https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-nuclear-portents-are

Op Sindoor 2: Nuclear portents are darker than General Chauhan puts it

Once while serving (19:34) and a second time when retired (37:41), former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Chauhan held forth that limited military operations like Operation (Op) Sindoor will unlikely escalate to the nuclear level. He assumes that Pakistan cannot escalate twice-over: first to the conventional level and thereafter also to the nuclear level.

In both talks, he noted that space for conventional operations owes to three factors. One is India’s No First Use doctrine, which - self-servingly - allows India scope for exercise of its conventional advantage over Pakistan. It does help keep the nuclear threat in abeyance, allowing India the option of limited war.

The second is that there is no threat of capture of territory in primarily non-contact - if kinetic – operations, such as Op Sindoor. This precludes tactical nuclear weapons’ use by Pakistan, allowing India greater scope for standoff, non-contact operations.

The third is that the onus for escalation on to the conventional level is in the hands of Pakistan, and once exercised, Pakistan loses out on also taking the war to the nuclear level. He believes that the escalation to the conventional level by Pakistan makes the ‘notion of escalating into the nuclear domain slightly difficult’ (38:30).

This infeasibility of a second step by Pakistan - having taken the first – presumably allows India the rationale and legitimacy to proceed with conventional operations with greater vigour. Trifle complacently, he concludes, ‘So, we are quite sure that we should be able to manage that.’

Dangerous possibilities

To Chauhan, Op Sindoor led to a ‘falsification’ of the notion that nuclear weapons deter all kinds of conventional conflicts. This is strange, considering that a limited war fought within a year of nuclearization of South Asia – at Kargil – put paid to the notion right at the outset.

Speaking of space for conventional operations (36:58), he noted that while Pakistan through its full spectrum deterrence (FSD) doctrine tries to diminish this space, India – for its part – is constantly at expanding that space. The Indian cold start doctrine, and lately, the dynamic response doctrine (cold strike) are testimony. Now, the doctrinal tussle continues as the real thing.

Chauhan believes that, ‘in future… it’s going to be a combination of contact and non-contact warfare (57:00),’ with additional space for conventional operations squeezed out of the other, newer domains of operations: cyber, space and cognition. In light of the escalated violence, it is not clear why Pakistan will abjure from FSD.

Busting the assumption

Chauhan makes the case that by initially restricting targeting to terror camps in Op Sindoor, India kept the conflict at the subconventional level. This is only partially true, since conventional ordnance was hurled across borders by conventional armaments. Amounting to an armed attack on a sovereign state, it can hardly be said to be subconventional. At best, the operation can be characterized as one at the subconventional-conventional interface. Only Op Sindoor’s first phase meets the definition in the army’s subconventional operations doctrine:

“Sub conventional operations arena comprises armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst states and below the threshold of war. These include militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism either employed as part of an insurrectionist movement or independently. Border skirmishes also fall within this category (p. 8).”

However, the subsequent days of Op Sindoor can be characterized as medium-intensity ‘operations other than war’ (OOTW), that can be cached in the term subconventional operations. The army defines OOTW as: ‘OOTW encompass a wide range of activities where military power is used for purposes other than large scale combat operations (p. 15).’

The operations on the last day arguably took the conflict into the ‘large scale’ realm, which per the air chief were conducted over a 1200 km-wide front with 200 km in depth, and, per his vice chief, used 50 long-range, precision-guided munitions. This amounts to a limited war, which on the spectrum of war is subset of conventional war (p. 12). The army defines such a war thus: ‘Conventional war conforms to the traditional image of war and is fought to achieve strategic and military objectives…. It may be total or limited in terms of duration, the range of weapon systems employed, scope, objectives and its ultimate outcome (p. 15).’

Chauhan’s claim that Pakistan escalated to the conventional level is a case of ‘the chicken or the egg.’ If limited conventional war is taken as Pakistan’s launch of Op Bunyan um Marsoos, then it must be recalled that India had already blinded a proportion of Pakistan’s surveillance and air defence capability in earlier strikes, shaping of the battlefield for the large scale strikes of the following day.

