Acknowledging the blind spot on Kashmir

Kashmir Times

• Published:1/27/2012 12:00:00 PM
• Updated: 1/27/2012 10:32:49 AM
• By: BY ALI AHMED
• Filed Under: opinion

ASHWIN Kumar’s placing of his documentary, Inshallah Kashmir: Living Terrorism, on the internet for 24 hours in protest against the censors not allowing it to get past, helps revert the spotlight on Kashmir. It tells the wider audience in India that there are dimensions to the problem that keep it alive. It reveals India’s own role in the alienation. The advantage that could accrue from acknowledging this is that the necessary balm can be applied by the government without looking over its shoulder fearful of criticism of being ‘soft’ on Kashmir.
The dominant narrative on
Kashmir is not entirely wrong. It
does capture the role of
Pakistan’s proxy war. The film
brings this out in its interview of
a terrorist unapologetically discoursing
on his prescription,
Islamism, for Kashmir and, as a
next step, in the rest of India.
While Pakistan has real world
concerns for proxy war, such as
tying down India’s power in internal
security, its human resources
policy for its ‘strategic assets’ is
more other worldly.
While this view has a limited
constituency in Kashmir, it
acquires a magnified influence
due to infirmities in India’s
counter insurgency strategy. The
film’s contribution is in bringing
this out as India’s blind spot. It is
not as if policy makers are not
alive to this. The rigging of elections
that set off the insurgency is
an accepted fact and India has
taken great pains in ensuring
democracy in letter at least thereafter.
For instance, it extended
the deployment of Indian troops
even after the 2001-02 crisis had
subsided to ensure a trouble free
election. The panchayat polls and
the report on regional aspirations
of last year are facets.
The internal political dimension
being taken as furthered by
these initiatives, it leaves the
external political dimension to be
addressed. India has gone down
the talks route once again wrapping
up the first round and stepping
into the second. Pakistan’s
credibility and ability to reciprocate
has been limited by its introspective
course since 2007. The
situation is unlikely to change
into the middle term. Therefore,
politically little else can realistically
be done but the ‘wait and
watch’ underway.
As for the developmental prong
of strategy that reaches the benefits
of India’s growth to the people,
there has been considerable
investment under the prime ministers
reconstruction program of
about Rs. 26000 crore. Mr. C
Rangarajan has made recommendations
twice over on generating
employment for youth. Trans LC
linkages are being strengthened.
While the recent incident at the
Uri hydel project suggests all this
is too slow, it is nevertheless
never too late.
These measures are certainly
necessary. The film however
warns against mistaking them to
be sufficient. What more must
India do?
Firstly, the film highlights the
urge for ‘freedom’ in the youth.
The idea is described by a former
civil servant well known for his
sympathetic approach, Wajahat
Habibullah, in the film and elsewhere
in his book, The Dying of
the Light, as no more a desire
than beats in any other Indian
breast. This means that procedural
democracy is not enough. India
would require to self-confidently
dismantle militarization that had
unavoidably attended its counter
insurgency campaign. It would
have to rethink its belief in the
AFSPA as panacea: intoxication
induced by its seeming necessity
also in the North East.
Secondly, the future may find
‘wait and watch’ in respect of
Pakistan as a lost opportunity.
The uncertainty in Pakistan provides
an alibi in the form of lack of
credible interlocutor. Even though
the military there is one, India for
good reason is unwilling to associate
with it. However, it is not
unable. Just as it is in a strategic
dialogue with its strategic partners,
such as the US, and even its
adversary, China, India needs to
engage the Pakistani military in a
strategic dialogue.
At a minimum it must have a
coordination mechanism that it
has just arrived at with China in
place with Pakistan, to ensure
that terror action in the interim
does not unduly rock the two ships
of state. The strategic dialogue can
over time unlock the status quo,
besides providing a lifeline for
Pakistan to step back from the
brink of extremism with potential
to spill over into Kashmir. This
would enable the two sides, that in
face of extremism, are actually
batting on the same side to fashion
a viable innings.
Lastly, India needs to reexamine
its counter insurgency record.
Indeed it has done so with the
eased conditions in Kashmir and
the North East enabling the
breather that has been well utilized
in rethinking counter insurgency
repertoire. India has found
that it is better placed in best
practices than any of the foreign
armies, not excluding the US and
Pakistan, that have confronted
insurgency and have been exposed
as wanting, over the past decade.
Even as this is a proud record, can
it be bettered?
The film brings out the damage
that the pursuit of the intelligence
imperative. The raising and handling
of renegades and questionable
methods in extracting intelligence
are two disturbing points.
The Supreme Court strictures in
the case raised by Ramchandra
Guha and Nandini Sundar
against the Salwa Judum need to
be taken seriously. Second, the
torture bill, currently under
review at the behest of the Lok
Sabha, needs to be taken to its
logical conclusion. Additionally,
and more importantly, parliamentary
oversight of intelligence
agencies and their institutionalization
needs to be progressed.
The private member’s bill being
spearheaded by Congress MP,
Manish Tiwari, can be a start
point.
However, the brutalization of
the insurgency also owed to the
judicial system being unable to
measure up to the extra-ordinary
demands. Unable to meet its routine
obligations, this is understandable.
However, it cannot
escape a proportion of the blame
for summary ‘encounters’ that
resulted in at least some bodies
ending up in unmarked graves.
Amends are apparent in the
Supreme Court’s inquiry after the
Pathribal incident. While judicial
deficiency does not imply that
anyone else can simultaneously
be ‘judge and executioner’, such
incapacities suggest that prevention
is better than management
and cure.
Lastly, it would be self-delusion to believe that India’s creditable record over the past decade can erase the past. The chief minister has made a case for reconciliation.
This is a point that is sure to have figured in the confidential report of the three interlocutors, given their proclivities. India must draw inspiration from its cultural tradition, experience of the freedom struggle and peace studies theory to arrive at home grown remedies. This domain is beyond the consciousness and knowledge base of its national security managers.
Since quiet in Kashmir reduces the incentive to address the issue, it is necessary to keep Kashmir in focus. At a minimum this helps prevent disturbances; the way that otherwise gets Kashmir, and indeed India’s North East, any attention.
Keeping Kashmir in the spotlight, that Ashwin Kumar has succeed in doing, ensures that far away New Delhi acknowledges that the problem will not go away without political intervention.
(The author is Research Fellow, IDSA)

