Kashmir: It's now or never

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/news.aspx?ndid=23225

• Published:12/9/2011 12:05:00 PM
• Updated: 12/9/2011 10:02:25 AM
• By: BY ALI AHMED
• Filed Under: column

  

That India's Kashmir initiatives are held hostage to its 'AfPak' strategy is by now evident. The outset of winter was a useful decision point for changing the situation around. Nothing has happened less due to absence of political will, but more due to grand strategy considerations. While the former cannot be discounted due to the political preoccupations at New Delhi since mid year, together with the latter another opportunity at arriving at an appropriate closure has been given a go by. This article argues that the possibility of negative scenarios for AfPak in the future should spur the Centre to take necessary measures, lest the window close steadily over time, if not slam shut dramatically.
That the time was ripe at the end of a quiet summer in the Valley was self-evident. The interlocutors have given in their recommendations. The economic program under the tutelage of C. Rangarajan has been underway. The military has managed its WHAM campaign with finesse. The chief minister mounted a campaign for a break in the deadlock, with his AFSPA plank as spearhead. At New Delhi, the opposition has been in disarray, leaving the Center enough maneuver room in case it had chosen to exploit it. Pakistan was under considerable pressure to the point of disjuncture in their relationship with the US. The second round of talks with Pakistan is due to begin.
In effect, India had forced a penalty corner. Its inaction since is risking its conversion into a goal. Worse would be in case this loss of opportunity with time proving a self goal. The hold-up calls for an explanation.
Both Pakistan and India are hedging their bets regarding the endgame in 'AfPak'. Pakistan's current restraint in Kashmir is explicable in light of its security circumstance to its west. India, apprehending this, is waiting it out, lest it play its hand in terms of conflict resolution initiatives prematurely. Reports of presence of 2500 terrorists in POK of which 700 are apparently in launch camps makes it pause.
The hope seems to be in a worsening situation in Pakistan, wherein the difficulty of that state can be turned to advantage. Since no one in the Valley would like to see instability imported from across the LoC, the problem will be more amenable to resolution. Pakistan, against the ropes, would be more likely to compromise on Kashmir.
Is this scenario likely? A scenario building exercise is warranted to test this perception of Indian strategy.
The key drivers are the choices made by the US and Taliban on the continuum of military competition and political engagement. The secondary drivers are stability of Pakistan, ability of the Afghan state and its security forces to cope and the proactive content of India's strategy. The baseline assumptions are that the US continues military engagement, the Taliban remains obdurate, Pakistani stability continues on its downward trajectory and India tends towards containment in its Pakistan strategy, that lends its AfPak strategy a competitive edge.
In such circumstance, the narrative for a 'baseline scenario' would have it that the military competition intensifies and spreads. While the US drawdown occurs, the US does not leave the region. It instead outsources the fighting to the Afghan National Security Forces. The Taliban increases its challenge. US pressure on Pakistan to take on the extremists results in Pakistani stability being compromised. Instability continues.
A 'positive scenario' is in a US drawdown and a tamed Taliban along with improved Pakistani stability. The narrative for such a scenario would read: US draws down militarily, but emphasises the political prong. The Taliban bites, with Pakistan acting as honest broker. The 'worst case scenario', reminiscent of the early nineties, is in the US departing, forced by economic and political compulsions back home. The Taliban make a triumphalist reentry into Kabul. Afghanistan dissolves into civil war and serves as a site for the regional proxy war, extension of an India-Pakistan cold war.
Of the three scenarios - status quo, positive, negative - above, India stands to gain less in case of either the positive or the negative one playing out. In case of a positive talks-driven outcome, Pakistan will be able to revert its attention to Kashmir after gaining 'strategic depth'. In case of a negative scenario, triumphalism could mean a return to the nineties, both in Afghanistan and, in turn, in Kashmir.
India's preferred scenario approximates the baseline one, of continuing instability keeping Pakistan occupied. The problem is that this implies continuing room for extremism in the region. India cannot insulate itself from being singed since India's abundant caution in Kashmir suggests that there is enough dry wood, twigs and leaves stacked to catch the proverbial spark from across.
In other words, India is not a gainer in all three scenarios. This implies that it should clean up its backyard, preserving itself from any stray sparks. This means arriving at an internal settlement, using the window of time till the outcome scenarios in AfPak materialize by about mid decade.
This is in keeping with the Prime Ministers strategy, expressed in his opening remarks at the meeting of All Party Delegation from J&K in wake of the unrest through the summer of 2010 that consumed 110 lives: 'But I recognize that the key to the problem is a political solution that addresses the alienation and emotional needs of the people. This can only be achieved through a sustained internal and external dialogue. We are ready for this. We are willing to discuss all issues within the bounds of our democratic processes and framework. But this process can gather momentum and yield results only if there is a prolonged peace.'
The solution is clear: a dialogue both internal and external. Since the external prong of dialogue is not entirely India's to control, the internal prong of strategy gains precedence. The problem is in defining 'prolonged peace'. As seen from the scenario building exercise, developments in the neighbourhood make 'prolonged peace' illusionary. Instead, prolonged peace has to be engineered by appropriate internal strategy.
The elements of the strategy are already in place. Peace prevails. If the time lapse since the prime minister's statement last August is taken as long enough to count as 'prolonged, the time is now.
A beginning can be made with an agenda setting tweak to the AFSPA!
(The author is Research Fellow Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) 

