https://www.academia.edu/44179437/NUCLEAR_HERESIES_Part_II
NUCLEAR
HERESIES
Part
II
BY
ALI AHMED
Ali Ahmed, PhD (JNU), has
been an infantryman, an academic and a UN official. His second doctorate, a PhD
under Special Regulations from Cambridge University, was awarded based on his
publications - inter-alia - on nuclear doctrine. This book is second part of a
compilation of his writings on nuclear doctrinal issues in South Asia.
Foreword
This is the second part
of Nuclear Heresies. The title owes to the main theme of the book, that
a nuclear doctrine that was genocidal to begin with, is now suicidal. The
doctrine self-interestedly assumes that South Asia is not in the state of
Mutual Assured Destruction. Since at the crunch this notion will be rudely
dispelled, the book endeavours to make the case that it would not do to wait
that long and instead rethink deterrence and rework doctrine, if not be rid of
the wretched weapons themselves.
The book has been twenty
years and more in the making. It comprises commentaries with focus mainly on
the India-Pakistan strategic equation, of which the nuclear factor is a
critical part. It engages with the doctrinal interconnection between the two
subcontinental states, arguing that their two doctrines taken together make for
a combustible mess.
The book covers the
century so far. Since we have managed to avoid a nuclear punch up, this implies
we can get along. By no means is this thanks to nuclear weapons. We can thus
coexist if not collaborate, and without nuclear weapons at that. This vision
needs to energise people, lest someday nuclear use be the trigger for good
sense.
I thank the publications
in which these commentaries appeared over the years. I have used others’ works
as peg for my arguments, sometimes using their ideas for target practice. While
some were genuine bhakts of the false god, deterrence, there has been over the
years an ideological contamination of doctrinal space by bhakts of the
better-known variety. My singular contribution, if any, has been to point to
this, hopefully to the betterment of strategic thinking in general.
I hope the commentaries
inspire students in particular. Here they can access the nuclear field through
an Ashokan lens. The liberal rationalist perspective has a long historical
tradition in South Asia. It needs airing in order that someday it gets the momentum
and escape velocity to reclaim its place, if not sway, in Indian strategic
culture.
Contents
1. The
Nuclear Domain: In Irreverence 8
2. Modi at the Helm: Whither Nuclear Decision-making? 17
3. Indian
Nuclear Command and Control 21
4. Indian
Nuclear Command and Control – II 29
5. The
Scientific Establishment: From the Brahmachari Bomb to Brahmastra 34
6.
Information Operations in Limited Nuclear War 52
7. A Call
for nuclear sanity 54
8.
Avoiding Nuclear War in South Asia 56
9. India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Strategic Direction or Drift? 58
10. Modi May Say Otherwise, But India Is Still Short of ‘Survivable
Nuclear Deterrent’ 59
11. What nuclear weapons have done to us 61
12. Are India’s nuclear weapons in safe hands? 63
13.
Nuclear Battlefield Preparedness 64
14.
India-Pakistan: Contrasting Doctrines 66
15.
Conventional Backdrop to the NuclearForeground 72
16.
Visualising the Impact of Nuclear Operations at the Conventional Level 78
17.
India’s forthcoming nuclear doctrine review 81
18. At
the Conventional-Nuclear Interface 88
19. The
Doctrinal Challenge 93
20.
The Danger of Strategic Determinism 99
21. India
and China: Nationalism and Nuclear Risk 101
22.
Political Dimensions of Limited War 102
23. What
Does India Mean By ‘Two Front’ Problem? 105
24.
Mountain Strike Corps: The Nuclear Dimension 108
25. Exit
Points and the Updation of Cold Start Doctrine 109
26. What
Does India Mean By ‘Massive’Retaliation? 112
27.
Nuclear Use: Need for Thinking on Political-Level Considerations 115
28.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine Review: Don’t Leave It to the Hawks! 116
29.
Nuclear Doctrine Review: NRRC 118
30.
Diplomatic Engagement in a Post Nuclear Use Environment 121
31. The
Aftermath of Pakistani Nuclear First Use 123
32.
Nuclear Doctrine Review: Three Deterrence Models 125
33.
Severe Indigestion From Nuclear Orthodoxy 127
34. An
Indian Nuclear Doctrine Review: A Third Model 129
35. Kashmir
and the Bomb 131
36.
Nuclear Doctrinal Revision for the China Front 133
37.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Storm in India’s Nuclear Teacup 135
38.
India-Pakistan: Distancing the Spark from theNuclear Tinderbox 136
39.
Rethinking India’s Nuclear Doctrine 140
40. The
Post Conflict Factor in Nuclear Decision Making 144
41.
India, Nuclear Weapons and ‘MassiveRetaliation’: The Impossibility of
Limitation? 146
42.
Nuclear Use Consequences for Pakistan 147
43. Hatf
IX and Possible Indian Responses 149
44.
Deterrence has a Shaky and Brief Shelf Life 151
45.
Demonstration Strikes, in an Indo-Pak Conflict Scenario 152
46. Tit
for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative 154
47. What
Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr? 156
48.
Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective 158
49.
Making Sense of ‘Nasr’ 161
50.
Nuclear Targeting Caveats 163
51. The
Military Intelligence Function in Future War 166
52.
Implications of Indian BMD Developments 168
53.
Nuclear Implications of the ‘Two Front’ Formulation 170
54.
Re-visioning the Nuclear Command Authority 172
55.
Policy Brief Reviewing India’s Nuclear
Doctrine 175
56. The
Need for Clarity In India’s Nuclear Doctrine 181
57.
India’s Response to CBW Attack 184
58.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine 187
59.
Taking Nuclear War-Fighting Seriously 193
60.
India-Pakistan: Missing NCBMs 196
61.
Prospects of India-Pakistan Nuclear Confidence Building 198
62.
NCBMs: Scaremongering, But with a Purpose 200
63. The
Direction of India’s Deterrent 201
64. Implications
of Indian BMD Developments 203
65.
Should India Give Up its NFU Doctrine 205
66. The
Logic of the ‘Sundarji Doctrine’ 206
67. The
Illogic of ‘Unacceptable Damage’ 208
68. The
Illogic of ‘Massive’ Punitive Retaliation 209
69.
Nuclear Trajectory in South Asia 211
70.
Nuclear C2: The Balance Agenda 212
71.
Deterrence Stability in a Context of Strategic Instability 214
72. Hatf
IX and Possible Indian Responses 216
73.
Arguing for NBC Training 218
74.
Mountain Strike Corps: The Nuclear Dimension 220
73. One
gaffe too many 221
74. Whose
command? Whose control? 224
75. The
nuclear numbers game 226
76.
Wanted: A peace movement 228
77.
Making nuclear sense 230
78. The
Bright Side of ‘Asymmetric Escalation’ 232
79. On Disarmament
Prospects in South Asia 234
80. Yet
Another Nuclear Controversy 235
81. The
Myth of ‘Weapons of Peace’ 237
82.
Getting it Right: Rereading India’s Nuclear Doctrine 239
83.
Pakistan’s Possible Nuclear Game Plan 240
84. The
Calculus of ‘Cold Start’ 242
84.
Limited Nuclear War, Limitless Anxiety 244
85. The
Day After ‘Cold Start’ 247
86. The
Logic of Nuclear Redlines 248
87. A
Smoke Screen called Limited War 250
88. The
Need to Revisit Conventional Doctrine 251
89. The
Impetus Behind Limited War 252
90.
Preparing for ‘Limited Nuclear War’ 253
