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Tuesday, 3 July 2012
Thursday, 28 June 2012
The Army: Missing Muslim India
MAINSTREAM, VOL L NO 27, JUNE 23, 2012
by ALI AHMED
This article begins with a set of statistics and thereafter proceeds to discuss these. The Platinum Jubilee issue of the magazine of the Indian Military Academy, published in 2007, has some revealing tidbits of information. From the lists of various officer alumni who have done the Academy proud, it is obvious that Muslims are few and far between. Only six Muslim officers, who have passed out of the IMA, have made the supreme sacrifice for the country since the 1971 War. Only one, late Captain Haneefuddin of Kargil fame, has been awarded a higher gallan-try medal, a Vir Chakra, ever since then. Only one Muslim Gentleman Cadet has won the Academy’s Sword of Honour post-independence, with the award being won way back in 1973.
These achievements appear somewhat meagre in the light of the Indian Muslims forming the country’s largest minority numbering over 175 million. It naturally raises the question: Why?
An answer can seen in a further set of statistics gleaned from the biannual magazines of the Indian Military Academy, published at the end of the Spring and the Autumn terms respectively. In the magazines a one-line pen-portrait is given of each Gentleman Cadet (GC) passing out, below the course photo of each company (equivalent of a House in schools). From the two magazine issues in 2005, it is evident that only eight Muslims passed out of the portals of the institution to become commissioned officers. In the Spring Term 2006, there were eight Muslims commissioned. In the Spring Term 2007, nine Muslims took the ‘Antim Pag’ or ‘Last Step’ as GCs but their first step as commissioned officers out of the 555 taking commission that term. The following Spring Term, 11 Muslim GCs passed out of 611. In the Autumn Term 2011, the latest one for which the magazine is available, 14 Muslims passed out. However, this last figure includes those from friendly foreign countries such as Afghanistan, the numbers for which have gone up since the strategic agreement with that country.
In other words, of the six magazines perused for ascertaining the numbers of Muslims gaining the officer commission from the IMA, 45 have made the grade. Assuming some were from foreign countries, less than 40 Indian Muslims have made it over two-and-a-half years into the Army from the IMA, that commissions more than 1200 officers a year. This compares somewhat poorly with the civil services yearly list on which 30 Muslims figured this year amongst about 900 who ‘made it’. Admittedly, there are other routes for officer commission these days into the Army, such as through the Officers Training Academy and through the Technical Officer 12th class entry stream. This means that the numbers making it into the Army are marginally higher and must be viewed against the total getting commissioned in a year, which a back-of-the-envelope calculation puts at 1800 plus a year.
Clearly, the overall number can only be as abysmal as the statistics accessed here reveal. While reckonings elsewhere place the percentage of Muslims at three per cent of the overall total of Muslims in the Army, the statistics in regard to officer numbers have been uninformed guesses at best. It is perhaps for the first time here that a figure of about 1.1 per cent of officer commissions being of Indian Muslims has been arrived at. The numbers of Muslim women officers can easily be imagined, with the OTA magazine being the right place to look for exact numbers in the absence of the government owing up to a problem.
The absence of information suggests that the statistics that are no doubt known to the government are somewhat embarrassing to reveal from the point of view of India’s and its Army’s secular credentials. It is no wonder then that a former Chief, General J.J. Singh, had put his foot down in revealing the details of Muslim representation in the Army when approached by the Sachar Committee for its report. The laconic answer given then was that the Army, being a secular institution, does not maintain such records. This explanation begged the question of how the mortal remains of dead soldiers were to be disposed-off in a war if the community to which a dead soldier belonged was not known?!
The intake being so limited into the commi-ssioned ranks, it is no wonder then that the martial achievements of Muslim officers can be covered in less than a paragraph as in the first paragraph here. The Autumn Term 2011 issue can be mined for more telling statistics. For instance, not a single Muslim name occurs in the list of names below the group photos of the Academy faculty, the administrative staff, the training team and, worse, even the academic department. This is the same case in the Spring Term 2008. Among the non-officer instructor staff in the drill, physical training, weapons training and equitation sections, there are nine Muslim instructors. Incidentally, even at this non-officer level there are no Muslims in the consequential Training section. The relative absence of Muslims is of a piece with the fact given in the Platinum Number that the IMA has had only one Muslim Commandant and one Muslim Subedar Major post-independence. (For the record the National Defence Academy, a feeder institution to the IMA, has had two Muslim Commandants.)
•
WHILE the numbers are few, the performance of Muslims at the Academy is also revealing. All six magazines carry photos and write-ups of the 34 top GC appointments, no doubt as incentive. Of the 136 appointments scanned only one was Muslim. Beginning with this leadership deficit, it is easy to reckon as to why there were no officer instructors in the two terms examined, 2008 and 2011. Not tenanting such prestigious appointments early on, the problem persists with very few making it to the higher ranks. This is accentuated by the steep pyramidal structure that the Army has. In other words, there is a cascading effect of the deficit of Muslim youth making it to the Indian Military Academy and beyond. The Army’s stock answer to this can be anticipated. The Army merely selects from those self-selecting to it as a profession. The onus is on India’s various communities to offer up their best youth for the noble profession of arms. This could easily have been accepted but for two facts. One is that General V.K. Singh’s exertions over the past year suggest that ‘community’ is a consequential factor, at least in the higher ranks. The second is that, given this under-representation, it is clear that this is compensated by over-representation of some other communities. What are the effects of such under/over-representation?