Curiously, in the recent laudatory documentary the air operations’ chief lets on that the air force’s crack at Pakistani airfields preempted Op Bunyan um Marsoos, saying, “Toh us raat yani ki dus ki subah, is se pehle ki voh hamla kar sake, hum hamla kar chuke the unki major air fields, radar sites aur command and control set up par (“That night or morning of 10^th, even prior to their strike, we had already attacked their major air fields, radar sites and command and control set up”).”

To the extent this version of events holds water, India too is implicated in upping the ante to the conventional level. Thus, neither the sequence of events nor definitional exercise vindicates Chauhan’s theorizing.

Indeed, exercising a choice in favour of escalation by either side cannot be discounted, since each side would continue to have agency in conflict. Therefore, the nuclear step is but a decision away; which if made in the ‘free hand’ environment existing on both sides, can spell radioactive trouble.

Rationally, Pakistan would to begin with resort to nuclear signaling with only if forced on the back-foot by India – which, taking Chauhan’s description of a future military conflict as guide, can only be a matter of time in a conventional war. Therefore, even if Pakistan reaches to brandish its nuclear card, it cannot be an isolated act, shorn off context, with the onus solely on it. Instead, India could well be stoking a risk to itself.

Never be too sure

The three operations – the one post-Uri, at Balakot and Op Sindoor – reinforce the Indian belief that a conflict can play out at the subconventional-conventional interface. India’s preparedness through partial and creeping mobilization of forces on the borders and the Line of Control discourages Pakistan from responding with contact warfare. Pakistan is thus restricted to a level of Indian choosing, at which India believes it demonstrated a marked advantage in Op Sindoor.

Such a perception does not account for Pakistan having kept its powder dry for most part in this exchange. The likelihood of Pakistan staying in the fight for longer next time, may make for an imitation of recent conflicts elsewhere: no victor, no vanquished. Such a circumstance can multiply political pressures within India, as a self-regarding stronger power that ought to have made short work of its weaker adversary.

Saving face is also important institutionally for a professional military. Take the case in Op Sindoor, when under the cover of a ‘free hand,’ the military continued to pummel Pakistan through the forenoon, even after it had assessed that it had already prevailed by early morning on the last day. The only rationale for this can be that the air force was given a greater leeway to get back at Pakistan after it lost aircraft to a Pakistani aerial ambush.

Pakistan has been known for its ambushes: Kargil, Op Swift Retort and the opening phase of Op Sindoor. Its next one may well be springing a contact war, escalating India’s launch of a limited military conflict into a limited, conventional war. The aim could be to force an outcome it desires: talks. Though only intended to deter, Indian readiness for this – seen in mobilizations of varying extent since Op Trident of the mid-eighties - makes a wider conventional war inevitable; setting stage for the nuclear backdrop to foreground itself.

This is not to forget the hardy perennial of human affairs, Murphy’s law on inadvertence; an instance of which in Op Sindoor was the alleged glitch in the Indian military operations’ hotline to its Pakistani counterpart. Chauhan – in a first - admits to the play of inadvertence in Op Sindoor. Warning against taking the nuclear angle lightly (59:00), he requires that next time round nuclear sites be taken out of the target list, such as the Nur Khan air base. As regards Kirana hills, he alleges the strike was unintended. Rightly, he cautions that ‘one will have to be more careful in future… so there cannot be such mistakes.’ His very sane observation is that in the heightened pace of operations errors and miscalculation can only elicit further wrong decisions. It is moot if the targeting was on account of nuclear signalling or ignorance on India’s part; both of which demand accountability.

The notion of victory

While it can be readily accepted that to begin with every effort of the military will be towards war limiation and its early termination, it’s a Clausewitzian verity that escalation is intrinsic to conflict. The military needs reminding of its own doctrinal rendering of two decades back: ‘War is prosecuted by the employment of strategy which aims at breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Disengagement from war is difficult because it develops its own dynamics and pace, which in themselves are unpredictable and could spin out of control (p. 13).’

Chauhan at his new perch as head of a well-endowed and privileged think tank in the national capital has his work cut out: either better explain why Pakistan cannot escalate twice-over or rethink his quip, ‘we are quite sure that we should be able to manage that.’

