is not going to be business as usual either for Pakistani security handlers in Rawalpindi or for their foot-soldiers of both hues - regulars and irregulars - on the frontline.  While those at the frontlines would likely be up at night hereon, like their Indian counterparts over the past quarter century, the brass in Rawalpindi would likely be in a huddle as to what the implications of the surgical strikes are for their concept of ‘full spectrum deterrence’. This article is intended to assist them in their confabulations on the future of full spectrum deterrence.

First, what is full spectrum deterrence? Full spectrum deterrence is Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine adopted to rationalize its acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. Their first nuclear doctrine mirrored India’s: minimum credible deterrence. However, with India’s shift in its conventional capability towards proactive operations – colloquially dubbed Cold Start - being demonstrated over series of exercises over the 2000s, Pakistan felt that it needed to deploy nuclear cover to paper over the growing conventional gap.

Unlike India, Pakistan has always subscribed to the NATO ‘first use’ philosophy of nuclear deterrence in that nuclear weapons are to deter war, including at the conventional level. In the early nuclear period, the nineties, mindful that India had three strike corps, Pakistan was liable to use nuclear weapons in the case of threat of being overrun in a conventional offensive by India. The lessons of 1971 for it were writ large on this doctrine. The possibility of nuclear use in extremis and was held out to deter India at the conventional level. Since India’s was a No First Use doctrine and India had the conventional capability preclude nuclear use, the premium on deterring India’s nuclear weapons was much lower. Quite like India’s doctrine, it was reckoned as one of city busting in light of few numbers of warheads and delivery systems.

Once it had the opportunity to go overtly nuclear, as a consequence of Pokharn II and presumably having more warheads and missiles in its armoury a decade and half since going nuclear covertly, its doctrine graduated to being one of using nuclear weapons in the eventuality of suffering ‘large’ losses in territory, forces, war economy and in case of externally generated internal instability. In one version of a graduated response, the shift was from counter city to also include counter military targeting. These were spelt out to reinforce deterrence at a time when India’s military was in a mobilized state in Operation Parakram. The noteworthy point was that the threshold was pitched somewhat high – to three of the four parameters ‘large’ had been tagged. Realizing that this gave a largish window to India’s forces below the nuclear threshold if pitched relatively high, Pakistan prevaricated soon after the famous interview by its then Strategic Plans Division chief, Khalid Kidwai. From counter-city

On retiring, Kidwai went on to put out a revised doctrine. The doctrine takes Cold Start more seriously than some Indian strategists. Pointing to the lack of military response to the mass casualty 26/11 attacks, these skeptical Indian strategists believe that India has not yet reached the capability levels called for by proactive operations since they posit a quick, telling, preferably jointly-delivered, blow, but not one that would make Pakistan reach for the nuclear trigger. Believing the cottage industry that built round Cold Start – that included this writer – Pakistan believed – perhaps self-interestedly – that India espied a window for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold. Pakistan then sought to draw the nuclear cloak more tightly round itself. The much-vaunted Nasr was trotted out - with a neutron bomb as warhead if its information warfare is to be taken at face value - to seal the so-called window shut. Now it is mostly counter military targeting in its  first blows, with counter city to serve as checkmate to India’s official formulation: ‘massive retaliation’. Last October, with a statement from its foreign office spokesperson and follow-on clarifications from its foreign secretary, Pakistan went public with this doctrine.

That India’s retaliation to the Uri attack was as precise as limited, might suggest to Pakistan that its doctrine is working. Lack of a heavier punch in the surgical attacks, might make it believe that it has managed to credibly extend nuclear deterrence to the conventional level. It needs timely reminding that such attacks are taken as below the conventional threshold, as defined in India’s subconventional operations doctrine. Though the doctrine characterizes these as subconventional, it does not discuss them any further owing to confidentiality.

From the internal political fallout of the attacks, these attacks are reportedly not quite a departure from earlier operations along the Line of Control. What appears different this time round is public acknowledgement of these. All that the pre-emptive attacks – retaliatory to some – imply is that while there is little change from earlier, implicit in the information operations attending them that there is messaging intrinsic to them.