In case the answer to this question is found to be negative and consequential, then there is a case for correction. This is a controversial point to make since it is suggestive of affirmative action. This is not how this article recommends corrective action. But, first, it is necessary to ascertain whether a diverse country such as India is better off with its Army reflecting its diversity. The reflexive answer of a traditionalist would be, ‘Why fix what ain’t broke?’ In other words, if the Army is working as an apolitical and secular organisation, there is no need to tinker with it. The answer offered here is an impressionistic one to the contrary. It is that the internal health of the Army does not give ground for comp-lacence. The Army officer corps is from the lower middle class and confined geographically to North India and more narrowly to a certain set of communities traditionally advantaged by the recruitment patterns over at least a century-and-a-half. The officer corps will therefore reflect the opinions and attitudes of the social class to which it belongs. It is no secret that there has been a churning in Indian society over the past two decades, brought about by liberalisation and the ascendance of cultural nationalism. This influence has been in the face of the Army’s involvement in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism in J&K. While, as is the wont of armies universally, the Indian Army can be expected to exhibit a conservative-realist bias, this is accentuated by the social origin of the officer class. The discourse in this social space has the Muslim ‘Other’ taking on greater dimensions, the proportions of which have been enhanced by the global security discourse centred on Muslim extremism. A terror-based ‘inside-outside’ linkage between the Muslim Indian and Pakistani intelligence, sought to be established by the media and some political formations, has greater play than otherwise would be the case. A content analysis of in-service publications can prove this to an extent. (That is not gone in here for want of space.) The absence of Muslims from an officer’s social space as colleagues and peers does little to dispel misinterpretations. The problem that occurs is in the perception of the social class in which the officer corps is anchored being elevated to the institutional threat perception and at one remove that of the state.
The disadvantage for under-represented communities is that they are unable to take advantage of the expansion in the security sector, incidentally the only sector growing in neoliberal climes. The Sixth Ppay Commission bonanza thus gets channelled narrowly to those advantaged, reinforcing the inequity. Given that Muslims have been shown up as under-represented here and knowing that most are from the equivalent of backward classes, it can be surmised that the problem afflicts the backward classes in general as well as SC/STs, given that the military does not have reservations (and rightly so). This means that the only government sector that is expanding caters for a certain section of society. (The Army has expanded by two divisions over the past three years and is set to add 86,000 men as part of a mountain strike corps over the next five year plan.) Continuing with the present intake pattern can deepen divides.
It is therefore with a view to correcting this perceptual and attitudinal bias that it is recommended here that the telling statistic of a mere one-to-two per cent of officers being Muslim be taken seriously by both the state and Muslim community. As a first step, the pattern of intake must be ascertained in-house to find out if what is surmised here carries water. Its implications, as discussed, can also be thought through. The Army, if the reasoning given in the previous paragraph is persuasive, must for its own reasons carry out a campaign to make itself attractive to a whole host of communities that are under-represented. These include those from the North-East and South India, leave alone Muslims. Civil-military liaison conferences in these States must be geared to energising the State administration to take corrective measures. This could include establishing Sainik Schools, increasing the representativeness of Sainik and Military school intake etc.
Additionally, commu-nities, such as India’s various Muslim commu-nities across the country, can rig up swotting classes to help its youth qualify and clear the induction hurdles. This is how States over-represented in the officer cadre prepare the youth. The Chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia and the Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim Universities, coincidentally being military men, can guide the community’s reaction. Affirmative action is not being suggested here, only targeted advertisement campaigns being followed up suitably by state and civil society action.
Ali Ahmad, Ph.D, is an Assistant Professor, Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
The Exit from ‘AfPak’: Don’t Blame Pakistan
by Ali Ahmed
June 27, 2012
New Delhi — At its Chicago summit, NATO read out what has been the writing on the wall all through Obama’s first term. It is that its departure from Afghanistan is inevitable, with the addition being that it is now imminent. That this has not unfolded according to script is cause for some hand wringing among commentators. Ashley Tellis, Christine Fair and Robert Kaplan have in quick succession sought to point to Pakistan as spoilsport, with the former dwelling on Pakistan’s impending strategic defeat. Will his hope materialize?
All through the war in its vicinity, Pakistan has been scalded, but has avoided being burnt. The much reviled Musharraf took a wise decision by siding with the west. In retrospect, it seems as though it was the only choice he had. The blame for the west’s inability to push through its agenda of peace-building has been laid at Pakistan’s door. Its provision of sanctuary to the Taliban is taken as a willful challenge. Yet again Pakistan may have had little choice in this since it would have been unable in any case to wrap up the Taliban and their Pakistani affiliates. If the west could not succeed despite the ‘surge’, it is too much to expect of the Pakistan army to have had a better showing. From these two strategic choices made by the Pakistan army, based on a clear understanding of its limitations, it is clear that Pakistan can be credited with doing at least some things right.
