https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/

Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLII, No. 628, April-June  2022.

Abstract

The article postulates a ‘peace operations’ triangle’ with peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding as its three sides. It argues, through a case study of the UN’s Abyei Mission, UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), that the three sides of the peace operations’ triangle need to be ministered adequately for success of a mission. Through the lifecycle of the UNISFA, it foregrounds observations on the inter-linkages between the three sides. UNISFA’s turn from being a mission with a largely military mandate to a multi-faceted mission indicates the significance of the three sides in peace operations. The operational art of peace operations, therefore, lies in arriving at a balance between the three.

Introdution

The heuristic on peacekeeping, made famous by Boutros-Boutros Ghali, had four components: peacekeeping, peacemaking, post-conflict peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy.1 Preventive diplomacy, as the term suggests, is prior to the onset of violence. The other three lines of operation are not sequential and have a degree of overlap.2 Challenges in peace operations are usually faced when there is imbalance in the attention and resources devoted to these. A peace operation’s success depends on a masterly employment of the tools respective to each line of operation. As strategy, in general, is an art, so is efficacious employment of peace tools, termed here as the Operational Art of peace operations.

In this article, a case study of the UN’s Abyei Mission is undertaken through the ‘peace operations’ triangle’3. The length of the three sides depicting that the salience of the side varies at different junctures in the lifecycle of a Mission. Preventive diplomacy brings about a peace agreement that allows for peacekeeping. The ‘peace to keep’ is used for peacebuilding, deepening constituencies in favour of peace, that in turn helps with peacemaking involving dealing with ‘root causes’. Thus, an interactive relationship can be seen between the three. Slovenly peacemaking aggravates peacekeeping, thereby constricting space for peacebuilding. On the other hand, peacemaking expands the space for peacebuilding, easing the onus on peacekeeping. Operational Art lies in ensuring none of the three sides loses ballast, while the three are energised to situation-specific levels. The aim is a positive, self-reinforcing equilateral triangle.

Background to the Abyei Mission

Abyei is a territorial dispute between Sudan and South Sudan,4 a left over from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period.5 Along with the Two Areas — Kordofan and Blue Nile — Abyei remained an outstanding border dispute issue, along their 2100 km long border.6 The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was inserted as a military mission to prevent the territorial dispute from becoming a thorn in the relationship between the two new neighbours.7 UNISFA acquired another significant dimension: that of border monitoring and verification.8 The expanded mandate that brought about the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM)9 assumed significance with the two States indulging in a brief border war in early 2012 over sharing of oil proceeds.10

The mission turned out not only the most remote one, but also unique in having a single troop contributing country (TCC), Ethiopia. There is a division of labour between the UN and the regional organizations — the African Union (AU) and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) — with the latter two in the lead on peacemaking,11 while the UN did peacekeeping. Peacebuilding in the form of humanitarian relief, reconstruction and support of refugee returns was the realm of respective UN Country Teams (UNCT). UNISFA, not being an integrated mission, limited its activity to provision of security for humanitarian actors and lobbying the UNCT in both capitals to pay attention to Abyei’s needs.

Lifecycle of UNISFA

The intimate interplay between the triangle’s sides can be seen over the lifecycle of the UNISFA.12 In light of the border war outbreak in early 2012, the AU turned its attention through the AU High Level Panel (AUHIP)13 to tidying up the CPA period leftovers. It put forward proposals on Abyei in September 201214 and an implementation matrix with a timeline in March 2013.15

Peacemaking in Abyei was through the implementation of June 2011 Abyei Agreement that had requested the Mission deployment.16 The Agreement formed the basis of UNISFA mandate. Talks proceeded for setting up an interim joint administration over the disputed area, reporting to a joint oversight committee (AJOC) between the two sides. However, a debilitating setback occurred when in May 2013, the paramount chief of the Ngok Dinka community was assassinated by a Misseriya youth.17

Hardening of the Ngok Dinka position, led to a unilateral referendum by the Ngok Dinka on Abyei’s status in October 2013. The referendum under AU auspices had been held up with disagreement over the definition of a ‘resident’. The Misseriya are a migrant community that is present in Abyei Area only during the dry season for cattle grazing. On the other hand, the Ngok Dinka is a settled community, mostly residing in the southern part of Abyei Area.18 In the event, the unilateral October 2013 referendum was not recognized by either South Sudan or the AU.19

Resulting insecurity at ground level held up local inter-community peacemaking and setback peacebuilding effort on part of UN Agencies, Funds and Programs (AFP). At the local level in Abyei, the Mission resorted temporarily to a ‘zone of separation’, wherein the Misseriya herds were not allowed to cross into settled Ngok Dinka areas for pasture. An intercommunity peace committee was formed in 2016 to dialogue on resumption of relations. This UNISFA supported the initiative for setting up of a joint market at Amiet. The Abyei common market became an economic hub, with a cascading effect on intercommunity relations as commercial stakeholders acquired a stake in peace. Equally, spoilers were active, periodically disrupting the peace effort with violence directed at the common market. UNISFA used troops to secure the market, but also bid for formed police units for the task.20

By end 2013, South Sudan was in the midst of a deadly civil war.21 This held up the political process at the national level. The period witnessed UNISFA slowly expanding its presence for border monitoring to a four point deployment on both sides at sector level, and, by 2018, also at team site level within a 20 km broad Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ). The two sides promised to demilitarise the zone in anticipation of AU-coordinated demarcation activity, logistically supported by JBVMM.22

There was an interesting tug-of-war of sorts between Sudan that only wanted a military predominant mission, while the Mission attempted to expand its scope of activity as per best practices elsewhere in integrated missions. Security Council Resolutions added facets, such as human rights, women and child protection, to the UNISFA mandate. Sudan — the host state — being weak and internally distracted, asserted its sovereignty through being difficult with the Mission on issues as visas and transit of logistics.

