UNPUBLISHED, REVISED VERSION OF THE PRECEDING POST

India’s Afghanistan policy in regime security terms

Foreign minister Jaishankar informed the recent all-party meeting on the Afghanistan situation that India’s policy is one of ‘wait and watch’. Whereas a policy-in-the-works is justified, a regional power should instead be pushing for an outcome it prefers in Afghanistan.

Diplomatically, it has at the two Security Council meetings joined the international chorus calling for moderation on part of the Taliban and to ensure a broad representativeness in the new government. As incentive, the mid August reference to Taliban among the armed groups has been removed in the late August Council resolution. Sticks to extract good behavior of the Taliban in power remain in the form of diplomatic recognition and sanctions’ lists procedures, on which India will likely fall in line with the Western powers. On the ground, having pulled out its diplomatic staff, it has limited possibilities of influencing the situation. This action willy-nilly acknowledges the preexisting deficit in India’s Afghan policy that resulted in India being kept out of the plethora of forums – the troika plus and quadrilaterals - that have come up as the peace process wound its way over the past two years.

While India’s intelligence moves are not known, these can be expected to include an outreach to the Afghan resistance shaping up at Panjshir holdout. By reassuring the resistance leadership of India’s continuing support, India can strengthen their hand. At the table currently with the Talban, they have the confidence to wrest their due in terms of representation in the new Taliban-led dispensation. If the Taliban’s ongoing tactics of coercion-with-talks fail to persuade their challengers at Panjshir, it provides India a leverage it could exploit depending on how the situation pans out.

An intelligence dominant Afghanistan policy

It is likely that the intelligence prong of strategy, even if invisible, is more active than its diplomatic one, since India’s Afghanistan policy has been intelligence-led. There have been multiple exchanges between the intelligence establishments of India and the former regime, especially since mid 2017, when President Trump decided to wind down the American commitment in Afghanistan. India’s Afghanistan policy is entwined with its Pakistan and Kashmir policies, making it a subset of its national security policy and therefore, the domain of the national security adviser.

However, despite this privileging of the intelligence prong of strategy - and perhaps because of this - not unlike most other states, India was unable to gauge the rapidity of collapse of the Ghani regime. Limiting its outreach to the Taliban eventuated in India being marginalized. Consequently, India surveys uncertain national security prospects in case the Taliban return to power. The threat is not so much from the Taliban, as much as from the unreformed and triumphalist Pakistan, that would be able to return its attention to its traditional preoccupation, Kashmir.

Kashmir returns as a conflict trigger

In Kashmir, it appears to be lull before the storm. There is enough tinder in Kashmir only waiting for the proverbial match stick. The recent outreach of the prime minister to the mainstream parties has not resulted in a breakthrough. Absent a promise of return to statehood prior to the elections, this remains unlikely. Such as reversion to statehood, albeit minus the earlier autonomy, would likely only be in case the elections are won by the ruling party at the Center. Consequently, the developments in the neighbourhood have potential for instability for national security, if and when the Pakistani state and non-state elements currently absorbed in returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, turn their attention to Kashmir.

In case unrest revives in Kashmir and presence of battle hardened Pakistani mercenaries resets the insurgency back to terrorism, India is liable to take harsh actions in Kashmir, besides being militarily firm with Pakistan. The current hiatus of relative stability, such as the Line of Control ceasefire reiteration in February, will likely unravel.

Prospects of wider insecurity

The fallout may not be limited to Kashmir. From the overdrive of the pro-right wing media on contrived linkages between Indian Muslims, Pakistan and Taliban is evident that already-frayed social harmony is set to suffer. Resulting polarization can be taken political advantage of by the right wing. ‘False flag’ terror operations implicating Muslims as perpetrators- as was the case in several terror incidents in the 2000s - shall heighten the political dividend from insecurity for the right wing.

It is by now well known that electoral advantage is sought by the ruling dispensation from India’s security showing. This remains true for how India will view its Afghanistan policy.

Since Kashmir remains delicate and a potential site for resumption of proxy war, India would perhaps prefer a like handle on the other side of Pakistan, not only to deter it but to get back at Pakistan in case of proxy war revival. Therefore, India may not be averse to instability continuing in Afghanistan. This explains lack of energy and dexterity in its diplomacy – exemplified by the term ‘wait and watch’ - in working for the presumed preferable outcome of returning stability and security to Afghanistan over the uncertainty of civil war.

The regime security calculus

In other words, not only has an intelligence-led Afghanistan policy failed India already, but is set to fail India once again in an impending unraveling of its Kashmir policy. That this has domestic political advantage for its political masters makes for ambiguity as to whether this is at all seen as a failure. On the contrary the powers-that-be may see an intelligence success through their parochial-political lens. Contending externally with the Taliban and its supposed sponsors, Pakistan, has internal political dividend in keeping up polarization. With the crucial Uttar Pradesh elections due soon, and their outcome’s implications for national elections in 2024, they primary prism for gauging national security policy is how any such policies influence political fortunes.

When national interest is defined as perpetuation of the right wing electoral majority for sustaining the Hindutva project in the unmaking of India as we know it, national interest articulation in traditional and conventional terms is futile. India is thus poised to move from being a free-rider to a spoiler for regime security and at the cost of national security.

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 https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/20835/Indias-Afghanistan-Policy---Wait-and-Watch-With-An-Eye-on-Pakistan

India’s Afghanistan policy explained in regime security terms

UNEDITED VERSION

Foreign minister Jaishankar informed the recent all-party meeting on the Afghanistan situation that India’s policy is one of ‘wait and watch’. It is an admittance of a policy in the works, depending on how the situation turns out in Afghanistan when the ongoing evacuation by the international community from Kabul airport ceases on 31 August and the Talitan installs itself in power soon thereafter. The complexion of the new regime – essentially whether and to what extent it is inclusive - will presumably determine India’s next steps.

Even if the current stance is dubbed ‘wait and watch’, the government should be pushing for an outcome it prefers in Afghanistan. Diplomatically, it has at the two Security Council meetings joined the international chorus calling for moderation on part of the Taliban and to ensure a broad representativeness in the new government. On the ground, having pulled out its diplomatic staff, it has limited possibilities of influencing the situation. This action willy-nilly acknowledges the preexisting deficit in India’s Afghan policy that resulted in India being kept out of the plethora of forums that have come up as the peace process wound out over the past two years.

While India’s intelligence moves are not known, these can be expected to include an outreach to the Afghan resistance shaping up at Panjshir holdout. By reassuring the resistance leadership shaping up of India’s continuing support, India can strengthen the hand of the challengers. At the table currently with the Talban, they can have the confidence to wrest due representation in the awaited dispensation. In case they are unsuccessful, then India can create leverage through continuing support that it can exploit against its traditional rival, Pakistan, depending on how things pan out.

An intelligence dominant Afghanistan policy

It is likely that the intelligence prong of strategy, even if invisible, is more active than its diplomatic one, since India’s Afghanistan policy over the recent past has been intelligence-led. There have been multiple exchanges between the intelligence establishments of India and the former regime, especially since mid 2017, when President Trump decided to wind down the American commitment in Afghanistan. Its Afghanistan policy is entwined with its Pakistan and Kashmir policies, making it a subset of its national security policy and therefore, the domain of the national security adviser.

However, despite this privileging of the intelligence prong of strategy - and perhaps because of this - not unlike most other states, India was unable to gauge the rapidity of collapse of the Ghani regime. Limiting its outreach to the Taliban eventuated in India being marginalized. Consequently, India surveys uncertain national security prospects in case the Taliban return to power. The threat is not so much from the Taliban, as much as from the unreformed and triumphalist Pakistan, that would be able to return its attention to its traditional preoccupation, Kashmir.

Kashmir returns as a conflict trigger

Rattled by President Trump’s 2017 focus on Afghanistan in order to bring the troops back by end of his presidency, India had appointed special interlocutor to seek a way forward in Kashmir. It upped the then ongoing Operation All Out so as to take advantage of Pakistan turning its attention to the end game in Afghanistan and dwindling down infiltration to negligible numbers. Emboldened by the earlier surgical strikes on land, India also launched aerial surgical strikes on Pakistan to drive home the point that it was now a New India and would be militarily proactive in its response to terror strikes of the magnitude as conducted at Pulwama. This contributed to the electoral fortunes of the ruling party at the Center, enabling its control of parliament to levels that made the constitutional reengineering on Kashmir’s special status possible. As of now, the statistics spell an insurgency at an ebb and infiltration at ‘zero’.

Even so, this appears to be lull before the storm. There is enough tinder in Kashmir only waiting for the proverbial match stick. The recent outreach of the prime minister to the mainstream parties has not resulted in a breakthrough. Absent a promise of return to statehood prior to the elections, this remains unlikely. Such as reversion to statehood, albeit minus the earlier autonomy, would likely only be in case the elections are won by the ruling party, and, therefore, are unlikely to change the political complexion soon. Consequently, the developments in the neighbourhood have potential for instability for national security, if and when the Pakistani elements – both state and non-state - currently absorbed in returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, turn their attention to Kashmir, which can be as early as the traditional last minute infiltration push before snows set in.

In case unrest revives in Kashmir and presence of battle hardened Pakistani mercenaries resets the insurgency to becoming terrorism, India is liable to take harsh actions in Kashmir, besides being militarily firm with Pakistan. The current hiatus of relative stability, such as the Line of Control ceasefire reiteration in February, will likely unravel.

The fallout may not be limited to Kashmir. From the overdrive of the pro-right wing media on contrived linkages between Indian Muslims, Pakistan and Taliban is evident that already-frayed social harmony is set to suffer. Resulting polarization can be taken political advantage of by the right wing. ‘False flag’ terror operations attributable to Muslims, as was the case in several terror incidents in the 2000s, shall heighten the political dividend from insecurity for the right wing.

It is by now well known that electoral advantage is sought by the ruling dispensation from India’s security showing. This remains true for how India will view its Afghanistan policy. Whereas its ‘wait and watch’ policy is good optics, it hides what is to follow. Since Kashmir remains delicate and a potential site for resumption of proxy war, India would perhaps prefer a like handle on the other side of Pakistan, not only to deter it but to get back at Pakistan in case of proxy war revival. Therefore, India may not be averse to instability continuing in Afghanistan. This explains lack of energy and dexterity in its diplomacy – exemplified by the term ‘wait and watch’ - in working for the presumed preferable outcome of returning stability and security to Afghanistan over the uncertainty of civil war over the remainder of the decade.

In other words, not only has an intelligence-led Afghanistan policy failed India already, but is set to fail India once again in an impending unraveling of its Kashmir policy. That this has domestic political advantage for its political masters makes for ambiguity as to whether this is at all seen as a failure. On the contrary the powers-that-be may see an intelligence success through their parochial-political lens. When national interest is defined as perpetuation of the right wing electoral majority for sustaining the Hindutva project in the unmaking of India as we know it, national interest articulation in traditional and conventional terms is futile. India is thus poised to move from being a free-rider to a spoiler for regime security and at the cost of national security.

 

Indian soft power as the missing ingredient in returning peace to Afghanistan

A LONGER, UNPUBLISHED VERSION OF THE ARTICLE IN THE PREVIOUS POST

While at the beginning of this month, apprehensions of civil war were extant, President Ashraf Ghani’s throwing in of the towel at a great reputational cost, appears to have averted the contingency for now. However, even though Taliban is now in control of Kabul and Afghanistan, prospects of instability persist.

At this delicate juncture with regional security poised to go either way, India, the gentle regional giant, can play a critical role in averting insecurity by moderating the Taliban through exercise of growing economy-based soft power. 

Dangers of continuing military tryst in Afghanistan stem from the traditional holdout at Panjshir being revived by the former regime’s deputy, Amrullah Saleh, tying up with the son of the former Lion of Panjshir, Ahmed Shah Masood. Panjshir held out in the Soviet era and in the subsequent Taliban 1.0. Consequently, it’s reversion to a hold out status serves today to pressure the Taliban to be magnanimous in victory.

The call by Saleh that he will fight on can potentially attract the thousands of well trained Afghan National Army forces who were seemingly let down by their political and military leaderships. The Taliban have also been faced with spirited protests in multiple cities. As Taliban depredations increase the gap between their words and deeds, the resistance is set to acquire momentum.

Currently, all players await the outcome of peace making deals on at the presidential palace, Arg, between the incoming Taliban, buoyant from their sudden victory, and an ad hoc coordination council of the former regime heavyweights. International pressures are for an inclusive interim government, even if under Taliban over-lordship.

How accommodative Taliban prove will determine the levels of support from the international community and the legitimacy of the arrangement in eyes of Afghans. The Taliban may settle for such an arrangement if it enables access to funds for development by way of which they can legitimize their taking over Kabul in a military victory. The former regimes accounts – frozen for now by the West – can be unlocked by Taliban good behavior.