So where does the responsibility lie? It is with Obama’s inability to convert the military surge into political gain. The surge was meant to represent the stick as part of a carrot and stick policy. It was to be supplemented by Pakistani army actions on its side of the Durand line, thereby choking the Taliban. In the event, the Taliban by forging a joint front with its ethnic fellows in Pakistan and Punjabi extremists, has been able to confront Pakistan with a dilemma: the more close it got to finishing the Taliban off in keeping with the desires of the west, the less stable it would get. The terror bombings in the later part of the last decade suggest as much. Pakistan, valuing its own survival above any doles the west could spare for its efforts, chose strategic prudence. Its holding out for an apology over the killings of 24 of its soldiers by U.S. forces at best provides a cover.
The gratuitous advice it has been at the receiving end of assumes that it could have gone the distance in taking on the Taliban. The west had got India on board to wind down tensions over time, after the spike in wake of the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. This was to enable Pakistan to transfer its attention to the western front. Could the Pakistan army have succeeded as per western expectations?
Firstly, the terrain is forbidding. It has been seen in Kashmir where the going is easier and the foe is less formidable, that it takes considerable troop strength. Pakistan does not have those levels of troops, even if it could spare them entirely from the eastern border. Secondly, the tentacles that the Taliban has acquired due to anti-Americanism in Pakistan and religious extremism enable it to expand the arc of instability at will to include Lahore and Karachi. This would have stretched Pakistan’s suppressive capabilities to the extent of challenging their institutional integrity by internal ethnic and ideological fissures. If the Pakistan army cracked, then Pakistan could have gone under, there being no forces of equivalent strength in polity. This would have been to the advantage of extremists. That the Pakistan army judged the possible outcome and refrained from provoking it, is to its credit.
The expectation that Pakistan not playing ball has led to dissipation of the promise of the surge is therefore not a fair one. If Pakistan could arrive at a conclusion that it could at best be supportive and not hyperactive, the possibility should not have escaped Pentagon planners. To compensate they really should have weighed the carrot part of the strategy appropriately. This means that the peace process needed to have been an equally significant prong of strategy. It was instead geared to create fissures in the Taliban between the ‘good’ and irreconcilable Taliban. It was outsourced to the Karzai regime, with its notable legitimacy deficit as far as the intended interlocutors, the Taliban, were concerned. Their attitude was evident from the efforts of Karzai’s pointsman, Burhanuddin Rabbani, being rewarded with assassination. Only later, did U.S. special envoy Marc Grossman, the successor to Richard Holbrooke, get into the act; a case of too little too late. While it cannot be said for certain that the Taliban would have proved responsive, persistence with the military option, in the tradition of the actions post 9/11, foreclosed any possibility of finding out.
The US was either a victim of its own hubris or strategically ineffective due to its internal politics and institutional fights. Obama, having wound down the Iraq war, perhaps needed an arena to prove he was tough. The bureaucratic tussle, set off by the reaction to 9/11, between Foggy Bottom, Langley and Pentagon, played out in dysfunctional policies towards ‘AfPak’. The responsibility for a suboptimal outcome can hardly be laid at Pakistan’s door, even if, in election year, Obama needs a fall guy.
Highlighting this is important, since the refrain in the commentaries cited and extant largely is that Pakistan has stabbed the west in the back, despite receiving $ 20 billion as incentive. A consensus over the consequence for such double dealing is being built up in terms of pushing Pakistan over the brink, the euphemisms used being ‘containing’, ‘isolating’ etc. Pakistan needs being wary of an embarrassed superpower. It can safely be predicted that the ability of the army to hold steady despite internal political disarray, demonstrated in weathering a decade long storm along both its external and internal axes, will now be sorely tested.
Wednesday, 20 June 2012
Why are Muslims missing from Army?
By Ali Ahmed
Financial Times, 16 June 2012
THE COMMEMORATIVE
platinum jubilee issue of the
Indian Military Academy magazine
tells us that only six Muslim
officers who have passed out of ima
have made the supreme sacrifice for the
country since the 1971 war. Only one, late
Captain Haneefuddin of Kargil fame, has
been awarded a higher gallantry medal, a
Vir Chakra, since then. Only one Muslim
gentleman cadet has won the academy’s
sword of honour post-independence. Such
meagre statistics for a minority community
comprising 13 percent of India naturally
raises the question: Why?
Gen JJ Singh declined to permit access
to the statistics on the numbers of
Muslims in the army to the Sachar Committee.
The reason was that the army, as
a secular institution, does not maintain
religion-based statistics. However, that
it has such records is self-evident since it
needs to know how to dispose off the mortal
remains of deceased soldiers in war.
