LIMITATIONS OF A MILITARY RESPONSE TO 26/11 Monday, January 5, 2009

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Advocacy for military action has not only come from notable voices such as that of opposition politician Mr. Arun Jaitley during the parliamentary debate, but also by military analysts as Gurmeet Kanwal and Maroof Raza. Though India has a stated position that military options have not been discounted in the current crisis, the option would certainly figure once again the next time round and with greater salience. While India has rightly not chosen to exercise the military option this time, its leadership may not be able to withstand the domestic pressure for military action next time. The good sense at the current juncture owes to several factors, not least of which is the status of the GWOT ongoing in the close vicinity. Besides, India would not like its economic trajectory to be diverted by a conflict in the midst of a global financial downturn. In refraining from the military option, India has wisely chosen not to play to the gallery. This may not be the case next time. In case the terror infrastructure persists in Pakistan, the likelihood of taking a different decision next time remains. This would be all the more certain in case of yet another terror attack of unacceptable magnitude. Therefore, the probability of employment of the military option early in the conflict would be higher. The military options therefore warrant a closer look from point of view of their consistency with political aims, their effectiveness in doing so and their escalatory potential. Military options are in an escalatory ladder in terms of force levels used, objectives addressed and nature of Pakistani response. At the lowest level is launching of fire assaults by artillery all along the Line of Control against known terrorist infrastructure such as camps. This would require simultaneous communication to Pakistan so that it does not mistake these attacks as presaging a wider attack. Missile attacks, with Brahmos missiles on targets in depth and in Pakistani hinterland, is the option at the next higher level. In the category of response through destruction by fire power means are also attacks by aircraft no similar targets. This would be much more escalatory, besides the problem of extrication of downed crew would heighten the crisis. Land forces could be used to activate the Line of Control by breaking the ongoing ceasefire. This would enable infliction of punishment on the Pakistani Army deployed there. At a higher level is sending of ground forces across. At the lowest level this would be in the form of special forces operations against terrorist camps in shallow depth along the Line of Control. Terrain objectives that serve as launch pads for infiltration may also be captured by infantry attacks. This would necessitate crossing of the Line of Control, which if contested by Pakistan has an obvious escalatory potential. The possible actions mentioned so far have the effect of conveying Indian resolve and to exact a price from Pakistan for its continued support of terrorism. If crisis communication is suitably managed escalation need not necessarily result. However, Pakistan is unlikely to act under such coercion. On the contrary, in expectation of further Indian action on the escalatory scale and even to provoke the same, it may carry through with its blackmail by diverting its attention and effort from pursuing the Taliban in the FATA and the NWFP. To prepare for and in response to Pakistani counter moves, India would require an a priori raising of its military alert status. This alert status may not involve mobilization as was the case in the Kargil War and Operation Parakram. India now has the Cold Start doctrine which entails swiftly moving into battle stations, as the name suggests, from a 'cold start'. Nevertheless, the moves and counter moves in anticipation and in misperception would complicate crisis management. These may even be deliberately resorted to so as to focus the attention of the international community on crisis resolution with each side trying to influence world community favourably. Over-extension in this posturing could lead to an unwanted outbreak of conflict. In case wider aims are sought, such as punishing the Pakistani Army for its sponsorship of terrorism, then taking the Cold Start doctrine to its logical conclusion has been suggested as a deterrent strategy by no less than the noted strategist and academic, Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan. While this may not be the option being considered presently by the government, this may be a response option in future in the magnitude of continuing terrorism and public pressures in India for firmer action demands it. According to Dr Rajagopalan the nuclear threat should not stay India's hand for Pakistan has a 'high' nuclear threshold. Its nuclear doctrine can be interpreted as the Israeli one of 'first use, last resort'. Therefore considering the next higher step in the escalatory ladder is worthwhile since there is space between conventional war outbreak and the nuclear threshold for inflicting attrition on the Pakistani military. The Cold Start doctrine is an outcome of post-Kargil Limited War thinking in India. It was initiated at a conference at IDSA by the then Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes. He said that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons and not war. The idea was carried forward by the then Director IDSA, Jasjit Singh. It has resulted eventually in the adoption of the Cold Start doctrine by Indian Army in 2004. The logic behind the move is reminiscent of the Cold War. As in the Cold War era, acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides made general war unthinkable. To avoid Total War, Limited War concept was developed during and in wake of the Korean War. Limitation is through self-imposed restrictions on aims, theatres of operation, weapons used and duration of conflict. Since the nuclear threat exists, limitation on the conduct of the conflict has been thought through in India also. It must be noted though that the doctrine has also drawn criticism. The employment of Cold Start in the context of a punitive response would likely also be along an escalatory ladder. It is possible that conflict could be restricted to the Line of Control. This may involve, in the first instance, capture of features that are of a defensive value so that their post conflict retention by India would enable firmer defences and secondly would make infiltration problematic of Pakistan. It is unlikely India would think of returning such heights as it had done in 1965. More offensive options could be capture of additional features that would place Pakistani defences there in jeopardy. This would make POK vulnerable to future attack by India, thereby dissuading Pakistani support. India may even consider deeper penetration, for once the initial crust has crumbled wrapping up the remainder would not be a problem. In this scenario the action would be confined to J&K, with India going in for a military solution to end the conflict there. Confining the conflict to J&K may not be possible since Pakistan may seek to react to its problem there by attacking in the plains sector of J&K or south of Pir Panjal. This could lead to an opening up of the Punjab front, making for a larger than originally conceived conventional war. This scenario may be pre-empted by India were it to choose not to confine the conflict to J&K but to expand it to the heart of Pakistan from the beginning. This would be to India's advantage since surprise would be capitalized to capture Pakistani territory and inflict attrition on its troops reacting to the invasion. The intention would be to capture shallow objectives, provoke Pakistani military reaction and decimate the same with armoured maneuver, artillery and missile fire assaults and air attacks. With requisite damage inflicted, India could declare unilateral ceasefire and withdraw from territory seized across the international border, while retaining the territory captured along the Line of Control. The aim of such a campaign would be to expose the Pakistani Army to defeat and weaken its standing in post conflict national politics. This would help democratic forces establish control there and roll back the terrorist infrastructure. The probability of this happy