India-Pakistan: Missing NCBMs

by Ali Ahmed

February 22, 2012

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/02/22/india-pakistan-missing-ncbms/

An Indian think tank reports (‘Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs: The Road to Nowhere’) on one reason why India and Pakistan do not pursue nuclear confidence building measures (NCBMs) with any sense of purpose or a degree of urgency as being “the threat of a nuclear showdown is primarily an invention of the West, especially the US.”

Is such a belief warranted? Does precedence of the nuclear level not having figured in the Kargil War and the ‘twin peaks crisis’ episodes suggest that the two states are rational enough to keep the nuclear overhang become a sword of Damocles?

The two states are working overtime to ensure mutual deterrence. Both are at the three figure mark in warhead numbers. Indians are additionally looking for a ballistic missile shield, having successfully conducted its fourth interceptor missile test, and a nuclear submarine anchored ‘triad’. Pakistanis have reinforced their intention of going first by unveiling the Nasr, advertised as a tactical nuclear weapon. Will deterrence hold if conventional push comes to nuclear shove?

Admittedly, the two states are wisely lengthening the nuclear fuse. India’s commerce minister’s three day visit to Pakistan is set to open up mutual investment. He inspected the integrated check post completed at Wagah border along with his Pakistani counterpart. The two states are into their second round of talks, indicating that even terror incidents of the order of 26/11 can at best dent the relationship, not set it back irretrievably. They have conventional CBMs and CBMs over Kashmir in place. On the NCBMs front they have extended the life of their agreement on interaction in case of nuclear accidents by five years.

However, if all these welcome features are taken as substituting for the missing, and more consequential NCBMs, there is need for ‘selling’ the idea aggressively. Not emplacing NCBMs while the going’s good, such as now, may be regretted later.

The fact is that India, believing that Pakistan exploited the nuclearisation of May 1998 more proactively, has drawn a page from Pakistan’s book. At the conventional level, imitating Pakistan’s observation of space for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, it has gone in for a ‘proactive’ offensive conventional doctrine. At the nuclear level, it has attempted to increase this space by assuring ‘massive’ punitive retaliation in case of Pakistani first use, even if provoked by India’s conventional pincers.

Pakistan for its part has reportedly firmed up its conventional counter, apparently termed ‘early strategic offensive’. Even though its troops are involved in counter insurgency on the western front, it intends to beat India’s integrated battle groups to the draw. Given that it is a military dominant state, it does not have democratic and bureaucratic encumbrances. It would need to use the time profitably while India debates whether and to what degree the Pakistani state is complicit and whether to go in for firepower-centric, air force led reprisals or go for Cold Start.

Secondly, even if Nasr is a deterrence-gimmick for the moment, when the balloon goes up, it would be hazardous to think, as revealed by the Indian think tank, that: “Though Pakistan threatens to use the nuclear weapons and has convinced the rest of the world that its nuclear threshold is low, there is a larger understanding between the two countries that the threat is only a posture and not an actual position.”

Given this as ‘dry tinder’ piled up high, all that is needed is the proverbial spark. This is not unlikely, given the onrush of the magic year, 2014. Imagine a situation in case of the West disengaging progressively from ‘AfPak’ in which uncertainty reigns. With both states in election mode over the interim, there would be less maneuver space for governments. It bears recall that the parliament attack and 26/11 both were in some measure a spillover of the turn of events in ‘AfPak’. Since the end game there is set to culminate in 2014, and if Leon Panetta is to be believed, may even be advanced to 2013, the ‘spark’ could well be round the corner.

The catastrophic terror threat by autonomous non-state actors in Pakistan not having receded, more needs doing to manage the fallout. Under the circumstance, getting NCBMs into place appears sensible. It is self-evidently so in India’s case since it has made arrangements over the past decade to leverage its conventional military advantage.

Superficially, this may not be in Pakistan’s interest since its nuclear deterrence is also meant to cover the conventional level. However, the Pakistan’s Establishment would not want the extremist fringe gaining space, more than a happenstance in case an India-Pak crisis turns into conflict.

In the December round of talks in Islamabad, India asked Pakistan to come clean on its nuclear doctrine. This bespeaks of maneuvering and validates the revelation in the think tank report of down grading nuclear dangers. The reason is perhaps that keeping such dangers off the radar screen enables the state to quietly work on nuclear preparedness unhindered by the self-interested scrutiny of an aroused attentive public. No wonder the mechanics of engagement are in place.

The logic from a state point of view should instead be that the more the nuclear preparations, the more the need to manage the environment. NCBMs provide the necessary cover and a back stop. What needs setting up instead is a strategic dialogue mechanism for across-the-spectrum engagement. Because it would be in continuous session, it can also serve, if needed, as an ‘NCBM plus’ or an NRRC (Nuclear Risk Reduction Center) by the backdoor.