Presumably, it has never got round to toting
these up. This could well turn out to be
a wise decision, since the numbers would
have proved embarrassing to the secular
credentials of India and its army.
One educated guesstimate puts the figure
of Muslims in the army at 29,000 or 2.5
percent. To arrive at the number of officers,
the consequential ranks, the biannual
magazines of the Indian Military Academy
provide an opening. The magazines carry
a one-line pen portrait of each gentleman
cadet (gc). From a study of six issues over
the recent past (2005-11), it is evident only
45 have made it to the ‘antim pag’ or final
step to the cadences of Auld Lang Syne.
The figure includes those from friendly
foreign countries such as Afghanistan.
Since the ima commissions over 1,300
gcs a year, this implies that just about
one per cent Muslims gain the officers’
commission from the Academy.
Admittedly, there are other routes for
officers’ commission. This means that the
numbers making it are marginally higher
and must be viewed against the 1,800 getting
commissioned a year. The number
of Muslim women officers can be easily
imagined. These compare somewhat
poorly with the civil services list on which
30 Muslims figured this year amongst
about 900 that ‘made it’.
Not only are Muslims few, but are also
wanting in leadership potential. Of the 136
gc appointments scanned in the six biannual
issues, only one was Muslim. Beginning
with this leadership deficit, it is easy
to reckon as to why there were no officer
instructors in two terms (2008 and 2011)
examined by studying faculty photos.
There is not a single Muslim name in the
training faculty, the administrative staff
and worse, even the academic department.
Among the non-officer instructors
there are nine Muslims. Not tenanting
such prestigious appointments early on,
the problem persists with very few making
it to higher ranks. The academy has
had only one Muslim Commandant and
one Subedar Major since Independence.
In other words, there is a cascading effect
of the deficit of Muslim youth making it to
officer ranks.
Assimilating these facts, first one has to
ascertain whether a diverse country such
as is India is better off with its army reflecting
its diversity. The reflexive answer
of a traditionalist can easily be anticipated:
If the army is working as an apolitical and
secular organisation, there is no need to
‘tinker’ with it.
A VIEW TO the contrary would be
that there is a double disadvantage
to under-representation: one is that
fewer numbers represent a handicap at the
standing start, and second is not gaining
access to consequences of representation
such as the Sixth Pay Commission bonanza.
The former makes the equity gap only
widen, adding to the deficit at the start.
This makes the representativeness of
the army, or otherwise, a political question.
While affirmative action is not the
answer, an internal review by the ministry
can throw up any attitudinal and structural
biases these statistics suggest. As a first
step, the army must carry out a campaign
to attract a whole host of under-represented
communities, such as those from
the Northeast. This has been done by the
central armed police forces over the past
decade of expansion that has brought up
Muslim numbers to 6 percent. Additionally,
Muslims can set up swatting classes to
help its youth.
The courts cannot be oblivious to the
fact that India’s Muslims are well-represented
only in prison statistics, comprising
19 percent of inmates. The government
must gear up political courage to put the
courts, and wider society, wise to facts that
otherwise stare India in the face.
Ali Ahmed is Assistant Professor,
Jamia Millia Islamia
AL
Wh
Wednesday, 13 June 2012
Civil-Military Relations: Questioning the
VK Singh Thesis http://www.ipcs.org/article/army/civil-military-relations-questioning-the-vk-singh-thesis-3638.html | ||
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Monday, 4 June 2012
Elevate Human Rights as the
Core Organising Principle in
Counter Insurgency
Ali Ahmed
Issue Brief IDSA
http://www.idsa.in/?q=system/files/PB_HumanRights.pdf
‘You must remember that all the people of the area in which you are operating are fellow
Indians. They may have different religions, pursue a different way of life, but they are
Indians and the very fact, that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of
India’s greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken up arms against
their own people and are disrupting peace of this area. You are to protect the mass of the
people in the area from these disruptive elements. You are not to fight the people in the
area but to protect them.’ - COAS Special Order of the Day 1955
1
Introduction
The Indian Army’s Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO)
2
comes up for review
next month, five years after its publication. When it was written, it had the section on
Low Intensity Conflict in the Indian Army Doctrine as guide and half a century of counter
insurgency experience to inform it.
3
The iteration this time has the Joint Doctrine for Sub
Conventional Operations
4
(JDSCO) to inform the reappraisal along with the past half decade
in putting the doctrine, dubbed ‘iron fist in velvet glove’, into practice.
5
The reappraisal
will no doubt benefit from the introspective input provided by the internal environment,
as mandated by the procedure for doctrine revision. The forthcoming publication may
also find useful the sometimes critical commentary from outside the military.
6
This Brief
is to constructively help inform the doctrinal revision underway.
7
The Brief advocates centring of the doctrine around the human rights imperative. This is
largely the case since ‘Upholding Human Rights’ is acknowledged in the JDSCO as one
of the ‘Principles of SCO (Sub Conventional operations)’.