Smile but keep powder dry

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main52.asp?filename=Fw100412Smile.asp

Ali Ahmed on how it is the Pakistan army and not the state which is a problem for India

Illustration: Tanmaya Tyagi ALSO READ  India, Pakistan aim for preferential trade pact  In Asia, India is too big to fail Can India and Pakistan mend the rifts? Yes. Here are a few good tips to make sure we get there

DR MANMOHAN Singh has accepted the invite to visit Pakistan extended by President Asif Ali Zardari during his lunch stopover while on a pilgrimage visit to Ajmer. Since a ‘mutually convenient date’ is yet to be ascertained for the visit, there is sufficient time to create the conditions for a useful outcome. What can India do to prepare such an outcome?

First, one must identify what has been the problem between the two countries. This is easily done since India’s problem has not been the Pakistan state, its political class or its citizens. It is instead the Pakistani Army. The question then is how to tackle the Pakistan Army. The problem has been accentuated in the period of the proxy war going back a quarter-century by a nexus between elements of the army, principally its intelligence arm, the ISI, and the right wing in Pakistan.

Is there any reason to believe that this time around, the Pakistan Army is on board? The Army, in keeping with a self-professed ‘guardian’ role, has kept India’s peace overtures at bay. This time around, the Army has indicated better behaviour on the Kashmir front, with the latest MHA Annual Report testifying to a decline in infiltration and violence in the Valley over the past year.

However, this could well be tactical, Pakistan wanting to wait out the US in its Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) endgame. Therefore, it cannot readily be taken that the leopard has changed its spots.

Being clear-eyed about the Pakistan Army position is a useful starting point to arriving at a doable aim for the visit. A minimalist expectation is that the visit broadcasts India’s goodwill. It helps narrow the even otherwise limited constituency of extremists in Pakistan. It will further draw forces interested in better ties, such as the liberals, the emerging middle class, commercial and cultural interests, away from the Army. It could even embolden rational forces within the military, splitting it from its ‘strategic assets’.

Since strengthening these forces is useful for the stability of Pakistan, the visit will be as much an investment in India’s own security as Pakistan’s.

While to stop at this point would be pragmatic, bolder steps can be envisaged since India is only in the consideration stage of the visit. These, however, require political will, supposedly in short supply in democracies contemplating elections as is India in the year after next. However, to be dismissive of their potential would be to do disservice to India’s growing power and aspiration.