India has recently committed to a working mechanism with China for consultation and coordination over their border issues composed of diplomatic and military officials of the two sides. This is a useful model for managing its relations with Pakistan. The timing of such an initiative from India is just right in that this would ease pressure on Pakistan and its Army, thereby making the idea easier to materialize and the state and its minder more amenable to peace overtures.

Both states have strategic dialogues with their mutual friend, the US. It makes more sense to have such a dialogue mechanism in place with the perceived adversary, i.e. with each other.

Prospects of India-Pakistan Nuclear Confidence Building

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/12/10/prospects-of-india-pakistan-nuclear-confidence-building/

by Ali Ahmed

December 10, 2009

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) arrived at between India and Pakistan at the Lahore Summit of 1999 had a whole host of measures that the two states were to undertake. This was to help dispel mutual apprehensions and concerns elsewhere that their nuclearization of the previous year had raised.

Many of these have been implemented in the period of engagement between the two states that began with the ceasefire on the Line of Control a year after the end of Operation Parakram in November 2003.

The Islamabad Joint Statement of January 2004 signified the new direction and content of their relationship because the Kargil War had derailed the understanding arrived at in Lahore.

Of the commitments made at Lahore, only one is balanced; it being that, ‘the two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea…’

This article discusses the prospects of talks on nuclear issues. The Lahore Declaration, which the MOU was to progress, mandated the two sides to ‘…discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.’

It has been reflected in the MOU as its very first point, thus, ‘The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.’

Despite this privilege, it stands neglected. The five rounds of talks have instead focused on the sixth point of the MOU, specifically that, ‘The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.’

This means that the more important issues have not been addressed. It appears that form has trumped substance. This begs the question: ‘Why?’

Both countries have their own expectations. Pakistan has been consistently ahead in proposing CBMs. This perhaps owes to its need to placate the West. It may wish to gain by creating dissonance in the Indian side, where multiple lobbies compete in a democratic space. It may hope that in doing so it would keep India restrained, even as it continues to employ terrorists for its strategic purposes.

India, for its part, may not wish to be seen to be hyphenated with Pakistan once again through the medium of talks. Wishing instead to be bracketed with China, it claims the China angle puts paid to any sense in bilateral nuclear discussions.

There are also pragmatic considerations, such as who India is to engage with. Talking to a civilian regime of uncertain longevity may not be useful, while talking to the Army would undermine democracy there.

But pertinently, India may not wish to engage in nuclear talks since it is presently in the midst of pressuring Pakistan in having ‘paused’ the composite dialogue, seemingly from a position of strength. It has pacified Kashmir; the US is now a ‘strategic partner’; Pakistan is in a tight corner facing off the Taliban counter in its core areas; and it has been alleged by Pakistan that Indian pressure is being mounted in Afghanistan and Baluchistan.

Therefore, to engage in CBMs at this stage would be inconsistent. Realistically, it would do so only once the otherwise unrelated dialogue has resumed and made some headway. The trust deficit having narrowed, India would then think of engaging Pakistan in nuclear talks.

Nevertheless, there is one incentive for India to engage in talks irrespective of the status of the stalled dialogue. This owes to recurrent reports on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being under threat from Islamists. The threat can be from Islamists gaining access to the weapons through ‘insider-outsider’ collusion or by terror attack. This is less likely since there would be no use of the weapons in the sub-conventional conflict in the region.

However, the threat that keeps the West interested in nuclear security would remain. The second dimension of the threat is from Pakistan ‘going under’, under the weight of its own contradictions. In such a case, India would prefer that the weapons remain in custody of the relatively rational-secular organisation currently charged with its custody, the Strategic Plans Division and the Security Division.

Pakistan, to assuage concerns, has let out a lot of information on the manner it has coped with the threat. This has been acknowledged both by the US and India, though both prefer Pakistan continue its efforts unsparingly.

The proposal here is that India engages Pakistan as mandated at Lahore on nuclear doctrinal issues, as a measure moving beyond mere confidence building to security building. This would at a minimum keep a line of communication through to the custodians of the arsenal. At a maximum it would develop the momentum necessary to move further in case the stalled ‘composite dialogue’ has gathered momentum in the future.

In case of an increased threat due to a deteriorating situation in Pakistan or due to an emergent threat then the mechanism would be available for networking Pakistan.

While diplomatic channels are available, these are staffed by non-experts; instead the requirement of the moment would be that experts, to include those in uniform, be in the loop. In case they are already acquainted with their counterparts on the other side, the crisis would be easier to master and would be able to supplement the interaction through the existing hotlines between the two military operations directorates and foreign secretaries.

India’s interest would be served by gaining reassurance that the arsenal, that is known to be India-centric, continues in safe hands.