8
Arriving at a ‘reasonable and
pragmatic balance between the demands of military necessity and humanity’
9
is
1 Rajesh Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counter Insurgency, New Delhi:
Routledge, 2007, p. 147. The Order was in wake of the army being called upon for counter insurgency
operations in Nagaland.
2 HQ ARTRAC, Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, Shimla: ARTRAC, 2007.
3
Section 14 of Chapter 5 in HQ ARTRAC, Indian Army Doctrine, Shimla: ATRAC, 2004.
4 HQ Integrated Defence Staff, Joint Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, New Delhi: HQ IDS, 2010.
5
Foreword by General JJ Singh, Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO), p. i. He states: ‘I have
emphasised the concept of ‘Iron Fist with Velvet Glove’, which implies a humane approach towards
the populace at large in the combat zone.’
6 Gautam Naulakha, ‘Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations: A Critique’, Economic and Political
Weekly, 7 April 2007; and Ali Ahmed, ‘Revision of the DSCO: Human Rights to the Fore’, IDSA Policy
Brief, March 2011.
7 Also see Vivek Chadha, ‘Heart as a Weapon - A Fresh Approach to the Concept of Hearts and Minds’,
IDSA Policy Brief, November 2011 [forthcoming].
8
Joint Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (JDSCO), p. 22.
9
‘Statement by the ICRC on the Status of the Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, 2008’, October 24, 2008.IDSA Policy Brief 3
admittedly a difficult proposition. This is borne out in the tension reflected in the doctrine
between the necessity of kinetic force and the equally compelling need for its restriction.
The Brief highlights doctrinal tenets that could potentially cause dissonance. Ironing
these out in the process of doctrinal revision will lead to an internally consistent output.
The proposal here is to elevate human rights from one among several principles to being
the core principle.
10
This Brief first discusses the competing perspectives on human rights to substantiate the
point that protection of human rights is more than just a strategic necessity or a force
multiplier. Thereafter it brings out the dissonance in the doctrine that arises from viewing
human rights protection instrumentally, or as a means to an end. The recommendation
is to take human rights protection as an end in itself, or as the ‘categorical imperative’.
Additionally, since the application of military force inevitably has consequences for
human rights, the political prong of strategy must be equally in evidence.
Placing Human Rights at the Core
In counter insurgency campaigns, it is critical to understand the nature of violence and
the nature of the military instrument. Its inescapable limitations are such that Clausewitz
once observed, ‘War in general…is entitled to require that the trend and designs of
policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.’
11
Extension of politics by the means of
violence must respect the nature of the means. The nature of violence is such that the
impossible cannot be demanded of it. Equally, militaries qua organizations are blunt
instruments. Given this, there is no escaping the tension between the application of
violence and human rights. This obviously means that the tension needs to be reconciled.
Clearly, this cannot be done at the expense of human rights. Therefore restriction can
only be, firstly, in the resort to force, and, secondly, in the manner of the use of force. The
former places an onus on the political prong of strategy and the latter lies more narrowly
in the domain of the military.
The existence of laws such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) suggests
that force application entails imposing on the rights of citizens. The doctrinal understanding
is that, within the ambit of these rights, the endeavour must be to have as light a footprint
as possible. Alongside, a strict human rights protection regime must be in place, termed
‘zero tolerance’.
12
The strategic fallout is in gaining support of the people, deemed the
1 0
The JDSCO has it as one among 11 principles. Even though these are not ranked by priority, it bears
noting that it figures seventh in the list.
1 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Michael Howard, Peter Paret and edited by Beatrice
Heuser, OUP, 2007, pp. 28-29.
1 2 DSCO, p. 55.Elevate Human Rights as the Core Organising Principle in Counter Insurgency 4
‘center of gravity’.
13
Valuing the human rights of citizens is thus consequential, though it
is a means to an end.
This perspective, reflected in the Indian Army’s doctrine, is that respecting the human
rights factor is a strategic necessity. The problem with such a perspective is that the
converse is equally implicit, that is, if required by strategy, human rights can be neglected.
The JDSCO says that, ‘It is our constitutional obligation to honour the HR of our people
and any disregard to this obligation will only enable the terrorist/insurgents to discredit
the state’s legitimacy and influence. (emphasis added).
14
Further, it states, ‘Upholding of
HR is a constitutional obligation and is also necessary to establish the credibility of the
government in the eyes of the people’ (emphasis added).
15
The qualifications, emphasised
here, make it apparent that the constitutional obligation is not enough on its own merits.
Instead, the strategic fallout makes it necessary to honour human rights.
This understanding is compounded by a perspective that takes human rights protection
as a ‘force multiplier’. A force multiplier is defined as, ‘a capability that, when added to
and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that
force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.’
16
This is
jargon that does not find mention in the DSCO in respect of human rights. However, the
JDSCO alludes to it, stating, ‘Popular support is the Force Multiplier in SCW for either
side and hence the centrality of the population’ (emphasis added). The understanding is
that popular support is the ‘force multiplier’ that makes for the centrality of the
demographic terrain. Such support is gained by respecting human rights. It thus makes
instrumental use of human rights as a means to an end. The population is not central for
its own sake but is only incidentally so; instead gaining popular support is the core
objective.