Time not right to let the guard down in Kashmir

Ali Ahmed
Research Fellow, IDSA

tehelka.com

The report on a political solution to Kashmir has been kept confidential, giving the govt breathing space to digest its contents and once its position is formed, either to release it in whole or in parts ALSO READ Interlocutors call for review of Central laws after 1952 Interlocutors report traces contours of a possible political solution Interlocutors submit report, Kashmiris call it irrelevant

UNLIKE THE usual practice, the report on a political solution to Kashmir by the three interlocutors Dilip Padgaonkar, MM Ansari and Radha Kumar has been punctually handed in to the home ministry. They have been asked to keep themselves available for interaction with parliamentarians to build a constituency for their recommendations.

The report has been kept confidential, giving the government breathing space to digest its contents and once its position is formed, either to release it in whole or in parts. The issue of concern is the implication of lack of political will to implement it. It conveys the impression that the appointment of interlocutors was an exercise to help tide over the summer and ward off winds arising from the Arab Spring. The turnout of a million tourists and decline in the number of home ministers may lull the government into believing that the worst is over. Though largely right, inaction is not an option.

Firstly, the people, led by the youth, have three summers of experience in peaceful demonstrations. Liberal application of the public service announcement has kept the lid on tight this time. But its next eruption has the potential to embarrass India poised on the cusp of great power.

Secondly, the physical attack on eminent lawyer Prashant Bhushan in the premises of the Supreme Court ostensibly for comments in favour of resolution in Kashmir, was a demonstration by forces that stand for the status quo. The timing of the attacks indicates they have the capability of holding up initiatives, if emboldened by hesitation.