The message is that these constitute a step up. In some analyses, these constitute a ‘crossing’ of some sorts; perhaps an internal psychological hurdle for Indian planners and decision makers. So while they may not by themselves herald the end of strategic restraint or beginning of strategic proactivism – as goes the debate – they suggest that more shall follow. Their success, its advertisement and political fracas that they have set off, incentivizes higher force packaging in successive iterations. This should ring alarm bells in Pakistan on the forthcoming blurring of the transition between the subconventional and conventional threshold. So, even if to Pakistan, deterrence works at the middle order and upper ends of the conventional threshold, its lower end stands frayed.

In Pakistan’s mind’s eye, full spectrum deterrence might have covered the subconventional level. Yet, the surgical strikes make clear that the nuclear deterrence cannot be stretched so as to cover that level. That such strikes have occurred earlier indicates that Pakistan is well aware of this already. By this yardstick, its term ‘full spectrum deterrence’ is somewhat of a misnomer. Pakistan’s own remonstrations with India on supposed Indian intelligence operations involving proxy Pukhtun and Baluch forces also surely prove to it that nuclear deterrence does not quite work at that subconventional level.

This is a trivial point to make since it is rather well known that nuclear bombs are unlikely to deter terrorism – as India so well knows. But then, ‘full spectrum’ is Pakistan’s claim, and hopefully, it is not self-delusive. Whereas so far India’s nuclear armoury has been unable to deter Pakistan at this level, the shoe is now apparently on the other foot, with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons unable – taking its allegations at face value - to keep India from putting its money where its mouth is: in Baluchistan for one.

To sum up, the change the surgical strikes have brought about is in removing the buffer between subconventional and conventional levels. In its review, Pakistan would do well, firstly, to revise its terminology – ‘full’ spectrum deterrence - since it is at best over a partial, even if a substantial, part of the spectrum. Secondly, given that heavier quantum attacks by India might succeed future terrorist outrages, Pakistan would be hard put not to retaliate conventionally. While not doing so would make its military lose face, the gainers would be jihadists claiming that they are the ones without bangles on. Consequently, conventional riposte – even if limited - by Pakistan, might force India to escalate conventionally, since Pakistan’s military does not have the luxury of hitting soft targets on this side. In other words, Pakistan would have itself dismantled its deterrent hedge at the conventional level. Lastly, India’s escalating in retaliation suggests that tactical nuclear weapons might not be able to prevent war after all. In case of their use in war, they cannot be expected to prevent nuclear retaliation either, even if the quantum of such nuclear retaliation invites debate in India.

From all this surely, it cannot escape Pakistan that full spectrum deterrence stands largely tattered by the surgical strikes. Should it now not be accorded a semi-decent military burial?  

How much of a departure since Uri?

http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=58214

Both India and Pakistan have notched a point each from their showing in the Uri terror attack episode. While the Indian military true to form, executed a commendable military operation, following it up with an equally precise press statement by its military operations head, the Pakistani military was wily enough not to pick the bait.

If the story was to end on this note, with Pakistan being suitably impressed by Indian resolve and proceeding to wrap up the terror infrastructure, it  would be game-set-and-match for the Modi-Doval duo and their supposed junking of the doctrine of strategy restraint in favour of strategic  proactivism. However, it can be reckoned that consummate Pakistan-watcher Doval surely knows that this is not the case, at least not before much water flows down the River Jhelum, on the banks of which rests Uri.

If that be the case, it would be naïve to attribute the aim of the operation as being pressuring Pakistan to roll back terror. It at best perhaps heralds that the earlier perception of impunity of Pakistani terror handlers and perpetrators is on notice. Even this might be rather ambitious, since terror handlers are unlikely to be roughing it out in camps close to the Line of Control (LoC). Along the LoC, at best foot soldiers might be found, and even they if not well back, would here on be more alert.

Therefore, future  such operations will unlikely be as surgical as this time round, and might on the contrary, end up rather messy, not  excluding the targets hit who might  well turn out to be civilians with no choice but to eke out  an existence in dangerous places. If and since terror handlers, inciters and profiteers shall remain unscathed and foot soldiers incentivized by the promise of a befitting martyrdom, militarily strategic proactivism does not portend much by way of strategic dividend.

