Conflict strategy for the decade ahead  Article No.:		Date:	25/12/2010
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Ali Ahmed
E-Mail-aliahd66@hotmail.com
The beginning of the decade is variously dated to the beginning of 2010 and at other places to 1 January 2011. Be that as it may, a preview of conflict possibility over the coming decade, or balance of the decade if you will, is warranted. Any such preview must begin with and remain anchored in India’s national aim and grand strategy. This article attempts to outline the appropriate security strategy for the coming decade. India’s grand strategy is to protect and further its economic trajectory. Economic power, seen as furnishing power in general, requires at least another decade of consolidation. This implies that India’s security strategy, that is an outflow of grand strategy, would require working towards keeping the forthcoming decade free of conflict and in case of conflict outbreak to ensure that this does not divert India from its economic trajectory. How can such an outcome be brought about? Keeping the decade free of conflict is not entirely dependent on Indian strategy. Conflict could be imposed on India by instability in its neighbourhood. For instance, on the Pakistan front, Obama’s December review promises culmination of the ‘surge’ in checking the momentum of the Taliban in 2011 and perhaps a roll back by 2014. In case of either a positive or negative outcome, regional stability could be impacted adversely. In case the Taliban is on the ropes, Pakistan or its proxies could engineer another Mumbai to divert attention onto a regional crisis. In case the Petraeus plan does not work, then triumphalism could infect the Taliban and its state sponsor. Therefore, continuous engagement with the possibility of conflict is the first step. Such thinking will help identify what needs be done to deter conflict and in case this cannot be done, to limit it. Limitation is important in order that the security situation does not force a costly diversion from or burden on India’s growth story. That this is the line of thinking in the security establishment is evident from the statement of the Army Chief, declaiming the existence of a ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and indicating that the Army has catered for proactive ‘contingency’ operations. The preparations and the strategic communication indulged in by the Chief is itself an effort at deterring sub-conventional attack on India. The very term ‘contingency operations’ spells limitation. Thus, an effort at both deterrence and catering for its break down through building in limitation can be observed. Ongoing military developments such as acquisitions, increased defence budgets etc are indicators of like intent across the spectrum of conflict. Escalation dominance that is expected to ensue from higher military asymmetry would enable deterring of an escalatory counter by Pakistan. Higher capability levels would enable easier reckoning with Pakistani counter, thereby lessening both the nuclear overhang as enabling limitation. Not having the capability would entail higher exertion or expansion of conflict, militating against its limitation. While it suits Pakistani agenda to project future conflict as one fraught with escalatory potential, to enable it to pursue its proxy war with impunity, India needs to be aware of the escalatory potential since escalation would be dependent in part on Pakistani decisions, forced by considerations such as ‘face saving’, internal instability, right wing tilt etc. A review of the potential for conflict escalation is below. In case of another Mumbai 26/11, contingency operations including surgical strikes are by now indubitably on the table. Pakistan may choose to ignore the option of a defensive counter and instead opt for a military adventure. To preempt Pakistan’s aggressive moves or to counter them elsewhere, India could choose to selectively launch operations as envisaged in now discredited Cold Start formulation. Pakistan, unable to face the fait accompli of Indian advantage, may escalate to a full blown conventional conflict. This may trigger Indian pincers across the international border to a depth corresponding to Indian appreciation of Pakistani redlines. India would be content to terminate the conflict at any of these stages, since in comparison with Pakistan, that has nothing to lose but much to gain in terms of Chinese assistance, India has much to lose on the economic front, particularly in relation to China. At the nuclear threshold level, India’s military moves would be mindful of both inadvertent triggering of thresholds as also any nuclear signaling Pakistan could resort to. The latter includes testing missiles, testing nuclear devices, ‘green field’ demonstration strikes and even perhaps a strike after due warning on captured territory such as an enclave. While these do not necessarily demand a nuclear response by India, Indian nuclear strategy, informed but not restricted by its nuclear doctrine, would likely prove responsive, in order to display resolve for in-conflict deterrence. The next higher, nuclear level of the spectrum is one that both sides have a mutual interest in avoiding. The point that emerges is that escalation could happen once a conflict is underway. The response would be dictated by the conflict aim, itself a function of the overall national aim. India’s strategy would be a combination of deterrence and limitation. In a way this is paradoxical. The intent to limit may prove alluring to the enemy to provoke or escalate, thereby diluting deterrence. This apparent underside gives rise to the alternative strategy option of being both proactive and aggressive. The debate is worth engaging in, but clearly the exercise of choice either way is a political prerogative. Such a political choice may well face the decision maker as early as next year. It should find the military ready on three counts: one, to take proactive but limited action as currently envisaged by its leadership; two, to take the battle with finality to the enemy aggressively as held by the alternative formulation; and lastly, for continued Indian restraint. The military would require facing up to either the test of combat and remaining untested, with the latter, being unpalatable, proving equally challenging. Seeing security and military strategy as ensconced in wider national strategy, and the international strategic circumstance, may help ease any unease. Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)