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/india-pakistan-our-very-own-small?r=i1fws&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true 

https://m.thewire.in/article/security/india-pakistan-in-a-nuclear-dyad-the-war-that-cannot-achieve-anything

India-Pakistan: Our very own ‘small potatoes’

From the relentless badgering on Operation (Op) Sindoor, it is clear that we are being conditioned for the next round. With a dispute over what the dispute is about in first place, it can only be a matter of time when the cycle of crisis-to-conflict kicks in, yet again. Gauging from preceding military exchanges, while the bad news here is that our own ‘little incursion’ will be on a higher note, the good news is that the military conflict may yet turn out ‘not a big thing.’

The usual crisis-to-conflict cycle has a terror attack of egregious proportions provoking an Indian backlash at the conventional level, to punish and deter. The Indian counter has been deliberately kept limited both in scope and duration. Likewise, Pakistan has also taken care to limit its conventional rebound.

Lately, however, India has gone on to evince indifference to Pakistan’s tacitly-held out nuclear card, by indicating a readiness to climb up the escalatory ladder. Ostensibly, India’s striking of airfields associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ complex was to show Pakistan that it was less-than-deterred. Such risking of escalation was to reinforce its conventional deterrent by exhibiting a nonchalance towards ‘full spectrum deterrence’ posited by Pakistan. It enabled coming good on the rhetoric on ‘Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.’ This stands incorporated into India’s ‘new normal’ doctrine: India will disregard Pakistan’s ‘nuclear blackmail.’

Indian feigning of unconcern in face of risk could do with an alternative explanation than helpfully offered in some detail by the doubly-retired chief of defence staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan.

Querying the General’s narrative

The strange exchange between the then CDS and the air chief provides the clue. It’s another matter that the air chief had no business taking his cue from the CDS, who in the current arrangement only has an advisory role. The former CDS admits that his office was institutionally ill-equipped for such decision-making, revealing that his small staff was expanded by an cell of ‘best set of officers’ (43:33); the ad-hocism of this arrangement is clear from confusion over its nomenclature – research or implementation cell.

Indeed, given the Pakistani outreach amidst calls from friends, a new reality had emerged after the 29 April meeting (7:55) with the prime minister described by the former CDS. At the juncture, Indians were aware of the third-party role of the United States (US). They reckoned on Pakistani restraint under US influence. This allowed India to chance a risky blow targeting select places – Nur Khan, Sargodha and possibly Kairana hills - despite their known association with the Pakistani strategic deterrent.

Consider if the Pakistanis had not committed to the US, would they not have responded to the four spells of strikes from pre-dawn and well into the morning and instead wound up their 48 hour Operation Bunyan al Marsoos in 8 hours (26:00)? The former CDS’ account that awareness of their dwindling ability to strike back decidedly influenced the Pakistanis to throw in the towel (28:50) sounds somewhat self-serving.

Chauhan betrays no indication in his recount of the decision whether their political master and other stakeholders were consulted. The general’s recall of the meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the use of force (8:26), has no mention of the cabinet committee on security, though the committee met the following day and may have endorsed the marching orders given at the meeting on 29 April.

However, those guardrails were regarding the attacks on terrorist camps on the first night. There is no record of the CCS ratifying the expansive follow-on attacks of the fourth day, though makes a passing mention of its meetings (30:10); nor does Chauhan inform of any consultations on the escalatory matrix and the decision-making authority to move up the ladder.

Indeed, Chauhan is quite clear: “(O)bviously over here we didn’t seek political decisions because those decisions were very clear. But if we had to seek political decisions it would have taken time. Whereas in these operations, in these fast pace of operations, which are happening overnight and at various domains over vast distances to understand that itself becomes very challenging (32:00).”

Indian flippancy – immediately after and a year on – is cover for an apt exploiting of the closing window on an opportunity and the seemingly ‘free hand’ given them. The ‘complete freedom of action’ given the military sounds suspiciously like the abdication of responsibility by the regime, reminiscent of General Naravane’s recollection in his unpublished book on the close-run incident on Kailash range against the Chinese. A retired air marshal under whose watch Sargodha was attacked claims no knowledge of the Kairana episode (1:05:50), while ingratiatingly contrasting the ‘operational freedom’ given the services by ‘this dispensation’ with previous ones (1:05:00); a thoughtful share that possibly got monitored favourably enough to land him a post-retirement job.

