https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/on-the-deletion-of-the-iftar-tweet?s=w

On the deletion of the iftar tweet

The recent episode of a ‘deleted tweet’ has set of warning bells in the military commentariat on the possible infusion into the military of majoritarian communalism. The defence Public Relations Officer (PRO) in Jammu – who is an army man - had put out a tweet on the army’s keeping secular traditions alive by its Rashtriya Rifles Force in Doda hosting an iftar function for locals. Taking umbrage, a Hindutva-allied media worthy, Suresh Chavhanke, called it evidence of the army being infected with the ‘disease’ (bimari) of secularism.

It’s likely that the deletion of the tweet was at the behest of the PRO’s hierarchy in the civilian Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) at the Ministry of Defence. Even so, there is a link of the PR with the information warfare branch of the operational headquarters, 16 Corps. That the army did not remonstrate with the PR hierarchy enough prior to the deletion and has since not insisted on its reinsertion – to some - indicates the portents, made worse by its seeming ambivalence on secularism.

The army had sufficient ammunition to push-back on directions received by the Jammu PRO. Not only was the event part of its public outreach, normal in counter insurgency environments where ‘winning hearts and minds’ is a doctrinal principle, but also because there is nothing to being ashamed of in subscribing to secularism. So long as secularism is in the preamble of the Constitution, which the military is sworn to defend, there is no shying away from being secular. Besides, a diverse army requires secularism as glue for cohesion, a prerequisite for operational effectiveness.

The army is familiar with all this. A look at the twitter handles of the two Corps involved in counter insurgency respectively on either side of the Pir Panjals indicate there has been the traditional outreach to locals by field formations during Ramzan. Interestingly, so is the case with the Srinagar DPR handle – the counterpart of the Jammu PRO – that also puts out effusive tweets on army-furthered inter-communal harmony.

On the contrary, the Jammu DPR twitter handle is remiss in studiously avoiding Muslim religious observances. The lone instance when it dwelt on a religious observance of Muslims now stands deleted. It has otherwise been faithfully reflecting the fraternization of the military with host communities, be it in Muslim or Hindu predominant areas. It also put out a tweet on the Baisakhi interaction of a Sikh military outfit and people in their area. It carries the military interfacing with the Muslim community on Yoga Day and other such commemorative days, as the Earth Day. It is clear from 16 Corps twitter handle that the military continues make inroads into the good books of the people in Muslim pockets including through participating with Muslims in observing Ramzan breaking of fast.

The question is what holds up the Jammu DPR from reflecting this activity as do the other twitter handles reporting to both the DPR and the army information warfare relevant, public information hierarchies?

It is apparent that he has his marching orders from prior to this episode and was wrapped on the knuckles for departing from them. It is also clear that it is not an autonomous, idiosyncratic action on the part of the PRO, but policy for his handle made outside of the DPR – since the DPR Srinagar representative suffers no such restricting on depicting Muslims in religious observance. Since the inner workings of the regime will only be clear on hindsight when on its departure memoirs and social media posts clarify aspects as this, only plausible theories can be guide for now.

Presuming the Jammu PRO’s twitter handle has a following in Jammu region, the answer lies in Jammu politics. The civilian minders of the PRO - outside of the DPR - are aware that there is an election on the cards, which may be as early as this autumn. The delimitation exercise drawing to a close now has given an advantage to Jammu, improving on its seat share in the legislative assembly for the Union Territory (UT). Some of the constituencies along the ethnic faultline between the two communities on the Pir Panjals have been reengineered to enable Hindu majorities, which could potentially make the difference to who gets the majority in the UT legislature. Winning the Jammu region would stand the ruling party at the Center, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), well to take over the reins in Srinagar, anointing a Hindu chief minister in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for the first time.