Lastly, the international factor needs to be kept in mind. The pressures on Pakistan after the US endgame in Af-Pak are evident. The visit by Afghan president Hamid Karzai to New Delhi and the resulting ‘strategic partnership’ that envisages increased. Awareness of Pakistan’s capacity for disruption in both Kashmir and Afghanistan implies that any intention for it to do so needs to be worked upon. By implementing the report, even if in part, Pakistan can be kept at bay.

Even if desirable, is it feasible?

The government has, in its earlier tenure, defied expectations in pushing through the Indo-US nuclear deal. An internal Kashmir settlement is an issue of equal magnitude to take a stand. But the government has been under siege throughout the year. The ruling party would be shy of handing the opposition that is in equal disarray, a ‘nationalist’ card to play.

The army-ISI combine needs to be displaced over the long term to end the Indo-Pak conflict

Next, the input of security forces can be predicted to be negative. The military, for instance, is wary of suggestions on even a partial roll back of the AFSPA. The commentary is on a ‘collusive’ threat from India’s neighbours. Evidently, it is not the time to let the guard down.

The understanding appears to be that the costs have been affordable so far and can be paid up indefinitely. With India on the seeming upswing in the strategic trajectory, there is little reason to placate adverse interests, either internal in the form of separatists or external in the form of the ISI.

G Parathasarathy, a formidable realist influence, has opined, ‘Indian ‘intellectuals’ and bleeding heart liberals have zealously believed that ‘dialogue’ alone can address the animosity of the Taliban and its ISI mentors towards India’. The subtext is that dialogue does not and cannot work. Instead the resulting cold war must be managed so as to bring about regime change in Pakistan by displacing the army-ISI combine over the long term.

Undecided, India’s strategy is poised between containment and engagement with the onus being on Pakistan to determine India’s choice. Pakistan’s past record suggests that India will be left with only one choice. India is apparently prepared, having former cabinet secretary Naresh Chandra’s task force looking at restructuring national security and by investing in military means.

This suggests that South Asia is headed for another lost opportunity. The nuclear backdrop compels a prayer that this, hopefully, would not prove the last.

Kashmir: Declaring premature victory

Kashmir Times

• Published:4/2/2012 11:48:00 AM
• Updated: 4/2/2012 10:31:35 AM
• By: By Ali Ahmed
• Filed Under: opinion
• 
  

Kashmir is quiet. But as the continuing stalemate over AFSPA indicates, it is not quite ‘all quiet on the Kashmir front’. The killing of four terrorists in their hideout in the Rajwar forest near Kupwara by the Rashtriya Rifles suggests that Pakistani cannon fodder exists. With the winter snows doing their annual damage, the infiltration season is set to begin early with infiltrating groups taking advantage of snow-created gaps. The Kashmir police is now armed with non-lethal means to tackle any outbreak on the streets. They have their ‘guardian angels’ in the form of armed chaperones from the paramilitary.
These tactical level indicators need however to be buttressed by the more positive developments at the strategic level for a fleshed-out picture of the coming campaign season. Externally, the India-Pakistan relationship is seemingly on an upswing moving towards a ‘result oriented dialogue’ phase. Internally, the status quo, in which India sees electoral democracy as an exercise of self-determination, is set to continue. The problem lies in seeing this situation as good enough reason for India to declare victory.
India’s strategy appears to be a security centric one. While the police, assisted by the paramilitary, is to control the ‘center of gravity’ of separatism, Srinagar, the military has the rural hinterland in a tight grip in order to break the influence of separatism radiating outwards from Srinagar and other towns in the Valley. The Army’s ‘Jee Janab’ policy over the past year is an ambitious one, designed more than to merely win hearts and minds. It stands the Maoist principle on insurgency on its head: of using a base in rural areas to envelop and take over the center. Here it is the counter insurgent resorting to the strategy of squeezing the city.
The success of the strategy is in the invective AFSPA incites in separatists. The calls for demilitarization, such as selective roll back of the AFSPA, are to unlock the vice like grip of the Rashtriya Rifles. Their omnipresence constricts space for terrorists. The concept of Territorial Army (Home and Hearth) helps soak up manpower that would otherwise have been available for recruiting into terrorist ranks, besides helping with surveillance.
With a tight lid on security, economic measures and governance are to be furthered. Another couple of years of quiet are expected to yield up self-sustaining peace. With over a million visitors last year, the Udaan program for training and employing half a lakh youth, panchayats in place finally, rail and road connectivity projects underway etc, the people are expected to grasp the dividend of peace.
Externally, India is well poised for discouraging Pakistani interference keeping alive India’s Kashmir problem. The widening gap between the two states is stark. While Pakistan appears to have seen off its worst year yet, this time round it appears that the military is backing the India-Pakistan engagement process. Utterances that Pakistan is placing its Kashmir interest on a backburner are indicators of Pakistani course correction. The winds of Arab Spring, not having rekindled the flames of 2010 in 2011, India breathes easier.
The paradox of these favourable factors is in India deluding itself into believing that little else needs doing, particularly in terms of dealing with the political dimension. The cold storage of the interlocutors’ report suggests as much. The continuing of the security template suggests little intention of proceeding down this lane either. In effect, the impression is that the proxy war defeated, only remnant eddies of the insurgency are to be contended with.
Yet, the security template betrays ambivalence, unease with the ‘solution’. Strategically, India is uncertain as to the effects of the wind down in AfPak set to unfold by 2014. Politically, it is aware that the angst arising from a faltering insurgency could well deepen the psychological wounds of Kashmiris. Unmet political demands for substantial autonomy, arising in the sentiment for ‘azadi’, keep alive disaffection. Since India expects that it can control the consequences, it does not see any incentive to address these demands.
Is India’s preference for a conflict management rather than a conflict resolution approach sensible? Past Indian responses to crisis do not infuse confidence: the recapture of Aizawl, the siege of Golden Temple, the Jaffna battle, the fall of the Babri Masjid, the aftermath of Godhra etc. However, while tight control and deep surveillance in Kashmir help keep India from being surprised and thereby over reacting, India’s crisis response will have its own compulsions and dynamics, rendering the direction, momentum, and outcome indeterminate.
Strategically, resort to a suppressive strategy is a given in light of political weakness at the Center. However, reliance on security forces can prove counter productive owing to their suspect quality. The central police forces have witnessed a rapid expansion over the last decade. The quality of intake and quality of socialization and training cannot be of a high order. This could result in the Rashtriya Rifles getting to the forefront. The Army’s self-image of ‘last resort’ will impact its actions. What ambers currently will be fanned to a flame. While security agencies can cope with the violence, any people centric non-violent opposition, the portents of which were on display late last decade, will have India stumped.
Internally, political fallout is certain. The liberal spectrum would be unwilling to concede the government the political space would like to tide over the problem. The debate will be ugly, since the stage has been set by the conservative-extremist spectrum holding up the political prong of India’s strategy. Unwilling to grant any concessions even from a position of strength, they would be less amenable under threat of a gun. The right wing, threatened by marginalization due to regional forces taking center stage in the latest round of elections, will opportunistically exploit the situation. This can only make for greater reliance on force by a defensive government.
Externally, Pakistan, regaining stability and over time regaining ground through the talks process with the Taliban underway, will be emboldened to reverse gear. The ‘CNN effect’ of harsh measures will certainly embarrass India politically. Though the international community will likely look away; India cannot thereafter be expected to project itself credibly as a rising democratic power with a difference.
In effect, India can be in deep trouble before the summer is out. All it takes is access of a few Kalashnikovs to down town Srinagar. This threat will continue into the middle term. Only a political turn to its Kashmir policy can help India break out of its strategic cul de sac.
(The author is Assistant Professor, Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia)

AFSPA: A question of justice

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/news.aspx?ndid=28532

• Published:2/13/2012 12:05:00 PM
• Updated: 2/13/2012 10:03:24 AM
• By: BY ALI AHMED
• Filed Under: column

  

A report in The Hindu has it that, ‘In the past four years alone, the Home Ministry has rejected at least 42 requests to sanction the prosecution of military personnel found by the police to have engaged in crimes such as murder, homicide and rape in Kashmir…’. Since the government does not have a written policy, its policy has to be inferred from its actions. In this case its action, or inaction, suggests that it is wary of permitting prosecutions of members of its armed forces, even though it has the power to do so under the AFSPA Section 6 (for North East) and Section 7 (for J&K).
The report acquires significance due to the Supreme Court pulling up the Army on the eve of Republic Day for stalling the prosecution in the 2000 Pathribal encounter case, initiated by the CBI against five officers. This is one among a few high profile cases that include Macchel in which three men killed were portrayed as crossing the Line of Control; the Malom case that provoked Irom Sharmila’s fast and the Manorama Devi case that had led to the Jeevan Reddy committee review of the operation of the AFSPA in the North East.
Procedurally, the cases that come up to the Home Ministry for decision have had preliminary investigation done by the police making apparent that the armed force investigated has exceeded its brief in acting in aid to civil authority. The Home Ministry’s hand is possibly held up by the recommendation it receives from the Ministry of Defence, where the Army is concerned. Where the Central Armed Police Forces are concerned, the Ministry has direct accountability for these. Yet it is reticent.
Where the military is concerned, the Army can dispose-off the case under the Army Act in case the Home Ministry does not permit prosecution by civil courts. This can be expected to preserve military cohesion and morale, prevent military men from being prosecuted in civil courts where their rights may be ignored in the surcharged atmosphere and it will strengthen the military judicial system and command authority. Such prosecutions could well have been proceeded with but for the case pending a decision with the Home Ministry. The time lapse makes the case more difficult to pursue, but it can still be opened under military law. In any case, for the Army to proceed, it would first require an indication that the Home Ministry is not permitting prosecution by the judicial system, since a person cannot be tried twice over. This explains why no action is usually taken in some cases of egregious violence: the reason being that that file is awaiting decision.
The problem with such a defence is that it virtually negates the utility of Section 6/7. While the section was to prevent motivated litigation against military men in the performance of duty, insertion of the section enables democratic control over the military. While military law can cope with most acts of omission and commission, where acts are ‘beyond the pail’ or have acquired strategic contours, there is a case for the Home Ministry to exercise of its powers. If the Ministry needs a ‘push’, the parliamentary committee overseeing the Ministry could scrutinise its action and members of parliament can raise parliamentary questions as to the process followed.
The problem that arises in not using the power with the Center is that it sends the wrong message to the people in the disturbed areas. Healing gets postponed. Second, the military gets a feeling of impunity. Allowing prosecutions helps deter violations. This is useful for military discipline. Third, good governance implies upholding the laws and the Constitution. Where it is felt that the military may not do justice adequately for organisational reasons, such as preserving morale, protecting the chain of command, hiding misdemeanours, covering up earlier misreporting etc., then the civil courts must be allowed to step in.
A valid concern would be that the judiciary in affected areas may be more harsh than warranted and the very process, that is bound to be extended and emotionally charged, would expose military men to personal risk. Innocent army men may suffer the indignity of being mishandled by over-zealous policemen, prosecutors and mischievous lawyers of the opposition. This can be addressed by having either fast track courts appropriately located in secure areas, or by moving the trials to a neighbouring state. Alternatively, the Defence Ministry must monitor the cases in question and the results broadcast. Withholding prosecution with the laconic comment that ‘no cause is made out’ does little to inspire confidence in the system.
Another valid concern would be on the consequences of such prosecution. A view is that morale will go down of the armed forces if extremists are allowed to get away with legal hurdles. The rank and file would be less willing to take initiative and risk. This would impede future counter insurgency effort, allowing the insurgent greater space. The problem with this line of argument is that it seems to suggest that cutting corners should be permissible. It disregards the overall counter insurgency paradigm that the means are as important as the ends. Permissive atmosphere for violations only fuels the insurgency. Lastly, it downgrades the premium on leadership. The military leader is expected to deliver on morale, discipline and effectiveness, even while the state must hold his hand. The criterion of ‘good faith’ is a leadership judgment that must be judiciously exercised by the military leader in appraising the act.
Details of exemplary punishments awarded since the start of the insurgency in Kashmir, given on the Northern Command website, are given in the table:
It is clear that only the first serial amounts to a consequential punishment. That the numbers have been released into the public domain suggests that the military is satisfied with its record. A second opinion, of its civilian masters, can be necessary balancer, since it is not self-evident that the military can be relied on entirely for dispensing justice. Its efforts need to be supplemented by the civilian judicial system, for which the two Ministries need to exercise their powers.
One aspect that acts as hold up, liable to be missed, is that some actions are under the rubric of intelligence operations, a kind of reverse ‘propaganda by deed’. For instance, the link made out by, among others, Pankaj Mishra, of the the Pathribal case to the Chittisingpora massacre of Sikhs, and in turn the Clinton visit to India of 2000, suggest an intelligence operation that went wrong in its cover up. It possibly had clearance at a higher level than which it was executed. The government’s reluctance is therefore understandable. It perhaps does not want to allow prosecutions in some cases and not in others.
A suggestion by Siddharth Varadarajan was that the government must give more than a one line answer as to why it is not permitting prosecution. The government could withhold permission in such cases by resort to the ‘national security’ excuse, even as it allows the other cases to go through.
Setting a precedent is important. If the past is guide, India will be faced with similar problems ahead. It must establish a ‘best practices’ scheme now by facing up to the detritus of its otherwise comparatively remarkably successful and humane counter insurgency campaigns.
*(The author is Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)

An agenda point for the foreign secretaries

Kashmir Times

published 6/16/2011 9:49:00 PM by ALI AHMED

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The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan are to meet this month to review progress made so far in the various strands during this ‘getting restarted’ round of dialogue. It would set the stage for the foreign ministers meeting, due next month. That this round has taken place itself being an achievement, it would be churlish to point out to no gains being made. However, if the foreign ministers’ meeting is not to prove a replay of last July’s Islamabad meeting, then there needs to be more on the agenda. This article makes a suggestion in this regard.

That no headway was intended by either state owes to both following a ‘wait and watch’ policy. They await Obama’s speech that is to bring out his design for ‘AfPak’, in particular if the nature of the impending drawdown in troops is to be symbolic or significant. If the former, it would gladden India; if the latter, it would gladden Pakistan.

Pakistan is waiting to encash on its relationship with the Taliban, nurtured assiduously over the past decade despite intense US pressure. It would prefer a negotiated end to the conflict to its north. Once its allies are ensconced in some kind of power arrangement there, it could turn its attention once again towards the west, assured of ‘strategic depth’ to its rear and the vitality of its ‘strategic assets’.

India for its part is aware that, to an extent, the return to ‘normalcy’ in Kashmir since 9/11 owed to Pakistan’s preoccupation with its western front. It has taken advantage of the benign fallout to firm in and rests content that a falling back to the troubled years is unlikely. It would prefer to see western presence in Afghanistan till as long as a verifiable promise of moderation is not extracted from the Taliban. It has played hardball with Pakistan so as to keep up the pressure to this eminently reasonable end.

Given that the Taliban has managed to whittle the west’s appetite for nation building, for the west to be looking for an exit is understandable. Towards this end, Obama would progress the political prong of strategy, even while keeping the military prong on course for a while longer. US military presence would therefore continue, but its combat role may progressively be less visible. This means that Pakistan’s significance to the end game in terms of delivering a moderated Taliban increases even while India is not entirely disappointed.

What emerges is that both states have handed over the course of the region’s future to the US. While this may have been sensible in light of the post 9/11 vigour of the US in hunting down the terrorists in their havens, the circumstance has changed a decade on.  Should the two self-regarding states in the region be waiting for hand-outs as they are? Should they not instead be shaping the region’s future?