Some Implications of the ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine

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The offensive doctrine adopted by the Indian Army has been dubbed Cold Start. It is essentially about being proactive in any future conflict. As to the extent it is cognisant of the Limited War theory is quite understandably indistinct, though it can reasonably be assumed that the doctrine does appropriately genuflect towards the nuclear backdrop. From its emphasis on being prepared for operations across the ‘spectrum of conflict’, it appears that the Army is ready for a conflict of any dimension including expansive conventional war, with the limits to be set by the political leadership as befits the situation. Most implications of conventional operations in a nuclear setting have been covered by military thinkers on both sides of the Indo-Pak border, such as that of ‘nuclear redlines’, ‘nuclear thresholds’, depth of operations, reconfiguration necessary for strike corps resources and asymmetric war possibilities. This article takes up the discussion on implications of certain features of Cold Start. Firstly, the limits of any future Cold Start offensive would obviously be politically determined and an outcome of political aims. As of the current situation it would appear that at best any Indian offensive would be of limited dimensions so as to sensitise Pakistan on the need for it to end its proxy war in J&K and across important locations in India. In a possible future scenario of a Talibanised or Lebanonised Pakistan, war aims may be more expansive to the extent of countenancing, along with the international community, a regime change. Military objectives would be jointly determined by the political leadership and important strategic voices, so that the nuclear dimension of the conflict is circumnavigated. Therefore, the limits of the offensive would be politically determined, even while the operational domain would be within the autonomous purview of the Services. Political leadership would have to be in the Indira-Shastri mould and that of the military in the Lal-Manekshaw-Nanda tradition. Nevertheless, institutional aspects, such as they presently are, need to be working at their optimum. There is scope for improvement in the direction of institution of a Chief of Defence Staff and further integration of the services with the Ministry of Defence. The debate initiated recently on the evolution of the Nuclear Command Authority needs to be taken to a logical conclusion for a decision and its implementation to be progressed with timely. Secondly, the aspect of asymmetric war needs further dilation. In wake of 26/11 Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP offered its services to the Pakistan Army in case of an Indian attack. The ISI chief called its cadres ‘patriots’. The Indian Army Chief has mentioned the training in POK being given even to women in handling arms, though he said this in the context of likely infiltration of women terrorists into Kashmir. However, it is a pointer to the manner the frontier inhabitants are being trained by the Pakistan Army. This indicates that not only would India’s forces be confronted with a levee en masse, or the legally permissible uprising of the population in wake of invasion, but also of orchestrated asymmetric operations in occupied territories. The scenario would be akin to that encountered by the Israeli attacks into Lebanon in 2006 and into Gaza early this year. The recent rocket attacks from across the Wagah border provide a window into the future. There are several implications of asymmetric conflict of this kind. One, Israeli counter tactics continue to be criticised in having lacked proportion and discrimination. The Indian Army would require studying these to ascertain as to the extent these have any validity in Indian conditions. Here it is argued that in case of an Indian attack, India requires making a distinction between common citizens and the Pakistani Army and its proxies. This would make for operational sense in that the resulting restraint would ensure that asymmetric war does not gain traction through people’s support. In this, tactics used by the US in the ‘Awakening’ campaign to pacify the Sunni triangle in Iraq may be instructive. General Petereus led US troops managed to get the Iraqi Sunni insurgents to turn on the Al Qaeda operatives in their midst. Towards this end, the information war campaign would have to be modulated accordingly. A prerequisite is a demographic profile up to intended operational depth. Two, in light of the Army’s learning in controlling Jaffna during Op Pawan, the civil affairs component should be identified and exercised. This would require a whole of government approach. The Sub Areas and Areas would be engaged in military logistics. Even though civil affairs staff will primarily comprise army officers, the civilian component comprising administrators would require being on hand speedily. This was the most significant lesson from the