This begs the question of what then was the aim.

The advertised aim of conditioning Pakistan is only possible to pull off in case of follow through with more-of-the-same in case of future provocations. With the resolve having been demonstrated, it sets up a commitment trap of sorts that entails a progressive increase in violence of retaliation. However, from the very limited nature of the operation just concluded, it is evident that the Indian military is attuned to the escalatory dynamics more rigorous operations might entail. In effect, the operation was a one-off, and not replicable with like benefit. If it heralds a shift in strategic doctrine as vaunted, then the new doctrine is suspect, and to put it mildly in one famous phrase, is ‘un-implementable’.

There is one other dimension of a possible externally oriented aim. It could be influence the international community to pressure Pakistan. The efficacy of this is difficult to imagine in light of the problem external players have had in dissuading Pakistan from supporting insurgency in Afghanistan, where their aims were directly affected. They can lean on Pakistan to display restraint in reaction to such operations in future – as has been done on this occasion - but are unlikely to be able to go beyond their known remonstrations against Pakistani supping with terrorists. If India were to be more venturesome militarily, it would be left to fend for itself, with none to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. In case the situation does come to the crunch, not only will terror rollback figure, foregrounding international pressures on Pakistan, but so would ‘root causes’, implying India would not be left off the hook. Since alongside military operations, strategic proactivism entails obfuscating ‘core issues’, by diversionary references to PoK and other areas of erstwhile J&K, there is an inherent contradiction between the military and diplomatic prongs of the newly minted strategy. Unfolding of its military prong would impact negatively on the diplomatic prong.

Since all this could have been easily discernible from any strategic analysis preceding the trans-LC foray, the purported aims of the operation – as external oriented – come under question. In fact, the logic of the supposedly abandoned doctrine of strategic restraint was all along precisely this: that militarily little can be done; therefore, other ways to approach the twin problems of Pakistan and Kashmir, including by meaningful conflict resolution internally and externally, need being broached. In fact the timorous manner of the operation, that allowed Pakistan to pretend that it did not occur at all, indicates that the verities of strategic restraint remain sound. In fact, the strict limitations attending the military operation, including public mention that it is not being continued further, indicates a genuflection of the military operation to strategic restraint. This reveals the supposed shift to a new doctrine of strategic proactivism is more of an information war smokescreen.

This brings one back to the question as to the aim of the operation. The aim, not being externally oriented, can only then have been directed internally: towards the public. The somewhat decisive UP elections are nigh. The strongman image of the prime minister needed refurbishing, under the persistent challenge not only from Pakistani terror provocations but also from political opponents bent on calling the bluff. This implies a military operation has been undertaken with an eye on internal politics. In the event, all parties have jumped on the jingoistic bandwagon, even those that subscribed earlier to the doctrine of strategic restraint. Internal politics appears to have trumped strategy. While this is indeed an abiding possibility in democratic states, the fact needs acknowledging. Pointing this out helps clothe up timely.

In other words, the new Pakistan-centric doctrine of strategic proactivism has its impetus less in the external strategic environment, but more so in the internal politics of this country. The driver appears to be the need for democratically establishing an unassailable dominance of the right wing political formations, prerequisite for the wider cultural nationalist project. The external aspect of this project is to emerge as the regional hegemon, by vanquishing Pakistan. But the fact that strategic proactivism cannot bypass the parameters set by the nuclear age and relative strengths on the subcontinent, suggests strategic proactivism cannot but have an ideological pedigree. The discipline of Strategic Studies informs that ideology undercuts strategic rationality.  

The problem with strategic proactivism lies in its success. The more successful it gets, the more the insecurity. For instance, the success of the recent military operation might suggest military options have efficacy. The next one might be less mindful of limitations, preventing Pakistan from playing deaf. Success could prove pyrrhic. This formed the intellectually sustainable basis of the strategic doctrine of strategic restraint. So long as strategic proactivism is yet another information war gimmick, directed not so much at Pakistan but a media-lulled electorate, it may not be particularly troubling. It would get to be so in case strategic minders in Sardar Patel Bhawan take it as seriously as its votaries in op-eds.