https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/the-nuclear-edge-1148925

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/india-pakistan-off-to-riot-with-nukes?r=i1fws

India-Pakistan: Off to riot with nukes

Attending the Shangri La dialogue, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan in an interview said that there is “a lot of space before that nuclear threshold is crossed…lot of signaling before that…and I think nothing like that happened… .” This echoes the Foreign Secretary Misri’s testimony to the parliament’s standing committee that there was no ‘nuclear signaling’ by Pakistan.

His Pakistani counterpart, General Mirza, also at Singapore, concurred, saying, “Nothing happened this time....” This is of a piece with what his defence minister said, "we should treat it as a very distant possibility, we shouldn't even discuss it in the immediate context.”

However, the two leading military men appear to differ on what might happen next time if the nuclear domain does make an entrée.

The CDS held: "It is my personal view that the most rational people are people in uniform when conflict takes place. During this operation, I found both sides displaying a lot of rationality in their thoughts as well as actions. So why should we assume that in the nuclear domain there will be irrationality on someone else's part?"

General Mirza is less sanguine: “But you can't rule out any strategic miscalculation at any time, because when the crisis is on, the responses are different."

Expectedly, while the Indian CDS hopes to widen the scope for inflicting conventional punishment on Pakistan as the ‘new norm’ by underlining military ‘rationality’, his opposite Pakistani number wishes to narrow such space, highlighting ‘strategic miscalculations’.

Is the CDS too pat in trying to extend the space he espies for war fighting below the nuclear threshold into the nuclear domain itself?

Here I dig into the mind of the CDS, the military adviser to India’s Nuclear Command Authority, to see if his advice will secure India at the crunch.

Admittedly, for now only CDS’ first book is available to peruse for evidence on his thinking. His second, most recent book, is not at book stalls as yet. In his lectures, he can only be expected to reiterate India’s tired nuclear doctrine.

Mitron, aap chronology samajhiye!

On the fourth night, after India struck Pakistan’s airbases, a report had it that Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), that oversees its nuclear arsenal, had been convened. The report was speedily distanced from by the defence minister, with the foreign minister helpfully intoning that if India ‘stops here’, so will they.

Apparently, Indians had struck two air bases of consequence for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the Nur Khan airbase that is in vicinity of its Strategic Plans Division, the nuclear hub of Pakistan, and the Sargodha airfield, which is close to the Kairana Hills, that reputedly house some nuclear facilities. The nuclear dimension was evident even to journalists, who questioned the Indian air operations chief on the targeting of Kairana Hills.

Since Indian aims could not readily be discerned enough to preclude the possibility that degrading Pakistani nuclear arsenal might have been one such, it was only prudent for Pakistan to take a view in the appropriate forum, its NCA. Who can tell that Indian targeting of the two airbases with nuclear significance was not to spook the Pakistanis in first place?

The Indian attack left Pakistan with a dilemma. If unanswered it would be India having the last laugh. But a tit-for-tat answer would only play into Indian hands, for India had demonstrated escalation dominance, an ability to prevail at that level of engagement; visible in its navy that had yet to debut.

The Pakistani gave up the satisfaction of getting in the last punch. They were content with their showing on the first night, which the CDS acknowledged in his interview in Singapore. Instead, they chose to display nuclear fangs: ‘nuclear signaling’ with a call for a sitting of its nuclear decision makers, the NCA.

The Pakistani military operations head placed an early morning call to his Indian counterpart. The Indian military operations chief, not having been briefed on how to respond to the call, played for time. The Pakistan high commission, though truncated, put in a word with the Indian foreign ministry and the two military operations chiefs had a talk in the afternoon. This sequence has India insisting no third party was involved.

To begin with, the US assurance to Pakistan on subsequent talks and on enhancing trade would have incentivized Pakistan to phone-in. To believe that a self-respecting Punjabi-dominant institution would throw in the towel is to be oblivious of strategic culture. Pakistan, catalysing the US to up its act, the limited aim from nuclear signaling – implicit in the very convening of the NCA meeting - Pakistan dissimulated over its NCA meet.

Such a reading of events explains the ceasefire, understanding, pause or ‘temporary cessation of hostilities’ (CDS Chauhan) being announced, curiously by the US, that evening. True to form, President Trump has credited himself repeatedly since.

That the Americans were concerned enough to step in is clear from their stance on the conflict shifting, from Vice President Vance indicating that they were prepared to let the two sides vent to Secretary Rubio, who is also temporarily national security adviser, working the phone.

However, while claiming a glorious victory, Indian petulance against US role makes obvious that the Indians were strong-armed into a ceasefire (‘pause’ if you will) by the Americans picking up nuclear signals, that its principal military adviser – the CDS - evinces did not exist.

The CDS’ political masters instead chose to placate the Americans - and with trade being as good a reason as any. Only they are too scared to admit it, so as to appease the regime’s more truculent supporters – the Trads – otherwise disappointed by the ceasefire.

Nuclear kabaddi

If there was no nuclear dimension to the conflict, then what explains Indian prime minister going ballistic on Pakistan’s ‘nuclear blackmail’? It is possible to argue that the American arm-twisting owed to Pakistan playing its nuclear card; which put off an India that knows better.