Peacebuilding progress was reflected in the return of refugees and recovery activity. However, the divided responsibility between the two UNCTs, distracted from a joint effort. There was a sense of alienation in northern Abyei among the Misseriya, since Khartoum-based AFPs were thinly represented in Abyei.23 The AFPs argued that the Misseriya were not as much conflict-affected as poverty-struck, precluding equivalence between the two communities.

In the interim, national level peacemaking under IGAD auspices concentrated on the fallout of the South Sudan civil war,24 a proxy war of sorts between Sudan and South Sudan. The two sides were agreeable to disengaging from their proxy war and even went so far as to not only rein in respective proxies but bring them to the table for settlement with the opposite capital. By 2018, insurgencies in both sides ceased, brightening prospects that the two could now discuss Abyei and the border issue.

On the Cusp of an Exit Strategy

Even as South Sudan embarked on implementing the Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS) signed on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa, the situation in Sudan unravelled. A civilian uprising unseated Omar al Bashir in April 2019. However, the military continued with its peacemaking — with South Sudanese assistance — with Sudanese rebels in Darfur and Two Areas.25  On the other side, the South Sudanese civil war protagonist, Riek Machar, re-joined the government in South Sudan in February 2020.26 These political developments put in place the political atmospherics necessary for settlement.27

However, peace at the local level proved elusive. The Ngok Dinka worried that with inter-capital bonhomie might see their cause sold down-river. They sought to be more hardline. In turn, Sudanese followed up by putting in a unilateral local administration in place.28 The two local administrations displaced the traditional chiefs, on whose back the local peace process was run, to a subordinate role. At the local level, the Ngok Dinka resiled from the local level peace process. A particularly gruesome incident in January 2020 had left some 35 Dinka dead.29 The annual Misseriya migration was held up. Fallout has been in a de-facto separation of the north from southern Abyei. This irks the Ngok Dinka who emphasise the de-jure borders of Abyei, arrived at under Permanent Court of Arbitration award during the CPA period.30

The mechanism AJOC, that was to oversee the joint administration as per the June 2011 Agreement, went into a limbo. The last time the AJOC met was at Addis Ababa in November 2017, when the AU facilitator last exerted his political role. At the time the chieftains of both sides also met.31 The Ngok Dinka viewed a joint local administration as Khartoum’s way to reassert its sway over the area. They want a time bound joint administration charged with holding a referendum. The Misseriya want the joint local administration to restore sway of Sudan over southern Abyei Area.

The Mission brought the two sides to dialogue again in Abyei in 2020.32 Peacemaking involves inclusivity, but this brings the problem of too many voices at the table and conflicting agendas. The national authorities like to play the lower levels against each other, sometimes using plausibly-deniable violence through non-state armed groups. This aggravates the protection of civilians (POC) task. Insecurity keeps peacebuilding from moving from humanitarian recovery to the development stage with donors shying away. Counter-intuitively, the Mission’s peacekeeping success served to setback peacemaking at the national level, since the two sides were each distracted with other more compelling crises. Peacebuilding in terms of reconciliation, therefore, got held up at the ground level, subject as the two communities are, to cues from the national level. Reviving the grassroots peace process has been the Mission’s priority, which has only recently borne fruit.  The Mission brought the two together for three conferences over 2020, to little avail. An innovation was in the Mission taking their representatives to a peace conference in Northern Bahr el Gazal State of South Sudan in 2021.33 This was followed up by another peace conference in Entebbe in May 2022.34

The competing demands on the transitional administrations in both capitals, and bouts of instability such as most recently in Sudan,35 make the Abyei issue recede further from national priorities. The UN is thus left with a lack of peacemaking to complement peacekeeping. This put paid to an exit strategy, eating up limited UN resources.

Lack of an exit strategy leads to risk from unforeseen events. The Sudanese-Ethiopian relations soured over a border issue in wake of outbreak of the Ethiopian civil war.36 Sudan asked for a changeover from the single TCC format.37 India has reportedly volunteered one battalion.38 Thus, the Mission is in midst of transition, opening up space to spoilers.39 At the local level, such risks are reflected in the spate of intra-Dinka violence with its unexpected onset in southern Abyei, between the Ngok Dinka and the Twic Dinka, from Twic County, Warrap State, South Sudan, to the south.40

With improved relations, prospects of advance on vexed issues such as the border, stand enhanced. In anticipation, local border communities have become more assertive, worried that their traditional homelands will be rent asunder by modern-day borders. The local communities evicted the JBVMM from three sites in the SDBZ and a sector headquarters in 2021.41 The two defence ministers meet periodically in a Joint Security Committee (JSC) to resolve such matters. The JSC could use the improved relations to put confidence building measures in place on the common border as per the security agreements of 2012. Whereas a border war has not recurred, proxy war has occurred across the SDBZ. The JBVMM can be enlarged to assist with border management, pending territorial resolution. The Abyei issue also awaits joint attention.42 Abyei is part of the basket of border problems, numbering 10 sites.43 Therefore, it will be part of the give-and-take of border negotiations. The Mission may therefore have to craft a pragmatic exit strategy with a time horizon into mid-decade, taking on board the political compulsions of the two sides.44

Conclusion — From a Scalene to an Equilateral Triangle

As seen from this case study on Abyei, each of the sides — peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding — is significant on its own count, as also the three together are mutually reinforcing. Operational Art is to get to a successful closure through synergy between the three. To be sure, there would be periods of predominance of one: unless security is provisioned by peacekeeping, peacebuilding cannot proceed; peacemaking opens up space for peacekeeping; and bottom-up peacebuilding and national level peacemaking are intertwined. Strategizing for a peace operation can use the visualization of an equilateral triangle as guide for operational planning and decisions.

Here Abyei has served as locale for application of this model of Operational Art. The Mission has been hobbled by outsourcing of peacemaking to the regional organizations. Its local level peacemaking suffered since the two communities adapted their stances to suit the position of the two national capitals. Constrained by an outdated June 2011 Agreement, the Mission can facilitate peacemaking, rather than take on mediator role. This deficit in peacemaking places a premium on peacekeeping. While a single TCC model has its advantages, particularly in a mid-sized mission, the regional political flux led to substitution by a multi-national force. Peacekeeping is thus back to square one with the resulting loss in institutional memory and preoccupation with transition logistics, the latter being difficult at the best of times in a UN setting, made worse in Abyei’s case as it’s the most remote mission in the world besides being only helicopter supported.

Given the vicissitudes of peacekeeping, peacebuilding faces the challenge of resource mobilization. The new Mission in Sudan, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS),45 which is an integrated Mission, can oversee AFP activity in northern Abyei, easing Misseriya concerns. However, it is challenged by the scope of needs, stretching as they are from the newly opened up Two Areas and Darfur, to refugees from the Ethiopian civil war.46 The Abyei Mission is poised for continuing tension between the three sides of the peace operations’ triangle, balancing which should keep the Mission leadership, the Secretariat and the Security Council engaged out to the middle term. Once the two States have had their respective UN-supported democratic elections, UNISFA may return to center stage. It would have to persist with enlightened conflict management in the interim.

Endnotes

1 Report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, A/47/277 – S/24111, June 17, 1992

2 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Department of Field Support, 2008, 19.

3 The term is inspired by Johan Galtung’s 1969 paper, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.

4 Ajay Jaswal, “United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA): A New Mission in the Hot Spot of Sudan,” USI Journal, CXLII, Jan-Mar 2012, 90-104, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/united-nations-interim-security-force-in-abyei-unisfa-a-mission-in-the-hotspot-of-sudan/.

5 For a background to the UNISFA, see https://unisfa.unmissions.org/background.

6 Details on UNISFA are at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unisfa.

7 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1990 (2011), June 27, 2011, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1990.

8 Security Council Resolution S/RES/2024 (2011), December 14, 2011, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2024.

9 “Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan,” July 30, 2011, https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1372.

10 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei,” S/2012/358, May 24, 2012.

11 Permanent Mission of India to the UN, “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri, Deputy Permanent Representative, on Resolution 2046 on Sudan & South Sudan at the United Nations Security Council, on May 02, 2012,” https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/42390ind2018.pdf.

12 For details on the UN’s activity in Abyei through its lifecycle, see https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/sudansouth-sudan/.

13 Aman Sethi, “Deadlock on Abyei persists,” October 25, 2012, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/deadlock-on-abyei-persists/article4028441.ece.

14 AUHIP for Sudan, “Proposal on the Final Status of Abyei Area,” appendix to African Union (Peace and Security Department), “Progress Report of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan,” December 14, 2012, https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/8219/PSC%20PR%202%20CCCXLIX_E.pdf?sequence= 1&isAllowed=y.

15 AU press release, March 9, 2013, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20130309/chairperson-commission-welcomes-signing-agreement-modalities-implementation.

16 “Agreement between the Government of Republic of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army on the Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security in the Abyei Area,” June 20, 2011, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_110620_Agreement TemporaryArrangementsAbyeiArea.pdf.

17 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei,” S/2013/294, May 17, 2013.

18 Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, “Update on Abyei,” Small Arms Survey, July 13, 2015.

19 AU press release, October 28, 2013, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20131028/african-union-strongly-condemns-holding-unilateral-referendum-abyei.

20 For the 2018 UNISFA Strategic Review, that dwells on the Mission during its consolidation phase, see “Letter dated 20 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” https://undocs.org/S/2018/778.

21 Global Conflict Tracker, “Civil War in South Sudan,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan.

22 “Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (S/2017/293),” https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/special-report-secretary-general-review-mandate-united-nations-interim-security-force.

23 Details on the UN Country Team in Sudan are at https://sudan.un.org/en/about/about-the-un.

24 United States Institute of Peace, “South Sudan Peace Process: Key Facts,” https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts.

25 International Crisis Group, “The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement,” February 23, 2021 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b168-rebels-come-khartoum-how-implement-sudans-new-peace-agreement.

26 “South Sudan rivals Salva Kiir and Riek Machar strike unity deal,” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51562367.

27 Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, “Special Envoy commends the continued strengthening of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan,” October 22, 2020, https://dppa.un.org/en/special-envoy-commends-continued-strengthening-of-relationship-between-sudan-and-south-sudan.

28 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General – Situation in Abyei,” S/2020/1019, October 15, 2020.

29 “More than a dozen killed in attack in South Sudan border region”, Al Jazeera, 23 January 2020, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/23/more-than-a-dozen-killed-in-attack-in-south-sudan-border-region, accessed on 30 January 2022.

30 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration),” https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/92/.

31 AU press release, “The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the Outcomes of the African Union Joint Oversight (Abyei) Meetings 24 November 2017”, https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/7920.

32 UNISFA, “Inter-Community Meetings Between The Ngok Dinka And Misseriya,” https://unisfa.unmissions.org/inter-community-meetings-between-ngok-dinka-and-misseriya.

33 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General Situation in Abyei,” S/2020/1019, October 15, 2020.

34 Press release, https://unisfa.unmissions.org/unisfa-brokers-peace-accord-between-two-communities-abyei, May 19, 2022.

35Rajen Harshe, “Another military coup in Sudan,” Observer Research Foundation, November 8, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/another-military-coup-in-sudan/

36 Zecharias Zelalem, “Rising tension as Ethiopia and Sudan deadlocked on border dispute,” https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/2/1/rising-tension-ethiopia-sudan-deadlocked-border-dispute-fashaga.