stabilisation operations in Iraq. Americans made two time consuming changes in their top order prior to arriving at a viable structure. Civilian administrators, perhaps from young volunteers, would require being at the core of the civil affairs component. As with the Civpol (Civilian Police) in a peacekeeping scenario, policing elements need to be on hand. The non-military component should be supervised by deputy commanders at all levels. Smooth functioning would require introduction of an exercise along these lines at the LBS Academy. A ‘whole of government approach’ alone can prevent a communication zone endangering break down of law and order. Precedence exists in the manner the 1971 operations were executed, where Bengali speakers were seconded both from the Army and the civil to the Mukti Bahini, temporarily. The best antidote is in the Pakistani civil administration handling their own population and civil affairs with supervision by own civil affairs staff. Four, the possibility of stampeded and panicked populations exists. The experience of Op Rah-e-Rast in Swat and that of the Sri Lankan Army in separating the LTTE from people requires attention. International attention may require moulding for which diplomatic and media resources need to be integrated into the larger information war ambit. The population movement could likely be without precedent given the gentlemanly tradition of past wars. It would not do to be surprised in the midst of a campaign. Rashtriya Rifles resources, duly psychologically and physically prepared, would require being attached to follow on forces. Necessary operating procedures for scenarios should be disseminated in Corps Battle Schools, where the troops undertaking tenures with the RR are introduced also to their possible conventional role in in-conflict stabilisation operations. Lastly, its not rocket science to appreciate that the National Disaster Management Authority and its meagre resources would be stretched in case of breakdown of the ‘nuclear taboo’. The military would require to designate and apportion resources prior for such contingencies, even as it continues with its operational mandate. Preparation for war is no longer solely the military’s responsibility. Anticipating the likely conflict trajectory indicates that there is an equal onus on the civilian side. The features requiring civilian attention and action, covered here, need to be appropriately fore-grounded. It can no longer await the outbreak of war. Such preparation would have value not only in wartime, but would add to the credibility of conventional deterrence in peace. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

Book Review
Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, Pentagon Press, Westport (CT), 2008,
pp. 221, Rs. 795.
ISBN 978-0-275-99945-2
By Ali Ahmed in The Third Frame
In his Foreword, noted India watcher, Stephen Cohen, notes the ‘special
role’ India will play in a globalized world. He recommends Bharat Karnad’s
India’s Nuclear Policy as ‘critical for understanding India’s evolution as a
204 Ali Ahmed
Book Reviews 205
great power.’ This owes to the book seeking, in the author’s words, ‘to
reveal the workings of India’s nuclear strategy and posture.’ The author
has achieved his aim in ample measure in not only disseminating knowledge
of the inner workings of the growing nuclear complex, but also analyzing
the same through his, by now patented, lens of nuclear maximalism.
Karnad keeps China in the cross-hairs contending that India needs a
‘consequential thermonuclear weapons inventory’ in order to play ‘nuclear
hardball’ in case the strategic situation was ever to deteriorate. With respect
to Pakistan, he is of the view that India is in a position to ‘overawe the
Islamic extremists potentially presiding over a Taliban ruled nuclear Pakistan’
on account of Pakistan not being a ‘credible conventional or nuclear threat
to India.’ He reveals how the concept of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ is
evolving and being implemented with the views of the military brass
increasingly shaping nuclear policy. He apprehends, through his interaction
with the many retired military men he has interviewed for the book, that the
‘weak link in the deterrence chain’ is the ‘indecisiveness and lack of will of
the Indian political leadership to take hard national security decisions’.
Having set out his world view, he dilates on the maturing of India’s
nuclear and missile capabilities, perhaps for the first time anywhere in such
detail. After covering the better known foundations of the capability in his
second chapter, he deals with the little known ongoing developments in the
third. His last chapter is on the implications of nuclearization for Southern
Asia with respect to Limited War and nuclear crises. His scathing approach
to the Indo-US nuclear deal owes, to the ‘curb’ it places on Indian nuclear
capability, contrary to what he sees as the US’ own strategic intent of
wanting ‘India emerge as a credible countervailing presence to China in
Asia’.
That India is giving itself a variegated nuclear capability comes out
distinctly in his description, bringing coherence to ongoing disparate
developments with respect to missiles, acquisition of delivery systems and
platforms and nuclear weapons. After initially being driven in their
autonomous efforts by a need to best the challenge of a technology denial
regime, the scientists are now, in Karnad’s description, working towards
integrated goals informed by multiple organizations involved such as the
Strategic Projects Group in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Strategic
Forces Command. It is the eventual complexion of the outcome, brought
about by emphasizing ‘credible’ in ‘credible minimum deterrence’, that
requires interrogation.