No stone can be left unturned towards this end, an aim of the majoritarian party particularly interested in seeing its writ run in J&K. Indeed, the Article 370 related Constitutional exercise can be taken as forerunner. Therefore, the Jammu PRO has to be deployed in compliance with the policy the ruling party follows in rest of India in its election strategy: polarization. The handle cannot afford to go soft on Muslims, show bonhomie between Muslims and the military. Showing such fraternization does no good for polarization, in which the Muslims are instead to be seen as the threatening Other. A consolidation of the Hindu vote bank requires intercommunity bonds be rent asunder. Showing the Muslim inhabited areas relatively stable does little to build the narrative of threat necessary for polarization. If the secular army is seen as mixing with Muslims without reservations, it would create dissonance in the mind’s eye of voters targeted by the narrative.

Muslims in the areas of 16 Corps, south of the Pir Panjal and part of the mentioned borderline constituencies, hold a key to the election result. Such blanketing them out is one part of the strategy. Its other prongs will likely unfold over the summer in the run up to elections. One is already on the cards. A Muslim former police officer from the southern belt, who created the notorious police outfit, Special Task Force, is set to woo Dogri speaking Muslims. However, the BJP has learnt its lessons from the coup pulled off by the Gupkar Alliance when it denied the BJP a favourable outcome in the local body - the district development council - elections. Though the Alliance has had ups and downs, including the departure of one of its constituents, it is contemplating fighting the upcoming elections as one. Therefore, there are other tricks up the BJP sleeve, including declaring some Muslim majority constituencies only tenable by Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes candidates, thereby undercutting the Alliance, since the SC candidates are per force Hindu. Along with its perceived allies in the Valley, such as the People’s Alliance and the Apni Party and the majority BJP-supported independents, the BJP hopes to stride home confidently.

This is the context of the resounding silence of the DPR’s Jammu representative. That this is not a policy for DPR as such indicates that someone outside the defence ministry hierarchy calls the shots in Jammu. It is easy to include the minister in the prime minister’s office, Jammuite Dr. Jitendra Singh, in such a speculative list. He was part of the delimitation exercise as the BJP member. It is possible that the order to delete the tweet therefore has origin outside both hierarchies: the defence ministry and the military. This explains why it could not be contested with any vigour, centralization being a long standing characteristic of the regime.

The good part is that the ministry and the military are not entirely on different and separate pages, even though the ministry can be faulted for letting the military down in not pushing back against unreasonable directions from external quarters in what is essentially its ambit. The bad part is that elements of the defence sector can be selectively intruded into to carry out the behest of the ruling party. Since the defence sector is traditionally taken as bipartisan, this is unacceptable, though in the context of the times, not unexpected.

While this time round, only the DPR has been trampled on, tomorrow it could be worse with the military being asked to be compliant to some or other unreasonable diktat. Preventing this requires the commanding general in the northern theatre take a stand. He must unequivocally adopt a porcupine or hedgehog like posture against any manipulation of the military domain for parochial political purposes.

For now the military has gone quite a way in a tacit pushback, highlighting the participation of its Badami Bagh-based formation head, General DP Pandey, in the prayers and repast after the breaking of the fast by his fellow soldiers and locals. General DP Pandey’s photos are all over social media in a pose reminiscent of Hrithik Roshan’s portrayal of Akbar in Jodha Akbar. Whereas a routine annual event, that its observance has been avidly disseminated appears to be a deliberate blow to the right wing’s insinuation that the military suffers from the secularism virus. Instead, the military is wishing to unmistakably demonstrate that this is indeed the case and all for the good of national security.

This round has been won by the military. There are rounds still ahead in the bout. As they say, ‘Abhi toh picture baki hai dost.’ It must recharge between rounds on the fount of its traditional trinity: apolitical, secular, professional. It is equally clear from the contretemps that the army remains in the cross hairs of the right wing. The right wing has taken a 100 yeas to get this far. It is not averse to losing some rounds in their winning the bout, finally. The ultimate round will be when they mount a challenge to secularism, unhinging it from the basic structure of the Constitution. Through small victories in rounds such as this time round over the tweet, the military does well to deter such a challenge. Its standing up for such principles emboldens the political spectrum, relatively flattened by repeated electoral defeats, to get its act together. All is not lost if institutions continue to stand.

