https://thewire.in/security/why-rajnath-singh-talks-defence-strategy-and-religion-together
Strategic culture: Rajnath Singh tests the waters on next steps
Speaking as the ‘yajman’ (‘chief patron of religious rituals’) at the second anniversary of the Ayodhya temple consecration, India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, said, “Ram is humble. Ram is virtuous. Ram is compassionate. But where necessity arises... Ramji takes on the role of vanquishing the wicked there as well. During Operation Sindoor, we worked under that same inspiration of Lord Ram.” For him and his colleagues in the Cabinet Committee on Security to draw on their shared cultural wellsprings during Op Sindoor is unsurprising.
At the event, Singh was present in his personage as Raksha mantri. He prayed, “May this flag of Sanatana Dharma continue to fly as long as the sun and the moon endure. May Lord Ram guide us all on the path of duty.” This is a natural corollary to cultural nationalism subscribed to by Singh. Rajnath Singh legitimates such subscription, thus:
No social movement is born suddenly from zero. It emerges from the consciousness of society, grows within society and takes shape while changing itself according to the changes in society. And when the movement progresses, it determines the direction of society. The temple construction movement has also been such a movement which not only shook history, but also gave direction to the present and laid the foundation for the future.
There are three higher-order problems with such formulation. One is the proximity it betrays of state and religion; the second is the partisan role of the state in the contested space of religion in a diverse society; and the third is implications for rationality and modernity that an anachronistic uptick in religion implies. Instead, here Singh is met at his own level.
When humility, virtuousness and compassion are notable in their absence from the regime’s repertoire, its claims to being inspired by a deity cannot be taken at face value. It shows instead the appropriation by political Hinduism – cultural nationalism - for legitimation of a bellicose turn to strategic doctrine. The changed visual depiction of the Lord - itself a step succeeding the makeover of widely loved Lord Hanuman – presaged this. As for the ‘movement,’ it stands forever tainted with the demolition of a mosque and a judicial sleight of hand that handed it the proceeds of its handiwork. Whether such a shady start can or should secure the future direction of society is debatable.
This is of a piece with Rajnath Singh’s belief system, which holds that, “Lord Ram is not merely an embodiment in stone, wood or soil, he is the centre of our culture and faith.” To him, “Lord Ram is our identity as well as that of our country.” The primacy of religion as identity carries significance for the ongoing (re)shaping of Indian strategic culture. Given the stranglehold the regime has acquired over all institutions, not least over those in the domain of national security - including lately the military - the regime cannot but be expected to pitch for strategic culture’s evolution in a certain direction. Hardly organic, the illegitimacy of this impulse must not be missed.
Strategic theory visualises three hierarchical platters in strategic discourse. The upper platter is somewhat amorphous, comprising the national ethic or ideology informing strategic doctrine or approach to the use of force. The second platter consists of guidance, the somewhat diffuse defence policy and military doctrines. The lowest platter has the tangible products: grand strategy and strategy. A hierarchical layering ensures pathways and guardrails are provided by the higher, prolix layer for the next lower, progressively more concise layer. Together and over time, these ideational tracts - along with implementation outcomes - shape strategic culture.
Strategic culture defined loosely is the historically-informed attitudes to power and behaviour of a nation in regard to the use of force. The location of the national ethic at the apex of the process makes it a consequential piece. Miscuing it potentially renders askew the whole strategic edifice. The debate in India over absence of strategic products – as the national security strategy - owes to the contestation over the national ethic. The Constitution - that drew on the ideals of the freedom movement - has mostly served for convergence in thinking on national security. However, witnessed in the Modi era is an attempt to lend an authoritative stamp on the national ethic, riding on the back of religion.
This owes to the unacknowledged political project furthered by the regime. There is a duality at play. While the Constitution is bowed to at one side, it is surreptitiously shredded at the other. The security domain - relied on by the regime for legitimation and sustenance - cannot escape such a game-plan. The harnessing of strategic culture to the regime’s purpose is yet another measure towards such an end.
Strategic culture is being constructed afresh through official diktat in the regime’s image. With a self-regard of being strong-on-defence it is eking out vignettes and aphorisms from ancient texts on India’s martial grandeur, seen by it as having been eclipsed for the past 1200 years. The regime is seeking Kautilyan thinking as revetment for its security policies. Barring exceptions, Bollywood has also largely been sequestered in its manufacture.
This is unexceptionable in itself, since the regime can well pitch for an assertive strategic doctrine and condition public sentiment accordingly. Afterall, its detractors back the robust counterpoise that has historically rivalled Chanakyan thinking, the Ashokan security perspective that prevailed through vast tracts of Indian history and geography. In this debate between ‘shanti and shakti,’ the problem is when gods are invoked to lend ballast to the regime’s preferred strategic doctrinal choice.
Referencing religion – as Rajnath Singh attempts - implies that the regime wishes not merely to steal a march over its opposition, but to outpoint them in perpetuity. Since the majoritarian game-plan does not necessarily have in mind the shaping of the external security environment as much as the domestic, this is fraught. Therefore, the parallel political project cannot be lost sight of in appraising the strategic field in India. Scholars are liable to arrive at anodyne appraisals of strategic culture if the duality is not sufficiently appreciated.
Singh makes evident the regime’s favouring of an ideology-driven national ethic. While cultural nationalism can and will influence the national ethic, it cannot supplant the Constitution. Only a Hindu Rashtra could anchor a national ethic in Sanatan Dharma. For now, doing so will elide the necessary consensus. The electoral verdict clipping the regime’s wings was on the basis of its gunning for the Constitution in the event of an ‘abki baar, char sau paar.’ The distancing by the seers from the spectacles at Ayodhya signifies the illegitimacy of the regime’s political project. Simply put, the ‘movement’ is not quite the place to rummage about for the national ethic.
As befits an democratically obedient military, the military has rightly addressed itself to constructing a strategic culture in line with an assertive strategic doctrine. Notwithstanding civil-military fusion, the mentioned upper platters of the strategic process are largely civilian mandated and must be politically-led. Rajnath Singh’s trial balloon – there was no ministry press release on the remarks – shows up potential next steps in reconstructing strategic culture. The military would be wise in not mistaking reiterations as marching orders. As the military drafts its vision document – part 1 is due out soon – it is hopefully wary of the regime seeking to fire from its shoulders