An argument would be that since they cannot together shape the region’s future, they are realistically hoping to make the best of what emerges from the impending changes in US course in the region. This is typical of a conflict management approach, beloved of realists. The belief is that with Pakistan busily proceeding downhill, there is no need for India to be overly concerned. Pakistan would be less able to impose on India’s interests.

The current ‘wait and watch’ policy has an underside. Pakistan may yet engineer a return of the Taliban to Kabul, taking advantage of the US desire, brought on by exhaustion of its European allies and a strained economy, to leave. Protecting India’s interests and its Afghan friends means ensuring that a civil war does not resume on US draw down. This can be done by the two regional powers networking with each other. This way the region’s future gets written in the subcontinent.

As a self-confessed regional power India needs taking charge. Here the suggestion is for Pakistan and India to arrive at a modus-vivendi. India wants Pakistan to re-examine its Kashmir obsession. Pakistan, beset as it is by the terror blowback, wishes to remain on even keel. India could permit increased political space for Pakistan in Afghanistan, while Pakistan could turn away from Kashmir.

That India has influence in Afghanistan can be seen from the manner Obama tried to include India into the remit of the now deceased Richard Holbrooke. India has fought that off. India maintains that there is little to link the end-game in Afghanistan with the solution to the conflict in Kashmir. At best, it does not want a resumption of training for terrorists there and an influx of Afghan terrorists into Kashmir.

This position owes to it not wanting Pakistan to use its ‘gun to its own head’ strategy to bring US pressure on India for ‘concessions’ on Kashmir. Pakistan would like take back something for its cooperation on enabling an honourable exit to the west from Afghanistan. The west seeking exit would bring pressure to bear on India to be responsive. India is wary of this since it is uncertain of Pakistan keeping to its share of the bargain in light of its earlier record.

The idea here is that India could use the opportunity of the squeeze on Pakistan, currently culminating, to induce a change of course in Pakistan. The coming talks between the two foreign secretaries can be used to discuss a trade-off. Specifically, it would mean assuring Pakistan of India’s support in its delivering the Taliban to the table. In return, Pakistan would require assuring India that any return of the Taliban to a share of power in Kabul would not be at the cost of India or its Afghan allies. More importantly, Pakistan needs to follow through on its oft-repeated intent of not allowing its soil for use by anti-India terrorists. The two foreign ministries can usefully use the two opportunities coming up to flesh out the idea.

In the realist world view there is no necessity for this since Pakistan going downhill can only pose a diminishing threat, easily manageable by increasing the power asymmetry between the two states. This is fair enough on realist terms. Bestirring to preserve neighbours from continuing instability is not persuasive for realists.

A counter question could well be why will Pakistan bite? In this view, increasing reliance of the US on it to influence the Taliban would bring it back into the reckoning. Therefore, it does not need India. India at best has obstructionist potential. Pakistan can go it alone. It is precisely for this reason that India needs to pre-empt the future. It would do itself the favour of timely preventive action in keeping Kashmir from being singed by the outcome. In doing so it would think and act like a regional power it claims to be.

It is not for ‘AfPak’, but Kashmir and its own wider social harmony that India needs to act. Now!
(The author is Research Fellow, IDSA)

AfPak End Game: Implications for Kashmir

http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/196080/20110811/afpak-end-game-implications-for-kashmir-afghan-us-pakistan-analysis-kashmir-military-security-implic.htm

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By Ali Ahmed

August 11, 2011 3:37 AM EDT

NEW DELHI: What are the implications of the developments in the "AfPak" theater of operation for Jammu and Kashmir? In the immediate term, the question is consequential to the outcome of the current round of talks between India and Pakistan.

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Pakistan's Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar

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On a wider note, the answer is pertinent in the ongoing end game in AfPak. But, for some, it is a useful question, since the Kashmir issue predates the Afghanistan problem. To others it is pertinent since the problem of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir dates to the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan. With the possibilities of a draw-down of US presence, increasing with bin Laden's death, the question assumes significance.