Karnad discerns a force of about 200 weapons, and 100 in reserve,
being delivered eventually by a strategic triad. This figure is subject to
expansion as India emulates Chinese ‘Limited Deterrence’ conception for
political and strategic reasons. This highlights the policy weight that the
strategic enclave and the military combine have acquired. It has resulted in
a shift from the original conception of ‘minimum deterrence’ in which the
very possibility of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage,’ reasonably defined, in
return for nuclear ‘first use’ or ‘first strike’ serves as adequate deterrence.
For this all that needs to be assured is that a finite number of weapon
systems survive even a salvo of the order of a ‘first strike.’ The military
focus on assurance on the damage that can be inflicted in return is what
drives up numbers and sophistication of the deterrent. The strategic enclave
for institutional interests can be expected to prefer an expansive conception
of the deterrent.
Karnad is right that political inattention has likely led up to such a pass.
In his view, political pusillanimity is responsible for the creeping pace of the
operationalization of the deterrent. He brings out the military’s suspicion of
political resolve on the manner of nuclear retaliation. The military’s position
on early and reflexive retaliation is under grid, in Karnad’s assessment, by
its felt need to forestall self-deterrence. Such a constraining of political
options can also be seen in the Army’s adoption of the Cold Start doctrine
in which mobilization schedules likewise restrict space for political crisis
management. This brings into question the extent political control over the
nuclear complex, but not in the direction Karnad prefers.
A rethink of aspects bringing about self-deterrence is necessary. The
more important one is to preserve the national space from further atomic
impacts in case of a nuclear exchange. A government’s responsibility towards
its citizens is to ensure damage limitation. This can best be brought about
by terminating the exchange at its lowest levels possible. Even if, for instance,
Pakistan were not to ‘survive the first retaliatory salvo,’ ‘cease to exist’ and
is ‘finished’, it would not rule out the risk of attacks by remnants of its
strategic forces. It is not the absolute amount of damage, but the mere
possibility of it that deters. This conception of existential deterrence that
had one time informed India’s doctrine of minimal deterrence has been
206 Ali Ahmed
Book Reviews 207
reflected on in Rajesh Rajagopalan’s Second Strike: Arguments of Nuclear
War in South Asia (2005, Penguin, New Delhi) and Rajesh M. Basrur’s
Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (2006, Stanford University
Press, Stanford). Karnad’s book helps revives the debate and if India is
moving along the expansive lines approvingly described by Karnad, then
liberal rationalists should join the debate yet again.
Described by Cohen as ‘one of India’s leading strategic thinkers,’ the
book is a recommended read to reappraise developments in the nuclear
field; best described in borrowing Karnad’s description of the earlier run up
to nuclearization, as nuclear operationalization by ‘autopilot.’
ALI AHMED

Mountain Strike Corps: The nuclear dimension

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Ali Ahmed

E-Mail- aliahd66@hotmail.com

Developments along the China front have been considerable over the year. Cumulatively they indicate a more assertive Indian posture. India has gone in for a Rs. 60000 crore worth of infrastructure development along the Line of Actual Control. In addition to two divisions in a holding role already raised, another Rs 60000 is to be spent on raising one mountain strike corps (MSC) and two independent mountain brigades over the next five year defence plan. This change is being viewed as far reaching as the mechanization of the eighties. However, nuclearisation by the late eighties had impacted the change then leading to the ‘father of mechanisation’, General Sundarji to rue when in retirement that Exercise Brasstacks had proven to be the last opportunity for large scale offensive maneuvers. Likewise, it can be expected that the nuclear factor will have implications for the army’s current expansion, if different. This article examines the nuclear dimension with which the mountain strike corps will have to contend. The wider nuclear context is framed by both India and China subscribing to a ‘No First Use’ (NFU) doctrine. Since this is a unilateral undertaking, it may be rescinded by either at any time. Some analysts point out that Chinese NFU has a caveat that it is not applicable to its own territory. Extending its perception of own territory to ‘South Tibet’ or Arunachal Pradesh, they argue that first use on its part cannot be ruled out. Therefore the nuclear level must not be ignored. While operational level stimulus for nuclear employment is unlikely for these strategic weapons to come into play, they can be expected to figure at later stages, in which either side is attempting to prevent defeat. The expectation could be that threat of use or lower order first use could help force war termination. Hypothetically, retracting from NFU itself would be a significant move to indicate that sensitive thresholds are being crossed in a conventional war, such as in India’s case for instance in the event Chinese manage to cross Bomdi La. In any case, the theoretical option of graduated nuclear response indicates that there is space for Limited Nuclear War. Despite its implausibility, limitation in the nuclear domain can be restricted to specific targets or theatres: for instance, strikes on strategic lines of communications such as mountain passes or strategic bridges in the hinterland. The variegated capability available with both states in terms of types of weapons and delivery platforms and the nuclear weapon numbers make this possible. Missiles have been known to be deployed in TAR and India is to stage forward a Brahmos regiment. Such nuclear considerations will form the backdrop of deployment and employment of the MSC. Since as a potent force it has the potential to turn round an operational situation, it may trigger nuclear employment. Such employment at the operational level would at best be tactical nuclear first use. Acknowledging this as a possibility will help psychologically preparedness and training to operate in a nuclearised battlefield. The current levels of nuclear equipment are in all probability inadequate. These need also to figure on the acquisitions list, at least the protective gear. Keeping the nuclear factor in mind implies that the MSC must be so employed as to reduce incentive of the enemy for first use. For instance, in case the signature of movement is minimized to the extent possible and the target in terms of concentration offered is minimal, then the enemy may refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. The MSC must not also get into such an adverse position as to force the strategic leadership to consider first use by India. The assumption behind MSC employment must be such that nuclear weapons are not available for either progressing its operations or extricating it from unintended adverse situations. This will ensure that only strategic compulsions dictate nuclear weapons employment and operational concerns do not act as bottom-up compulsions at the strategic level. The more significant aspect at the conventional-nuclear interface is that of choice of operational level objectives. In case the objectives are of a higher value and the effectiveness of the corps in achieving them in the event turns out to be of a superior order, then the possibility of enemy compensating for its conventional deficit in the sector through nuclear use increases. China may choose to exercise the option in case India poses it a military threat or forces an adverse military situation of higher order political costs. The circumstance of Chinese tactical resort to nuclear weapons in first use mode may prevail up to the time, perhaps till end of the decade, till when India reaches a level of notional equivalence; parity being ruled out. This is not true in the reverse case since India would not be breaking its NFU, not on account of any moral considerations, but for reasons of asymmetry. Indian equivalent use of nuclear weapons in response will inevitably follow since India’s doctrine is one of ‘assured retaliation’. The factor, pointed out by Gurmeet Kanwal, that the waters contaminated by nuclear use all flow into the Bay of Bengal will be a primary consideration in such retaliation. However, such response may not be escalatory. This is not necessarily an adverse circumstance for conventional forces, since the nuclear factor is more manageable at lower levels of exchanges. The ability to exploit such nuclear use must be intrinsic to the MSC, both in terms of equipment inventories and NBC training levels. Resilience, self-sustenance and survivability of the MSC will then be sorely tested. MSC must in such circumstances conduct its campaign to reduce any reliance on nuclear weapons, since once introduced every endeavour to terminate exchanges at the lowest level of nuclear use will be in evidence. Even if nuclear use is less significant for the China front, the inevitable dual tasking of the MSC for the Pakistan front implies that the nuclear dimension needs thinking through. Its arrival in the western theatre may compel Pakistan to compensate by bringing the nuclear backdrop to foreground, at a minimum through rhetoric. Here, the brief sketch of the nuclear dimension has been to serve as trigger.

Nuclear Use Consequences For Pakistan Ali Ahmed

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India’s then Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, speaking in the context of Pakistani nuclear rhetoric during the stand-off between the two states in 2001-02 said, "[India] could take a [nuclear] strike, survive and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished." His statement conveyed the Indian leadership’s resolve to bolster credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent, as also reassure its military that it would never fight from a position of disadvantage. The use of the term ‘finished’ is interesting in that it is unambiguous. It brings out clearly what would occur should Pakistan resort to nuclear ‘first use’. This paper dwells on the meaning of ‘finished’ in the context of an India-Pakistan nuclear encounter. At a minimum, discussion on the shape of post nuclear conflict Pakistan would strengthen deterrence. While military reflection has attended nuclear war, political possibilities that open up have not found mention. Doing so is necessary to have a road map available were the admittedly unlikely event to come to pass. Nuclear optimists would have it that India’s nuclear deterrence would hold, particularly as the Pakistani Army is a rational organisation and has much to lose by resorting to nuclear weapons. It would stand to lose not only the war but also its place in Pakistani polity post war. Therefore, even the ‘last-resort’ Samson option is not entirely credible, for at that late stage nuclear weapons could only have a vengeance value. Thus, while nuclear scenarios cannot be ruled out in future conflict, there is a strong possibility that the possibility of being ‘finished’ may see the nuclear taboo intact at the end of any such war. However, the initiative being with Pakistan and war dynamics being an uncertain realm, the outcome of nuclear exchange(s) are worth a pause. India’s doctrine is one of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation to ‘first strike’, with first strike generally equated to ‘first use’ in the Indian nuclear lexicon. Even if Pakistan was to employ nuclear weapons in the most circumspect and non-provocative manner, India has promised to exact ‘unacceptable damage’ in return. Whether this would be through a ‘massive’ attack is debatable, since doctrine is meant to inform strategy and not substitute for it. A doctrine of Assured Retaliation does not necessarily imply Assured Destruction. Nevertheless, retaliation would inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. A favoured example of non-provocative nuclear use is a nuclear strike on a tactical target in a defensive mode on its own territory, perhaps a sector with least amount of collateral damage. This does not however imply ‘tactical use’, in that nuclear use would not be to influence a battle situation as much as to influence war termination efforts of the international community, energised by the break in the nuclear taboo. In such a circumstance, whatever the quantum of India’s response in terms of numbers and tonnage, cumulatively the effect would be on Pakistani territory. Thus even in this lowest level of nuclear use scenario, Pakistan and its people stand to suffer as a result. In case the strikes are on non-Punjabi territory, then the minority populations would be justifiably aggrieved as to call for a change in the political order centred on Punjab and its Army. Since the military controls the National Command Authority, the military would bear the onus. Post-conflict there would be a reckoning that would assuredly displace the military from its perch atop the state apparatus. In a scenario of Indian nuclear restraint, Pakistan would not be quite ‘finished’, but the guardian status of its Army would certainly be so. This would be to Pakistan’s long term benefit. In case Pakistani nuclear first use is higher on the scale of ‘opprobrium quotient’ – a term devised by former Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji – then the violence of India’s response would almost certainly be higher. This would not only be so because it would be justifiable, but also because of the anger such a strike would evoke and the need to deter and end further Pakistani misadventure. Clearly, in such a situation, balance of the conflict would witness expansion in the aim of the conflict to at the minimum regime change and at a maximum the temporary eclipse of Pakistan as a state. Since it would be unwise for India to permit a state that has violated its security in such a manner to continue, political and constitutional innovation in expanding India to include Pakistani territories cannot be ruled out. While the effect of a higher order nuclear exchange on India would be considerable, Pakistan would be in worse shape. Being smaller, the damage would be proportionately greater. An international effort would be necessary to mitigate the calamity. Being the occupying power India would require leading such an effort, even as it addresses the damage it has itself suffered. Thus there are two connotations to the term ‘finished’. In the first involving lower order nuclear use, post-conflict Pakistan would be very different with its Army cut to size by its own people, angered in the manner it had chosen to defend them. In the second instance, in case of higher order nuclear use, India should contemplate ending the independent existence of Pakistan. That the latter would involve expansion in Indian aims to reorder Pakistan is obvious. However, the former – lower order use – would require a more nuanced response. The recommendation here is that in such a case – that is the more likely manner of nuclear use by Pakistan – India should ensure regime change and an irreversible end to Pakistan’s status as an ‘NWS’. This does not necessarily require the Indian military to continue the fight in nuclear conditions since running the nuclear risk may not be warranted. Ending the risk finally for the future should instead be attempted. Concerted internal and external pressures need to be mounted to deliver the NCA to international justice. This would strengthen the international legal order, end the hegemony of Pakistan’s Army in Pakistan and place India unambiguously as the sole regional power.

Hatf IX and possible Indian responses  Article No.:	1830	Date:	05/05/2011
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Ali Ahmed
E-Mail- aliahd66@hotmail.com
Pakistan has recently demonstrated the short range SS Hatf IX or the NASR claiming it is nuclear capable. The test was reported on 19 April in media networks across the region. Its nuclear capability depends on the miniaturisation achieved since the Chagai tests at which three low yield (sub-kiloton) devices are said to have been detonated. Analysts in Pakistan have described this as the country’s answer to ‘Cold Start’, espoused by the Indian Army. The surface-to-surface (SS) tactical nuclear capability of Pakistan came from a need to deter any conventional attack by India. Over the last decade, India had shifted to a conventional doctrine of ‘Limited War’ in which it intended to launch multiple shallow thrusts to keep below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. The SS missiles have been depicted as serving to deter even such shallow depth attacks in a low nuclear threshold mode. Implicit analysis is the intent of nuclear first use. So, what is the effect of this development on Pakistani nuclear doctrine? The doctrine is generally taken as effecting first use, in the absence of Pakistan’s espousal of ‘no first use’ or NFU. It must be acknowledged that absence of explicit doctrine of NFU does not imply ‘first use’. Since Pakistan has not brought out a declaratory doctrine, preferring ambiguity, it is not known for certain as to what its doctrine is. In other words, Pakistani operational doctrine could well be of NFU. However, consensus has it, based on its actions and statements of personages that the bias in Pakistan’s case is in favour of ‘first use’. Pakistan seeks to ‘do more’ with nuclear weapons than is usually credited to them. Like the NATO in the Cold War period, it also employs its nuclear deterrent to cover the conventional level. This it does in the belief of conventional asymmetry with India. The ‘first use’ threat is to deter India from leveraging its conventional advantage. India has anticipated such a posture and gone in for a Limited War doctrine. The doctrine taking cognisance of possible nuclear thresholds, stipulated multiple-pronged offensives by integrated battle groups over a broad front keeping below any appreciated thresholds. Pakistan, in demonstrating its SS tactical nuclear capability has attempted to depict a lower threshold so as to restrict further the scope of these limited offensives. Knowing that Pakistan relies on information warfare to enhance the credibility of its deterrence to cover the conventional level, there is little reason to take Pakistan at its word. Shallow thrusts do not do much damage to Pakistan. At best it would suffer infrastructure damage along the border and require managing refugee flows. Air operations would likewise be circumspect in the extent of attrition they inflict on strategic reserves. This would be a more consequential threshold and therefore airpower will have to be more carefully calibrated. Since the political and military aim in a limited war would be to keep the conflict restricted in scope, time and intensity, Pakistan has the conventional capacity to respond adequately without having any deficiency being compensated by nuclear weapons. Given this, the utility of nuclear first use is less in order to deter shallow depth offensives, but more to deter possibility of launch of strike corps in wake of shallow depth offensives. India’s conventional doctrine lends India the flexibility to fight a wider war since it reckons with strike corps employment in war. Strike corps could use any of these shallow depth offensives as launch pads for deeper objectives. In the words of the conventional doctrine they, ‘should be capable of being inserted into operational level battle, either as battle groups or as a whole, to capture or threaten strategic and operational objective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the enemy’s reserves and capture sizeable portions of territory (Indian Army Doctrine, 2004: 55-56).’ While Pakistan has practiced its counter to ‘Cold Start’ in the Azm-e-Nau III exercises last year, it may not prove equal to stemming India’s strike corps, particularly if more than one of the three, are employed simultaneously. In the event, it may have to react with the SS missile against threatening pincers. The missiles therefore under-grid Pakistan’s first use posture described by one analyst as ‘asymmetric escalation’. The Hatf IX therefore attempts to extend the cover of the nuclear overhang more credibly to cover the conventional level. In the current scenario of Pakistan’s strike reserves being also employed for counter-insurgency tasks and into the near future, they may have to reel in and then deploy into action. While they are doing so and traversing to battle stations, they would be subject to attrition by airpower. They would thus be sub-optimal and may not be able to stanch India’s conventional inroads. Implicit in building the NASR is the threat of first use on elements that do not have a conventional counter or reserves suitably positioned for reaction. There are three options at which India could prove responsive to the threat. One is in the additional step it has built in at the sub-conventional level before resorting to the conventional level. This may be seen in the recent distancing from the ‘Cold Start’ theory through launch of proactive contingency operations calibrated to Pakistani proxy war provocations. The second is by going in for a ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy. This would mean retaining the strike corps in a posturing role geared to escalation control by deterring conventional escalation by Pakistan. This builds in two fire breaks prior to the more credible possibility of nuclear first use by Pakistan. The last is in extending nuclear deterrence to cover the low threshold mode. Presently, the doctrine of assured retaliation posits that such retaliation must be to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’. However, Pakistan may delude itself into believing it can get away with lesser punishment in the event of a strike with low opprobrium quotient. It may be prompted towards this by its risk taking capability, deficiency in strategic sense and a military dominant aggressive strategic culture. India could in such a circumstance resort to a quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus strike. This may mean a departure from ‘unacceptable damage’, but the threat of the same remains to deter nuclear escalation. Even if India’s declaratory doctrine meant for nuclear deterrence and in tune with India’s interpretation that nuclear weapons are political weapons is retained as such, this shift can be done in India’s operational doctrine. This would deter Pakistani first use even in the low threshold mode as suggested by the development of NASR. The window that Pakistan has tried to reopen for continuing its proxy war taking advantage of the stability/instability paradox can thus be slammed shut once again. Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi

Kargil: Afterthoughts on the Operational level Ali Ahmed

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The tenth anniversary of the victory at Kargil was marked in 2009. Among the many events organised to mark the occasion, the Northern Army Command honoured the next of kin of the heroes through a visit to the site of their martyrdom. That Kargil was not an unqualified victory in the tradition of 1971 is accepted as witnessed in the title of the official report on the conflict, From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage, 2000). Even though there was much to commend in the showing at Kargil, such as junior leadership, ability to mass firepower, innovation in air power, heavy media coverage, shortcomings such as those in equipment, intelligence, vulnerability of lines of communication have also rightly received attention. However, this article dwells on the relationship between the operational and strategic levels during the conflict to see if there are any lessons learnt from the conflict. The three books that cover the military aspects of the conflict fairly well, miss out on the operational level. Lt Gen YM Bammi’s Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (Noida, India: Gorkha Publishers, 2002) and Amarinder Singh’s A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999 (Patiala: Motibagh Palace, 2001) restrict themselves in the main to the tactical level, recounting the great battles now part of Indian military lore. Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006), authored by the Chief at the time, Gen VP Malik is revealing on this score in that it describes the intimate interface of Army Headquarters with the tactical plane. The missing link is the operational level story of Kargil, perhaps because much of the detail cannot be made public due to its continuing security value. Nevertheless, one can hazard a guess that there was extensive interaction between the tactical level and the military operations directorate. This has found mention in passing in journalistic accounts such as Harinder Baweja’s A Soldier's Diary – Kargil: The Inside Story (New Delhi: Lancer, 2000). What are the implications in terms of managing conflict given that the Kargil War appears prototypical of wars of the future? It is notable that the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen HM Khanna, does not figure in the iconic war photographs that emanated from Kargil. The Command Headquarters in Udhampur exercised considerable self-effacement; restricting its domain to logistics, provisioning firepower, interfacing with the Air Force, tasking reserves mobilised and managing the overall operational situation in J&K including the terrorism aspect. The major task of the headquarters was to arise in case of need for expansion of the conflict from beyond its localised confines on ‘own side’ of the LC in Kargil. In case the going was found to be impossible, then General Malik indicates in his book that he may have gone back to the government for revision of the ‘terms of reference’ of the CCS. In such a case of widening the front to enable attack from the rear and multi-directional attacks, the battle would have indubitably gone beyond the tactical confines to the operational level. In case the LC elsewhere was activated alongside to keep enemy reinforcements tied down, then the staff at Udhampur and Srinagar would have been crucial to the effort. In the event tactical prowess and intimate monitoring of the battle space from South Block did not let this happen. What is the lesson in this? Given that the Kargil conflict was a discrete case in light of its unique context; its lessons may only be partially generalised. At Kargil, the requirement to enforce victory within the political parameter of limitation, perhaps justified the extensive engagement of Army HQs with the localised theatre of operations, necessitating a number of visits of the Chief to the front. The lesson of more ‘hands on’ control is perhaps reinforced by the reported removal of a strike corps commander in the opening stages of the subsequent ‘Operation Parakram’. Nevertheless, the danger is in Army HQs losing the wider picture in case of over-concern with a particular sector. Arriving at a balance is relevant to the future in which recurrence of ‘Kargils’ can take place as also Limited Wars, which by definition compel limitation. How then can this limitation be exercised without Army HQs overly intruding on the operational level? Firstly, in case a shared understanding of limitation pervades the service, this is easier achieved. This indicates that a Limited War doctrine, as is being discussed in different forums including defence studies bodies such as the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), requires promulgation. This would help place the service across the hierarchy on the same page without ambiguity. Secondly, intimate control, as is inescapable in limited conflict scenario, would require operational level headquarters being responsible for exercising it. This would be the principle challenge of Operational Art in the nuclear age. This would leave the apex free for engaging with issues of wider import as nuclear thresholds, joint direction of the war, managing the political interface and winning the information war. Lastly, there is a case for operational command devolving on theatre level headquarters. Among other more weighty reasons, this also owes to the chemistry of personalities, such as personal equations between the Chief and his C-in-C. These headquarters would of necessity have to be joint headquarters, a reform that can only succeed the eventual (since inevitable) creation of a CDS. This in turn awaits acceptability of the idea of Chiefs divesting command responsibility, role and functions in favour of a role that better matches their official nomenclature. At Kargil, history records that the political-strategic scope of the conflict was managed ably; ensuring that Pakistan could not escalate by widening the conflict to escape defeat in detail. This enabled combat power, particularly firepower and surveillance resources, to be transferred to and within the theatre with lesser risk. However, the retrospectively justifiable ‘narrow focus’ Kargil model cannot be replicated in future conflict. Received theory on division of labour between the three levels of war needs translation into organisational relationships in light of the Kargil experience. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies