https://substack.com/home/post/p-152354915
An early bird, the best National Security Adviser India never had, General Hooda, lists four military lessons from the recent step back in Ladakh: one, get intelligence analysis right; two, get contingency planning in place; three, get a realistic fix on relative capabilities; and, four, ‘rebuild’ deterrence against Chinese military coercion by communicating that redlines will be met by a ‘decisive and visible’ response.
Cumulatively, these steps could presumably defuse into the future the four possible explanations of the Chinese intent behind the provocation in Ladakh: one, to snap back against Indian infrastructure developments; two, to gain territorial control; three, to broadcast regional dominance; and, four, to influence India’s strategic relationships.
Here I undertake a reality check on Hooda’s unimpeachable case for a rebuilding of deterrence.
The four lessons reconsidered
The first on the (wish)list is sound intelligence analysis. As with the Kargil intelligence debacle, information did trickle in but did not inspire a scramble. However, this time round no intelligence review has been done. Sans any effort at accountability, even if a better look onto the Tibetan plateau and beyond - with a leg-up by a strategic partner - strategic intelligence will likely continue to be hobbled. Operational level intelligence - necessary to trigger preemptive or responsive action - will therefore unlikely be spurred.
Contingency plans are likely in hand, given additional troops and information periodically put out on exercises. The problem however is not with readiness as much as resolve.
Surely, Fire and Fury corps, as it was configured pre-Galwan, had the wherewithal to spring a counter grab action. The same could have been conducted anywhere else along the eastern front (then under the current Chief of Defence Staff). Covid outbreak is but a fig leaf, since Ladakh was in any way winter cut-off and had is integral resources in place.
So, it’s not so much capability, but delegation that is a problem.
The problem will likely remain. General Naravane’s recall of the hotspot atop Kailash range is a case to point. Extracts from his memoirs – since held up in the works – have him reaching for the defence minister, when the Chinese reactively clambered uphill from their side. Apparently, the answer he received was ‘jo ucchit samjhe, karo’ (‘do as your wont’).
Clearly, preparedness can incentivize action only up to a point. Will to shoulder the consequence and unintended consequences must be demonstrated by matching delegative power with redlines.
Hooda’s third lesson carries two examples of the Indian perception of Chinese capability. Apparently, pre-Galwan, there was a belief in an Indian advantage in the air and adeptness in mountain warfare. The two should have instigated a vigourous response to Chinese provocation. In effect, the assumptions turned out as vapid as General Ayub Khan’s pre-1965 views of the Indian military.
Now that Chinese have caught up on both counts, and are amply ahead on parameters as infrastructure, advantaged as they are by terrain, and technology – if Pravin Sawhney is to be believed - India is left without comforting assumptions. When it couldn’t take the cue of wishful assumptions, why will a better fix on relative capability today spur action?
On to General Hooda’s fourth ask: ‘a successful deterrence strategy rests on three critical pillars, often called ‘3C’s - capability, communication and credibility.’ Credibility is based on resolve. Resolve is but synchronized military capability and political will.
That the counter in 2020 - though a great logistic feat - was operationally reactive, shows that though adequately poised (it had a decade of military buildup in Ladakh behind it and a nationalist government into its second term), India was not able to deliver a credible counter. Neither parameter – military capability and political will – having changed relatively since, how can deterrence find itself ‘rebuilt’?
Deterrence of what?
Deterrence is to prevent harm on oneself by creating the perception that the action will prove futile or will invite like or disproportionate hurt on the perpetrator. For now, self-evident is India’s potential for deterrence by denial.
Having achieved its objective of having India respect its territorial claims through springing the crisis and the gambit of interminable talks, China is satiated territorially. Since it has no further territorial intent in Ladakh, a capability for deterrence by denial has only a limited benefit, restricted to preserving an ability to protect existing infrastructure, and that yet to come up if not effected by unrevealed compromises at the parlays.
Contrarily, India needs a capability for deterrence by punishment, a better heft on tackling the other three explanations of the crisis and likely to persist into the future.
India has exerted a capability for deterrence by punishment - or ability to up the military ante - to bring home to the Chinese that disengagement is in the interest of both states. Its showing on Kailash range amounted to this.
It may yet need to show military muscle to influence talks to go beyond their current enabling of patrolling access at merely two of the friction points. There are three other friction points where buffer zones have to be rolled back to open up patrolling points.
A deterrence by punishment capability serves to deter Chinese adventurism in search of regional dominance. With 17 Corps coming into its own, and the Uttar Bharat Area being converting to an operational corps, and incipient steps to theaterisation in the works, China must be wary. At the cusp of super-powerdom it would unlikely wish to be defrocked.
The third explanation is regards Chinese messaging India against too close a relationship with the United States. The latter might be more pronounced as the Trump Presidency kicks in, wherein, to cosy up to the Russians, he is liable to be more assertive with the Chinese. Given India’s past propensity (‘Ab ki baar, Trump Sarkar’, ‘Namaste Trump’), it is liable to fall in line, with a need for external balancing as cover. This would necessitate preparedness at a higher notch.
By this yardstick, the step after disengagement - de-escalation – must only be selective and partial. The ‘new normal’ must see India’s capability for deterrence by punishment in place, with its contingencies well practiced. Even so, a military doing its bit is never enough.
Realistic?
The problem with intelligence setup is set to remain. The military can expect to be let down with a recurring lack in strategic intelligence. Recall how the hype around two rounds of personalized diplomacy – Wuhan and Chennai – failed miserably to pick up signals of Chinese reneging. With the same narrative employed yet again before Kazan, the intelligence subsystem of national security will likely fall in step with the political narrative, stemming ostensibly from need for an economic reopening to the Chinese behemoth.
The larger problem is with political reluctance in reconciling with playing second string in global affairs. It does not go well with the ideological beliefs of the regime in place and its domestic posturing. Yet, it cannot afford being upended, like was Nehru, during its national majoritarian project. Consequently, it would unlikely countenance a military distraction, whatever the cost in national interest. It follows that expecting delegative authority for activating contingency responses is mite too much. Expect instead dilution in deterrence by appeasement: much fury, no fire.