The Taliban’s uninspiring record so far lends pause to any guesses as to how the situation will pan out. Having won a seemingly decisive victory and deliriant from downing a superpower, hubris might get in the way and they may encash their cheque too soon. Triumphalism in Pakistan, their major backer, might also derail their applecart since Pakistan has consistently demonstrated a deficit in strategic good sense.

Being strategic at this juncture implies acknowledging limitations by the Taliban in running a modern state and their need for assistance. Reconciling to the gains of the last 20 years and keeping their promises on good behavior in relation to women and minorities can stabilize them in power. The Taliban have made the right noise so far and an outreach to employees of the former regime to run the government.

They have already made a believable promise to keep Afghanistan free of presences of international terrorism. In fact, it is not impossible to imagine that since it is the Taliban that alone had the ability to rid Afghanistan of international terrorists of various hues – Al Qaeda, Islamic State and those bedeviling neighbours the Stans, Russia and China – the US may have played a strategic, if covert, game in midwifing the return of the Taliban to Kabul.

While a tall order in itself, now that the Taliban has been strengthened by the war material left behind by the West and acquired from the Afghan National Army, it can with characteristic ruthlessness deliver on this promise. They have invited back the Afghan air force members – who have not fled to the Stans with their planes – so that the vaunted air force can be revived.

The Taliban has the potential backing of China, Russia and Iran. Should it play its cards well, even the US will fall in along-side. The UN in situ is already on standby to lend a hand with the peacebuilding to follow. Pakistan is well aware that it does not have the heft to sustain an Afghanistan that is not at peace with itself.

Therefore it is not inevitable that Afghanistan will end up in another civil war, as succeeded the fall of the Najibullah regime. This best case scenario can be made a self-fulfilling prophecy if one key player, India, steps up and lends a hand, but by extracting, in collaboration with its international partners, a quid pro quo in the Taliban moderating itself and more self-centeredly also going after anti-India terror elements in its campaign against international terror outfits.

Having temporarily pulled out its diplomats from Afghanistan on the basis of security concerns, India is sensibly in a wait-and-watch mode. Even so, India is warily trying to keep Pakistan from prematurely anticipating gaining of strategic depth and turning back the tide towards normalcy in Kashmir. It has been tough in the Security Council, of which it has the presidency this month, by keeping Pakistan out of the two deliberations this month at that high forum, even though procedurally it could have obliged Pakistan – being a stakeholder in the region and developments – to be invited to make its pitch.

India can hold out a plausible threat that it will reciprocate Pakistani proxy war resumption in Kashmir with support of resistance forces in Afghanistan, thereby denying any gains Pakistan sought in supporting the Taliban’s return. That Pakistan will find this believable is evident from its vociferous objections over the last two decades to the presence of Indian consulates in Afghanistan.

Since the worst case is not in India’s interest either – since it returns instability to Kashmir and perhaps   in the mainland – it is a scenario best avoided. So instead of a wait and watch approach at this critical juncture, India could instead diplomatically step up to the table with an offer neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can afford to ignore.

It can incentivize its outreach to the Taliban by offering market access by Afghanistan, economic upturn being an indispensible factor in post-conflict peacebuilding. Connectivity through Pakistan can be negotiated since Pakistan also stands to make geo-economic gains, its army chief having dropped hints early this year. While the meager land trade in dry fruits on between India and Afghanistan through Pakistan is stalled for now, it can be magnified several times over when it resumes.

An Indian peace offensive can preserve India’s interests in Afghanistan and make good its sentiment in regard to the plight of the Afghan people. It will preserve Kashmir from the feared blow-back if Afghanistan dissolves into civil war and becomes a site of proxy war. It can turn the breeze of a peace outbreak, witnessed early this year on the Line of Control, into a gale. This will not only allow India a breather from its two-front predicament, but ease arriving at a fresh arrangement with China on the Line of Actual Control, since the two – India and China – will be collaborators in returning peace to Afghanistan.

In this option, Afghanistan can be seen as an opportunity. Politics being the art of the possible, so is external politics. Collaborating with its two neighbours with whom India has strained bilateral relations over a non-bilateral issue has potential to inject eddies of cooperation into the bilateral relationship. Needless to add that diplomats will need to work in some simultaneity between India easing up on Afghanistan to enable Pakistan and China take their pickings, while the two oblige by easing up likewise on Kashmir and in Ladakh. Pakistan must be held to zero infiltration and China to settle for an agreement on the other frictions points in Ladakh.

Consequently, instead of hard power that finds mention in the commentary on its options, India must instead seriously consider staking out its interests by deploying its economy-based soft power. An emerging great power cannot be a free-rider indefinitely. Wait-and-watch is a policy for those without options and cards, which does not behoove a regional power.

The case for proactivism made, a word on its feasibility. That this soft-power option has not found mention so far bespeaks less of the commentariat being stupefied by developments than aware that the option will not find traction with the right wing Indian political leadership. India’s strategic minders have ceased to assert national interest in face of the regime’s parochial self-interest of self-perpetuation in power and furthering the Hindutva political project. These twin goals require India to be at odds with its Muslim neighbours, so that the resulting media-induced polarization within polity can be used for electoral purposes. Coming as it does the Afghan crisis in the run up to crucial polls, it is not national interest that will determine India’s response, but which option is best for electoral dividend. Even so, it is important here to place the option ‘out there’ in order that if it is a road not taken and India’s security predicament deepens, we know where the responsibility squarely lies. 

 https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/afghanistan-crisis-india-must-deploy-its-economic-soft-power-7379771.html

Afghanistan Crisis | India must deploy its economic soft power

While at the beginning of this month, apprehensions of civil war were extant, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani’s throwing in of the towel at a great reputational cost appears to have averted the contingency for now. However, even though the Taliban is now in control of Kabul, and Afghanistan, prospects of instability persist.

At this delicate juncture with regional security poised to go either way, India, the gentle regional giant, can play a critical role in averting insecurity by moderating the Taliban through an exercise of its growing economy-based soft power.

The dangers of a continuing military tryst in Afghanistan stem from the traditional holdout at Panjshir being revived by the former regime’s deputy, Amrullah Saleh, tying up with the son of the former Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud.

The call by Saleh that he will fight on can potentially attract the thousands of well-trained Afghan National Army personnel who were seemingly let down by their political and military leaderships. The Taliban have also been faced with spirited protests in multiple cities. As the Taliban depredations increase the gap between their words and deeds, the resistance may acquire momentum.

Currently all players await the outcome of peace-making deals on at the presidential palace, Arg, between the incoming Taliban, buoyant from their sudden victory, and an ad hoc co-ordination council of the former regime. International pressures are for an inclusive interim government, even if under the Taliban over-lordship.

The Taliban’s uninspiring record so far lends pause to any guesses as to how the situation will pan out. Having won a seemingly decisive victory and delirium from downing a superpower, hubris might get in the way and they may encash their cheque too soon. Triumphalism in Pakistan, their major backer, might also derail their applecart.How accommodative the Taliban prove will determine the levels of support from the international community and the legitimacy of the arrangement in the eyes of the Afghans.

Strategic good sense at this juncture involves acknowledging their limitations in running a modern State and their need for assistance. Reconciling to the gains of the last 20 years and keeping their promises on good behaviour in relation to women and minorities can stabilise them in power.

As it contemplates its decision, the Taliban has the potential backing of China, Russia and Iran. Should it play its cards well, even the United States will fall in along-side. The UN in situ is already on standby to lend a hand with the peacebuilding to follow. Pakistan is well aware that it does not have the heft to sustain an Afghanistan that is not at peace with itself.

Therefore, it is not inevitable that Afghanistan will revert to war. This best-case scenario can be made a self-fulfilling prophecy if one key player — India — steps up and lends a hand, but by extracting in collaboration with its international partners a quid pro quo: Taliban moderating itself.

Having temporarily pulled out its diplomats from Afghanistan on the basis of security concerns, India is sensibly in a wait-and-watch mode even as it speedily evacuates stranded Indians and Afghans wanting an Indian refuge. Even so, India is warily trying to keep Pakistan from prematurely anticipating gaining of strategic depth and turning back the tide towards normalcy in Kashmir by stubbing out Pakistani hopes of a UN Security Council appearance in the two discussions on Afghanistan this month with India in the chair. India could go further and if push comes to shove reciprocate Pakistani proxy war resumption with support of resistance forces in Afghanistan.

India would do well to avoid this worst-case scenario by stepping up to the table with an offer neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can afford to ignore. It can incentivise its outreach to the Taliban by offering market access by Afghanistan, economic upturn being an indispensable factor in post-conflict peacebuilding. Connectivity through Pakistan can be negotiated since Islamabad also stands to make geo-economic gains, its army chief having dropped hints early this year.

An Indian peace offensive can preserve India’s interests in Afghanistan and make good its sentiment in regard to the plight of the Afghan people. It will preserve Kashmir from the feared blow-back if Afghanistan dissolves into civil war and becomes a site of proxy war. It can turn the breeze of a peace outbreak, witnessed early this year on the Line of Control, into a gale. This will not only allow India a breather from its two-front predicament, but ease arriving at a fresh arrangement with China on the Line of Actual Control, collaboration elsewhere easing bilateral ties.

Instead of hard power that finds mention in the commentary on its options, India must instead seriously consider staking out its interests by deploying its economic soft power.

 https://www.milligazette.com/news/Opinions/33905-india-should-reform-intelligence-agencies-in-national-interest/

Reform intelligence agencies in the national interest

Reprising an earlier argument made on these web pages occasionally over the past ten years is apt in light of a new book shedding light on India’s intelligence agencies. The case made earlier was that India’s largest minority, its Muslims, have been saddled with responsibility for the terror threat by its intelligence agencies for no fault or doing of their own. Over the last two decades the terror threat in India was, firstly, hyped up through intelligence operations, and, secondly, pumped up through ‘black operations’, involving terror acts by non-Muslims passed off as Muslim perpetrated. A recently released book, Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the RAW and the ISI, by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, provides testimony for the argument.  

The authors make the case that the setback at a Kandahar over the turn of the millennium - in which India exchanged a few Pakistani terrorists in its custody for the passengers of a hijacked plane - resulted in a boost for operations of intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies operations had apparently been curbed somewhat at the late 90s when India was contemplating expanding an outreach to Pakistan through a composite dialogue. The Kandahar episode – that followed close on the heels of the Kargil War - upended any thought of dialogue with Pakistan. Instead, it resulted in the intelligence agencies being allowed to reactivate offensive operations, along with painting Pakistan black by winning the war of narratives.

As per the book, intelligence agencies consequently launched information operations - buttressed by diplomats - highlighting Pakistani interference in India’s domestic affairs through proxy war in Kashmir and also by supporting Muslim extremists and criminals in the hinterland. While the book does not go into any detail, it hints that, in addition, they also conducted ‘black operations’ in order to further implicate Pakistan as a terror sponsor state. In his review of the book, Sushant Singh, the fearless scribe on strategic affairs, lets on that the book has clues that even as significant an incident as the parliament attack has traces of a false-flag operation. He refers to the insufficiently probed role of the rogue cop, Davinder Singh, who allegedly was a player in that episode. Since the authors rely on intelligence sources, they portray that the terror attack was handiwork of Pakistan, white washing the career gains the rogue cop made over the next decade and half. Unbelievably the cop turned up in the Pulwama episode too. That he continues to be on the loose, having been discharged from service without a probe ‘in the national interest’, should ring bells.

Readers of this publication need no elaboration on the other terror attacks attributed to Muslims.  The book brings out that at least 16 major terror attacks across the country were of dubious origin. Some involved at least one army officer and one sitting member of the current parliament. The army officer, Purohit, has been let off, since he supposedly kept his hierarchy informed of his penetration of the saffronite cell that was behind the bombings such as in Malegaon and in Hyderabad. This only serves to reinforce the suspicion all along that the bombings were by saffronite extremists, but brings to fore the covert support of intelligence agencies with the ostensible rationale of a build-up of a case against Pakistan as a terror sponsor for strategic and foreign policy purposes.

However, that rationale is self-serving, dressing up intelligence agencies’ doings in plausible national security terms. What is concerning is the saffronisation of the intelligence agencies – and elements of other security services - brought out in the book. Such saffronisation must be placed in the context of Hindutva politics being played out over the period. At the time, the right wing party was out of power and was in search of a key to Delhi. The intelligence agency-overseen bombings thus provided the ballast for the campaign of right wing forces. The bombings generated polarization and marginalized the minority. On the back of the resulting manufactured ‘wave’, the current ruling dispensation came to power mid-last decade.

This brings to fore the political role of the intelligence agencies, which clearly calls for closer executive and parliamentary supervision. This is easier said than done. While parliamentary oversight does not exist – there being no parliamentary standing committee charged with this – there is little evidence of executive oversight either. Recall, the bombings averred to here were in the period of the United Progressive Alliance ten years sway. Its national security advisors and home ministers were unable or unwilling to clean up the intelligence agencies’ stables. It can be inferred that their inability and unwillingness owed to their knowledge that the rot was rather deep. Besides, findings of an Indian non-Muslim hand behind the bombings would have revealed Indian foreign policy offensive against Pakistan sterile and rendered vacuous its backing for initiatives as the convention on international terrorism. Now, intelligence agencies variously report to the two right hand men of the prime minister, Amit Shah and Ajit Doval. Since the ruling dispensation has been the gainer from actions of intelligence agencies, it is hardly likely to trip itself up.

That a continuing series of intelligence failures not having prompted a clean-up so far, it is hardly likely that the finding here matters that intelligence agencies were acting outside their mandate by creating the political conditions for electoral triumph of the right wing. Not only was India found flat-footed at Kargil, but so has been the case - if the official narrative is to be believed - with the terror attacks from parliament to Pulwama. More recently, the Chinese intrusions in Ladakh escaped the intelligence agencies. Worse, the Pegasus affair - ‘Snoopgate’ - has also not evoked introspection and course correction. The fall of India’s ally, the Ghani government in Kabul, will also unlikely stir matters. Their hard-sell that with Article 370 gone, Kashmir will mend, has not quite worked out and the chickens are readying to come home to roost. A system that plants incriminating evidence remotely in computers and then makes arrests using the planted evidence as evidence of conspiracy as has been the case with the BK16 or charges victims of communal carnage as has been done in the case of the one-sided political violence in North East Delhi can neither self-regulate nor autocorrect.

Therefore, to carry any expectations of fair play or rule of law is to be naïve. The intelligence agencies have Chanakya as their mascot. Kautilyan thought informs the working of this regime. Regime survival is the primary morality in Chanakyagiri and intelligence agencies have pride of place in its scheme. It misses national security minders that Chanakya wrote in and of a period when India was a space for contesting principalities. Principles and values cannot be imported from two millennia back to inform workings of a parliamentary democracy today. To the extent intelligence hands subscribe to Hindutva, to them Hindutva legitimizes their distancing from the professional ideal. This accounts for the authoritarian and illiberal democracy India has become in its 75^th year. A rollback to the constitutional framework implies first a reform of intelligence agencies in the national interest.

 

 

 https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/20743/The-Fallout-of-an-Afghan-Civil-War-on-Kashmir

Civil war fallout on Kashmir

Afghanistan is heading into a civil war. The Taliban and the Afghan government have not resumed their talks process started last September in Doha, even as they square off on ground with the Taliban controlling the country side and the government losing five cities so far.

At an open session of the Security Council called at the behest of the Afghan government and facilitated by India, holding the rotating presidency of the Security Council through August, a consensus could be observed with all members against an Emirate emerging in Afghanistan.

Even so, as of now, it appears that the pessimistic possibility, of the two sides contending militarily till winters set in and dampen military moves, is in the offing.

From civil war to proxy war in Afghanistan

Currently, verbal professions to the contrary apart, it is not self-evident that relevant actors find the impending civil war unwelcome. Strategic calculations may well prevent a meeting of minds on how to avoid a civil war and in case of its incidence, how to bring it to a close.

An internationalized non-international armed conflict lends itself as a setting for proxy war. In addition to the two parties, the government and the major insurgent group, the Taliban, ethnic militias have formed at several locations to fill in the vacuum created by the dissipation of the Afghan national security forces. Reports have it that all sides have militarily supportive external actors.

The Americans are assisting the Afghan air force and are conducting air strikes of their own. Pakistani elements of the Jaish and Lashkar are reportedly participating in Taliban offensives, with the Afghan government claiming that tens of thousands of fighters have entered Afghanistan from Pakistan. India is backing the government as part of its strategic partnership commitment dating back a decade. India and Iran may reprise their earlier support for the Northern Alliance in backing these militias.

India-Pak proxy war prospects

For India, keeping Pakistan tied down in Afghanistan in a proxy war will help keep Pakistan off Kashmir. Thwarted from gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan and from limiting Indian influence there, Pakistan may revive its proxy war in Kashmir.

In such a case the escalation dynamic may kick in. Whereas Indian support for the Afghan government is legitimate, escalation may be clandestine, with intelligence operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, such as Indian support as alleged by Pakistan for the Tehrik-e-Taliban. Pakistan for its part may up-the-ante by backing terrorism in India’s hinterland.

India’s conventional deterrence against Pakistan’s subconventional challenge has been diluted lately. India’s pivot to the China front has led to transfer of some of its Pakistan-centric strike corps assets to the mountain strike corps poised against China. India’s ongoing commitment on the China front will prevent it from resorting to retribution in the form of surgical strikes, fearing escalation might prove diversionary from the China front.

India has also thinned out its paramilitary, the Rashtriya Rifles, from Kashmir by deploying up to a division worth in Ladakh this year. This may incentivize Pakistani adventurism, though the multi-tiered counter infiltration grid has not been affected. Activation of the LC by Pakistan would enable it to thrust Afghan civil war hardened Pakistani infiltrators.

Counter terrorism as excuse, a heavy handed Indian response can be expected in the Valley. There has been an increasing reliance on the police and central armed police since the neutralization of Article 370. No known doctrine informs the functioning of these uniformed forces function and reporting as they do to the ministry of home, accountability may be at a premium.

Preventing such outcome

Strategically, India can ill afford an active Pakistan front, since it is staring down China for now. However, the government is liable to prioritise its own parochial interests, based on the election cycle. Therefore the question to answer is if an uptick in militancy and its counter in Kashmir is in the political interest of the Modi government, looking as it is to elections in Uttar Pradesh soon and national elections thereafter. Arguably, a stand-off with Pakistan is better for the opportunity it affords for polarization and electoral gains thereby.

Pakistan’s relative reticence in its proxy war over last few years owes as much to the continuing scrutiny of the financial task force, but also because Pakistan has been busy with returning the Taliban to a controlling position in Kabul. If this objective is placed out of reach by India’s support for the Afghan opposition, then Pakistan may revert to its traditional preoccupation – Kashmir - with vengeance.

Both sides have stepped back from the promise of initiatives of earlier this year such as the resumption of ceasefire on the LC, indicating that they are not averse to a strategic contest in Afghanistan.  Preventing such a contingency requiring such calculations by the two sides to be dispelled is a tall order.

India needs reminding that whereas the talks process with China has enabled stability on the Line of Actual Control, the threat remains. A weakened conventional deterrent against Pakistan precludes election-influencing resort to surgical strikes, making these politically risky. A restive Kashmir will negate the Indian position that its Article 370 related initiative has returned normalcy. As for Pakistan, it needs no reminding that a return to the terror situation of early last decade is hardly in its broader national interest.

Preventive diplomacy in Afghanistan

Avoiding a civil war in Afghanistan is a first, essential step. The US having bailed out, the onus is on the regional powers, Russia and China, to step up and fill the breach by bringing about a regional solution to a regional problem.

This is easier said. The hasty manner of the US exit suggests it is keen to leave a ‘mess’ behind for its antagonists – Russia, Iran and China – to contend with. India having kept Pakistan out of the Security Council meeting on Afghanistan may prompt Pakistan, and its benefactor, China, keeping India out of the Troika-plus grouping in the lead on Afghanistan.   

Even as the two sides slug it out on ground for a position of advantage at Doha, the international community must get its act together. While India must help the Afghan government whittle Taliban’s military momentum by provisioning political support, military equipment and discreet military advice, alongside it must upgrade its outreach to the Taliban from an intelligence-led to a diplomatic one. For its part, Pakistan may require applying the brakes on its protégé, the Taliban, lest its very success backfire in international opprobrium. 

Both India and Pakistan need to find a way back to where they started off the year with. Their intelligence contacts need to be speedily revived and a joint diplomatic support to the Doha mediation offered. This is the best way the two can prevent an otherwise upcoming civil war in Afghanistan, an imperative if the two sides are to fulfill their much vaunted claims on behalf of Kashmiris.

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 http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=112113

What a civil war next door means for us

It is widely believed that Afghanistan is heading into a civil war. The Taliban and the Afghan government have not resumed their talks process started last September in Doha, even as they square off on ground with the Taliban controlling the country side and the government losing five cities so far. Taliban has reportedly lost some 200 fighters over the week in Afghan air force bombings.

At an open session of the Security Council called at the behest of the Afghan government and facilitated by India, holding the rotating presidency of the Security Council through August, the Afghan government has asked for the Security Council to warn Taliban against attacking cities. The call found echo in the statements of some members of the Council.

The current situation

This makes sense in the balance-of-power logic, with both sides having some tokens in the power play that inevitably precedes negotiations, with the government holding the provincial capitals even if the Taliban controls the intervening rural spaces. Such a power equation helps build symmetry on the negotiation table and bears promise of an agreement emerging with the two sides relatively evenly represented in an interim government that an agreement is expected to midwife.

Taliban’s gains on ground are therefore troubling. Not only do they set back the talks, allowing it to grab as much as it can in the interim, but portend an uneven agreement. Given the latter possibility, it makes it more likely that the two sides may persist with fighting, with the Taliban hoping to make military gains and the government hoping to preserve its space and reclaim lost ground.

For this reason there is a consensus in the international community that the Taliban must be cautioned against attempting to take Kabul militarily and any Taliban Emirate emerging thereafter would not be recognized. This would place the Taliban at the same starting point it was some 25 years ago when merely three states recognized it, though it had control over some 90 per cent of Afghan territory then. Besides, persisting with fighting in face of calls for military restraint would jeopardise not only political support, but also humanitarian and developmental aid that serves as incentive for the two sides to arrive at a compromise agreement at Doha.

The Security Council’s open session ended in further deliberations in a closed format. The outcome will likely be reflected in a Security Council resolution when the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) comes up for extension by the Council next month. Interim developments, both on ground and at Doha, will inform the resolution on the UNAMA mandate that will reflect these developments.

Optimistically, if the Doha talks make progress and fighting is curtailed, UNAMA can be mandated to extend support to the Doha process till it eventuates in an agreement on interim power sharing in Kabul. Alternative, if the military situation worsens, the international community can exert pressure to open up the humanitarian space, extending but maintaining a status quo on the mandate of the mission. In both cases, the UN secretary general’s newly appointed personal representative would support forming an international and regional consensual position on the future of Afghanistan supportive of a ceasefire and a resumption of the peace process.

Unfortunately, as of now, it appears that the alternative - pessimistic - possibility is more likely. The two sides may contend militarily till winters set in and dampen military moves. Thus, it is only over the turn of the year that movement on the peace front may be more visible. This gives enough time for the international community and the regional players to get their act together.

Currently, the prominent actors are only superficially on the same page. The United States (US) has fast forwarded its exit, without meeting the earlier intended timeline of the Doha peace process resulting in an agreement by when it departs. This has prompted criticism from regional players as China that it is a hasty withdrawal and from Pakistan that the US is leaving a mess behind. The three, joined by Russia, are confabulating in the extended troika while the other regional players, as India and Iran, feeling left out, want to join the conversation. As tit for tat, at the Council session, Pakistan, a major player, was not in the room, kept out – in its reckoning – by India as chair of the Council.

Proxy war clouds ahead

Strategic calculations might yet upend a meeting of minds, leading to violence continuing. The Americans are assisting the Afghan air force and are conducting air strikes of their own. To the Americans, such support lends confidence to the Afghan government to persevere against the Taliban offensive. However, air strikes are prompting the Taliban to rationalize its uptick in violence against civilian targets, such as its recent assassination of the media head of the government, and forays into urban areas.

This solidifies civil war portents, an outcome the US may not be averse too since it leaves the ‘mess’ – Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s word – at the doorstep of China, Iran and Pakistan, states with which it does not have cordial relations. Besides, it helps the US get back at the Taliban by denying Taliban control of Afghanistan for defeating it in a decade-and-half long insurgency. An Afghan cauldron will keep China’s Belt and Road Initiative centric interests in the region in abeyance.

A civil war might serve as setting for proxy war. India would continue its support for the Afghan government under its decade-long strategic partnership and revive its relations with its erstwhile partner, the Northern Alliance, by reaching out to the ethnic self-help militias that have formed across Afghanistan in wake of the Afghan national defence and security forces proving less than able to take on the Taliban despite over a decade of capacity-building by the US and, to a lesser - and less visible - degree, India. For its part, Pakistan will likely deepen its military engagement with the Taliban. It has reportedly deployed elements of the Pakistani terror organizations as Jaish and Lashkar in support of Taliban offensives.

