https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/how-the-world-must-help-syria-help-itself-3311183

How the world must help Syria help itself

The departure of dictator Bashar al Assad for Moscow within two weeks of the offensive by rebel forces, led by the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), supported by Turkey-supported Syrian National Army and an assortment of rebel forces to the south, has been...

The fighting in Syria has been at a stalemate since 2020, and it was allowed back into the Arab League only last year. Therefore, the timing of the offensive and its rapid success, makes Ahmed observe ‘a deep-seated conspiracy between Israel, Turkey and the United States (US).

For Turkey, it was to get Assad out of the way so that the 3.3 million refugees in Turkey could be returned to Syria. For Israel, the toppling of the Assad dynasty has been a long-standing goal. The regime’s collapse enables the US to further isolate Iran and embarrass Russia.

As in Iraq when the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) took over Mosul and in Afghanistan when the Taliban defeated the Afghan National Army in double-quick time, the Syrian forces melted away. Assad’s backers were busy elsewhere. While Iran was focused bolstering Hezbollah in Lebanon, Russia was concentrating on the Ukraine conflict.

However, since there is sufficient precedence of regime change collapsing under the weight of its success with rebels fighting each other over time. This has been visible in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Sudan.

Consequently, Ahmed believes the aftermath of the offensive will likely leave Syria worse off.

The question arises as to how to avert such an outcome by transforming this juncture into a ‘historic opportunity’ and preserving Syria from another bout of civil war in which the rebels contest each other for the spoils and power.

On this count, the situation is not without promise.

The HTS has been preparing for the role of taking over Syria in its strong hold at Idlib. It has over the last few years taken care to distance itself from its Islamist past as offshoot of the ISI. Its leader, Ahmed al Sharaa, reinvented himself as a pragmatic revolutionary. The HTS acquired administrative experience and capacity in running Idlib.

During its operations and since its victory, it has made the right outreach to other stakeholders, including the Syrian government. It has allowed the prime minister, police and officials to stay on. It has signaled Russians on continuity of their presence at their air and naval bases. It has sought to calm minorities fearful of its Islamist past and cautioned its fighters on protection of civilians.

Even so, the international community would do well to assist, in keeping with the long-standing principle of the Syrian peace process: ‘The future of Syria is a matter for the Syrians to determine.’

The peace process was earlier jointly led by the United Nations (UN) and Arab League, witnessing mediation by joint mediators. As of now, the UN Security Council remains seized of the matter and has a special envoy, Geir Pederson, taking stock. In the field, humanitarians are providing succor to the displaced.

The UN has a start point in Security Council Resolutions 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015 and Resolution 2554 (2020) of 4 December 2020. These call for an interim governance arrangement enabling inclusive governance, drafting of a new constitution and conduct of credible elections, and held to a finite timeline and international standards of accountability.  

As first step, review of the HTS on the terror sanctions list would need to be done against its claim of not being associated with any extremist entity. While exercising caution in support of the Taliban has proved warranted in its treatment of women, the UN could be more forthcoming in the case of HTS, lest it miss an opportunity in Syria. 

The promise of reconstruction helps incentivise moderation, since accessing external assistance will only be possible if there is a modicum of stability, which is, in turn, predicated on an interim power-sharing arrangement amicably arrived at.

The European Union’s offer of reconstruction assistance is timely on this count. Such assistance can be expected from the Arab states too, enabling a proportion of the USD 200 billion to be raised over time.

India, being a long standing friend of Syria and having widespread regard in the region, must push for the UN’s lead in political and humanitarian support, lest extremism find roots in another ungoverned space. 

 

Cost of neglecting conflict resolution in favour of conflict management is rather steep

https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/cost-of-neglecting-conflict-resolution-in-favour-of-conflict-management-is-rather-steep-2719941

It’s never too early to pick lessons from the wreckage of a conflict outbreak. As a conflict continues, subsequent — not necessarily more pertinent — lessons could otherwise over-write ones gleaned earlier. From the terror onslaught over the weekend ...

Since the war is set to continue, with Israel already at levelling much of Gaza and readying for a ground offensive in case the secret talks to release the hostages taken by Hamas fail, it is clear that costs of neglecting CR in favour of CM can be rather steep, not only for belligerents but also for the international community.

As with the military disaster suffered by the Israelis exactly 50 years ago at the onset of the Yom Kippur War, the Hamas has dealt a blow at the very outset. For the Hamas, the reckoning is underway. The aftermath will unfortunately exact a greater toll of innocent Palestinians, as Israel goes about choosing a more lasting landscaping than this time to just ‘mow the lawn’.

As for the region, the costs are in a hastily aborted putative peace initiative. There were indicators abroad over a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, in the spirit of the Abraham Accords. In return for a blanket security guarantee from the United States (US), rumour has it the Saudis were to jettison their hitherto commitment of not normalizing relations till Israel accepts a self-regarding Palestine as an equal interlocutor.

However, Israel used the cover of the peace initiative to unfurl a ‘grab what you can’ strategy to further the right-wing agenda of its hardline Netanyahu government. It feared a closing of the door on its agenda to restrict the post-normalization space for Palestinians.

Palestinians, who were subject to Israeli impositions in terms of a continuing land grab in West Bank and a creeping attempt to change the status of the Temple Mount complex, were skeptical of the peace initiative. Their fight back against Israeli repression has resulted in over 300 casualties this year, in part prompting the conflict.

Hamas reasoned that allowing normalcy over Palestinians heads would leave them out in the cold. They were also worried that the Palestinian Authority, run by their rival Palestinian faction, Fatah, in the West Bank, might succumb to the enticement from the promise of developmental support by the international community, in the form of the ‘peace support package’ discussed on the sidelines of the General Assembly high-level week, to buttress peace deals.

The reacted in the only way they know how: the launch of asymmetric war. Their expectation is that subject to such terror, Israel would resort to what could amount to state terror, placing it afoul of international humanitarian law since its reaction would be compounded by its unfolding also in occupied territory.

Hamas also rode on regional dynamics. The Iranians were worried that the Saudis position would stand enhanced with the backing of the US and Israel. Suspicion is that Iranian might have prodded Hamas on, given its own penchant for asymmetric war developed under late General Qassem Soleimani.  

In short, the CM approach that under-grid the mentioned peace initiative has been upturned. Conflict management puts a lid on conflict by eliding addressing of root causes. The time and seeming stability bought by the approach can vanish by some or other actor either taking unfair advantage, as did Israel by pursuing a right-wing agenda, or another acting as spoiler, as has Hamas in its terror attack. The limitations of CM are now obvious.

CR on the other hand addresses root causes. It holds the conflict parties to the table, incentivizing and pressurizing them into a negotiated resolution. The habits from engaging with each other act as eddies, expanding the space for possibilities and cooperation, termed in peace theory as conflict transformation. The cost of abandoning of this approach, that had a promising start in the early 90s with the Oslo Accords, is self-evident.

The lesson for South Asia is stark. The region nurses a territorial conflict for as long as the Israeli-Palestinian one has been on the table. South Asia appears sanguine with its own CM approach extant over the Kashmir issue. It is equally liable to be evicted from this comfort zone should it continue turning a blind eye to the attractions of CR, made explicit in Israeli Titanic hitting Hamas’ iceberg.