Cost of neglecting conflict resolution in favour of conflict management is rather steep
It’s never too early to pick lessons from the wreckage of a conflict outbreak. As a conflict continues, subsequent — not necessarily more pertinent — lessons could otherwise over-write ones gleaned earlier. From the terror onslaught over the weekend ...
Since the war is
set to continue, with Israel already at levelling much of Gaza
and readying for a ground offensive in case the secret talks to release
the hostages taken by Hamas fail, it is clear that costs of neglecting CR in
favour of CM can be rather steep, not only for belligerents but also for the
international community.
As with the
military disaster suffered by the Israelis exactly 50 years ago at the onset of
the Yom
Kippur War, the Hamas has dealt a blow at the very outset. For the Hamas, the
reckoning is underway. The aftermath will unfortunately exact a greater toll of
innocent
Palestinians, as Israel goes about choosing a more lasting landscaping than
this time to just ‘mow
the lawn’.
As for the
region, the costs are in a hastily aborted putative peace initiative. There
were indicators
abroad over a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, in the spirit of the
Abraham Accords. In return for a blanket security
guarantee from the United States (US), rumour has it the Saudis were to
jettison their hitherto commitment of not normalizing relations till Israel
accepts a self-regarding Palestine as an equal interlocutor.
However, Israel
used the cover of the peace initiative to unfurl a ‘grab what you can’ strategy to further the
right-wing agenda of its hardline Netanyahu government. It feared a closing of
the door on its agenda to restrict the post-normalization space for Palestinians.
Palestinians,
who were subject to Israeli impositions in terms of a continuing land
grab in West Bank and a creeping attempt to change the status
of the Temple Mount complex, were skeptical
of the peace initiative. Their fight
back against Israeli repression has resulted in over 300 casualties this
year, in part prompting the conflict.
Hamas reasoned
that allowing normalcy over Palestinians heads would leave them out in the
cold. They were also worried that the Palestinian Authority, run by their rival
Palestinian faction, Fatah, in the West Bank, might succumb to the enticement
from the promise of developmental support by the international community, in
the form of the ‘peace support package’ discussed on the sidelines
of the General Assembly high-level week, to buttress peace deals.
The reacted in
the only way they know how: the launch of asymmetric war. Their expectation is
that subject to such terror, Israel would resort to what could amount to state
terror, placing it afoul of international humanitarian law since its reaction
would be compounded by its unfolding also in occupied territory.
Hamas also rode
on regional dynamics. The Iranians were worried that the Saudis position would
stand enhanced with the backing of the US and Israel. Suspicion is that Iranian
might have prodded
Hamas on, given its own penchant for asymmetric war developed under late
General Qassem Soleimani.
In short, the CM
approach that under-grid the mentioned peace initiative has been upturned.
Conflict management puts a lid on conflict by eliding addressing of root
causes. The time and seeming stability bought by the approach can vanish by
some or other actor either taking unfair advantage, as did Israel by pursuing a
right-wing agenda, or another acting as spoiler, as has Hamas in its terror
attack. The limitations of CM are now obvious.
CR on the other
hand addresses root causes. It holds the conflict parties to the table,
incentivizing and pressurizing them into a negotiated resolution. The habits
from engaging with each other act as eddies, expanding the space for
possibilities and cooperation, termed in peace theory as conflict transformation.
The cost of abandoning of this approach, that had a promising start in the
early 90s with the Oslo
Accords, is self-evident.
The lesson for
South Asia is stark. The region nurses a territorial conflict for as long as
the Israeli-Palestinian one has been on the table. South Asia appears sanguine
with its own CM approach extant over the Kashmir issue. It is equally liable to
be evicted from this comfort zone should it continue turning a blind eye to the
attractions of CR, made explicit in Israeli Titanic hitting Hamas’ iceberg.