This understanding owes to other significant imperatives that the state and the military
are required to consider. These are territorial integrity and the state’s monopoly over
the use of force. The warrior ethos of the service that privileges prevailing in a military
contest, both externally and internally, also impels taking human rights as a means to
an end. Lastly, it is not always that grievance impels insurgency; greed does so too.
17
For righteousness to prevail there has to be a reluctant resort to force that leads to a
regrettable impact on human rights.
1 3
Ibid., p. 15.
1 4
JDSCO, p. 25.
1 5
Ibid., p. 44.
1 6
‘Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’, Joint Publication 1-02, US Department of Defense,
2005.
1 7
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance’, Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–595, 2004.IDSA Policy Brief 5
These interpretations – human rights as a strategic necessity and a force multiplier -
bring to the fore a need to privilege human rights unambiguously. This can best be done
by moving to an understanding that human rights are instead a categorical imperative. A
categorical imperative denotes an ‘absolute, unconditional requirement that asserts its
authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end in itself’.
18
The term
itself is Kantian, the philosophy behind which is not covered here. Elevating human
rights protection conceptually to a categorical imperative ensures that it becomes the
organizing principle for both doctrine and strategy.
This intuitively appeals to soldierly sensibilities because it is in keeping with India’s
warrior and civilisational ethic. This is acknowledged as such when the DSCO views
human rights as, ‘the very essence of human behaviour and interaction.’
19
Institutionally,
the military places the ‘country’ first ‘always and every time’.
20
By definition, the term
country is beyond mere territory; it is essentially about people. Lastly, loyalty of the
soldiers is first to the Indian Constitution, rightly brought out in the DSCO as: ‘Indian
Constitution, Indian Army, regiment, unit and colleagues.’
21
Therefore, doctrinal
acknowledgement of human rights as a ‘categorical imperative’ will negate the
instrumental interpretation of the HR factor.
Significantly, that it is a constitutional obligation makes it an over-riding imperative.
There need be no other reason, period.
22
The DSCO acknowledges as much noting that
the ‘Indian Army…holds these Fundamental Rights as one of its most cherished values’
and wishes to ‘keep the environment sensitised about this constitutional obligation.’
23
The Way Forward
It bears reiteration that the application of force against those resorting to violence is
legitimate and often inescapable. The level of force application is a professional military
decision. However, organisational theory and social psychology point out that such
decisions are influenced, sometimes negatively, by institutional and personal level factors.
Better known are corrupting factors at the personal level such as the overweening desire
for awards, ‘Rambo’ sub-culture, etc. But institutional interests, such as the need to of the
military to project a certain image and the self-image it maintains also sometimes influence
1 8
http://www.categoricalimperative.org/
1 9 DSCO, p. 53.
2 0
This is the Chetwodian motto adopted for the officer corps by the Indian Military Academy.
2 1 DSCO, p. 55.
2 2
This is reminiscent of the proposition in Tennyson’s ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’, specifically, ‘Theirs’
not to reason why’.
2 3 DSCO, p. 54.Elevate Human Rights as the Core Organising Principle in Counter Insurgency 6
military action. For instance, the application of force can sometimes be influenced by the
demonstration effect intended, over and above the due demands of the operation
underway. Therefore, the military decision must have limiting parameters in keeping
with one of the oldest questions in political science: ‘Who guards the guardians?’
24
The
well regarded parameters are discrimination, proportionality, military necessity and
increasingly, legality.
25
This is fairly well appreciated. The Indian Army Doctrine demands that the COAS
Commandments be respected ‘notwithstanding the tense, stressful and turbulent
situations at the grass roots level.’
26
Incidentally, it advocates, ‘low profile and peoplefriendly operations rather than high intensity operations related only to body and weapon
counts.’
27
Consequently, it maintains that, ‘Violation of Human Rights, therefore, must
be avoided under all circumstances, even at the cost of operational success’ (emphasis added).
28
A tendency towards permissiveness is brought about by the competing, instrumental,
perspective on human rights. The 2006 DSCO talks of a need for kinetic operations
dominant attrition warfare leading to the ‘elimination’ of terrorists in the early phase of
deployment.
29
A shift to non-kinetic manoeuvre warfare in which terrorists are
neutralized is to take place in the later stage.
30
The understanding seems to be that the
Army will be called out only when the situation is bad enough to warrant it. Upgrading
of the central armed police forces for tackling lower order insurgency, as witnessed in
Central India, is being done. Once the situation escapes their control, military deployment
could take place. The military would require appropriate force application to wrest the
initiative and stabilize the situation. Thereafter, the shift is to be made to a manoeurvrist
approach.
31
The problem is that kinetic force application makes the army seem an alien imposition,
since in the early stages the likelihood of peoples’ support for the insurgent is higher.
32
2 4
The phrase ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ is attributed to the Roman poet Juvenal, Satires (Satire
VI, lines 347–8), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quis_custodiet_ipsos_custodes%3F
2 5
There is a separate set of considerations that could be dwelt on in doctrine too on the very deployment
of the military. These would include legitimacy, constitutional provisions etc. In effect, a distinction
can be made domestically on the parameters attending military deployment and employment, in
the tradition of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in international law of armed conflict.
2 6
Indian Army Doctrine, pp. 23, 30.
2 7
Ibid., p. 23.
2 8
Ibid., p. 26.
2 9
The heuristic (DSCO, p. 22) uses the term ‘elimination’. The Foreword uses the term ‘neutralization’,
p. ii. The reconciliation is in favour of ‘neutralization’ (p. 33).
3 0
Ibid., p. 21.
3 1 DSCO, p. 22.
3 2
JDSCO, p. 39.IDSA Policy Brief 7
This is further complicated by external support and proxy war. The compulsion to gain
military ascendance increases, making it difficult to identify when to shift from one
approach to the other.
33
Instead, the intensity of the insurgency should dictate the levels of military force applied
with professional innovation in tactics preventing the compromise of effectiveness. There
is therefore no need for the timeline positing the kinetic-non-kinetic distinction. The wait
to reach a position of strength for enabling political initiatives can be undercut by proactive
peacemaking and peace-building subsumed in the political prong of strategy. This often
awaits the non-kinetic, later phase, resulting in the prolongation of the insurgency, with
avoidable consequences for the human rights of citizens.
Next, consistency can be built in to eliminate expansive interpretations. For instance, the
DSCO highlights ‘minimum force’.
34
But an element of dissonance is brought in by the
JDSCO, which rules in favour of ‘optimal rather than minimal or maximal’.
35
This shift
calls for explanation especially since the Supreme Court has used the term ‘minimal’ in
its 1997 judgment in the Nagaland case.
36
The Supreme Court judgment does not say
‘minimum’, leaving the military to judge what is considered minimal in the context of
the situation.
37
The principal criterion of the level of force to be used is effectiveness.
There is no cause for the military to endanger either its own soldiers or innocent people
in preserving the life of terrorists unwilling to lay down their arms. Therefore, doctrinal
rhetoric such as ‘punitive’, ‘overwhelming’, etc. provides avoidable loopholes leading to
expansive interpretations of the tenet of minimal force.
Another example of dissonance in the JDSCO is in its simultaneous enumeration of human
rights as a ‘principle’ along with the principle of ‘balance between people friendliness
and punitive actions.’
38
The term ‘punitive action’ of the JDSCO suggests that people
friendly operations may indicate ‘lack of strength or resolve for dealing with culprits’. It
seeks to compensate for this by calling for ‘punitive action’ using ‘optimal as against
minimal’ force. This is untenable since punishment is beyond the scope of military
authority and can be seen as evidence of institutional interest.
3 3 Ali Ahmed, ‘Revision of the DSCO: Human Rights to the Fore’, IDSA Policy Brief, March 2011.
3 4 DSCO, p. 33.
3 5
JDSCO, p. 27.
3 6
The Supreme Court bench comprising Chief Justice, M.M. Punchhi and Justices, S.C. Agarwal, A.S.
Anand and S.P. Bharucha considered the Naga People’s Movement Of Human Rights Vs. Union Of
India case on 27 November 1997.
3 7
The judgment stated: ‘The laying down of these conditions gives an indication that while exercising
the powers the officer shall use minimal force required for effective action against the person/persons
acting in contravention of the prohibitory order’ (emphasis added).
3 8
JDSCO, p. 27.Elevate Human Rights as the Core Organising Principle in Counter Insurgency 8
Silence is as much a give away of thinking as words. A conspicuous area of silence is the
absence of reference to international obligations. This ignores the National Human Rights
Commission’s (NHRC) definition of human rights as the rights relating to life, liberty,
equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the
International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India’ (emphasis added).
39
India’s
international obligations are specifically the four Geneva Conventions, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
40
While the first has been enacted into
law,
41
the latter are incorporated in the Constitution. At a minimum, a discussion on
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is mandatory. Since torture is ruled out
by this provision, the slovenly passage of the right against torture through the parliament
is not of consequence. The DSCO has merely one paragraph on legal matters.
42
The
JDSCO does not have any mention of human rights related law in its coverage of
international law in its Chapter 3.
43
In effect, the meagre discussion of the legal dimension
amounts to a doctrinal blind-spot.
The much-in-the-news AFSPA finds mention in a reference to respecting Do’s and Don’ts.
44
At a minimum, a guide on how to ascertain the ripeness of an area for disturbed areas
status and when to revoke such status needs to be discussed. This would be useful in the
arriving at the military’s input into the decision.
45
This would be in keeping with the
Supreme Court’s requirement that the disturbed areas status needs to be under constant
review, along with every extension of the Act. The Supreme Court had mandated:
It is, therefore, necessary that the authority exercising thepower under Section 3 to
make a declaration so exercises the said power that the extent of the disturbed area is
confined to the area in which the situation is such that it cannot be handled without
3 9
The Protection Of Human Rights Act, 1993, No. 10 of 1994, (8th January, 1994), p. 1, http://
www.nhrc.nic.in/
4 0
F o r t h e t e x t , s e e U N T r e a t y C o l l e c t i o n , h t t p : / / t r e a t i e s . u n . o r g / p a g e s /
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.