If this proves insufficient and when push comes to shove on the basic structure, the military must seek the prompt of the dharma in the circumstance. The received wisdom from the West has it that the military has no part in such circumstance, but events in Trumpian United States suggest that this part of the theory on civil-military relations stands superseded even in the Mecca of civil-military relations theorizing. The yet-to-be-named Chief of Defence Staff and his army counterpart, General Pande, assisted by newly appointed Vice Chief, General Raju, have their role cut out, though all this will remain unsaid in their mandate.   

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/whats-hindutvas-strategy-for-indias?s=w

What’s Hindutva’s strategy for India’s Muslims?

A commentator with extensive connections in the intelligence establishment recently wrote that the hooligans going after Muslims across India need to be bottled up. This distancing from Hindutva storm troopers is in wake of Americans frowning on human rights going south in India. The piece seemed to suggest that the wave of Hindu communalism was not Hindutva establishment instigated, triggered or fanned. This is a typically glib ducking of responsibility by the right wing for what it has wrought. It’s at best a tactical stepping back temporarily while obscuring clarity on whence came such hatred to engulf India on the backs of two Hindu festivals.

Such a reading of the latest episode in intercommunity relations implies that there is a method to the communal madness, in turn implying that there is a mastermind at work. The obfuscation by the scribe in question is proof there is something to hide, which begs the question: What?

Hindutva aims have been articulated by its progenitors a century ago. Organizations that adhere to it like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have propagated these all along, in full view and subterranean. Today, they are at the ascendant having captured political power nationally, through - among other means – infiltrating the political spectrum. One such insertion from their ilk, Narendra Modi, has been voted in prime minister twice over.  

While aims are rather well-known, the strategy to beget these aims is not quite self-evident. Whereas a century ago, the aim of creating a particular order in post-Independence India was legitimate to articulate, aligning it to be in accord with the extant Constitution needed Hindutva to be mealy-mouthed. Hindutva propagation is legitimate, though some of the aims are afoul of the basic structure of the Constitution. The problem is that now that it is consolidated in power, it will exert to upend the basic structure at some point in the future. Besides, there is the question of how it got to power in first place, through somewhat dubious means - even if vindicated by democratic election victories.  

This article deals with one prong of Hindutva’s relations with Muslims. This strategy prong helped Hindutva get to power and a pole-position by polarizing society to profit electorally from making Hindus a vote bank.

The initial phase witnessed Hindutva strategic minders turn tables on Pakistan-abetted terrorists. The violent extremism from within Muslim ranks - prompted by the communal landmarks of the nineties - had Pakistani provenance, as part of Pakistan’s engagement in the interminable South Asian Cold War. Hindutva strategic minders took to depicting terrorism as solely a Muslim handiwork. Media purveyed this into drawing rooms, making of the canard a commonplace. Black operations, projected as terrorism perpetrated by Muslims, spurred the narrative.

Hundreds of Muslim youth picked up for the terrorism in the 2000s and later released, some after a decade in jail, shows that someone did resort to terrorism, and it was not these alleged culprits. Though some Muslims were gunned down in encounters and some are sentenced to hang as alleged perpetrators, some – not necessarily Muslim - who carried out some of the bombings - and plotted these - have evidently got away. It would require the rollback of Hindutva to uncover the evidence and make the claim with a degree of certitude.

The terrorism was also to depict the Manmohan Singh government as weak, to clear the way for the Hindu Hriday Samrat, Narendra Modi. He had acquired majoritarian icon status on the back of the myth that Muslims were out for vengeance for the Gujarat pogrom and had been felled in over 22 encounters. Taken together with the projection of ‘India in danger’ and ‘Hindus in danger’, both India and Hindus willy-nilly acquired a protector.