The Pakistani answer to the question is more pertinent. Pakistan's actions have so far been directed by its aims of preserving the military's internal hegemony, its nuclear assets and its position on Kashmir. It is unlikely to give up its Kashmir position for strategic reasons, too. It would not like the ire of anti-India groups directed its way, especially at a time when it is in the cross-hairs of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

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There will, therefore, be no unilateral rollback of terror infrastructure as demanded by India. It reportedly has 250 fighters in Kashmir and about 750 waiting to infiltrate to set the temperatures for the summer's campaign. Forty have reportedly made their way in already, a figure provided by the state administration but disputed by the Indian Army.

Currently, Pakistan is not backing these overly since it is tied down on the western border, with reports on possible operations in North Waziristan increasingly likely. While a festering Kashmir does provide it an alibi against moving purposefully to its west, this summer Kashmir has been peaceful. This increases the likelihood of Pakistan playing along with the exit plan of the west in terms of prioritizing its western concerns over its own.

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What does this imply for Kashmir? The answer is already evident in Kashmir. It has had a relatively peaceful summer. This owes as much to India's preventive policing measures based on lessons learnt over the last three summers as to restraint on Pakistan's side in instigating its proxies. The talks between the two countries are the way Pakistan is seeking to keep the issue alive, rather than having it resonate on the streets.

How is the Indian security establishment answering the question? India does not believe that there is any connection in the solution to AfPak and Kashmir. It has managed to ward off US preference that a solution to Kashmir could help with resolving AfPak. The only connection India sees is that a reversion to the 1990s, in a hasty exit of the west from Afghanistan, could lead to a return of terror to the Valley.

India is in a position of strength. This has an intrinsic and extrinsic dimension. Its intrinsic dimension is in the positive trends towards normality in Kashmir. Terrorism has been nullified. Militancy is unpopular. The work of the army, led by a charismatic Muslim general, Ata Hasnain, is a big reason behind that.

Meanwhile, a three-member team of interlocutors, set up by the Home Ministry last year, has submitted six reports so far and is expected to come up with its final report by fall. India has not taken game-changing initiatives such as reconsidering the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. This indicates prudence and readiness for a rainy day.

The extrinsic factor is that post 26/11 re-engagement between the two states is on course. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has accepted an invite to visit Islamabad tendered during the recent visit of the newly appointed Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar.

For the re-engagement, India prefers a credible interlocutor. Pakistan has sent indicators that the peace process has the Army's backing. With the initial round of separate engagements having culminated in the foreign ministers' meeting late last month, the prospects of the "composite dialogue" resuming are bright.

Tacit US prodding may have a role to play. Hillary Clinton, in her speech at Chennai during her India visit last month, spelled out US expectations, taking care to keep off Kashmir. She said, "Reconciliation, achieving it, and maintaining it, will depend on the participation of all of Afghanistan's neighbors, including both Pakistan and India. We all need to be working together ... We will continue to encourage New Delhi's constructive role ... We also believe Pakistan has an essential role and legitimate interest in this process, and those interests must be respected and addressed."

It is not too early to hazard a preliminary assessment. Pakistan, through its restraint in Kashmir this summer, has seemingly incentivized India to stay the course in the re-engagement process. For the moment, this establishes the commitment of its Army to the peace process.

India has, on its part, made corresponding moves on both the home and external fronts. The prospects now depend on how the US is able to engage and moderate the Taliban by deft management of the upcoming conferences in Turkey and Bonn later this year. In effect, the Kashmir issue is crucially dependent on how the AfPak end game unfolds and its outcome.

The triple bomb blasts in Mumbai was designed to stall any progress in relations between the two states, and it imply that the two countries have not traversed out of the woods yet. There is a need to move on the Kashmir issue, irrespective of how the AfPak situation evolves. India and Pakistan must stay the Kashmir course on an independent, if parallel, track in working towards making Prime Minister Singh's visit to Pakistan a success. (Global India Newswire)

(The writer is a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi