https://thewire.in/security/is-modi-regime-conditioning-armed-forces-dissent-subversion

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-armys-bombshell-into-the-domestic

The army’s bombshell into the domestic sphere

At a seminar at an intellectual hub of the Indian army, a general speculated that the Pahalgam attack may have been a ‘trap’ set by Pakistan to get India into striking back.

Discounting that the converse could be speculated on equally plausibly, what detains us here is what the general goes on to say.

This is especially so since it is not self-evident from what the military informs on his talk. It also seems to be a departure from what the seminar was about to begin with.

Reportedly, he said that, “countries inimical to New Delhi have been trying to replicate what happened in Bangladesh, in India. The yearlong farmers’ protest, the agitation against CAA and the situation in Manipur, (he said,) was part of a larger ploy to destabilise the country and to prevent it from being ‘Viksit Bharat’ by 2047.”

In short, in a seminar advertised as on ‘disruptive technologies and future warfare’, when - per the military - he is ‘exploring how technology synchronises strategic communication across services’, he instead indulges in what’s but plain and straight-forwardly political-speak.

The text has not yet been made available in the open domain, being perhaps in the compiling stage of the seminar proceedings, it is hard to grasp how the political line he plugs fits in with his topic ‘Weaponsing the Narrative’.

Apparently, slides showcasing anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) protests and Manipur were trotted out by the general to depict these instances ‘as part of information warfare,’ that accompanies so-called ‘colour revolutions’ instigated from without for regime change.

He brings into military’s seminar rooms a conspiracy theory – that an erstwhile global hegemon is out to sabotage the regime, using the instrument of democratic agitation by motivated stakeholders ranging, in his imagination, from farmers to the usual suspects, Muslims, and - not to forget - Kashmiris.

In effect, the general does ‘weaponise the narrative’, but against democratic dissent provoked by the regime’s missteps and ideological propensities.

This brings up the question if a serving general can indulge in blatant political-speak and if the military should be lending a forum for such purpose.

Reportage from the first edition of the Ransamwad has the usual coverage of the usual worthies. The only other talk that found mention in the media was of this general, indicating that even an otherwise compliant media picked up the sound of a potential bombshell.

It is not known if the military was similarly sensitive. Was it privy to the content of what the general was to say prior? Has it taken umbrage against the forum being abused?

The troubling thing is that the military may by now be inured against seeing the general’s obvious politicking as such.

This can be on two unedifying counts: one, that it is likeminded, and, two, that it is too wimp, under the ministrations of this regime for over a decade, to roll-back the well-regarded penetration of such thinking within the military.

The first would not surprise.

Afterall, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) earned his blue-eyed status by seconding his ethnic kin, the then army chief, on the anti-CAA agitations. The army chief in question went on to be his predecessor as the first CDS.

Since his chair (which incidentally per rumours is to fall vacant next month) is open to all three-stars, it is unlikely this politically garrulous two-star general is auditioning for it. From his current and previous appointments its evident he has been put to pasture, so may only be signalling for less.

Greener pastures lie ahead for such voluble generals, from joining regime-friendly retired brass-hats on their breezy speaking circuits. Recall when last heard, the general was busy using info-war techniques on Kashmiris disaffected by the hollowing out of Article 370. His then boss at Chinar Corps, a self-styled info-warrior, is doing fine by this yardstick out of uniform.

Of the second, the army’s genuflection to ‘apolitical’ has singularly failed to deter. No wonder, the video on an ‘apolitical’ army was withdrawn once. Generals shooting their mouths off is no longer unknown.

Whereas it can be argued that they are doing their info-war turn, it is excusable at a stretch if and only if no Indian community or legitimate stakeholder is disparaged in the bargain.

The army has no business lending its reputational weight to pejorative inuendoes such as wanton claims that anti-CAA protests were ‘part of information warfare’.

The subtext is that Muslim and liberal participants in the protests were stooges of a proverbial ‘foreign hand’, which, in this case, is shorthand for our friendly neighbour – to where protestors have ad infinitum been invited to migrate.

Since this was reportedly part of the slides of the presentation – and not off-the-cuff answer to a question as the other nonsensical mouthings of the general are – it has seeming imprimatur. In hindsight, his earliest appearance appears portentous.

His invite to the forum can easily be seen to be complacence on part of organisers, mistaking the general’s service in Pakistan, where was an attaché, and in Kashmir, where he was the info-war minder, as relevant background.

However, it cannot be ruled out that there is a politicised cabal out to polarise professional spaces, who may serve as conduits to forces outside. It stands to reason that where the majority is somnolent politically, it takes but a few political entrepreneurs in uniform to reset the organisation’s compass.

If so, spring cleaning is overdue.

The timing of the general’s presentation made at a location housing the army’s largest officer presence suggests that it is no coincidence, but could well be a considered opportunity by forces-that-be to implant a skewed perspective into the military’s mind.

Two ingredients of the scenarios posited by the general exist current day.

Exponentially strained relations with the a ‘strategic partner’ exist at a time when the regime facing its most significant convergence of challenges, from a potential backlash to voter disenfranchisement possibly aggravated by ‘tariff wars’.

Does it anticipate democratic direct action ahead, that it wishes to pre-emptively delegitimise? Is the regime conditioning the military into believing that democratic dissent amounts to subversion? Does it wish to inoculate the military with diversionary opiate prior?

There is no call for the military to view the events where people have taken to the streets such as in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and, indeed, in Pakistan, with any prejudice. When institutional checks and balances breakdown, people tend to democratically even the playfield.

There is no call for a military to have a position on any disturbances a government encounters. It has to stick to the rule-book, irrespective. Its role does not require an ideological overlay.

On the contrary, having such blinkers on will turn it into just a more muscular version of the Khakis in khaki-chaddis in Delhi and Manipur during respective crises.

Instead, as antidote to the good general’s potion, it may like to timely reprise lessons from its showing in Gujarat.

The theoretical problem with ‘weaponizing narratives’ the general surely elided in his talk is that some among the intended targets are domestic, including voters. ‘All is fair in love and war’ is not wholly applicable in such cases.

A practical problem is that Operation Sindoor continuing, and the next possibly five-year war promised as ‘soon’, the domestic space can only continue in the line of fire of the regime’s information war.

This, when it is steadily losing its mojo, can only escalate, catching not only the common citizen in its crosshairs, but its most vulnerable ones – the minority - at that.

Since influence operations are the flavour of the season, the military must in the current circumstance tread tenderly (p. 27). It needs reminding that its existence is over double that of a self-important entity currently celebrating its centenary.

 

Awards: The final nail in the military’s ‘apolitical’ coffin?

https://m.thewire.in/article/politics/by-a-largesse-of-military-awards-the-regime-is-using-the-armed-forces-to-bolster-modis-image

The army chief rightly observed that the perception of victory amongst common folk in Pakistan in its counterpart of Operation Sindoor, Op Bunyan al Marsoos, has been fostered by the elevation of its army chief to five-star rank.

The observation holds good for the Indian side too. With seven Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medals (SYSM) dished out at Independence Day, a perception of a splendid victory is sought to be manufactured.

To the credit of some recipients of the largesse, they sheepishly acknowledge their role as confined to the operations rooms, disavowing from the hyperinflation in awards.

In other words, it is not a citations ‘push’ but a ‘pull’ from top that resulted in the surfeit.

Not acknowledging the downing of Indian aircraft, including a Rafale, dented the regime’s image. The belated claim by the air chief that India went one up by accounting for six Pakistani aircraft in the 4-Day War, has not quite made up for that deficit. Doling out largesse is its answer.

Admittedly, going beyond the call of duty is laudable. But going beyond the call of the duty of obedience most certainly is not.

As a subordinate institution to its political overlord, the military eventually must comply – as indeed it has in this instance.

In this case, the regime is using the military yet again to bolster its image as strong-on-defence, and that of its leader, Narendra Modi, as a Warlord. It’s not for the military to facilitate this.

Though Mr. Modi has surpassed Indira Gandhi’s record of number of days in office as also the number of speeches delivered at Red Fort, he does not have a 1971 War-like splendid victory to his credit.

A 1971 War redux is impossible in the nuclear age – recall the field marshal (FM) next door reminding everyone that he would take half the world down with him in case provoked down that route.

An equivalent victory must therefore be contrived. Since, per the army chief, there is only information war to war these days, winning the war of narratives is all that is needed.

Op Sindoor was to serve the purpose of image building. Mythmaking around it needs more doing. Awards inflation is one such measure.

If General Chauhan is to be believed, the important thing is how resilient a Service is. By their cornering of the top awards, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has done well by this yardstick.

Obviously, its leadership bounced back from the ambush by a certain Aurangzeb the first night. The Pakistani Air Chief, inauspiciously named Babur,  was waiting for his date with military history, sleeping on a mattress in the air operations room since terror struck Baisaran. In the event, the IAF on the last night made up for the first.

But does that merit the numbers of higher war-time distinguished service awards toted up?

It another matter whether Op Sindoor was ‘war’ to begin with. It’s normalized by now for higher leadership in command of operationally active formations to take home the second of that series.

Interestingly, the IAF middle order collected most Vir Chakras, awarded for war-time gallantry in face of threat, risk and the enemy.

This was indeed the case on the first night when these pilots persisted with their tasks, even in face of some of their colleagues falling out about them - if reports of Indian planes downed are to be believed.