Post 9/11, vilification of Muslims was easy. This was made even easier after 26/11 with the killing - under controversial circumstances - of the lead investigator, Hemant Karkare, who had turned up the dirt on majoritarian Hindu-perpetrated terrorism. The uncovered evidence was dispatched into oblivion and the promising line of investigation ceased. The elevation of a suspected majoritarian perpetrator to parliament and reincorporation into ranks of uniformed forces of an accomplice, only heightens suspicion that there is much to hide. The strategic community bought into the line of development bandied by electoral strategists, overlooking the controversial aspects of the rise of Hindutva. None questioned how terrorism ceased instantly with the present government taking over or argued that this amounted to circumstantial evidence that the hand on the terror tap was not Muslim.  

Micro-terror took over. Lynching was now the weapon. A court let off the perpetrators of one of the early instances of lynching, arguing that he was ‘looking Muslim’ at the wrong place at the wrong time. The current-day evolution of these instances is a mob violence lead by majoritarian extremists. The similarity in pattern of provocation followed by mob violence across India proves a method to the madness, and a centralized impetus to it. The uniform response of razings of Muslim properties, even in non-ruling party ruled states, points to this. The strategy prong directed at Muslims – of use of violence targeting them – has metamorphosed from implicating them in terror to intimidating them in their ghettos.

The consequence of polarization now having consolidated – the second electoral victory both nationally and in the most electorally significant state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), testifying to this – the goalposts have shifted. The Muslims are in a corner, but that’s not enough. Akhand Bharat has to be materialised on a fast-tracked time-table, according to the head of RSS, Mohan Bhagwat. This will require the Muslims to be incorporated into the Hindu fold, as has been the attempt with Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. What this entails in incessant pressure on Muslims to condition them, not so much to moderate the principles of their monotheism – which can be accommodated in the Hindu pantheon given the philosophical diversity within Hinduism – but to accept that theirs is not the only God-validated path. Since Indian Islam has been syncretic, this is also a doable proposition. It only requires dilution in the orthodoxy that maintains that Islam is the only true path, a literalist interpretation of the call to Islam.

This would entail keeping up the pressure on Muslims, through such legislation as Amendment to the Citizenship Act (CAA) and those that had been expected to follow as per the Covid-interrupted famous ‘chronology’ proffered by the home minister once. These are back on the agenda and can be expected to be rolled out with a vengeance. A community already on the ropes would be able to see on which side its bread is buttered. The Stockholm Syndrome would set in, with a safety valve on offer asking that they fall into their slot at the bottom of the social pyramid – whence most had escaped from some centuries back.

The choice is between mere survival – as now – and what might spill out of the feeding trough for lowest castes. Already behind the Dalits, Muslims masses cannot afford the labyrinth. As for the privileged Ashrafi Muslims, they can ‘go to Pakistan and please take their orthodoxy with them’. Their leadership of the wider community is under challenge by Pasmanda leaders, and, any unity in the community stands disrupted by the historical Shia-Sunni cleavage. A twin-pronged assault on the Muslim masses and elite will fissure Muslims, softening them up as prelude to a mafia-style offer that cannot be refused – rejoin the Hindu fold in a ghar wapsi of sorts, or else.

If Hindutva’s strategic minders, who together with likeminded officials and intelligence agency practitioners that constitute India’s ‘deep state’, could create the conditions through the UPA government’s 10 somnolent years for India’s turn to Hindutva, now that they have the reins of power, surely much more can be expected from and of them. The strategy is already discernible.

The masses continue to reel under innovative schemes keeping up the pressure: love jihad to land jihad, hijab ban et al. The intimidatory violence by mobs being only the latest is forerunner to more of the same. This time there is not merely tacit support by the regime evidenced by its looking away from prosecuting majoritarian perpetrators. The difference between the two governments – United Progressive Alliance and the National Democratic Alliance – on this is that while the former was unwilling to chance the Hindu vote, the latter feted perpetrators.

This time round the State is active participant. Its backing of the one-sided violence in the course of the North East Delhi is indicator. In this it took the usual partisanship endemic to India’s policing culture to another level. It has since taken to bulldozing Muslim properties that cannot be left to mobs lest it besmirch the State. The UP government’s smugness on the latest bout of communalism sparing UP owes to it having already set the pace and gold standard on this, with its response to the anti-CAA protests. The idea is to strip the minority of their right to self-defence. 

Arbitrary jailing of Muslims in the intelligentsia, without the relief of bail, is a commonplace. The National Security Act suffices for the masses. Students in two Muslim-affiliated central universities were attacked by police during the anti-CAA protests. Former Vice President Hamid Ansari’s early warning was met with an assault by right wing trolls. The voice of prominent liberal Muslims is marginalized along with their Hindu compatriots. The plight of Kashmiris needs no highlighting, whereas what’s in store for the Bengali Muslims, referred to as Bangladeshis, conjures up visuals of concentration camps.

The yet-to-come legislations on populating population registers will be accompanied by detention centers to house those who are unable to produce plausible papers detailing their ancestry. Assam provides a glimpse of an all-India exercise. Even if opposition-run state governments drag their feet, there is enough Hindutva social and political capital in a political culture taken over by Hindutva to ensure enough problems for Muslims. And then there is always the Uniform Civil Code as another stick to beat them with!

All this makes for talk on genocide prospects, though a cultural genocide is more plausible. The government will not allow the situation to go out of hand to an extent as to attract adverse attention to its policy of reduction of the minority to by stealth. Besides, it would not like to sully its record on law and order, a prerequisite for its ambition for a USD 5 trillion economy. Already, voices from the corporate sector cite economic reasons to rein in communalism and other commentators claim it detracts from India’s global image building as a Vishwaguru. This only indicates that communalism is kosher; only consequence management needs finesse.

The international environment is favourable for the surge Bhagwat promises. There is a beeline to New Delhi by those – principally the United States - who could have otherwise flagged India’s human rights record. The Antony Blinken reference to this in his India trip was blatantly a prop to the US’ weaning away of India from Russia. So it could be shot down out of hand by his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Pakistan, ever interested to fish in India’s troubled waters, has been given a taste of its own medicine and is also otherwise internally beset, besides having resurgent Taliban as neighbour. China, that could plausibly like to see India distracted internally, is not too keen on interfering in internal politics of other states as a matter of policy; no doubt a policy not so much informed by principles as much as brought about by its own abysmal record on that front.

The suave Jaishankar has let-on that the regime believes it’s a ‘moral responsibility to correct historical wrongs’. If the regime’s actions in respect of Article 370 and the Ayodhya Temple provide a clue, these go back beyond what Nehru did to include what Aurangzeb wrought. The timeline for the undoing of historical wrongs has been recently brought forward to 15 years by Bhagwat. The Hindutva strategy therefore will be accordingly compressed in time and its incidence will consequently be with greater intensity.

Already the makeover of India to New India finds ready acceptance. Pointing to Constitutional shortfalls is taken as an anti-national act prompted by hate, opening doors for arrest for sedition, hurting feelings and instigating unrest – even though the unrest would be from hurt, Hindutva forces and sedition, if any, is in terms of an willingness and capacity to overturn the Constitution by Hindutva. It just succeeded in getting the army strike off a word it had used in a tweet that appears in the Preamble, Secularism, calling it a ‘disease’. Hindutva’s strategic minders need reminding that strategy is a two-player game. Their actions may prompt aggrieved responses challenging India’s impressive suppressive template, with consequences that could void Bharat of Akhand.

 MONUC AND INDIA’S PEACKEEPING CONCERNS

USI Journal Jan 2014

MONUC is the acronym of the French reading of the ‘UNO Mission in the Congo’. (To Congolese children it is simply an affectionate ‘Monique!’ tossed lightly at passing MONUC personnel!) It is an ambitious UN undertaking, in light of earlier perceived failures of the UN in Somalia and Rwanda. In fact, with regard to the latter, the MONUC is almost a kind of atonement, given that the failure in Rwanda sparked off the conflict in Congo that has required UN attention in the form of its most expensive mission, budgeted for this year at over $ 600 million. Expanded mandates indicate the interest of the international community in alleviating a human tragedy and international security threat that has consumed about 3.5 million lives. In its recent capture of CNN headlines through disturbances in its North Eastern Ituri region, glimpses of Congo’s broader plight can be obtained from the instances reported of cannibalism, tribal war, warlordism, child soldiers on drugs and murder of UN Military Observers. With India having recently contributed an Air Force contingent comprising attack helicopters and utility helicopters, and an infantry guard company for their protection, it is worth revisiting the conflict to assess if the Indian peacekeeping investment will be both secure and successful.

Despite its chequered history, the MONUC has delivered peace. Having implemented the initial phases of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, it is presently poised in support of the interim government that is to lead the country into democratic elections two years hence. The initial phases were the disengagement of belligerent forces and withdrawal to new defensive positions, overseen by military observers of MONUC. Thereafter, in Phase 2 of its operations MONUC verified the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese territory. However there are continuing allegations made by all sides, namely the two major rebel sides known by acronyms RCD (G) and MLC, and the government (GoDRC), of foreign presence abetting the other side. Since this admittedly intractable problem does not threaten strategic peace, the MONUC has rightly moved on to making DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Resettlement) as its Main Effort. This has necessitated a change in the deployment from overseeing peace along the ceasefire line between the three sides to concentration towards the East of the country where the main groups of fighters slated for voluntary DDRRR are anchored.

This has also required the expansion of the military component of the mission to include two Task Forces for undertaking the envisaged DDRRR. India had initially been a prime candidate for providing the troops for the Task Force owing to its formidable peacekeeping reputation and skills. In the event, the task has been taken on by South Africa in search for regional preeminence. A Indian helicopter contingent is to operate in support of the South African Task Force in furthering DDRRR operations in an area imagined loosely as a triangle with its apex resting at Kindu, a provincial capital, and its base stretching from Lake Edward to the North to Lake Tanganika to the South. The second Task Force, cornered by Bangladesh, has been diverted to the Ituri region owing to compulsions arising from the ethnic crisis between the Hemas and Lendus mentioned earlier. In September 03, it is slated to take over from the International Emergency Multinational Force, an EU contribution as its first ‘Out of Area’ operation, currently engaged in stabilizing the delicate ethnic conflict in Bunia, the capital of Ituri region.

DDRRR is a multi-million dollar enterprise funded by World Bank for foreign fighters in Congo. The program is ‘voluntary’ and envisages the move back to Rwanda of disarmed fighters for reintegration with civil society. The exit of these groups from Congo will not only partially reduce the internal military turmoil in Congo but will end Rwandese security interest in Eastern DRC as these groups are seen by Rwanda as an existential threat. Given this external security dimension of the problem, DDRRR is focused on more intimately by the UN. The groups targeted are the ex-FAR (Forces Armee Rwanda), comprising the Hutu elements of the former Rwandese Army, and the Interhamwe, a militia recruited in the mid-Nineties from the Hutu refugee camps that came up in Congo in the aftermath of the genocide.

The problems with this program are considerable. The areas that these groups operate in are largely anarchic, even though they are nominally in RCD (G) territory, a rebel faction propped up by Rwanda. These areas are controlled by the bush fighters called Mai Mai. Given this complexity, DDRRR becomes a difficult proposition at best and a non-starter at worst. In order to ensure these territories answer to a central authority based at Goma, the RCD (G) has launched multi axial operations. So long as these operations continue, the targeted groups would not yield themselves for DDRRR. Therefore the prerequisite for DDRRR is for an end to RCD (G) expansionist operations. This is an unlikely development given the political requirement of RCD (G) appearing as a rebel faction in control of its territory in order to extract maximum from the political engagement with the GoDRC in the Interim Government in Kinshasa.

DDRRR operations themselves have been low key, proceeding from ‘preliminary’ to ‘progressive’ in the period prior to the arrival of the Task Force and requisite air assets to penetrate into the interior. Thus far the focus has been in employment of civilian ‘facilitators’ with language skills on information operations under a civilian dominated DDRRR set up within the MONUC. These facilitators run a string of ‘contacts’ who are able bodied and conversant with the terrain. The contacts penetrate the jungle with the DDRRR message. Thus far their dragnet has yielded a steady stream of volunteers and their dependents that can at best be classified as ‘refugees’ rather than ‘former combatants’. For the process to be more effective there is a requirement of pro-active Milob-centric (Military Observer) contact operations. With the authority of the uniform, these Milobs would be better able to convince the leadership to volunteer their motley groups for the process. Presently, lack of security in the areas prevents Milob activity of this kind. At the moment the junior lot of soldiery are amenable to repatriation as they are too young to be implicated in the genocide. Given that the leadership comprises those ‘wanted’ for their role in the genocide by the UN Tribunal dispensing justice in the case, it is hardly likely that their accession would be readily forthcoming. The process can therefore be expected to do no better than to attract a steady trickle of weaponless deserters.

It is at this juncture that the Indian helicopter contingent, comprising five Mi 35 attack helicopters and five Mi 17 utility helicopters, acquires relevance. Not only must their role but also the threat thereto must be considered. Its political utility for India is in its visibility as a high profile military asset for a high stakes UN mission. This is in keeping with India’s larger bid for a UN Security Council seat, resting as it does partially on India’s half-century long inimitable peacekeeping record. In terms of military employability, the helicopter assets are to help deploy and protect Task Force troops sent into the proverbial African ‘bush’. The plan is to deploy ‘reception areas’ and ‘assembly areas’ in vicinity of the targeted groups for enticing them into the DDR process. These will of necessity have to be air maintained and secured owing to absence of road access in Congo’s interior. The groups are then to report at these centers, be disarmed, subject to the bureaucracy of registration etc, and then heli-lifted into rehabilitation camps in Rwanda for subsequent re-induction into civil society. The initial tasking of the helicopter assets would be to enable establishment of contact with these groups. This would involve extensive aerial recon, obtaining of security guarantees for the liaison work and landings and finally induction of Task Force troops and logistics for austere UN facilities to come up for DDRRR. Clearly, this is easier said than done.

The foremost problem is naturally of security, that of ‘who?’ will stand security guarantee in the jungle. The masterminds of the Tutsi genocide are unlikely to be keen on the process as it hits at their power base of forcibly recruited Hutu child fighters. While their combat power has been whittled due to absence of access to warlike material, they remain masters of a forbidding terrain in which finding targets for attack helicopters would be a near impossible task. Therefore it is only an acceptance of reality that the DDRRR process remains a ‘voluntary’ endeavor, with the MONUC using its political acumen rather than military muscle for inducing a sense of participation in these groups. The military assets could thus play a supportive role in this propaganda war as visible instruments ready to provide security to those willing to sign up. Indian diplomatic and military minders should carefully scrutinize any evolution of the mandate away from this restricted role, lest its brave airmen are put into harm’s way for no corresponding gain or appropriate purpose. The tendency to ‘creeping mandates’ has been a UN pathology that has marred its record in Africa. It is only prudent that a constant watch be kept in the mission area and in New York on the institutional factors and Security Council political dynamics that largely account for mission expansion despite sobering on-ground reality.

A word on the threat assessment of these assets while based at Goma, their place of deployment, is in order. Goma is a visually exciting place, nestling as it does on the lava slopes of the active volcano Mount Nyiragongo that merge with the inland sea, Lake Kivu. It is the politico-military stronghold of the strongest rebel movement in Congo, RCD (G) - G for Goma. As can be expected, the sway over Goma of the faction is complete, and its hold decreases only with distance from Goma. Therefore the assets are secure while at the helipad abutting the airstrip at Goma and guarded by alert Garhwali infantrymen who have earlier served in ‘hotter spots’ as Srinagar and Kargil. The over the horizon ‘threats’ can only arise from the presently far fetched possibility of an implosion within the RCD (G), in which splinter groups fight it out for control of their capital and its tactically important airport. Lastly is the threat from the materialization of the perpetual rumour of the Kivus region having an agenda of secession from Congo, given that it is mineral rich and physically, economically and emotionally forms part of the Great Lakes Region.

A positive outcome in terms of DDRRR has potential to emerge from the political outlook in Kinshasa. An interim government comprising representatives at Vice Presidential level from all factions has been formed under President Kabila. The integration of respective militaries of the rival factions is underway. Understanding reached at this level and cooperative working relationships established are hoped to over time ease the political factors that impact adversely on DDRRR in the East. A politically secure and placated RCD (G) would be in a better position to permit MONUC access to the targeted groups on its territory. An eventually integrated Army would be best positioned to induce, if not coerce, the groups in question for exiting Congolese territory. MONUC facilities could thus provide a safer and quicker way out for these groups. The success of DDRRR is further dependent on one other factor, it being the handling of indigenous groups of Congolese fighters, the Mai Mai, who as has been mentioned, are in a tactical alliance with the Interhamwe and ex FAR groups. It is envisaged that a program administered by the MONUC and funded by the UNDP will help resettle the Congolese groups. Once this is underway, the targeted groups will be isolated and their continued violation of Congolese sovereignty will attract no outside support, thus making DDRRR as their only option. It is recommended that the Indian contingent await these developments rather than to proactively seek a military ‘solution’ to the problem of kick-starting DDRRR. When this stage arrives or is imminent within a timeframe of about a year and more, India could revisit the question of contributing a Task Force comprising an Infantry Battalion to the MONUC to operate alongside its airmen.

Stating that peacekeeping in Africa is challenging would be an understatement. In other words it is fraught with the risk of situations spiraling out of control in fairly short order. Take for instance the latest crisis to emerge out of the ‘Heart of Africa’ (Joseph Conrad’s imperishable phrase), Congo. The situation in its Ituri province deteriorated to the extent of mass ethnic killings on account of inattention of the Security Council seized as it was with the Iraq War. This indicates that the institutional evolution of the MONUC (and at one remove the UN) is not of the order as to be able to handle multinational military operations, particularly in crisis situations. Therefore entrusting Indian military assets to the UN must be with the caveat that a national veto will attend their employment when dispensing force. This would ensure no abuse or misuse of national military power placed at the disposal of the UN occurring for reasons of organizational perversity or hidden power games that an unromantic look at any UN deployment will reveal. A manner of doing so would be to have Indian military staff officers in key decision making positions of operational control over these air assets, and later over a putative Indian Task Force. Interestingly, the civilian political wing of the MONUC presently does not have a single Indian! The Indian Milobs number 41 at last count. An endeavor at New York must be to get them into positions of authority in the mission which would be beneficial for both the mission and for India. 

Congo requires every support that the international community can extend to enable it to emerge from its testing times. Its leaders have made giant strides in reconfiguring their country from its time of war. India could extend a supportive hand, not only for altruistic reasons, but also for strategic ones. There is a large Indian trading community in Congo and in Central Africa in general. India has a respected image as a political heavyweight in Africa and a considerable cultural influence, emanating incidentally from Bollywood. India would only be bolstering its strengths by being militarily involved through peacekeeping under UN auspices. Given the larger political gains expected thus, the risks attending any military undertaking in Africa must both be courted and negated with elaborate mental and procedural preparation. While lessons from India’s Liberia experience need to be taken into account, any unwarranted caution they impose is unjustified. It is a sprit of engagement that should inform India’s participation in MONUC and future peacekeeping in Africa.

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Biodata: Maj Ali Ahmed is an officer of the MARATHA LI. He has recently completed a tenure with the MONUC.