General Chauhan reveals the dangerous determinism that results when the military is left to itself, saying, “if you want to change (the escalation ladder) in between, this is not possible (33:50).” The air marshal is equally clear that the Sargodha attack did not need governmental decision, but was made in-house (1:04:40). This perhaps explains why the Pakistanis were kept on the phone even as the CDS gave the go-head for the Sargodha strike (34:05); though at another place in the talk he contradicts himself claiming the Sargodha and Nur Khan strikes were already done with when the Pakistani call came in (28:12).

Untested rungs

The manner Op Sindoor played out suggests that it will serve as a template for future military conflicts, since it enables the two sides to ventilate without going overboard. An untried rung exists: continuing non-contact exchanges of greater scope, intensity and duration.

An expanded military conflict could include – additionally - a transgression of borders by (wo)manned air power to complement the firepower of loitering drones and missiles, ballistic from the Indian side and cruise from Pakistan. Even if India was to throw in the repeatedly-promised sea power, with its impact taking time to manifest the effect would only be in a thickening of non-contact operations and a widened area of incidence.

Limitations in magazine size – a logistics lesson learnt the hard way separately by the US and Ukraine - on both sides would keep the two sides to a graduated escalation pathway. A hint that India is mindful of the quagmire Pakistan can pose is in the speculative slotting of an air warrior to head the western integrated theatre command if and when raised, implying it envisages predominantly non-contact operations on this front.

Yet, the conflict could turn into war if it goes on long enough. Russia’s war on Ukraine and that of the US on Iran show how best laid plans get waylaid. The ongoing air defence preparations by both sides could prove resilient enough to reassure each that it can last the distance. Support from respective strategic partners may add fuel: Chinese and Turkish for Pakistan and of Israel for India.

Persisting with the buffer of a stand-off conflict occasions greater risk of sliding into the more dangerous: contact warfare. It’s only when either was to throw in land forces into the conflict milieu that escalatory prospects truly kick-in.

India has recently created the capability – finally and at long last - for this and has a ‘dynamic response strategy’ to go with it. It has the temptation to deploy it to good effect. It may assess that it could exploit Pakistani vulnerability on its western border, and create favourable facts on the ground. Even so, India has taken care to keep these forces agile and, therefore, retractable.

In a ‘raid and revert’ role - in a replay of the post-Uri wide-front raids - tactical use of these is not in itself violative of the status quo on the frontline. If instead operational level dividend is sought in a ‘seize and hold’ mode - as at Siachen or in a ‘reverse Kargil’ or by taking back Pakistan-occupied areas - escalation gets ruled in.

Territorial transgressions are more difficult to explain away than the momentary violation of air space. In such a case, optics may drive Pakistani reaction rather than strategic good sense. Its holding to its quid pro quo-plus promise could prompt over-reaction. The need for the army for a good showing to retain its hold on Pakistani politics and that of its recently-elevated leader to earn his five-star spurs would be part of the impetus to escalate. Impending escalation could be projected to instigate third-party interest, noting that last time it managed to convert initial disinterest into avid involvement.

A third party’s mediatory activity has utility for India too, allowing it to climb off a high horse; especially if Pakistan when bested in the non-contact phase - it ups the ante to a contact war. To begin with, India does not wish to go the whole hog down a military route. Peace probes provide a much-needed off-ramp. Plausible deniability currently attends the re-forged links with the Pakistani establishment, almost in line with the US-revealed understanding arrived at between the two sides. It also knows better now the cost of discounting third party efforts.

The takeaway

The employing of the military for a meaningful political end is strategically fraught. In a nuclear dyad, military means cannot possibly serve any sane political end. The international order having become more accommodative of war itself, military conflicts not amounting to war – at least at their outset - will likely punctuate the regional future into the middle term.

The under-explored rungs of the escalatory ladder and an endurance-testing duration of such conflicts may see these plateau at a mutually affordable level. Consequently, though such a future is unwelcome in itself, it is not as bad as it could otherwise be. That the political direction by the head of a nuclear power is a laconic ‘we need to do something big’ (10:17) to ‘teach Pakistan a big lesson’ (9:04) shows how bad it can really get.

This finding should serve as incentive to timely get the parliamentary system of accountability and checks and balances into place, which in the security sphere is a revitalised cabinet committee on security.