It is widely held that India cannot realise its ambitions on the world stage as long as it is tied down in its region. Strategically, Pakistan, for reasons of external balancing, will lend itself to China’s power play in the region at India’s cost. India cannot afford Pakistan’s Army exercising a veto. In effect, India needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs India. This implies that India cannot get away on the cheap. Political investment is necessary, for which the conditions have to be created by ambitious political and diplomatic moves.

THE CURRENT strategy is predicated on deepening the political, economic and military asymmetry with Pakistan that is seen as autonomously proceeding downhill. This is unlikely to work, firstly, because it amounts to writing Pakistan’s epitaph prematurely, and, secondly, the leaked letter of General VK Singh to the prime minister suggests that the asymmetry does not quite exist despite India being the world’s largest arms importer.

Any alternative moves would require being in sync with India’s long-held, popular position that it will not negotiate, leave alone concede, under the threat of a gun. This can only be even less so with Pakistan holding a gun to its own head. So, what can India do?

Home minister P Chidambaram is proceeding this week to Kashmir to preside over a meeting of the unified headquarters. This is admittedly to survey the coming summer campaign. In case Kashmir is as quiet this summer as it was last year, there would be a strong case to review the AFSPA by the time autumn sets in. Demilitarisation, a demand dating to the ‘healing touch’ policy, can then proceed over the winter, building on the momentum of the PM’s visit. A pronouncement laying out a road map by Chidambaram will help keep the situation manageable, keep the visit on course and inject in it potential for success.

A retraction of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) prior to the Prime Minister’s visit can go a long way in assuaging any reservations in Pakistan that its political leadership is selling out on Kashmir. Saner elements in Pakistan can claim that India is being more pliable through talks than it ever was through proxy war. Likewise, India can gain more through seeming concessions, than it has ever managed by a hardnosed, if not a hardline, posture.

Given the peace dividend at stake, the Prime Minister’s visit to Pakistan is a chance that must be taken. President Zardari’s ‘very soon’ could well be as early as this autumn.

A general’s unforgettable legacy

Ali Ahmed on where Chief of Army Staff Gen VK Singh leaves army-related issues on 31 May

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main52.asp?filename=Fw250512general.asp

IF A PARTY was to be held in South Block on the day the chief dons civvies, on 31 May to be precise, it would be understandable. He has exposed the underbelly of the ministry’s procurement system in going public with the Tatra bribe offer; disrobed the Defence Estates’ civilians over misappropriation of land in the Adarsh scam; and by bluntly referring to the ‘hollowness’ of his force, has shown up the bureaucrats as the stumbling block within. He may well go down in history for the chasm inadvertently revealed between the ministry and the military, in his supposed ‘spooking’ of the ministry through unprogrammed military movements.

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To his detractors, he would be remembered for his self-interested exertions to extend his tenure into the next year by the unprecedented dragging of the government to the Supreme Court. Even well-wishers in the Army and in civil society cringe at the implicit suggestion that at least one of his predecessors was communal, favouring his community in a proverbial ‘succession’ list, and that at least two of his predecessors were corrupt.

And now, his swan song. The general appears to have attempted the last-minute sabotage of the career of one of his successors, who stood to gain by the alleged manipulation of the general’s date of brith in his showcause notice this week to the 3 Corps commander on a botched intelligence operation. The unfortunate implication — that in doing so he may firstly be exhibiting a communal prejudice of his own, and secondly, be helping someone as yet unidentified who he is more inclined towards thereby furthering the malady — seems to escape him.

However, his lasting legacy would be in his fight to get his brainchild through, that of getting the government to accept an expansion on the China front by a mountain strike corps comprising two specialised divisions amounting to another 86,000 troops. This has been his handiwork beginning with his study report on the army’s ‘transformation’ in his previous appointment as Eastern Army Commander.

At least some of the impetus of his differences with the bureaucracy owed to the government’s going slow on this proposal. It had earlier cited the downslide in the economy to undercut it. In the event, the leak of his letter to the prime minister — part of the wider mudslinging match between the two institutional sides — resulted in the parliamentary committee’s endorsement and the government’s acceding to the expansion at the Unified Commanders conference.

While security concerns have been deployed for legitimising the expansion, the factor of institutional interest is intrinsic. A way the army can continue setting the agenda in face of big ticket purchases impacting relative salience of the services, such as the MMRCA, the Vikramaditya and Arihant etc, is through gaining a strike corps. For a chief to have gone out on a limb to progress this amounts to an investment in not only a legacy but also a future.

His pro-Anna campaign remarks of last year have already elicited an invite from the Anna campaign to join up. Further, the chief’s ending of his tenure in a flurry of addresses at ex-servicemen rallies provides a clue on his motives, since, incidentally, ESM are the lookout of a civilian department within the ministry. Given that the chief has blown any chance of a post-retirement sinecure from the government, he has taken care to create a constituency for himself. Since recruitment will benefit traditional recruiting areas, the Chief has single-handedly gifted these communities a lifeline.

BUT GERMANE to the legacy is the strategic course he has set India on. The mountain strike corps follows raisings of two mountain divisions in a defensive role. This means that India’s erstwhile posture of ‘dissuasive deterrence’ on the China front is firmed in. However, the military thrust lately has been towards an ‘active deterrence’ posture. This means adding offensive punch.

This is of a piece with India’s proactive and offensive posture on the Pakistan front, exemplified by the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Though the general had earlier placed the doctrine in cold storage by disavowing from it, he backtracked at the peak of his DOB crisis on Army Day by saying that it remains on the cards.

Whether this helps Indian security is moot. The jury will have to consider whether this generates an avoidable security dilemma between neighbours. Theory has it that even defensive exertions can lead to an action-reaction arms race cycle, that can precipitate the conflict they are designed to deter. The ‘two front’ scenario is crystallising, not least by India’s actions.

The general in setting off a self-fulfilling prophecy is set to have the satisfaction of saying while fading away, ‘I told you so!’

Ali Ahmed is Assistant Professor, Jamia Millia Islamia

Deterrence has a shaky and brief shelf life

http://www.tehelka.com/story_main51.asp?filename=Ws030112Deterrence.asp

Ali Ahmed says current India-Pakistan nuclear confidence measures are not enough

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THE FIFTH meeting of the Joint Working Group on nuclear confidence building measures (NCBMs) ended in Islamabad as the year 2011 ended. There was a previous meeting in late 2007 and a subsequent one was aborted after the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. Between then and now we had the 26/11 crisis with a nuclear backdrop. And in the meantime, Pakistan has unveiled a tactical nuclear missile system, the Nasr. India’s steps towards a triad and a ballistic missile defence system are sure and steady. Clearly, the two states got the timing of the meeting right.

But there’s much to be done. Periodic meetings are useful but insufficient. What needs doing instead is the establishment of a standing engagement mechanism. The problem with this is that neither state wishes to give the impression that it sees the nuclear dimension of their relationship as problematic. They wish to convey that deterrence being in good health, there is no need for a more extensive interface. Both appear to be nuclear optimists, sanguine that deterrence works. Another problem is that the two states have arguably entered an era of mutual assured destruction (MAD). MAD’s yardsticks of the Cold War on the levels of destruction amounting to 50 per cent of the industrial capacity and 25 per cent of the population need not detain us. Given the nuclear ordnance at the disposal of the two states, they can despatch the other back to the Stone Age.

The arsenal of both reportedly is in the vicinity of three digits. India believes it can destroy Pakistan while it can survive because of its size. Pakistan for its part has been increasing its nuclear numbers to ensure that enough survive to be able to set India back sufficiently for India to disabuse itself of the notion that it can survive Pakistan.

India’s posturing is apparently for deterrence; to assure Pakistan that since it would survive, it does not fear Pakistani nuclear posturing. Yet, firstly, the subcontinent being one geographic entity, nuclear effects will have consequences across the Indo-Gangetic plains. Second, Pakistan’s numbers are sufficient to take out a few consequential Indian cities. With New Delhi and Mumbai gone, it would take a while to put India together again. Lastly, even if India survives, it would lose out in its competition with China.

While the possibility does serve to deter, the doctrines of the two states enhance dangers. Pakistan, hoping to extend the working of deterrence to the conventional level by preventing an Indian conventional attack, has advertised its intent of going nuclear first. India hopes to use its conventional might to deter Pakistan from being overly provocative at the subconventional level. Given that at the subconventional level armed non-state actors operate with impunity, the situation does call for strategic engagement between the two states.

That none of the series of crises, numbering in some counts to seven in the nuclear era dating to the mid-1980s, has eventuated into a conflict of nuclear proportions suggests that deterrence is operational. But while relying on deterrence may be useful and also help cement NCBMs, the two states must more importantly arrive at a solution to their outstanding problems. CBMs, as the term suggests, are no cure; while deterrence, being fallible, needs to be made redundant. The problem is that deterrence and conflict resolution are mutually incompatible. Deterrence brings about protraction of conflict. It makes the possibility of conflict endemic by inducing the notion that it is manageable. Its management becomes equated with national security. National security is therefore doubly threatened by deterrence: one through keeping existential problems unaddressed and, second, in deterrence promising more than it can deliver when push comes to shove.

THE DANGER is for the two states privileging NCBMs over the consequential dimension of their engagement. The implication of deterrence as a strategic doctrine subscribed to by both states is that they do not expect their underlying disputes would be resolved soon. In effect, nuclear dangers would persist. NCBMs, while necessary, are insufficient. What needs to be put in place is a Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC) to manage future crises so they do not spiral into conflict. Since neither state wishes to draw attention to the nuclear dimension of their relationship, they would be wary of the term NRRC. Therefore, the mechanism could be created under a different name and with a broader mandate, such as that of a strategic dialogue.

This would help them address the deeper substratum of their relationship, that of imbalance in relative power. India’s preponderance is seen as threatening by the Pakistani military that runs that state.

Ali Ahmed is a research fellow at the IDSA.
aliahd66@gmail.com

OPINION

A Plan For Bonn

Domestic distractions should not come in way of the historic opportunity India has for turning the region around. It is time for India to take the onus for peacekeeping in the region and play to its weight.

ALI AHMED

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279202

Quite like 10 years ago, India has again gone empty-handed to Bonn with nothing for either of its friends, Afghanistan or the US. This is not unreasonable since it has limited leverage. However, is this good enough for a country that regards itself as a regional power?

It is being argued by some that there is little reason for India to take the lead. Pakistan is protesting the US attack on the border outpost along the Durand line by staying away from Bonn. It has broken off its initiative to get the Taliban to talk. The cracks in its relationship with the US are showing up. India can therefore coast along, goes the argument.
This is questionable. It places a premium on the US plan for the region working out. The plan is a draw down of Western troops over the next three years. With simultaneous bolstering of Afghan security forces along with whittling of the the Taliban, this is thought possible. At the optimistic best, this implies continuing instability to show for over a decade of military action in the region.

There are worse possibilities. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are unlikely to get their act together in time. Even the Indian army with a proven track record in fighting insurgency had found it difficult to train the Rashtriya Rifles as a counter insurgency force. To assume that the ANSF can pull it off, even with Indian help, is a trifle optimistic.
The Taliban may not prove a push over. In case greater pressure is applied on Pakistan to ‘go after’ it, it could heighten the backlash Pakistan faces with a little help from the Tehrik- e- Taliban Pakistan. The latest attack that has left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead can only harden Kayani’s resolve not to risk civil war.

It is evident that the US, itself facing a second recession in five years, wants a face-saving way out. Its European allies are exhausted. It is unwilling to pay the price of a climb down in terms of a super power sitting across the table with a non-state actor, the Taliban. It can neither continue the war indefinitely, nor bring it to a close. It needs help.

It is here that India can step in. It has kept up a low profile developmental contribution so far. Doing so has helped keep Pakistani paranoia under control. But with US intentions unlikely to work, worse outcomes loom. India needs to be more than a constructive bystander.

The Taliban having proven resilient implies that it is a strategic actor. India must establish links with it and ascertain if it is amenable to moderation. The Eid statement from Mullah Omar, that has strangely not found much traction in strategic commentary, can serve as a take-off point for reconciliation. A negotiated end to the fighting is a potential future. The sweetener on offer could be international commitment to reconstruction in return for a reformed Taliban.

At a minimum, India can assure Pakistan that it would not prove obstructionist in case Pakistan is able to deliver a moderated Taliban to the table. India must play its role as a ‘strategic partner’, prevailing on the US to also take a seat, along with Karzai if necessary.

India can take the idea further. The pre-negotiations stage of conflict resolution, leading up to a ceasefire would, to begin with, require insertion of blue berets or UN monitors. Subsequent negotiations towards a comprehensive peace agreement would require inter-positioning of ‘blue helmets’ — UN peacekeepers — for ‘robust’ peacekeeping. Finally, implementing the accord would require Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) under UN supervision.

UN is over-extended with commitments in Africa. It would find it difficult to undertake expansion of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). It is here that India can make an abiding difference.
Along with Pakistan, it can offer a SAARC peacekeeping force in a UN-SAARC ‘hybrid’ peacekeeping mission. With the other two South Asian states among the top 5 UN troop contributing countries —Nepal and Bangladesh—alongside, Afghanistan can be painted blue. Troops from Turkey and other Muslim states can join in transforming the UN mandate from peace enforcement to peacekeeping.

Naysayers would have us believe that trust levels do not exist between India and Pakistan to take up anything jointly. The SAARC does not have institutional capacity. If the US has been unable to tame the Taliban, how can ‘blue helmets’ ever hope to? The gainers being Pakistan and the Taliban, the strategy sounds like appeasement.

All of this misses the point that the Taliban could perhaps be brought around. Militarily this is only possible at the unacceptable risk of destabilising Pakistan. The way out is political resolution. Both the US and the Taliban need to come round simultaneously, so that neither appears to be giving up. With Pakistan working on the Taliban and India on their mutual partner, the US, this is not impossible.

What is there for India in all this?
Acting as midwife for peace in the region, India takes centre- stage, playing up to its weight. Pakistan can be persuaded to let up on Kashmir in return. India’s economic engagement in Afghanistan is of such an order that it will continue to have influence, even with Taliban accommodated in the power structure.

India’s domestic distractions should not come in way of the historic opportunity it has for turning the region around. It should have offered this win-win plan at Bonn.

Afghanistan: Let’s try peacekeeping

http://dawn.com/2011/11/19/afghanistan-lets-try-peacekeeping/

Ali Ahmed | 19th November, 2011

    6

With the jirga over and Bonn II at the doorstep, the US appears to be taking firm steps to stay on in Afghanistan in some fashion after 2014. Doing so may not be all bad if the fighting stops and the US bank rolls reconstruction. This presupposes a ceasefire and talks with the Taliban. The ensuing peace, peacemaking and peace building entails interposition of ‘blue helmets’ between the two sides. Is peacekeeping the answer?

What obtains now can pass as a classic case of ‘hurting stalemate’. This may not be a ‘mutually hurting’ one at the moment, since both the hyper-power and its asymmetric opponent have reserves yet. Nevertheless, the ‘surge’ having expended itself and the Taliban not having exhausted yet another empire, the situation exhibits a certain ‘ripeness’ for resolution.

Irrespective of whether either of the two would view it this way, the people of Afghanistan deserve a try at peace and Pakistani people must be preserved from further effects of instability.

The assassination of the government’s interlocutor suggests that talks have a potential. They need a catalyst. Peace studies theory suggests that if belligerents are unwilling to talk directly, as seems to be the case here, mediation can be tried. The UN has a special political mission, the UNAMA, in Afghanistan. Its good offices could be used to bring the two sides to the table.

Talking while fighting has been tried elsewhere, but doing so could derail talks. As first step, a ceasefire needs working out in the pre-negotiation stage. The trust levels between the two sides, understandably low after 10 years of mutual demonisation and war, implies that a neutral force needs interpose and monitor. This could be by ‘blue berets’, but that would be to expose military observers to undue risk. Instead, ‘blue helmets’ in ‘robust’ peacekeeping are the answer.

Coincidentally, the region boasts of the finest record in peacekeeping. Four countries of the region are represented in the top five UN troop contributing countries: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Nepal. At the recently concluded SAARC summit in Maldives, brave words were spoken in favour of peace. Can the states rise for action? Can the region contribute a joint peacekeeping force for saving a fellow SAARC state from further violence?

Such a force could deploy under a UN flag. As a rough plan, the Pakistani contingents could perhaps locate in Pushtun areas, the Indian deployment could be in the more peaceful north, the Bangladeshis can deploy in between and Nepalis in areas of Hazara domination. Muslim peacekeepers from Turkey, Indonesia etc can deploy alongside as the Taliban had once bid for.

As talks make headway with time, the South Asian profile of the mission can deepen. With India and Pakistan working together, as they have done on UN missions elsewhere brilliantly, the UN mission can graduate into a ‘hybrid’ UN-SAARC one having knock-on benefits for South Asian identity and integration.

A preliminary agreement could be arrived at, confining US troops to their bases. Taliban coming over ground peaceably would require cantonments. With fighting over, negotiations could then proceed towards a comprehensive agreement. This would require the Taliban moderating itself, accommodativeness by the other ethnicities, promise of neutrality and assistance by regional states, US draw down and demilitarisation.

This is an optimist’s future. However, the Taliban may prove obdurate; their al Qaeda allies would sabotage any deal; Islamists may prefer grinding the US down; the US may want an excuse to stay on for other reasons, such as Iran, China, Central Asian access; India could do without Pakistan at ease; Russia and China are not unhappy with the US predicament etc. For the SAARC idea to take off, its two protagonist states need to make up first. At best, the idea is premature. In short, a post 2014 civil war is inevitable.

Between the hopeful and naysayer extremes is the alternative of continuing instability. This is perhaps ‘good enough’, the young in Afghanistan having known no other reality.  An ANSF, ratcheted up with ISAF mentoring and Indian training, can take on a degraded Taliban. Yet, the expectation that instability can be managed can prove illusive. The future may conceal an India-Pakistan crisis; spread of instability in Pakistan; economic down turn affects; election-related self-centered US decisions; ‘black swan’ events etc. Outsourcing of the region’s future course to an external power amounts to abdication.

India and Pakistan are happy with the current trajectory of their reengagement. Neither is entirely unhappy with respective strategic circumstance. Pakistan is with fingers crossed, waiting for the US call to broker negotiations with the Taliban. India is preparing for it to fail. Both seem to think, and perhaps rightly, that they can manage the aftermath. Destructive and obstructionist cold war gambits are so much easier to play. Networking instead could reveal policy incapacities, power limitations, intellectual vacuity and a moral deficit.

In other words, peacekeeping is not going to happen. Not until people force their minders – governments and non-state actors – to swallow their ego and work constructively with the ‘other’ side. The idea is here, and so is the time.

Ali Ahmed is a research fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

The views expressed by this blogger and in the following reader comments do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Dawn Media Group.

Time for the ‘Grand Bargain’

http://dawn.com/2011/10/19/time-for-the-grand-bargain/

Ali Ahmed | 19th October, 2011

    79

The agreement on strategic partnership with India signed by Karzai in his recent visit to New Delhi indicates a possible direction of the future. The apprehension in Pakistan is that the clause, ‘India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces’ may not be in its strategic interests. Pakistan has thus far leveraged its geo-strategic advantages to keep India’s profile down. However, the recent set back to its relations with the US and Karzai has witnessed New Delhi gaining ground. Is this then the time for the two states to arrive at the ‘grand bargain’?

The ‘grand bargain’ has figured among the possibilities for some time. It involves a trade-off between the two regional protagonists to mutual advantage. There is a ‘lose some-gain some’ whiff to it that takes their face-off beyond its zero-sum confines. The alternative is a future of power play the partnership agreement hints at, though taking care to proclaim, ‘The Strategic Partnership between the Sides is not directed against any other State….’

India has gained the position of advantage that has eluded it for over two decades. It is militarily on top in Kashmir. It has reached out to Afghanistan overtly. The high level visits following Karzai’s to New Delhi were from Myanmar and Vietnam, heralding greater Indian comfort levels in respect of China. With the European allies in Nato exhausted, the US is seeking partners to help strengthen the ANSF to enable its exit. A Task Force is currently reflecting on how to make its national security more efficacious, increasing its ability for and therefore the likelihood of its muscle flexing in future.

Pakistan is seemingly on the ropes. Backlash from the home-grown Taliban has deterred action in North Waziristan. Karachi has been restive. Balochistan and sectarian violence are ever present indices of ‘failed state’ status. Floods, dengue and electricity shortages serve as reminders of the governance agenda neglected in the attention accorded to high politics. With even Mullen abandoning kid gloves and his ministrations of the Pak-US relationship no longer available due to his retirement, there is a sense of foreboding. China has not given any indication that it can or will substitute.

India thus enters the end game in AfPak advantaged, one that could prove ephemeral. Pakistan will steadily attempt to erode it buoyed by a belief that it helped see off the Soviets, one set to be reinforced in step with the impending US draw-down. This will impel it to beat back Indian ‘containment’, which in its mind’s eye extends into Balochistan. It has kept its ‘strategic assets’ intact in order to up the ante in Kashmir. It can divert extremist energy away from the backlash it is experiencing back into the proxy war. Therefore even if Pakistan is down, it is not quite out.

But in view of the growing disparity in power between the two states, this time round it will not be ‘back to the nineties’. In other words, even if Pakistan has the capability to be disruptive, India has capacity to manage the cold war. The ‘hurting stalemate’ that helps end conflict will be in abeyance for longer. Ripeness for resolution is not evident. Pakistan will not bite from a position of weakness and India would like a self-sustaining position of strength. This is apparently not the right time for unveiling the ‘grand bargain’.

Such an understanding informed by traditional realist thinking is fraught. A power tryst will have crisis points. As past pattern suggests, these can eventuate in conflict. Despite best intentions to the contrary, conflict could escalate. The nuclear backdrop could inadvertently come to foreground. While Pakistan may end up paying a proportionately higher price, will India be able to thereafter retain its place and pace as a plausible rising power?

Having less to lose and with the military hijack of the decision, Pakistan may risk such an aftermath. But does India need to play along? As a regional power, it could demonstrate a capacity to shape the future. The understanding that in addressing its Pakistan problem thus, it is being ‘proactive’ is wanting. It is instead being reactive, with Pakistan’s ‘deep state’ setting the regional agenda. Instead, India needs to reset the region.

But this is not solely in India’s hands. Its political and national security establishment could do with some incentive. Pakistan holds the key and a gesture is all it takes. The qualifying acts are many ranging from prosecuting the perpetrators of 26/11 meaningfully to sending Pasha across for confabulations. The impending second round of talks can then be gainfully used to chalk out the grand bargain.

It would inescapably involve ‘give and take’. Elements of the end state in AfPak include moderation of the Taliban, cessation of combat operations by the ISAF and safeguarding Afghanistan’s ethnicities. While India does not take kindly to Kashmir being mentioned in the same breath, the pending settlement of the problem’s external dimension can be taken up alongside, if separately.

Surely, with an outbreak of peace, a SAARC-UN hybrid peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan cannot be too far behind!

Ali Ahmed is a research fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.