outcome is questionable in that a conventional Indian attack would arouse the nationalist instinct in Pakistan that would be capitalized on by right wing forces. Thus even if Pakistan Army were to suffer reverses, the nature of the conflict would change to an irregular war reminiscent of Iraq. President Musharraf had once promised an unconventional war in case of Indian invasion. Thus civilian casualties would mount even if India intends to quit Pakistani territory early. The lessons of Israel's Lebanon War of 2006 are stark. Withdrawing in face of an irregular counter would invite the odium of defeat for India. Therefore, war hysteria would mount and India would be sucked into an unintended conflict of indefinite outcome. Therefore, even if India were to win the battles as is likely in light of relative military power equations, political victory would remain distant. The nuclear question needs highlighting. Many security analysts, such as Dr Manpreet Sethi of the Center for Air Power Studies, are of the opinion that the Pakistani nuclear threshold is fairly high. To deter Indian conventional power, Pakistan depicts an irrational stance and projects a lower nuclear threshold. Others, as Kanwal, advocate that Pakistan's bluff be called and India's conventional power be used more aggressively with the threat of Pakistan being dismembered were it to resort to any kind of nuclear first use. This is the dominant school of thought in India. Their argument is fairly sustainable in case of Limited War and makes the military option politically enticing. That possible nuclear thresholds would be incorporated in all operational planning is evident from the Limited War thinking in India. Therefore, escalation to nuclear level can be discounted in case it is credibly conveyed to Pakistan that the war embarked on by India is a Limited War. In such a case, Pakistan would attempt maximum self-preservation and exercise of nuclear restraint even as it awaits India's return to its starting blocks. However, it can be expected that during the conflict the nuclear card would be used to maximum rhetoric effect in attracting international mediatory attention to the 'most dangerous place on earth'. The improbable however must not be lost sight of, for both are nuclear powers. In the circumstance of an expansion in the Limited War, through the dynamic of war acquiring its own logic and momentum, Pakistan could resort to the ultimate form of nuclear signaling through nuclear first use in the form of a 'demonstration'. This could be the conduct of a nuclear test, nuclear explosion on an uninhabited portion of its territory or a use of a single low kilo ton bomb on an insignificant Indian military target on its own territory. While this would be intended to energise conflict termination efforts, it would certainly arouse passions It is here that the Indian doctrine of 'massive retaliation' would be found wanting. Presently the doctrine is one of 'assured retaliation' in the 'assured destruction' mode. It would just not do for India to lose the moral high ground that is crucial to political outcome, by devastating Pakistan through counter value targeting. It would amount to genocide exposing the Indian leadership to serious accusations of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The response is only appropriate for an attempted 'first strike' by Pakistan which is the least likely form of Pakistani first use. The doctrine therefore requires revision to the form suggested by General Sundarji. His sensible recommendation is for nuclear war to be terminated at the lowest level of escalation. It should countenance a quid pro quo or at best a quid pro quo plus response. This would be more suited to the proactive Limited War doctrine that India has adopted. His perspicacious reading is that enemy aims should be accommodated to maximum extent possible and face saving should be part of the end state to avoid escalation in the charged setting. It may be argued that this could result in a lowering of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan, further limiting application of Indian conventional power. It would make nuclear war fighting a seemingly feasible proposition, thereby drawing India away from its position that these weapons are political tools only for deterrence. While not contesting the genuineness or moral strength of the Indian position, it is not one shared by Pakistan. Pakistan's position is akin to that of NATO in its Cold War years in which it relied on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet conventional aggression. Pakistan's resort to first use would require a sensible India response. Were India to resort to a massive punitive response it would be abandoning its Limited War intent, rendering its cities vulnerable in turn. Indian punitive response cannot guarantee elimination of Pakistan's retaliatory capability, not being intended to. Pakistan could use its surviving warheads in retaliation even in face of in-conflict deterrence. Thus absurdly India stands to lose a city or two just for the sake of the initial Pakistani strike on an ingressing Indian military target. This crisis should help initiate a debate on 'proportional deterrence' or 'graduated response' in India. The options lower down on the escalation scale are India's most likely response options in future. Stand off missile attacks and air strikes, as earlier conducted by the USA against Libya, Sudan, Pakistan and Iraq, would only dent terror facilities for these can be recreated at will. Ending the ceasefire would be of little utility as it would amount to a return to the pre ceasefire period that had yielded little by way of helping resolve any issue. Cross Line of Control use of land forces would only shift the Line of Control forward, create a fresh set of recruits to terrorist ranks of displaced Pakistani settlers along the Line of Control and would require unnecessary expenditure in firming in the relocated forces in new defences, as was the case in Kargil after the war. The new line would be even more porous to infiltration as the area would be well known to the Pakistanis and would take India some time to settle into. Therefore, terrorism in Kashmir would receive a boost, exposing India to further terrorist outrages. This indicates that military options have a limited value, if any. They are found wanting in effective compellence and coercion. In no way is Pakistan incentivised to act against the terrorist organizations, for it alone can root them out, or at best contain them, should it choose to do so. Therefore there is a case for India to consider other avenues of addressing its strategic predicament. These include engaging with the Kashmir issue meaningfully. Credible elections there should be taken as a start point and not as an end in themselves. Pakistani overtures of the Musharraf era are an opening. The presence and actions of the US in the region are another causatory factor for the spread of terror. There is a case for India to exercise its growing power in trying to bring about a regional approach substituting the US in the region. While relying on US engagement in terms of aid, development assistance and political support, cessation of military operations that are leading to an accretion in terrorist ranks need to be fore grounded. Other measures already being undertaken by India are required to be followed through. These include defensive measures and development initiatives with respect to its minority community. Discussing military options is useful so as to reinforce deterrence. However, the discussion also contributes to self-deterrence. These would therefore not be impressing Pakistan much. Which means resort to these would only be a futile expression of frustration and playing to the gallery. This would only help the terrorist cause and shift the political center of gravity of both states to the right. In the current circumstance they jeopardize the GWOT and on that account have probably not been resorted to. Therefore, India and Pakistan are at a juncture where their continued reliance on military means to settle differences should be seen as being untenable. Moving away from the militarized paradigm of thought is an alternative. Since Pakistan is unlikely to initiate this and would be a follower in this regard, the onus is on India. But for that it must first acknowledge the limitations of the military option.

A grand bargain for India and Pakistan

The Financial World, 20 June 2011

THE FOREIGN secretaries of India and Pakistan are to meet this month to review progress made so far in the various strands during this ‘getting restarted’ round of dialogue. It would set the stage for the foreign ministers meeting due next month. However, if the foreign ministers’ meeting is not to prove a replay of last July’s Islamabad meeting, then there needs to be more on the agenda. This article makes a suggestion in this regard. That no headway was intended by either state owes to both following a wait and watch policy. They await Barack Obama’s speech that is to bring out his design for AfPak, in particular if the nature of the impending drawdown in troops is to be symbolic or significant. If the former, it would gladden India; if the latter, it would gladden Pakistan. Pakistan is waiting to encash on its relationship with the Taliban, nurtured assiduously over the past decade despite intense American pressure. It would prefer a negotiated end to the conflict to its north. Once its allies are ensconced in some kind of power arrangement there, it could turn its attention once again towards the west, assured of strategic depth to its rear and the vitality of its strategic assets. India for its part is aware that to an extent the return to normalcy in Kashmir since 9/11 owed to Pakistan’s preoccupation with its western front. It has taken advantage of the benign fallout to firm in and rests content that a falling back to the troubled years is unlikely. It would prefer to see western presence in Afghanistan till as long as a verifiable promise of moderation is not extracted from the Taliban. It has played hardball with Pakistan to keep up the pressure to this eminently reasonable end. Given that the Taliban has managed to whittle the West’s appetite for nation-building, for the west to be looking for an exit is understandable. Towards this end, Obama would progress the political prong of strategy, even while keeping the military prong on course for a while longer. US military presence would therefore continue, but its combat role may progressively be less visible. This means that Pakistan’s significance to the end game in terms of delivering a moderated Taliban increases even while India is not entirely disappointed. An argument would be that since they cannot together shape the region’s future, they are realistically hoping to make the best of what emerges from the impending changes in US course in the region. This is typical of a conflict management approach. The belief in India is that with Pakistan busily proceeding downhill, there is no need for India to be overly concerned. Pakistan would be less able to impose on India’s interests. The hard-line expectation is that Pakistan’s oft-aired obituary will ring true finally. India will then be at the vanguard of containment, in conjunction with its strategic partner, the US. Then it would be able to shape the regional future. It is precisely for this reason that India needs to pre-empt such a future. Expecting that India would not be singed by the outcome is unrealistic. AS A self-confessed regional power India needs to take charge. Here the suggestion is for Pakistan and India to arrive at a modus-vivendi. India wants Pakistan to re-examine its Kashmir obsession. Pakistan, beset as it is by the terror blowback, wishes to remain on even keel. India could permit increased political space for Pakistan in Afghanistan, while Pakistan could in turn walk away from Kashmir. The coming talks between the two foreign secretaries can be used to discuss a grand bargain. Specifically, it would mean assuring Pakistan of India’s support in its delivering the Taliban to the table. In return, Pakistan would require assuring India that any return of the Taliban to a share of power in Kabul would not be at the cost of India or its Afghan allies. More importantly, Pakistan needs to follow through on its oft-repeated intent of not allowing its soil for use by anti-India terrorists. This it can do if allowed to claim that India’s implementing of the impending report of the three interlocutors in letter and spirit is at its behest. The jihadis then - no longer required - can be rolled back non-militarily. Currently, it can be said that the Indian government is not keen on the hard-line. Yet, talks are for forms’ sake for both parties. India assumes Pakistan will fall out of the equation and Pakistan thinks it will bounce back. Even if India is right, the consequence in both cases makes such a future worth pre-empting. The two foreign ministries can flesh out the idea. The off-the-record agenda should be the trade-off suggested. It must lead up eventually to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh taking up the Mohali invite of Yousaf Raza Gillani to visit Islamabad, where Hamid Karzai could well join them to arrive at a regional solution to a regional problem. India can then be said to have lived up to its credentials as a regional power. Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at New Delhi’s Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. He may be reached at aliahd66@hotmail.com

Strategy Advocacy for Pakistan claws.in

Ali Ahmed

Research Fellow, IDSA

E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com

A saying that is as accurate as well known is, ‘While states have armies, the Pakistan Army has a state.’ This owes to the Army being on top of the power hierarchy there and in control of Pakistan’s security, India, Kashmir and Afghanistan policies. Taking advantage of its control of the state, the Pakistan Army has consistently advanced its own institutional interests under the garb of national interest. Samuel Huntington, in his seminal thesis on military professionalism, The Soldier and the State, observed, “The military ethic is thus pessimistic, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist…It is, in brief, realistic and conservative.” The Pakistan Army has had a long association with the US military that believes in realism. Therefore, it is axiomatic that the Pakistan Army subscribes to the realist school that privileges power, power balancing and realpolitik in strategic matters. Realist thinking is known to be sensitive to power asymmetry and the requirement to compensate for imbalance through internal and external balancing. This explains in some measure Pakistan’s attitude to and behaviour towards India. External balancing involves relying on China and the US for weapons and economic aid in an attempt to offset India’s forces equipage. Internal balancing by Pakistan includes reliance on religious extremism to generate national cohesion and to create cannon fodder in terms of irregular forces as force multipliers. These constitute Pakistan’s ‘strategic assets’ deployed for proxy war. Pakistan is at a critical strategic juncture in which its utility to the international effort in taming the Taliban is peaking. Nevertheless, Pakistan remains in the category of potential ‘failed’ states as also ‘rogue’ states. What are the implications of the current juncture on appraisal through the lens of institutional interest and the realist perspective of the Pakistan Army? Pakistan is now in the cross hairs of a terror backlash. Its Army’s corporate cohesion is under threat from both the ethnic divide and religious extremism. Its perceived adversary, India, has taken significant measures to defuse the proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir and terrorism elsewhere in India. It intends to continue to refrain from discussing Pakistani concerns till the latter indicates its sincerity in rolling back the terror infrastructure. More dangerously for Pakistan, the visiting US Defence Secretary observed that India is poised at the limit of its tolerance. Pakistan’s complaint on Baluchistan to the Indian prime minister indicates its sensitivities. Further, the US has added democratic strictures in monitoring its largesse as evidenced in the passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill. China, while an acknowledged ‘all weather friend’, would not like to become embroiled in any India-Pakistan conflict. It would instead use Pakistan for its own strategic ends of encircling India, but not at a cost to its growing economy. India in any case is preparing to face down a ‘two front’ challenge. India pursuing a multi-vector policy of partnerships may prove more useful for both the US and China. Therefore, external balancing has its limits. For institutional interest, internal politics matters. The lawyers’ movement and media awakening, portends an expanding middle class. The institutional regeneration of the judiciary has potential for demonstration effect on other institutions. These would with time demand the democratic dividend of civilian control over the military. The backlash of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has been contained temporarily by public support for military action against it. Also the growing backlash that includes targeting of the Army indicates that the groups are becoming autonomous. They could subvert sections of the Army inclined to reactionary ideology and disrupt its internal cohesion. Externally, in case of further provocation of India, a post-conflict call to accountability, as was evidenced after the 1965 and 1971 Wars, may witness the permanent eclipse of the military. From the twin lenses what would be the recommended strategy? Over the middle term, India, through higher defence budgets based on a thriving economy would be able to tide over gaps in its current military inventory. By then changes in the higher defence organisation may also be in place. Thereafter, the asymmetry would be irreversible. The pulls of India’s rise on Pakistani commercial and middle classes would deepen; particularly the need to benefit from trade, cultural exchange and access to educational and medical resources. In contrast growing population, dwindling economic prospects and increase in the underclass attraction for fundamentalism imply that sustainable alternatives to external largesse need to be found. Accessing India’s growth miracle may be an answer. Realism indicates that where balancing is not possible, ‘bandwagoning’ be considered instead. For Pakistan, the material advantages are obvious. In case its identity is not threatened, then it could consider opening up. Actions of India’s right wing politicians, namely visit of former prime minister, AB Vajpayee, to the Minar-e- Pakistan, the sentiment of LK Advani on the Quaid-e-Azam and Jaswant Singh’s appreciation of Jinnah, are potent signals. Even as Pakistan gains, so would, counter intuitively, it’s Army. The commercial foundations of the military would gain a wider market. A growing economy lifted by the Indian economic tide, would enable a larger resources cake for the Army. External largesse would likely continue in any case since the US is unlikely to switch off once again from the region in a hurry. Declining Indian threat would enable military modernisation. The nuclear assets would be preserved in perpetuity. Politically, since the Army would control the opening up, thus benefiting many sectors, societal respect for it would grow. Would India oblige? India has been following a dual-pronged ‘carrot and stick’ policy. Its major gain would be in ending of its ‘Two Front’ challenge. Its relations with China also stands to improve since Chinese support to Pakistan would cease to matter. SAARC would become relevant to regional problems and gain India credibility as a regional leader, enhancing its Great Power credentials. The strategy recommendation through the institutional and realist lens for Pakistan is ‘bandwagoning’. The implication for India is that its strategic thrust should be to create conditions for Pakistan to ‘bandwagon’. Towards this end a strategic dialogue with Pakistan outside of the composite dialogue may be a beginning. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

Naval Operations in an India-Pakistan Context  Article No.:		Date:	20/06/2010
1585 claws.in
Ali Ahmed
Research Fellow, IDSA
E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com
The Indian Navy has rightly furthered and defended a wider maritime dimension in its strategic thinking. The focus on external presence in the Indian Ocean, the growing Chinese footprint, India’s seaborne economic interests and the navy’s deterrent role has kept Pakistan peripheral to its perspective. In the Kargil conflict and the mobilisation of 2001-02, it demonstrated that it could proactively handle Pakistan by shifting naval assets from the eastern seaboard. Action is also in hand in conjunction with the Coast Guard to fill in security deficiencies that the 26/11 terror attack revealed. Given these concerns, it is understandable that the naval dimension of conflict strategy in the India-Pakistan context has received less attention. This article dwells on possible naval force application in otherwise land-centric conflict scenarios against Pakistan. 26/11 has demonstrated that defensive operations in terms of safeguarding the coast would be equally important in wartime. The presence of India’s commercial capital on the western coast, coastal development in Gujarat, offshore oil assets among others indicate that defending these from both sea and air borne attack would be important. The asymmetric threat would additionally need to be factored in. Nevertheless, offensive being a preferred strategy, naval options would depend on the level of the conflict. These include options short of war; conventional war operations; and also a nuclear card. These are discussed below. In case India goes in for a response option not amounting to war, such as ‘surgical strikes’ by air force, missile strikes and perhaps activation of the Line of Control to a limited extent, then the Navy could participate through a 1971-like raid on Karachi harbour or terror facilities connected with the ‘Karachi Project’. A rerun of the post-Kargil downing of the Atlantis reconnaissance aircraft is another example. The possibility of escalatory reaction by Pakistan would need to be catered for even as these are launched, lest the head start with Pakistan enable it to seize the initiative in such case. The next higher order case is launch of conventional war in a ‘Cold Start’ scenario. This would imply naval participation in real time with the surface, subsurface and air assets available with the Western Fleet. In the interim, as with the building up of strike corps in wake of pivot corps offensives, the assets from the eastern seaboard and further south could be mobilised. The Navy would be critical in effecting Pakistan’s economy, particularly by interdicting fuel and operations at its main port, Karachi. Increasing naval pressure would likely be dependent on whether Pakistani reaction to Cold Start is escalatory and intended to spiral the conflict into a higher order war. That any such conflict in the realm of Limited War would inform naval operations. In any such expanded conventional war, given international presence in the waters, it would require being mindful of the law of sea and of international law in relation to blockades. Additionally, over the near term, it would require factoring in US-NATO logistic presence at various ports. Perhaps with time, commercial and naval use by the Chinese of Gwadar and other Pakistan ports would also require attention in such operations. An additional possibility is that of influencing the internal situation in Pakistan. This could be in the form of uprisings by the Baluch, Sindhis or Mohajirs. The major operational task in addition to gaining sea dominance would be to constitute a credible amphibious threat and execute it if necessary. This would be in conjunction with operations of Southern Command south of the desert sector. Already a brigade worth land forces capability exists. The INS Jalashwa has been acquired for the purpose. A joint doctrine has been formulated by HQ IDS that covers the details. This would be designed to increase pressures on the Pakistani leadership to concede Indian aims. The highest level is the nuclear one. Since India has a ‘retaliation only’ nuclear doctrine, introduction of nuclear weapons would be a Pakistani initiative. Naval operations have potential to impact Pakistani nuclear threshold thinking. The cumulative impact of the land and air offensives would be enhanced by operations across the front of Pakistan’s premier city, Karachi. Two of the ‘thresholds’ described by Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai who headed Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division could be affected by naval operations. One is regarding ‘economic strangulation’. The allusion is perhaps to an effective blockade. The second is with regard to internal destabilisation. This is perhaps a reference to a possible wartime spike in Baluch insurgency and unrest in Karachi. Attention on this score would therefore be advisable. How the nuclear card would manifest in the naval dimension has yet again received little reflection. The possibility of a demonstration strike after due warning by Pakistan needs to be ruled in. Given that Indian forces would be advancing in the desert sector and threat of collateral damage to his people exists in developed terrain, the sea lends itself as a possible ‘green-field’ site. It would enable him to show case his missile capability alongside. While this would place his action in international waters outside the pail of international law, it would increase international conflict termination focus as intended. The next category of nuclear first is ‘lower order’ nuclear strikes involving military targets. This could be an aircraft carrier task force or an amphibious flotilla in the Arabian Sea. However, a more likely possibility is on amphibious landing under execution. This would be in keeping with parameters of strikes with the least ‘opprobrium quotient’: on own territory in a defensive mode. Lack of suitably placed reserves particularly if the Southern Command is making headway; and the resulting threat to Karachi could conspire to trigger such reaction. This month the three Indian armed forces chiefs figured in a media photo on the release of the joint doctrine document on air and land operations. The initiative needs taking further to deliberating on operations in all three dimensions – air, land and sea - at all three levels: sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear. As has been seen here, the potentiality of the lower two to nudge the next higher level exists, particularly when taken cumulatively in their effects. The Joint Doctrine of 2006 could consider these aspects in the five-year review due soon. Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi

Towards A Limited War Doctrine claws.in

Ali Ahmed

Research Fellow, IDSA

E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com

That the Army Training Command’s (ARTRAC) flagship publication, Pinnacle, has chosen a discussion on the Indian Army Doctrine as its theme for a forthcoming issue, indicates the doctrinal effervescence in the military brought about in part by nuclearisation in the last decade. The current issue also reports on a seminar on Joint Air Land Operations in which a sub-theme was ‘Nature and limits of employment of military power and its strategy’. This is proof, if any, that limited war thinking, begun promisingly in a seminar at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in wake of the Kargil War in early January 2000, is coming of age in the military. The thinking since that seminal seminar culminated in the Indian Army Doctrine, a publication of the ARTRAC in 2004. However, in this, there was no explicit mention of a Limited War doctrine. This article recommends further evolution in Limited War doctrinal thinking in light of the strategic circumstance current in South Asia. That such thinking is well underway can be discerned from the Centre for Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS) having commissioned a book by Maj Gen (Retd) GD Bakshi on the subject. It is to be noted that along with GD Bakshi, Manpreet Sethi in her recent book Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence (New Dehi: Knowledge World, 2009), also underlines that air power, due to its inherent flexibility, readily lends itself as primary instrument in the prosecution of Limited War. Perhaps, the Army doctrine, currently reportedly under review, would evolve along these lines. A range of possibilities exist in strategic literature. Characteristically, it was the perceptive General Krishnaswamy Sundarji who had already by the early nineties discerned that this was the direction of future writing: “Indian conventional operations should be modulated in scope and depth of penetration into Pakistani territory so that ingress can stop before Pakistan resorts to the use of nuclear weapons.” Sethi, in the same vein in her book, states, “Military strikes would need to be restricted in depth into enemy territory and spread in geographical expanse, or limited in scope to carry out deeper, narrow thrusts into adversary territory in order to remain well away from the expressed ‘red lines’ of the nuclear threshold…”. Bharat Karnad, dilating on the topic in the War College Journal (Autumn 2005), writes: “Converging rapidly on major towns…for shallow but decisive ingress into Pakistani territory is that it is doable…and in each case confronts the GHQ with the dilemma of major proportions of how to stanch the flow…restricting advance to populated environs…capturing a string of major towns.” However, Gurmeet Kanwal, in his Indian Army: Vision 2020 (New Delhi, Harper Collins, 2008), is skeptical believing that: ‘‘Broad Front – Shallow Objective” offensive planning is unlikely to dissuade Pakistan…The only sensible option for India would be to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and plan to launch Strike Corps offensive operations to ‘Strike Hard – Strike Deep’.” Nevertheless, in his current assignment as Director CLAWS, he has in its recent seminar ‘Limited Wars in South Asia – Urgent Need for an Indian Doctrine’ weighed in on the side of the need to formulate a military doctrine on limited war under nuclear overhang. Since Limited War would unfold under the nuclear backdrop, thinking on the implications for nuclear doctrine and the implications of nuclear doctrine needs also be factored in. Here again there appears to be a menu of options. For Sethi, it would be “logical to use the weapons on cities… (to cause) unacceptable damage to make deterrence work best”. She is not persuaded by India’s current doctrinal understanding that unacceptable damage requires ‘massive’ punitive retaliation. Kanwal wishes to retain the threat of “massive punitive retaliation with full force of nuclear capability” so as to perhaps keep an enemy appropriately deterred. Karnad has been a strong votary for “Graduated deterrence or discriminate deterrence…A nuclear version of ‘flexible response’.” But, in the opinion of this author, General Sundarji’s take on this requires greater deliberation than it has received. He wrote: “Terminate nuclear exchange at lowest possible level with a view to negotiating the best peace that is politically acceptable.” Presently, the term ‘Limited War’ occurs but once in the Indian Army Doctrine and that too on a graphic on Spectrum of Conflict (p. 12). This is understandable as the doctrine had a wider ambit. But just as the Army and the HQ IDS have since taken out doctrines on other aspects with unique characteristics such as Special Forces, joint warfare, amphibious warfare, sub-conventional warfare among others, there is a need to do the same for Limited War. This is particularly so since the graphic in question seamlessly melds Limited War with the next stage of Total War but makes a distinction with the next higher stage of Nuclear War. Doctrinal reflection would do well to revisit this conceptualisation for two reasons: one, that in the nuclear era keeping war from becoming Total War is imperative; and two, that Nuclear War could yet erupt even during prosecution of what is originally intended as a Limited War. The nuclear overhang virtually negates the conception of Total War. Therefore, Limited War is here to stay and requires deliberateness in thinking through that only a separately articulated doctrine can ensure. While thinking through military dimensions of Limited War is undeniable, more importantly it needs to be done in keeping the nuclear doctrine in mind. Movement in one may entail a corresponding movement in the other. Therefore, the doctrinal exercise cannot be restricted to being one internal to the military. It should instead be ‘military led’, considering input and cross fertilisation from a wider field, not excluding in particular, the National Security Council. Thus, jointness – quite apparent from the ARTRAC seminar referred to also having as which also had a subtheme, ‘Synergising Air/Land Warfare for Dominance’ – needs to be carried further to a ‘whole of government’ approach to doctrinal formulation. For instance, Limited War, not being only for punishment, but for wider political effect, may require an equally prominent diplomatic prong. This widening of the doctrinal process, while seemingly far-fetched in light of the disrepair in our higher defence organisation can be initiated only by an enlightened military.

Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: Th e Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge,
2007). Pp. 258. Price: Rs 495. ISBN 978-0-415-40459-4
.India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343
Praveen Swami has established his journalistic credentials in reporting and analysing, among other things, the
Kashmir situation, for the reputed periodical, Frontline, and for the well-regarded newspaper, Th e Hindu. Recourse
to his in-depth reporting is virtually a necessity for gaining a handle on the complex situation. Th is owes to his
range of sources, particularly in the intelligence and police, but also his self-imposed requirement of getting a
feel of the ground through visits to the remote and relevant locales as necessary. Th e insights gained have been
packaged with balance and sensitivity over the years. Th at said, the book falls short of his own standards in terms
of being uni-dimensional in its focus on ‘Jihad’ at the expense of the several factors that have underpinned the
India–Pakistan six decade long tangle and the two decade old insurgency in Kashmir. Jihad has, of late, acquired
a notoriety that sells. Any linkage with Jihad these days instinctively leads to delegitimisation, so strong is the
dominant, largely western media–led, discourse. Unfortunately, insertion of the term Jihad in the title serves to
misrepresent the Kashmiri situation and in doing so does a disservice to the very people Swami has so sensitively
written about for over a decade.
At the outset, it is conceded that the author has brought to the fore a relatively lesser known dimension of the
vexed Kashmir question—that of the covert war between the two states and by non-state actors. Th is is a signal and
original contribution to the otherwise over-crowded Kashmir book shelf. Since other dimensions such as the foreign
policy and military have already been brought out by other perceptive authors earlier, there was little remaining to
be told. Swami, in accessing the intelligence trove that is usually off limits, has been able to shed fresh light on the
confl ict. His work, therefore, is a necessary supplement to known aspects. It is with good reason that Swami writes:
‘No one book of course can tell the tale of all these and all the other struggles which together constitute the Jammu
and Kashmir confl ict…Th is book traces just one thread of a complex weave. It is however a thread that few have
paid attention to…’ (p. 16). Nevertheless, the manner in which it is titled, the focus on Pakistan–directed Jihadi
terror and his reading a historical continuity into it, distracts from the other, equally salient dimensions that are
absent from his book. Th is shortcoming can however be overcome by the discerning reader keeping in mind the
context, parallel happenings and competing narratives in other facets of the confl ict.
Swami’s book is a product of his Senior Fellowship at the United States Institute of Peace in 2004–05. Th is is
perhaps the cause for the over-emphasis on ‘Jihad’, since during the period, the topic had reached a crescendo in
the US. He covers his ground with great detail, even delving into hitherto classifi ed intelligence fi les. He traces the
Jihadist journey in Kashmir to the original schism between the fundamentalists and secularists in the anti-feudal
politics in Kashmir prior to the Accession. Th ereafter the political project of the Muslim Conference was taken
up by the Pakistani state for identity and other, more secular reasons grounded in realpolitik. Th e despatch of the
tribal lashkars and later, a like invasion under Operation Gibraltar in 1965 are examples. Th e untold story revealed
by Swami shows how the Jihadist enterprise was kept alive through the quieter period of the seventies and eighties.
He attributes the explosion over the turn of the last decade to the ability of the infrastructure already available in
Pakistan to exploit and hijack the civil unrest in Kashmir. He thus sees continuity in Kashmir’s troubles in Jamaati
politics and its linkage to the other side of the border.
Book Reviews 337
India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343
In actuality, the religious motivation aspect, while not absent, does not impel the most grave challenge the Indian
state has ever faced from any of its constituent minorities or ethnic groups. Among the prominent competing
factors is the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan based on secular, historical and resource related claims.
Th e covert war is a result also of this tussle between the two states. Th en there is the aspect of the uprising since
1990. Th is was occasioned by a constellation of factors, including the culpability of the Indian state. Th is was not
a jihad to begin with, though jihadi forces did play a role and have since acquired prominence. Last is the aspect
of power asymmetry between the two states. Addressing this through realist logic meant that Pakistan ties down
Indian military power in manpower intensive counter insurgency operations. Th is strategy explains ‘K2’ (Khalistan
and Kashmir) referred to by Swami. Th is implies jihad has been more a strategic tool, rather than having any
autonomous reason to exist. It is for this reason that Pakistan continues to hedge in curbing terror originating from
its soil, despite the ‘blowback’ that it is currently experiencing. Take for instance the numbers of jihadis. Th e number
of foreign terrorists has seldom touched 60 per cent. Th eir motivations range from mercenary to youth escaping
anonymity and ennui in the stratifi ed Pakistani society. Witness the origins of Kasab. Even their handlers, though
espousing Islam for self interested reasons, cannot be oblivious to money and power. Swami’s neglect in bringing
out a more variegated picture indicates his scholarly instinct has been held hostage to his intelligence based sources.
Th e requirement of bringing new sources to light is important. Drawing sustainable conclusions is more so.
Th e important point that emerges indirectly from Swami’s work is that the Indian state has been responding
primarily to the element of jihad that is only one among the multiplicity of factors and not necessarily the most
signifi cant. Th is is evident from the importance intelligence experts have been accorded over the years in formulating
India’s policy with respect to Kashmir. Many are listed in Swami’s sources and some remain unnamed. Swami has
elsewhere informed us of the interface the ISI has had with RAW over Kashmir that did not lead anywhere in the
early nineties. Such contacts are in the air as of the writing of this review and in light of the competition between
the two state agencies, are bound to lead nowhere. Th is calls for a political approach and political control. Th at such
a strategy will not be forthcoming owes to policy space conceded to the intelligence community, strengthened in
the wake of Kargil with the addition of new structures. Th e pathology is well understood in the case of Pakistan;
however, as has been amply brought out by Swami, the intelligence input, that has queered India’s policy response,
awaits a book length treatment. It is perhaps one reason why India has not been able to bring the problem to
a closure through political means. Having misinterpreted the Kashmir problem as a jihadi covert war alone,
it has understandably not wanted to appease such forces. Th e political working group established as a result of the
Prime Minister’s Round Tables exercise in the middle of this decade did not even submit a report. Th e governance
initiatives that have been taken are arguably not enough.
An accurate interpretation of the Kashmir problem has been held hostage to many factors that include inadequate
intelligence analysis. Others include the zero sum contestation with Pakistan. Since acceding to legitimate grievances
in Kashmir would be taken as a Pakistani ‘victory’, India stays its hand in turning the rhetoric of ‘sky is the limit’
and ‘hand of friendship’ to reality. Th e ascendance of the conservative end of the spectrum and cultural nationalism
in India over the nineties has also infl uenced the government’s position. Th e hard line is, therefore, inescapable.
Analysis such as that of the credible Praveen Swami only serves to further prevent the necessary initiatives. Th us,
338 India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343
Kashmir remains on the boil. Th is serves Pakistani interests. Indian interests are not served since Kashmiris are
Indian citizens and secondly, continuing instability gives Pakistan a handle. Lastly, it energises forces that Swami
describes as Jihadi at the expense of other motives that boost these such as ethnicity, historical grievance and
freedom from counter-insurgent pressures.
With the corresponding covert war from the Indian side, not only in Kashmir but also in Pakistan, not
being covered, Indian intransigence is only superfi cially understandable. In case these are to be factored in, what
emerges is a duet between two contending intelligence agencies, virtually autonomous of political control. While
in Pakistan the ISI can be expected to be granted a blank cheque by the military.I In India, there appears to be
a defi cit of political and parliamentary control. Th is is a telling comment on India’s democratic good health.
Swami unintentionally opens up a pandora’s box that it would behove political decision makers to introspectively
address in the North Block and 7, Race Course Road.
Research Fellow Ali Ahmed
IDSA

Demonstration strikes, in an Indo-Pak conflict scenario claws.in

Ali Ahmed

Research Fellow, IDSA

E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com

Deterrence is the sine qua non of nuclear weapons. In the Indian scheme, these are not meant for war-fighting. Therefore the accent in discussion on their utility is rightly restricted to the credibility of deterrence and how this can be enhanced. This is the case in India, more so because it has been a ‘reluctant nuclear power’. Its nuclear doctrinal tenets therefore reflect deterrence, weighing in heavily towards ‘assured retaliation’ and that too, one designed to cause ‘unacceptable damage’. It is possible that the Strategic Forces Command may dwell on war-fighting as part of contingency planning and professional curiosity. This would be directed to ensure that if the enemy is the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the conflict, it is not only deprived of any perceived benefits, but also pays a price. Alongside, there would be considerations of damage limitation, escalation avoidance and control to the extent feasible, in-conflict deterrence, nuclear signalling, and responding to international concerns in order to gain the political and moral high ground. The aim would likely be to see that favourable war termination ensues with minimum damage incurred, even if this means that the enemy escapes maximum punishment. In any such exercise, targets and desired effects on them would be weighed against the options available in terms of bombs, damage templates and delivery systems to inflict the same. It is understandable then if the value of demonstration strikes escapes full attention. This article dwells on this less remarked upon aspect of nuclear use. In the case of Pakistan, the famous ‘option enhancing strategy’ has nuclear tests and demonstration strikes at the lowest escalatory level of nuclear first use. It is imagined that in case of conventional conflict, such nuclear explosions that are essentially target less would serve for nuclear signalling. The intent would be to convey to India that the nuclear threshold is nigh and that threatening conventional actions be called off or desisted from. The idea is to call attention of the Indian political and military leadership to the dangers in the situation. At the kernel is hope for war termination by bringing to bear international pressures on both sides to end the conflict while it is still in the non-nuclear plane. Since nuclear use in this manner would not have targeted Indian troops or territory, there would be no necessity for India to consider nuclear retaliation. However, India may yet like to convey that it remains undaunted. While rhetoric to that effect would serve a purpose, there may be a political need to demonstrate resolve. This can be done by mirroring Pakistani demonstration by either carrying out a nuclear test or doing a demonstration strike. While the former capability has already been made explicit over the past three instances of tests, the latter has the advantage of indicating that India has married a useable nuclear warhead to a workable delivery system. This tit-for-tat behaviour would serve to stay Pakistani hand even as it contemplates going nuclear. A demonstration strike cannot easily be taken as the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict, even if it is in an uncontested part of the conflict theatre. It is therefore not quite ‘first use’. Since Pakistani nuclear use in this fashion cannot be construed as ‘first strike’ or first use; similar Indian reaction keeps it within the parameters of NFU. Since there is no breach for NFU in demonstration strikes, even though they do make the conflict more fraught, India can also consider using tests of warheads and missiles and demonstration strikes in a proactive mode also. The advantage is in reinforcing deterrence once conventional conflict has broken out. There is a need to do so at the critical juncture when Pakistan could be in the midst of contemplating a lowering of the nuclear threshold or early nuclear use. This would create the space for conventional operations that are most likely to be conducted in the Limited War concept to reach their culminating point. The aim should be to see that the culminating point is below the perceived enemy nuclear threshold. Since this cannot be known with any degree of accuracy, there is a requirement of attempting to broaden the gap between the sub-conventional level and the nuclear threshold for force application of desired levels of conventional power. Demonstration strikes may be considered as one option available to do so. These would supplement diplomatic efforts, the information campaign, official statements and political pronouncements that collectively serve to inform the enemy of limitation to Indian aims and intent of early war termination. This increases the space for conventional force application as it reduces any enemy inclination towards nuclear resort either by design or in fear and haste. Even if the enemy nuclear threshold is assessed as high enough to permit conventional operations below it, there is no guarantee that it is instead a dynamic situation dependent one or against it getting disengaged from its higher tither in the furry of conflict. Communications through multiple channels to this end would be reassuring and function as the carrot to the demonstration strike that can act as stick. There would be a requirement of orchestrating the warning, statements from political and official quarters and action of agencies involved in the demonstration. The warning would be required so that there is no misunderstanding and the enemy’s attention is drawn to the desired site. Such options need consideration and debate in peace, in order that in times of actual conflict rehearsed means are on hand to implement without a faux pas. The counter argument has validity. In case India were to go in for a demonstration strike, would it be counter productive by bringing down international pressures to bear on the government to cease operations prior to its preferred end state? Would it heighten fears within the populace and thereby bring internal pressures equally to bear on war time decision making? Since the nuclear genie would have been let out, would it be the rationale for eventual enemy nuclear ‘first use’? These questions need fair consideration prior to operationalising the option. But to not cater for the option would be self denial that can only be regretted at leisure. The answer is in what demonstration strikes mean for deterrence.