The tactical changes made and the air defence suppression done on the last night might have mitigated the threat and risk. The weaponry in all cases was stand-off and technology-heavy. Also, the lesson from the Varthman episode well learnt, in no instance did any plane of either side cross the border or Line of Control (LC).

So, air defence targeting apart, Vir Chakras for trashing Pakistani airfields from well within own territory might not easily fit the bill. Technical skill in releasing ordnance is recognized with the Vayu Sena Medal (VM), of which there were many won, a list that should have been longer.

In contrast, only five of the 12 pilots of aircraft that went across the LC during Operation Bandar received the VM.

Is the defence ministry going the home affairs way in devaluing awards?

Recall Advani perversely handed out the Ashok Chakra to each of seven police men who unfortunately perished while manning the parliament gate during the terror strike that December, along with disbursing a crore rupees to each.

Questionable also is the handing out of higher war-time distinguished service awards for those who were ‘left out of battle’ as it were.

The operationally-ready posturing of the other two Services would have weighed on FM Munir’s decision to throw in the towel. Evidence for this is the Pakistani side at the military operations’ chiefs talks during the draw down asking for the withdrawal of one operationally threatening army formation.

Thus, there was both a demonstration of force and a display of more to come. The latter goes by the term escalation dominance. Pakistan seemingly got the message.

However, Munir may have had other inducements, including President Trump’s supposed intervention. That he has been handsomely compensated, with no less than a luncheon at the White House, and a twice-over trip to the United States - that has since had some Indian strategists green with envy.

Unfortunately, quite like with deterrence, it can never be definitively known if the posturing did the trick. Clearly, Munir’s considerations were less operational than strategic.

Therefore, seven Sarvottams dished out is an overkill, particularly when contrasted with only three awarded prior – to, namely, the commander of the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the air and land operational commanders of the Kargil War.

Even Hari Kumar, the architect of the Balakot strike, did not figure in the medals, though as history knows, Modi went on to a ‘splendid victory’ of a different sort, one at the polls.

And, if this is the score in what is arguably not a ‘war’, what might the military wish-list include in war itself? If awards are so liberally distributed, then wouldn’t these lose their sheen.

India does not need to look any further than its neighbour to know where it should not venture. The friendly neighbourhood FM took home a medal. But then, let’s remind ourselves, he is only catching up with us.

An army chief here had atypically helped himself with a distinguished service award. The Leetul Gogoi controversy he dived headfirst into shows up the underside of messing with the straight and narrow on awards.

Since the situation in Kashmir – notwithstanding the vacation of Article 370 - triggered it all, worth noting is all three brass-hats heading formations in Kashmir received awards for their showing.

The army commander is an SYSM recipient. Though new in the chair, taking over the week following the terror attack, that he was the army’s Strategy head at New Delhi prior, implies his award could do with closer scrutiny: Why, in face of a war onset, there was no effort at protecting civilians along the LC, resulting in casualties? Was this deliberate: to raise war temperatures? What was his advice on the conciliatory opportunity emerging with Kashmiris on the streets protesting the terror attack on their touristic lifeline? Did he advise against the dragnet in which some 3000 were picked up?

The Chinar Corps commander certainly did not merit the list. In the chair since last year, how is it that he concurred with the removal of the central police post from Baisaran? Why did he lend army engineers for the Israel-like demolition of houses of purported militants? Did he respond to allegations of torture of graziers on the Pir Panjals? How is it that the Pahalgam perpetrators were allowed to get away for this long? What was the content of the aborted press briefing that was to take place on the killing of the three, to whom Amit Shah attributes the Pahalgam massacre?

The two must know if and to what extent the official narrative on Pahalgam and the subsequent killing of the perpetrators misleads. What was the handing over brief of the former army commander? Did he take home any secrets that the nation must be apprised about?

Awards have a purpose beyond the obvious.

The run-away Modi-endorsed hit, The Kashmir Files, has a scene in which a character remarks that a Padma award has been handed out to the military man for keeping him quiet, for he knows too much and perhaps also knows the truth. The regime is no less crafty than that screen writer.

Into the second decade of serving its current political master, the military must have figured out Modi’s management repertoire.

Personalized loyalty, unleavened by institutional integrity and purpose, is the hallmark. The political Principal’s journey is littered with those who stood by their Constitutional roles falling by the way side; even while those who fell in line have been elevated beyond their competence levels.

Quite like other institutions of governance, the military has been recipient of like attention of the regime. The military appears now more subservient than subordinate.

The air chief’s carte blanche is evidence: “A key reason for success was the presence of political will. There were very clear directions given to us. No restrictions were put on us… If there were any constraints, they were self-made.”

The awards are rewards for falling in line; with the sanctity of awards unhinged alongside – another nail for good measure.

The military must expect more nails will be hammered into its ‘apolitical’ coffin. The regret is that the din will not alert the dead.