4 1
For the full text, see http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1954823/
4 2 DSCO, p. 15.
4 3
The focus is on terrorism related agreements at the international and regional level (JDSCO, pp. 17-
20)
4 4 DSCO, p. 68. The DSCO incorporates the Supreme Court judgment in this regard: ‘The instructions
in the form of “Do’s and Don’ts” to which reference has been made by the learned Attorney
General have to be treated as binding instructions which are required to be followed by the members
of the armed forces exercising powers under the Central Act and a serious note should be taken of
violation of the instructions and the persons found responsible for such violation should be
suitably punished under the Army Act, 1950.’
4 5
This is the case currently in Jammu & Kashmir.IDSA Policy Brief 9
seeking the aid of the armed forces and by making a periodic assessment of the situation
after the deployment of the armed forces the said authority should decide whether the
declaration should be continued and, in case the declaration is required to be continues,
whether the extent of the disturbed area should be reduced.
46
Policy Recommendations
India’s counter insurgency policy is people-friendly in keeping with its credentials as a
liberal democracy. The tone and tenor of doctrine reflects this. Doctrine bravely deals
with the tension between application of force and the impact on human terrain. Evidence
from the ground lately suggests that this is a largely successful exercise. Yet, some policy
recommendations to help improve doctrine are as under:
• The Ministry of Home, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, the National
Security Council Secretariat and the NHRC, needs to spell out an overarching
national approach. This would help in formulating strategy at the next lower level
in each of the areas where the AFSPA is applicable.
47
This will bring in accountability
and a ‘whole of government’ approach. It would ensure that the counter insurgency
strategy orchestrates the twin prongs, political and military, at the two levels,
centre and province, in sync. This could be part of the national security doctrine or
done independently. These foundational documents must make clear that human
rights are sacrosanct.
• Institutionally, at the level of the military, the nation-institution distinction must
be maintained. There is potential for the ‘fair name’ of the institution being mistaken
for the ‘good’ of the nation. This leads to departures from the straight and narrow
on human rights. Even as the military leadership is sensitive to this, political level
oversight of the military in such situations needs to be intimate. Currently, the
problem lies in the fact that the military answers to the Ministry of Defence whereas
the problem in the areas in question comes under the domain of the Ministry of
Home. There is an additional political authority by way of elected democratic
provincial governments in place. But the horizontal relationship of the military
with the provincial government is to be one of ‘cooperation’, as per the Supreme
Court judgment. The Unified Headquarters is useful, but is subject to structural
limitations. In effect, the military is answerable not so much to the provincial
government, but to the Union government through the Ministry of Defence. This
4 6
Supreme Court ruling in the Nagaland case, 1997.
4 7
For instance it would help the Central Armed Police Forces, on the frontline ever since the earlier
default resort to military deployment, has been considerably curtailed after the Group of Ministers
report of the early 2000s, to arrive at respective doctrinal documents.Elevate Human Rights as the Core Organising Principle in Counter Insurgency 10
increases the onus of coordination and oversight on the two central ministries,
home and defence, and, in particular, the political appointments within these.
• Internalisation of human rights through revision of the Army doctrine by placing
human rights at its core is recommended. Areas of dissonance pointed out need
reconsideration. A strict adherence to the guidelines of the Supreme Court,
specifically its order on ‘minimal’ force, is a must. The current human rights record
has been arrived at in a situation of relative military ascendancy in Jammu &
Kashmir and the culmination of political processes in Nagaland and Assam. The
test of the Army’s sensitivity could arise in more challenging circumstances in
futur e . Thi s ne c e s sar i ly means going beyond t raining and pedagogy
48
to
internalization through socialisation into reinforced norms.
• In matching strategy with the legal domain, the next iteration of doctrine must
extend to dwelling on conditions that entail declaration of an area as ‘disturbed’
under section 3; the exit indicators for such status as well as repeal of the Act;
parameters for governmental permission under section 6/7 of the relevant AFSPA
for prosecutions; and clear endorsement that Do’s and Don’ts amount to law. The
government could consider amending the Army Act 1950 for making violations
punishable under law as was desired by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The nature of violence and of military force is such that the acceptance of impositions on
human rights in counter insurgency is only realistic. Limiting its affects on the hapless
citizenry therefore acquires urgency. The first step is to ensure against doctrinal
justification or rationale for imposition beyond that warranted by the very nature of
force. Building in internal consistency in the doctrine is necessary. Towards this end,
elevating human rights as the central pillar of doctrine to the status of ‘categorical
imperative’ must be considered. Since insurgency and its counter is less about the visible
military contest and more about the competition of ideas, this will ensure that the ‘idea
of India’ prevails over insurgent alternatives on offer.
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