Implications for Kashmir

For India, keeping Pakistan tied down in Afghanistan in a proxy war will help keep Pakistan off Kashmir, over which India has tightened its political and military control of late. Perceiving that its mentee, the Taliban, is thwarted in Afghanistan, Pakistan may return to its long held preoccupation, Kashmir, by resuming infiltration of Afghan civil war hardened Pakistani Punjabi fighters to revive the intensity of terror and help boost the insurgency in Kashmir. With China breathing down India’s neck on the other side, in Ladakh, Pakistan will unlikely be deterred by India’s conventional might, whittled as it has been with the pivot to the China front involving a diminution in its conventional advantage by transfer of some of its Pakistan-centric strike corps assets to the mountain strike corps poised against China.

Since the Taliban will be rather busy within Afghanistan, it is unlikely they will spare time and attention for Kashmir – the fear voiced in some strategic writings based on the factually incorrect narrative that international jihadism and Taliban presence was incident in Kashmir in the nineties when the troubles there were at their peak.

A revival of the insurgency, buttressed by Pakistani terrorism by proxy, shall lead to India responding with a heavy hand. The regional security situation can get potentially worse since the trend in surgical strikes over the past decade has been incessantly upwards. Earlier these were retributary raids, which in 2016 grew in magnitude and by 2019 had acquired an aerial dimension. More stringent population control measures impacting Kashmiris can be expected.

Reliance on the police, assisted by the central armed police, has only grown since the nullification of Article 370 two years back. With a proportion of the army-led paramilitary force, the Rashtriya Rifles, redeployed to Ladakh in the face off against China there, the security forces – feeling resultantly more vulnerable – will likely be more heavy-handed.

Politically, such a situation might be read as an opportunity by the Indian government. It is on-the-ropes after a series of setbacks to include a poor economy, disputed record in its showing on Covid, an alienated constituency of farmers and ‘Snoopgate’. Facing elections in a crucial north Indian state, Uttar Pradesh, early next year, it can use a stand-off with Pakistan for electoral gains, as it did in the last state elections there soon after the 2016 surgical strikes.

For Pakistan, continuing military contest in Afghanistan has the advantage of allowing its protégé to make gains and cement its strategic interest there of ‘strategic space’. Strife in Kashmir enables it the cover of a political rationale highlighting human rights to reengage in its interference in Kashmir. Pakistan gets two places to divert the Islamist energy within its society, even though this has the underside of developing a backlash in its cities as was the case a decade back. Besides, it can help it get back at India for tripping it up in Afghanistan and spurning its offer of geo-economic incentives made early this year.

Heightening preventive diplomacy

The upshot of this worst-case assessment is that while players may voice a disinclination for a civil war, all may not be unwilling to settle for one in case their interests are not met. The strategic interests of the US in leaving behind a restive Afghanistan must be called out, even if this dilutes focus on the Taliban as the sole spoiler.

Prevention of the worst-case entails the political moves currently framing the developing situation in Afghanistan need being energized in an expansion of the extended Troika to include India. The regional organization most relevant – the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – must step up, since it has both political heft and is best positioned to lend support to any agreement from the peace process, including by deploying military monitors or peacekeeping troops along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as requested by the Afghan government at the Security Council. The UN envoy can play a catalytic role in all this.

Even as India is helping the Afghan government whittle Taliban’s military momentum, it must upgrade its outreach to the Taliban from an intelligence-led to a diplomatic one. This will help it mirror the other actors who have links with both sides, making it appear less of an outlier thereby. India can exploit and further its proximity with the Gulf states by helping them move faster on the peace process. It can position itself as a responsible player by easing the job of the UN envoy and bolster its longstanding case for a permanent Council seat.

For this to transpire, the internal political fallout of the possibility of being scalded by an Afghan civil war’s fallout in Kashmir must be brought home to Indian security minders. The sentiment voiced by Olympic javelin gold medalist Neeraj Chopra that had Nadeem, the fifth place Pakistani finisher, joined him on the podium it would have been good for Asia needs to come to fore.

 

 https://southasianvoices.org/the-escalatory-risks-of-indias-integrated-battle-groups/

The Escalatory Risks of India’s Integrated Battle Groups

In recent years, changes in the Indian military have made escalatory risks and the nuclear factor loom larger in the event of any military confrontation. These changes are threefold: a shift to integrated battle groups (IBGs) from corps-sized formations, a military pivot away from the Pakistan front and towards China, and under-the-radar nuclear modernization. All these changes lend themselves to fueling escalation between India and its adversaries during a conflict.

The impact of these changes suggest three escalatory steps. The first step on the escalation ladder is the availability and utility of IBGs as of next year (2022), by which time they will be “carved out of existing formations.” IBGs are small, agile units with offensive tasks within both “pivot” (ground-holding) and strike corps that lend themselves to joining battles earlier and can enable a swift transformation of a crisis into a conflict. The second step of escalation involves secondary support for IBGs. As IBGs have a lighter footprint, they may require reinforcement in the face of an adversary’s response, resulting in increased intensity of a conflict, higher levels of force commitment, and possible horizontal escalation at the conventional level. Finally, the third step risks escalation to the nuclear level, made more likely by the preceding conventional escalation.

Escalatory Impulses

While IBGs were initially envisioned for India’s western-front on the Pakistan border, as the threat of salami slicing on the Sino-Indian border comes to the fore in India’s defense planning, IBGs are now being operationalized on both fronts. While their development on their own does not provoke nuclear thresholds, the employment of IBGs is likely to foreshadow greater escalation, both vertical and horizontal, that in turn brings the nuclear equation into play.

Against Pakistan

For Pakistan, India’s shift to IBGs appears in line with the deterrence compulsions of the nuclear age. If Pakistani deterrence messaging on tactical nuclear weapons is to be believed, corps-level operations flirt dangerously with the nuclear threshold—placing achieving reasonable political aims through conventional force at an unnecessary level of risk. Though India conceptualized Cold Start in 2004, military leadership acknowledged that operationalization of the doctrine was still pending as of 2017. Now IBGs will provide Cold Start with teeth, enabling the launch of pivot and strike corps limited offensives. However,  in response to terrorist attacks, the presence of ready-to-mobilize IBGs can shorten the fuse between crisis and conflict, enabling India to go beyond the surgical strikes pitched as the dividing line between subconventional and conventional levels. Surgical strikes, which may be aerial or involve a few dozen troops, have not pushed Pakistan down the conventional escalation route so far. However, IBGs—potentially entailing several thousand troops—are decidedly breaching the subconventional-conventional divide, thereby likely to provoke further conventional escalation.

Furthermore, India’s divided attention between China and Pakistan may make Pakistan more capable of responding to IBGs, allowing escalation to occur more quickly. India is slicing up its third strike corps against Pakistan to create an additional mountain strike corps for use against China. The 1 Corps has reportedly been stripped of much of its infantry and some of its armor. Under the circumstance of seeming equivalence—two of Pakistan’s strike corps versus India’s two plus the newly downsized corps—Pakistan may react more successfully to IBG offensives under its “new concept of warfighting” doctrine. Pakistan has reportedly engaged in extensive war gaming and exercises and repositioned its response forces to negate any advantage India seeks from its Cold Start doctrine. Since this preparation may give Pakistan the confidence to take on India’s Cold Start IBG-executed offensives, Pakistan could proceed to do so, generating adverse operational circumstances for the Indian military. A few years on, when India has regained the fighting elements of the strike corps for the plains, it will be back to square one, but with an increased capacity for being quicker off the blocks.

A military setback by Pakistan would have both internal political and reputational costs for India, perhaps pushing it to over-compensate and go beyond the scope of limited offensives by IBGs. Should symmetric conventional escalation tend towards India gaining an upper hand, either through territorial gains or degradation of its military assets, Pakistan could uncover its well-advertised conventional-nuclear “full spectrum deterrence” doctrine, predicated on the strategic effects of tactical nuclear weapons, bringing the nuclear factor into the equation.

Against China

The dynamics of the situation on the India-China front also lend themselves to accelerating the impetus to horizontal escalation, outside of the military contest on the Himalayas. The Himalayan terrain on the border makes IBG-sized forces deployable, maneuverable, and easily switched between theaters of conflict. Since IBGs imply small portions of territory being captured, rather than territorial chunks, escalation may incorrectly be presumed to be manageable.

However, IBGs make military options figure more readily into the menu of political choices. In the fall prior to the Ladakh crisis, the IBGs intended for use in mountains were only used in exercise HimVijay, on the other end of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), in Arunachal Pradesh. A second IBG related exercise was Pakistan-front centric. As a result, the military option in Ladakh was defensive and restricted to “mirror deployment,” though there were also other reasons, such as the onset of the pandemic, that caught India flatfooted and impacted its decision-making on Ladakh.

Although India did not deploy IBGs during the Ladakh crisis, the likelihood of military escalation will be higher next time as IBGs are primed for conflict. The early position by the Indian government that down played the crisis and asserted that there was no intrusion that merited a military reaction in Ladakh will no longer be an option. A political need to “do something” may lead to upping the stakes in Ladakh. India played down the crisis last year, in part because it did not have the force readily available for a military reckoning in Ladakh. In the next crisis, with IBGs on hand, India has the ability to be responsive to domestic political pressures and compensate through military action.

This rising political view is in part due to criticism of India’s failure to exercise a counter-grab option and thereby increase its strength at the post-Ladakh crisis negotiations. China has therefore proved only partially responsive to a negotiated disengagement and de-escalation. Such learning from the crisis may entail greater Indian reliance on IBGs in an offensive role, since IBGs are customized for agility in mountainous terrain. While this capability and intent has deterrence utility—forcing China to think twice before any military adventure—deterrence is never cast-iron. Deterrence has a dark side: actions required to maintain credibility might require suitably positioned and tasked IBGs to launch quick offensives.

In a future crisis, while IBGs of defensive formations would as part of “offensive defense” replicate maneuvers like the Kailash range occupation in August 2020 in real time, India could also deploy offensive IBGs to push into China’s side of the LAC and counter-grab the Moldo garrison or Rudok. Either proactively or in response, China may capture Daulat Beg Oldie—India’s well-known Achilles heel—clinching its advantage in the Depsang area. The localized border war may expand under compulsion from a nexus of military factors and nationalism to include air raids and missile exchanges against other regions in both countries. In an adverse circumstance developing on the Himalayan front, Indian maritime strategies have already mapped out horizontal escalation to the seas near the Malacca Strait.

While the nuclear aspect has historically not played into India-China confrontation in the same ways as India-Pakistan crisis, it is nonetheless a crucial aspect to consider as India’s force options expand. Both India and China commit to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons and have other motivations to not deploy the nuclear option, however the vagaries and uncertainties of conflict may stretch doctrinal commitment.

Preventing Escalation

The likelihood of escalation brought on by IBGs and the increasing focus on China has grim indications. The nuclear factor in an India-Pakistan context is well acknowledged. Pakistan’s possession of tactical nuclear weapons makes this stark, as does India’s shift—discerned by some experts—towards jettisoning NFU. Against China, any public rescinding of NFU in face of tensions on the border, would likely be read as nuclear messaging—adding great uncertainties to conflict dynamics on LAC. By embarking on IBGs India is making its military power usable. However, India would do well to acknowledge the resulting escalatory dimension and take prior precautions.

There are already functioning channels of communication with all sides. These channels need to be formalized for escalation control and early conflict termination. India has ongoing military talks and a diplomatic working group with China. With Pakistan, the intelligence channel is already functional, with the recent ceasefire on the Line of Control to show for it. Such conversations, alongside preventative diplomacy, will partially help enable India to overcome escalatory tensions.

Preventive diplomacy is also essential in mitigating escalatory risks. Kashmir continues to be a flashpoint for nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan, India must seek further back-channel negotiations and DGMO talks. This is admittedly easier said than done, but the escalation prospects of military developments suggest that while in the past escalation was avoidable—as the non-availability of IBGs made moving to the first rung of the escalation ladder more difficult— now, with the capability at hand, India is likely to have greater pressure to address the political problem that might give rise to their use.

Against China, India must temper the impossible-to-achieve aim of restoring the status quo ante in Ladakh by countenancing the mutual give-and-take necessary in border negotiations. While there may be some domestic costs of this approach for Indian policymakers, the alternative risks straining limited resources and keeping the border primed for more serious clashes or conflict. Even while military moves, such as strengthening deterrence by denial, are afoot and a strategy of hedging by toting up strategic partnerships, such as the Quad, are underway to strengthen India’s response to salami-slicing on the LAC, India must diplomatically ensure that in a future relationship of “antagonistic cooperation,” cooperation rather than antagonism dominates.