37 “UN to withdraw Ethiopian peacekeeping force on Sudan’s request: Khartoum,” Al Arabia, August 24, 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/08/24/UN-to-withdraw-Ethiopian-peacekeeping-force-on-Sudan-s-request-Khartoum.

38 Rajat Pandit, “India to send a battalion for peacekeeping ops in Africa,” Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/88939315.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_ campaign=cppst.

39 Press release, https://unisfa.unmissions.org/ sites/default/files/unisfa_pis_pr_97.pdf, October 17, 2022.

40 “Ngok-Twic Border Conflict: A Manifestation of Botched Socioeconomic Development in South Sudan,” Reliefweb, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/ngok-twic-border-conflict-manifestation-botched-socioeconomic-development-south-sudan.

41 “UNISFA expresses grave concern over the development in JBVMM’s Sector One,” Reliefweb, September 4, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/unisfa-expresses-grave-concern-over-development-jbvmm-s-sector-one.

42 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, “Chapter IV – Resolution to the Abyei Conflict,” https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369. It was signed at Naivasha, Kenya, on May 26, 2004.

43 Elsheikh Chol, “Sudan, South Sudanese officials discuss border disputes,” Eye Radio, https://eyeradio.org/sudan-south-sudanese-officials-discuss-border-disputes/.

44 UN press release, “Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2609 (2021),” December 15, 2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14738.doc.htm.

45 UNITAMS website is at https://unitams.unmissions.org/en.

46 UNITAMS press release, ‘Security Council briefing on the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, , https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/security-council-briefing-un-integrated-transition-assistance-mission-sudan-unitams-14, Reliefweb, September 14, 2021.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-army-and-hindu-rashtra-through?utm_source=twitter&sd=pf

The army and Hindu Rashtra through a cultural lens

The Indian Army is in throes of radical change. The most significant changes are the office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), theatrisation, the organizational rejig in favour of integrated battle groups (IBG) and the Agnipath scheme. Of the three, the last – Agnipath – is a new feature attributable to the Narendra Modi government. The others – CDS, the theatre concept for jointness and IBGs – date to over a decade.

The CDS – an office variously termed and mandated - has been in the pipeline for long, only to be shied away from by earlier governments on political grounds. From the successor to the first incumbent not being appointed as yet, it is apparent that the Modi government grabbed at the jointness agenda in order to differentiate itself from the previous governments. In the flush from a politically – but not quite operationally – successful surgical strike – and an aerial one at that – it wanted to capitalize on its strong-on-defence image. A more prosaic explanation is perhaps that it merely wished to provide a billet as CDS to a general otherwise to retire the day the appointment was announced, as reward for his political leanings.

The radical aspect of the appointment – integration of the Services in the Ministry of Defence - was hollowed out with the CDS also reduced to being head of a new department, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). This entity had not been thought up in the preceding debate on defence reforms. An outhouse for the military - but within the compound wall - was not how integration of uniformed bureaucrats was ever envisaged. This should detract from the political dividend from the reform – that the Modi regime is so strong-on-defence that it even breached the citadel of bureaucrats in a ministry the  lead bureaucrat stands pompously styled as in-charge of ‘defence of India’.

News is that another assault is in the works. From the record, it can be expected to be launched as a surprise package: a new CDS delinked from DMA, itself redefined. ‘Better late than never’ and ‘better a tortoise than a hare’ will be the accompanying din, to obscure the anomaly in which the military (DMA) sits in judgment on its own case. That is by way of illustration of what to expect of the regime in relation to the military (‘army’ and ‘military’ used interchangeably) in New India.

New India has been announced, with the ‘Old’ transited out of in the observance of the Azadi ki Amrit Utsav. The distinguishing feature of New India is the triumph of Hindutva in its political dominance and dictation of political culture. Old India was a creation of the left-liberal, Khan Market/Lutyen’s gang that right wing political forces behind New India have been at pains to displace. New India is best exemplified with the fierceness in the freshly-minted Simha atop the under-construction parliament building. The head of the Executive unveiling the symbol on the grounds of the legislature in a Hindu religious ceremony, with other religion representatives being notably absent, add to the symbolic break with Old India. If the ground-breaking ceremony is indicator, the inauguration of the Ayodhya Temple on the site of the illegally demolished Babri Masjid, will mark the unmistakable passage of Old India.

A New India requires a matching military. The professional military of Old India would not do. The makeover of the military is intrinsic, symbolic of and critical to the success of the New India project. It is of a piece with major changes in States. The British Indian Army took some 150 years to stabilize after the Battle of Plassey, with the merger of the three presidency armies. Independent India also experimented with reordering the profile of the military, domesticating it from a colonial force furthering interests across three continents to one befitting a post-colonial, democratic state. It is only right that if the Second Republic in the offing has an army in its own image.

The structural aspects of this – modernization, jointness etc – are a product of doctrine keeping pace with strategic developments. Instead, of greater consequence for the incipient Hindu Republic (borrowing from the term ‘Islamic Republic’) is the accompanying cultural change. Whereas, from a cultural perspective, a shift to modernity in keeping the higher technological and educational indices of the army may appear the obvious route to go, that cannot be the trajectory taken, modernity being at odds with the reverse march of history in New India. A dharmic Republic requires an army suitably imbued with the wisdom of ancient philosophies, carted down through generations safe from marauding invaders out to extinguish Hindu civilization, by a hardy upper caste. A return to the Kshatriya ethic is necessary, its principle characteristic being its location in the caste hierarchy. It is no wonder the introduction to the nation of the newly sworn in president, the symbolic head of the armed forces, was through a photo showing her sweeping a temple floor.

This fits well with the turn to a majoritarian democracy, since the Kshatriya is subordinate to the intellectual class. Theory on a democratic military subordinates the military to the political level. While theory veers to the military professional standing outside – if not above - the political fray, in a relationship of ‘objective’ civilian control of the military by the political level, the cultural shift requires instead ‘subjective’ civilian control of the military, in which the military is – eventually - Hindutva-inspired. This explains the ‘deep selection’ model adopted by the Modi regime for military commanders, which in its latest iteration has the CDS being picked from a catchment including all serving and recently-retired three star officers; counter-intuitively, including those from the ‘staff’ stream. It also explains the delay in the selection of the second CDS. The first CDS has set the example, precedence and standards in opening up the military to Hindutva inroads. Deep selection involves looking out for such inclinations in candidates.

Teething troubles appear to have stalled the selection of a successor. There is perhaps a spillover of modernity-induced skepticism in the military to Hindutva overtures. The Old Republic is apparently not dead and the New Republic yet to be born. The prerequisite is to shift to subjective civilian control, easing the process of birthing the New Republic. It is not without reason that the process has a certain subterfuge attending it. The New Republic is presented as an evolution. It is almost as if a muscular version of the Old Republic is being manufactured, understandably, with a Hindu veneer. The talk of a Hindu Rashtra is not yet mainstream, confined to supportive formations that can be discounted as ‘fringe’ when convenient. Since plausible deniability of verbiage by the head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is not credible, the cat is out of the bag – as is indeed the game plan. Inject the Hindutva discourse through an intravenous drip into national consciousness.

The military has alongside to be dismantled as a credible, internally-cohesive and mandate-driven institution. Its strengths as an institution have to be dissipated. This is a horizontal lesson from other institutions that have been subverted from within, sister institutions in the security field leading the pack: intelligence, police and accountability bodies as one dealing with human rights. In the Army’s case, a dismantling and reassembling is doubly necessary. At some point in the India makeover, it might be necessary to use it against the un-persuaded. Advancing subjective civilian control is facilitative. Minimally, even if objective civilian control is to be retained for purposes as credibly managing an external security environment, then it has to be preserved from the backlash that a makeover prompts. Having a like-minded military helps.

The hold of an image as a modern, self-regarding professional military needs dilution. The contours of this are not fleshed out. To what extent the Islamisation of a neighbouring military, Pakistan, serves as a potential model is unknown. How Mujahid compares to Agniveer is uncertain. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence of intent along such lines. What is certain is a difference from the neighbour in terms of purging of any praetorian tendencies through the Kshatriya model of internalised subordination.

For now, dismantlement suffices. Take for instance the tinkering with the Beating Retreat. But beginnings of reassembly can also be discerned in surprising changes within the military, such as, in one case, incorporation of the aarti into a military parade. The military not being an island, this is the tip of the iceberg. Furor that departures from the traditional practices invoke will wane as exhaustion sets in. Part of the brouhaha includes trotting out of Hindutva-adhering brass-hats with their own public missive disparaging dissent. Opportunist commentators offer their services in a gratis tongue-lashing of traditionalists. Just as an opposition-mukt Bharat is aimed for, the discourse space is to be rid of disruptive echoes from dissidents. The army's gatekeepers are to be deep selectees to unlock its gates from the inside.  

What might an army of a Hindu Rashtra look like? It will certainly continue with professional preoccupations currently engaging it: jointness, IBGs et al. These are intended in part to keep its head down while the makeover progresses. It will also be kept out of trouble; securing India taken over by more Hindutva-friendly instruments as intelligence (Pakistan), home minister-answering security forces (Kashmir) and, increasingly, under Minister Jaishankar, foreign policy (China).

Modi has learnt his lessons from earlier prime ministerial ambushes: Emergency and Golden Temple in case of Indira and the military misadventures of Rajiv Gandhi. While posturing at Brasstacks and at Sumdorong Chu proved useful to project an assertive India, the latter recklessly went a step ahead with his Sri Lanka foray (as Jaishankar best knows). This partially explains the limited-aims ‘showing of eyes’ to Pakistan, including through the much-vaunted surgical strikes. Thus, despite Galwan, Indian military merely engages in talks, though deployed in strength along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) enabling other options too. From the 16 rounds of talks even this deployment has proven futile, showing ineptness even in demonstrating muscles to undergird one’s position on the table. War avoidance is dressed up as supreme strategic footwork, so much so that Jaishankar elbows Doval as India’s national security mastermind. The grand strategy is to gain time and space for consolidation of Hindutva rather than being sidetracked by traditionally-conceived national interest. To distract are volleys – including by use of the outgoing president’s shoulders for this - on the parochial impulses behind opposition’s caviling about selling of national security silver.

The inter-relationship between political, strategic and organizational culture is a useful prism to view all this. There are two ways to visualize: one is as concentric circles with political culture at its center; and second is as a triangle, with the three being vertices. The concentric circles model is hierarchical. Of the intercourse in the two directions – inside-out and outside-in – the former predominates. The second model is more reality-depicting. It shows a degree of autonomy in the three: each impacted in its own way by inter-dependent factors. Thus, not only does Hindutva impact the political level, it influences organizational culture as well; only differently.

While Hindutva minders in the national security establishment might like to bend reality, it is proving difficult and time consuming. Deep selection and the search for a pliable CDS are proving short as means. New India does not as yet approximate the reality depicted by the concentric circles model. Hindu Rashtra would. Getting to that will entail shoving the relatively autonomous vertex of strategic culture in the triangular model into being the non-entity outer circle in the concentric circle model.

Hindutva dominance of political culture leaves an imprint on organizational culture: politics playing out in a society the military comes from – the military not being an island. The tricky part is the imprint on strategic culture. While political cultural dominance profits from a projection of strategic felicity, mistaking assertiveness for aggression is to invite trouble. This explains the posturing in parliament by Amit Shah that had it that he was ready to spill blood (presumably including his own) for retaking Aksai Chin. Taking him seriously would have seen a different response to Galwan than ‘mirror deployment’. In the event, deft strategic communication compensated for strategic ineptitude. The upshot of staking out the LAC on a long-term basis is in its keeping the Indian army from looking inwards to any mandate on the preservation of the Constitution. For its part, Pakistan continues to serve as a useful foil, with Rajnath Singh happy to refer to the Maa Sharda Shakti in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir while refraining in such imagery from a mention of Mansarovar in Tibet in his depiction of Hindu-sthan’s civilisational frontiers. Hindu Rashtra as a proto Akhand Bharat is bogeyman only for Pakistan. The strategic challenge is to strut one’s stuff without having to prove it. The risk from hollowing out of the army through the Agniveer scheme can thus be run since the strategic environment will not require strategic exertion. The army’s organisational culture is to be messed around with to keep if from tripping up changes in political culture. 

The army of Hindu Rashtra will be informed equally by India’s military record as its mythological past. India’s armies have always kept out of politics, though actively used in medieval times by contenders for power. Other than in colonial interest, they have seldom ventured abroad: the exertions of Ranjit Singh being mostly in territory not seen as alien. They have been largely used in placating India internally. Both mythology and epics testify to this predominant role of the army: if of the Chakravartin, ending strife, or, if of the rebel, precipitating strife. The army’s preoccupation in the Moghul period was similar.

Since these days, India is largely placid internally – and there is an extensive internal security force under the home ministry – the army can step back from this role too. Its role in external strategic management is eased by a strategic doctrine of war avoidance. In this the hollowing out of the military is messaging to adversaries that New India poses little threat, diluting any security dilemma that can detract from getting to be Hindu Rashtra. Subjective civilian control will keep the army from addressing any dilemma over its role in preservation of the Constitution. Agniveers are key national security providers getting to Hindu Rashtra.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/agnipath-infantry-no-longer-queen?sd=pf

Agnipath: Infantry no longer Queen of Battle

The Infantry prides itself as the Queen of Battle. The Ukraine War reinforces this image. No amount of missile strikes and tank maneuvers could manage to force the Ukrainians out of their strongholds. In fact one of the lessons from the Russian showing outside Kiev has been that its coup de main was short on Infantry. Later, the Infantry, stolidly fighting from objective to objective, has delivered results in the Donbas; no doubt, with the support of ordnance thrown prior at the objective to soften it up. The other lesson has been that even this Infantry thrown into battle has been debilitated by its poor quality.

This only proves a commonplace with the Indian army: that a high quality Infantry is both indispensible and imperative. India was conquered by the British largely by drilling Indians into cohesive Infantry. They used the regimental system, initially based loosely on ethnic lines, only to be firmed up over time into a regimental system informed by the ‘martial race’ theory. The idea was that cohesive infantry units fought better and cohesion was an outcome of bonds between members of the unit, anchored on shared ethnicity and culture. Though the martial race theory under-grid the regimental system, the ‘martial race’ aspect was informed by the 1857 experience. Its political intent was to restrict regiments to ethnic groups that could be relied on to support the British. It was otherwise militarily useful in leveraging cohesion for military power. The resulting force multiplication for the British Indian Army helped the Allies win the Second World War.

Sociological theory from the two World Wars partially bore out the theory arrived at through a racist lens in India. Scholarship reckoned that a battle-winning factor was cohesion of primary groups. Cohesion sprung from inter-member affinity, which could of course be forged against the odds but was greatly facilitated by preexisting primordial affiliation. The organization facilitated the intended outcome, combat spirit. The outcome itself was a function of horizontal integration in subunits, which with vertical integration - added by the military leadership in the command chain – made for formidable fighting units and formations.

A prominent reading suggestion in any military sociology leg of an undergraduate degree in military studies makes this finding explicit. In her book on the Falklands War, Mates and Muchhachos, Nora Kinzer Stewart, contrasting the operational performance of the two sides, British and Argentinian, alights on cohesion as making the difference. To her, the regimental strengths of the British Infantry carried the day, while the Argentinian side was handicapped by their reliance on conscripts who proved uncertain of their mates at the crunch.

The Indian experience validates theory. Whats App forwards – though rightly denigrated as a source of information – provide a clue. Ostensibly written by a former officer of one of the units that vacated some of Kargil’s peaks off Pakistani occupiers, a post recently had it that the battalion had been launched into a conventional operation directly from the Valley floor where it was engaged in counter insurgency operations. Apparently, the commanding officer got together one of the battalion’s games teams – in this rendering, Basketball – and tasked it with dislodging the Pakistanis off a holdout. Likewise, another commanding officer once told me how he used the battalion’s towering Kabaddi team players in squaring off against the Chinese in the jostling characteristic of the game of one-up-manship on the Line of Actual Control, a game that had tragic results at Galwan. Basically, the two units unwarily relied on preexisting bonds between the members of groups tasked – in this case their games-imparted mutual regard for fellow teammates. This is in subconscious acknowledgement of cohesion as a combat-winning ingredient.

Post-Independence, the regimental system stood the army in good stead since it was often involved in operations at short notice. The 1947 operations, the Indian Peacekeeping experience in Sri Lanka, the Kargil War and the response to the Ladakh crisis are examples. In such instances, camaraderie presaged by the regimental system helped the army adapt to the emergent circumstance. At other instances, there was considerable preparedness through extensive training, as in the run up to the wars in 1965 and 1971. Tactical training enhanced cohesion, making for operational effectiveness. The 1962 War loss was from poor planning, leadership and neglect of training, while the regimental system-based cohesion can be credited with mitigating the rout somewhat.

The centrality of the regiment to the Infantry is evident from the formative experience of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR). Put together in short order in face of a severe proxy war challenge in Kashmir, the RR added fuel to the fire by its upping the suppressive template. Personnel turbulence lent anonymity to members of primary groups, enabling shirking. The difficult man management problem was bypassed by resort to questionable measures as pseudo-gang operations at the operational level and, at the tactical level, culling of high-caliber outfits from the mass into Ghatak platoons tasked with the role of the hammer, while the mass provided the anvil. Over time, when RR units were affiliated to a set of units within a regiment and contributing arms and supporting arms, the strengths of the regimental system became operative even in RR and helped bail it out. The RR has since taken charge of the counter insurgency grid and can credibly claim to have curtailed the proxy war. The take-away is that the regimental system can only be trifled at risk of a poor operational showing, while being conscious of what makes the Infantry tick might redeem ‘transformational reforms’ – as is touted the Agnipath scheme.

Agnipath’s implications for the regiment-based Infantry must be viewed in light of cohesion in the Infantry. The Infantry is critical for an army’s showing. Regiments by their provision cohesion for Infantry fighting units are consequential for what the Infantry delivers. The impact of Agnipath on the regimental system is thus the criteria to examine what the scheme means for the Army and its Infantry.

For now, the Agnipath’s roll out has been accompanied by the reassurance that the regiment system would not be trifled with. Regiments - presumably their ethnic-based intake - is to be kept out of the All India All Class (AIAC) turn that Agnipath promises. Even so, there are two internal contradictions in the scheme.

Firstly, pre-existing AIAC regiments (in the combat and support arms) have had an equally credible showing in India’s wars. This owes to cohesion in such units being instilled by elitism or role-based regimentation and enabled by personnel stability. Primary group bonding and wider horizontal integration in secondary groups comprising subunits and units does not necessarily need primordial affiliation, as obtain in ethnic-based regiments, but can be forged in the crucible of training, crisis environment and combat.

Take for instance the Galwan episode. Whereas 12 of the gallant men who died were from one battalion, the other 8 were from affiliated outfits. Yet their collective showing was remarkable, indicating the cohesion can be injected by the circumstance, but with a caveat that there has to be a preexisting cohesion-enabling factor such as cohesive groups: primary, secondary or tertiary making for organisational integration.

The reverse is also possible, as the American experience with cohesion in Vietnam – recounted in the must-read study by Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel - indicates. Shirking, irresolute and indisciplined behavior is also possible. Such an outcome owed to personnel turbulence within the ranks, preventing the forging of intimate bonds of friendship and camaraderie. Taking cue, the Americans in their wars that were part of their Global War on Terror resorted to sending in cohesive units that were to together stay the course through their tour of duty, restricted to one year on ground. Cohesion was sought through training prior to induction and by the threat environment compelling its regeneration on ground, enabled by the primary group knowing they have to stick it out together against the odds.

On the other hand, Agnipath compounds this problem by introducing alongside its promise of an AIAC shift, personnel turbulence at the spear tip – through a continuing turn-over with a vast majority of a cohort (75 per cent) leaving every four years. Since the intake is faced with a continuing necessity of being found worthy of retention among the 25 per cent slated to stay on, the competition engendered potentially places out of reach the primary group bonding based on mutual trust, love and confidence. The finding from Roger Little’s work on the Korean War - that the ‘buddy groups’ helped soldiers navigate the rigours of war – and of Charles Moskos from the Vietnam War on intra-squad relationships  - appear to have been neglected.

The extreme administrative pressures this puts on junior leaders – who have to continuously evaluate their charge on their suitability for retention - has been dwelt on in the criticism of the scheme. Job security concerns might lead to a fratricide of sorts. Catching the eye of the commanders might end up the sole aim of Agniveers, leading to a crab-like melee. Absent training opportunities and an operational setting in which to gauge the wheat from the chaff, units might tend towards retaining gladiators for being better at games or other avoidably subjective criteria – in which the typically-Indian sifarish might play a role. (While there is a notion that ‘gamers’ – those with better mechanical coordination of the body that makes them better at games – make for better soldiers, this is just a fond peacetime notion. No study has underwritten it, though it is easy to prove or disprove just by finding out how many - if any - of the gallantry award winners were proficient at games.)

In short, not only primary groups but secondary group formation also suffers. Horizontal integration absent, the premium will be on vertical integration. Absent any role of the organization in aiding integration, there is every chance of the weak link giving way, and with untold operational consequence.

Though the scheme appears nonchalant on these counts, there are two features that argue in its favour. The first is a finding from studies in the aftermath of World War II. The famous Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz study on cohesion and disintegration in the German Army through its years of retreat had it that, counter-intuitively, the primary group sustained its fighting ability through the series of defeats. This is credited not only to the leadership capability of the junior leaders – its non-commissioned officers – but also to the youth conscripted into the ranks. The latter is significant. The youth grew up in the years Hitler rose to and held power in Nazi Germany. They were imbued with the Nazi spirit in varying degrees and bore the imprint of Hitler’s authoritative image. Some were from the Hitler-Jugend. They were partly instilled with Nazi-style nationalism. This, when positively articulated by the Wehrmacht professionalism embodied by their leaders, allowed them to stay the ranks and put up a spirited defence of the Fatherland on both fronts. That it was an existential fight, especially on the eastern front, helped. Cohesion could thus be output of both their showing on the line, while simultaneously - in a mutually reinforcing cycle - adding to their showing in combat. In any case, the psychological underpinnings cannot be elided.

So, does the Agnipath scheme rely on a Hitler-Jugend of sorts, Indian youth who have come of age as Narendra Modi and Hindutva have been ascendant and in power?

There have been apt comparisons elsewhere of the similarities between Hindutva – the philosophy that Modi and his support base is unapologetic about - and Nazism. It is no secret that at inception Hindutva was enamoured of fascism. Hindutva wishes Hindus to reemerge from a history in which they were eclipsed for a thousand years by militarily-adept Muslim invaders. This interpretation of history instills an inferiority complex, in Hindutva adherents, of a deficient masculinity, prompting their effort to breakout. Regaining military prowess is a way to reestablish virility. Agnipath is a scheme designed to put youth through their military paces, dispelling forever the myth of the effete – if not effeminate - Hindu. The latter traits are attributed to the corruption of Indic thought by insurgent Buddhism and similar subaltern philosophies. It is no wonder that a scowling Simha has replaced the benign set of Asokan lions India had once chosen as its national symbol.

Agniveers inducted into the Army would thus be imbued with the ardour Modi has infused into New India. That they rioted on receipt of news of Agnipath is discounted as born in ignorance. Modi, reacting to the protests that greeted the announcement of Agnipath, gave out the aim of the scheme as, 'Certain decisions look unfair but will help in nation-building in long run.' To what extent has this placated youth is uncertain, since simultaneously, the army asserted that it would not select any protestor, leading to dissipation of agitations. Therefore, even if the establishment is reliant on Hindutva and Modi’s larger-than-life image to energise Agniveers, and to thereby compensate for the deficiencies of the Agnipath, prospective Agniveers have - in their burning trains – let on that they are not quite the Hitler-Jugend. The regime could take course correctives, such as by in a subterranean manner having right wing formations sponsor Agniveers. It could over time compel the military to use Hindutva-inspired motivational gimmicks, if not use it to propagate Hindutva itself. This will help the regime with its nation-building objectives, voiced by Modi.

If the aim of the scheme is nation-building, then the regime must insure in the interim that the nation survives any national security challenge. This it has set about doing by a policy of appeasement, best evidenced by Modi, firstly, denying any intrusion had taken place in Ladakh, and, subsequently, when it is evident that there is intrusion, keeping mum. The vacation of the intrusions at places has been at India’s cost. This is appeasement, an acknowledgement that India is militarily overawed. The strategic logic given is that it buys India time, such as by allowing India to get its act together by building arteries as the Char Dham highway that will enable it to bring its military power – being upped alongside - to bear. Since the power trajectory is not in India’s favour, it is uncertain how this power asymmetry can ever be bridged. But the strategic narrative buys Modi time, allowing for kicking of the can down road when he might have passed into history as a much mythologised and sanitised figure. Since the military will not be tested when a policy of appeasement is operational, that the Agnipath scheme defies received scholarship on military sociology will remain under wraps. This will enable Hindutva to gain its political objectives sought from the scheme.

What does this political-level digression imply for India’s Infantry? The ‘digression’ is necessary to understand the wellsprings of Agnipath. Clausewitz’s understanding that politics supersedes military considerations is not only valid for war time, but perhaps more so in peacetime. The political look here makes clear that the good health of the Infantry is not what informs the scheme. Good health is not essential, since deft foreign policy footwork can compensate. Therefore, operational effectiveness is not the criteria to gauge Agnipath. Scholarship also shows that the regimental system is dispensable. Cohesion can be acquired by other means, with the challenge of combat itself being one such. In any case, some military strategists have it that war will not be manpower-heavy as much as technology and firepower-centric.

Therefore, the Infantry can expect another makeover sometime down the line, when the feedback will be leveraged to realign Agnipath a half-decade on. The AIAC system can permeate Infantry. This will put paid to the regimental system and consign to history regimental history and pride dating to the British era. The Indian Infantry will be nourished by an Indian – if not quite Hindutva - nationalism. It will remain untested since on the frontiers it would be reduced to a border-guarding role and would have disengaged from internal security, outsourcing it to central police organizations, as evidenced already in Kashmir. (The latter insight stems from the fact that Agnipath was not thought up for organizations reporting to the home ministry yet. Instead, a small proportion of Agniveers are to be discharged into those organizations, implying that these are to stay unscathed (dispelling the snide thought that Agnipath will be extended to these too at some point later). To elongate this sidelight: that home ministry has not be tapped for Agnipath also shows the political impulse behind the scheme; it being to defang the military lest it entertain notions of coming to the aid of the Constitution when it is twisted into that of Hindu Rashtra. Another perspective has it that it is not so much to keep the military out, but to make of the military an accomplice that Agnipath has been thought up. The jury will be out on this till New India is transited to Hindu Rashtra sooner than later.)

So, how should the Infantry navigate the impending? India’s 1962 debacle can be attributed to quaint notions of foreign policy deftness back then. Today, any overreliance on interpid Jaishankar’s footwork will only replicate the 1962 result. The Army therefore must take its own call.

It would require keeping its Infantry honed, irrespective of the nation building mandate it now has as against a hitherto national security one. It must accept and embrace Agniveers. It must resist Hindutva-centric motivational pitches. Seeing the writing on the wall for ethnic-based regiments, it must prepare for such a future. Such a future also owes to the suspicion some ethnicities inspire in a Gangetic-centric nationalism of Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan. Substitution of the regiment symbolism with national artifacts must proceed apace. Agniveers must be kept out of the Rashtriya Rifles, lest in their nationalist zeal they mistake the subnationalism intrinsic to India as ‘anti-national’. Agniveers must be indoctrinated with inclusive patriotism, as against the hard nationalism the regime expects. This is a tall order since there is no shortage of Hindutva-inclined officers, with the vast majority coming from Hindutva catchment areas.

Every generation of officership has its unique challenge. The post-War one looked at demobilization; the post-Independence one faced obsolescence; the post-1962 one, reinvention; the post-1971 one, lethargy as a regional power, rudely shaken up by the Tamil Tigers; the post-liberalisation one, an insurgent periphery; the post-nuclearisation one, a redefinition of conventional power; and the post-Modi one, a crisis in professional credibility. The forthcoming challenge of a military makeover can expect to keep the Infantry busy into the decade. Its current day ethos can tide it over the period. What emerges thereafter must not be allowed to be laid at Infantry’s door.