But then, if Americans took the nuclear card more seriously than Indians, why is India’s new doctrine for the ‘new normal’ predicated on a determination not to be thwarted next time by nuclear brinkmanship by Pakistan?

Popular scenarios have it that neither Pakistan nor terrorists deterred, a terror attack remains a prospect. A 21 per cent drop in water flowing into Pakistan increases not only the likelihood of one, but also of direct military operations by Pakistan that has equated interference with Indus flows with an ‘act of war’.

During Op Sindoor Pakistani troops had moved towards the border. It is clear that the next crisis will see conflict start where this one ended. The CDS believes there are more steps in the conventional escalatory ladder under the nuclear threshold. Cold Start-lite operations by both sides is a potential start point. Since this conflict ended on a nuclear note, the next can be expected to have a nuclear dimension from the very outset.

India’s broadcast intent not to be taken in by nuclear moves on Pakistan’s side implies it will test these steps next time. Pakistan for its part will try to make its nuclear signaling more explicit and plausible, to overcome Indian cognizance deficit or to make it impossible for India to feign nonchalance.

At such a juncture, would the CDS prove the ‘right man at the right place’?

CDS: a nuclear war-deterrer?

General Chauhan – being CDS – cannot but have reiterated the government endorsed nuclear doctrine. In an address at a seminar last year, he highlighted ‘no first use’ (NFU) and ‘massive retaliation’ as the leitmotif of India’s nuclear doctrine.

To him, ‘massive retaliation’ ought to stay Pakistan’s hand. Not quantified, ‘massive’ can mean many things, including a quid-pro-quo-plus response or counter value targeting. In any case, it is the promise of a giant step up the escalation ladder, in case of a low-level nuclear strike – the more rational and therefore more likely introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict.

Not having first strike capability (the ability to reduce vitality of Pakistani nuclear retaliation to negligible and presumably tolerable levels), precludes a credible first strike on India’s part. Pakistan’s second strike capability makes ‘massive retaliation’ an illogical proposition.

Strategic rationality continuing into the nuclear domain implies restricting nuclear exchanges to the lowest threshold of nuclear use. Advising the rational course would be the CDS’ lot.

There is much going against such advice including extant doctrine; hate ideologies; heightened emotions; sovereign impunity; mob pressures; and, the known narcissism of all five nuclear decision makers in the Indian NCA.

CDS: a nuclear war-fighter?

The General’s first book – written on sabbatical as a One-Star at the Center for Land Warfare Studies - is about effects of nuclear war. In his previous rank, he had served at the NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) Warfare desk of the army’s Perspective Planning Directorate, where his ambit covered ‘escalation dynamics, deterrence theory and its applicability in the South Asian context.’

He is cognizant that a conventional war escalating to the nuclear level ‘cannot be discounted’ on two counts. This could owe to ‘miscalculation or misapprehension, exacerbated by the prevailing tension of war leading to unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons;’ or ‘to gain a local or temporary military advantage or to avert a major military disaster.’

His response-options include ‘punitive retaliatory strikes’. These could be either counter value or counter force (he clubs counter military use with counter force). If the former, these would be ‘catastrophic’. As regards the latter, ‘devastation, though lesser in scale and magnitude,’ effects both the military and civilians.

He considers ‘single nuclear strike’ and ‘limited nuclear exchange’ as nuclear use options. Two of his case studies on nuclear damage assessments - a tactical nuclear strike on army units and on a medium sized border town.

The good part is that he rules out spasmic nuclear retaliation as the only option, despite the nuclear doctrine’s ‘massive retaliation’ phraseology. His summary of preceding assessments of the counter value targeting of Mumbai shows his awareness of consequences. His case study on the nuclear targeting of New Delhi reinforces.

The bad part is that this rules in nuclear war-fighting. His book aims at enabling the military to fight through a war gone nuclear, even as damage mitigation is done on the civilian front to enable the fight.

All told, our CDS is no hawk, notable from the phrases he uses: ‘specter of nuclear holocaust’, ‘nuclear dangers’, ‘disaster’, ‘inherent insanity in the use of nuclear weapons’, ‘madness’, ‘humanitarian disaster’. In short, he would advise against scrambling after political ends at such levels.

Deserving a Marshal’s baton

From his writings, the CDS discerns a divide in the nuclear domain between lower order and higher order nuclear exchanges. To him, nuclear rationality implies restricting conflict to lower order exchange(s). Consequently, his advice on breach of the nuclear taboo must be to temper pursuit of escalation dominance short of a higher order nuclear exchange.

The good part is that this is in keeping with Pakistani nuclear thinking. Its Full Spectrum Deterrence is predicated on asymmetric escalation with tactical nuclear weapons, even as it maintains a second strike capability. Not being ‘target rich’, it’s not pre-disposed to higher order nuclear exchanges.

The two sides could use the primer on nuclear strategy developed by General Sundarji: ‘finally, and most importantly, make every effort at war termination short of nuclear weapon use, failing which terminate hostilities at the lowest possible level of (nuclear) use, with honorable concessions.’