Pakistanis, for their part, are apprehensive of the conspiratorial whispers that surface from time to time of a US-India-Israeli intent to ‘take out’ Pakistani nuclear weapons. Their apprehensions would be allayed. But more importantly, having such a mechanism in place and immune from the vagaries of the larger relationship between the two states enables them to navigate crisis, and worse, conflict, without an overbearing extension of the nuclear overhang.

NCBMs: Scaremongering, But with a Purpose
http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/ncbms-scaremongering-but-with-a-purpose-3575.html

In his probe as to why the two states, India and Pakistan, do not pursue Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (NCBMs) with a degree of urgency, D Suba Chandran (Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs: The Road to Nowhere, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/indo-pak-nuclear-cbms-the-road-to-nowhere-3571.html) brings out that this may perhaps owe to a belief that, ‘… the threat of a nuclear showdown is primarily an invention of the West, especially the US. Though Pakistan threatens to use the nuclear weapons and has convinced the rest of the world that its nuclear threshold is low, there is a larger understanding between the two countries that the threat is only a posture and not an actual position.’ Is such a belief warranted?

Chandran refers to precedence of the nuclear posture in the Kargil War and the Op Parakram episode to suggest that the belief owes to the two states in not having leveraged the nuclear capability then, do not expect to do so in future. In effect, mutual deterrence will hold. Besides the two states are engaged elsewhere and would find a military tryst trifle inconvenient: with Pakistan tackling internal terror and India on an upward economic trajectory. They have also resumed talking to each other, indicating that even terror incidents of the order of 26/11 can at best dent the relationship, not set it back irretrievably. They have conventional CBMs and CBMs over Kashmir in place, so NCBMs can wait.

All this is not altogether bad news. It suggests that nuclear overhang is not quite a Damocles sword. Nevertheless, since NCBMs are not unwelcome in themselves, there appears to be a need for ‘selling’ the idea. Here scaremongering is resorted to, to convey that not emplacing NCBMs while the going’s good, may prove to be time lost, when and if push were to come to shove.

The Kargil and Op Parakram episodes are a useful precedent of nuclear disutility, but dangerous in case they spell complacence. The fact is that India, believing that Pakistan exploited the nuclearisation of May 1998 more proactively, has drawn a page from Pakistan’s book. At the conventional level, imitating Pakistan’s observation of space for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, it has gone in for a proactive and offensive conventional doctrine. At the nuclear level, it has attempted to increase this space by assuring ‘massive’ punitive retaliation in case of Pakistani first use, even if provoked by India’s conventional pincers.

Pakistan for its part has reportedly firmed up its conventional counter. It is apparently termed ‘early strategic offensive’. Even though its troops are involved in counter insurgency on the western front, it intends to beat India’s integrated battle groups to the draw. Given that it is a military run state, it does not have democratic and bureaucratic encumbrances. It would need to use the time profitably while India debates whether and to what degree the Pakistani state is complicit and whether to go in for firepower-centric, air force led reprisals or go for Cold Start.

Secondly, it has an irregular army that could well serve as more than a force multiplier for an Iraq style imbroglio. Its current foes in FATA have already promised to join the fray on the military’s side in case India provides them a common enemy. Lastly, it has unveiled tactical nuclear weapons. Even if a deterrence-gimmick for the moment, when the balloon goes up, it would be hazardous to be dismissive of their presence as the situation would then be qualitatively different.

Given this as ‘dry tinder’ piled up high, all that is needed is the proverbial spark. This is not unlikely, given the onrush of the magic year, 2014. Imagine a situation of a departing West, a triumphalist Taliban and a shaky Pakistan. Add to this, a rightward tilt to Indian polity in election mode. It bears recall that the parliament attack and 26/11 both were in some measure a spill over of the turn of events in ‘Af-Pak’. Since the end game there is set to culminate in 2014, and if Leon Panetta is to be believed, may even be advanced to 2013, the spark could well be round the corner.

A spark may not be unwelcome since it would give the two states an opportunity to let off steam, with calming effects for society and polity. This can only be so if the nuclear overhang were not come to fore, dramatically and unspeakably. This can be best ensured by getting NCBMs in place.

This is self-evidently in India’s interests since it has made arrangements over the past decade to leverage its conventional military advantage. Superficially, this may not be in Pakistan’s interest since its nuclear deterrence is also meant to cover the conventional level. However, a closer look suggests that Pakistan’s Establishment would not want the extremist fringe gaining center-stage, more than a happenstance in case an India-Pak crisis turns into conflict. 

In effect, what needs setting up is an across-the-spectrum strategic dialogue mechanism. Because it would be in continuous session, it can also serve if the need  beas an ‘NCBM plus’, an NRRC by the backdoor.