https://www.indianewsstream.com/a-suggestion-for-india-on-the-afghanistan-peace-talks/
A suggestion for
India on the Afghanistan peace talks
Some ten years back, India scared
off Richard Holbrooke, a legend in cracking heads as a mediator, when he tried
to manage the external security environment as a prelude to getting on with his
mandate from President Obama to get the Taliban to the talks table. Central to
his conflict analysis was the role of the regional players, India and Pakistan,
in the conflict. Believing that he had been put to it by Pakistan, exercising
its nuisance value through its hold over the Taliban, even Manmohan Singh’s
relatively weak government in its second term, managed to fob him off. His failure
perhaps led partially to a heart attack that soon claimed his life.
The United States (US) has learnt
its lesson, though often and as recently as this week at Davos, the US reiterated
its interest in an India-Pakistan engagement over Kashmir. This was at the
behest of Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan in his meeting with Trump, the
subtext being that since Pakistan is playing along with the US gameplan for an
exit in Afghanistan, it needs to be obliged by the US leaning its on strategic
partner, India, to cut them some rope on Kashmir. Reflexively, India – as
earlier – has declined any role for third party assistance with its problem
with Pakistan.
This latest regional spat apart,
the tenth round of talks between the US and Taliban proceeds in Doha. Currently,
the culmination ceremony of the previous round having been cancelled by Trump
inimitably through a tweet last September, the talks have resumed. Whereas
earlier the pressure over talks was for talks between the Afghan government and
the Taliban, President Trump settled for talking directly to the Taliban as
precursor to arranging talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
The Taliban had in September balked
at the presence of the Afghan government, who they consider American puppets,
at the signing ceremony that was to be held at Camp David. At the time of
writing, the Taliban has offered to let off the Americans as they prepare for
departure, even as they wind down – but not by much – their targeting of
government forces. It is not known if the previous sequence of talks between
the Taliban and the Afghan government at Oslo would follow this round of talks
with the US, if successful.
For its part, India is wary of
the talks. It’s long-held, if unrealistic, position has been in favour of
intra-Afghan talks being Afghan-owned and Afghan-led. It thinks that US
departing would be premature as it would lead to a power imbalance between the
Taliban, which is supported by Pakistan, and the Afghan government, that is
rather unsteady on its feet. For the reason that the Afghan government is
fragile and propped up by external powers, including India through its military
training program, political and donor support, the Afghan-led process has not
gotten off over the past decade.
The eternal hope has been that
the military training, among others by India, US and the United Kingdom, would
finally get the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) up to speed to whittle
the Taliban. This has proved wishful. Instead, it is to the Taliban’s credit
that the threat of spread of the Islamic State in has been contained and pushed
back. Knowing this, India is in an internal debate to the extent it needs
touching base with the Taliban, though up-front it awaits the outcome Trump’s
viceroy for the region, Zalmay Khalilzad, is to serve up soon.
To the extent that a settlement
with the US buoys the Taliban in its talks with the government, the Taliban
would drive a hard bargain. The Afghan elections process that began late last
year is as yet incomplete. While there are reports of the ANSF perking up at
long last, making gains in some six districts recently and taking on at least
half the burden of bombing the Taliban by air, it is uncertain if this late
surge on its part can compensate for the gain in Taliban’s image from having
fought the superpower to a standstill and agreed to its departure with dignity,
if not surrender as such. The understanding is that Taliban was much in its
element in fighting off an infidel, external foe, and would not like to pursue
a fight with their fellows, now that the US is out of the equation. It would
put it afoul of their own kin and ethnic cousins on the other side. Besides,
some reports have it that some fighters are exhausted and were enticed by the
2018 Eid ceasefire. Thus, the possibility of asymmetric talks with Taliban
holding the upper hand is tempered somewhat.
This should mitigate India’s
concerns somewhat, assuming these were genuine. It cannot be said with any
certainty anymore if India’s heart beats for the Afghans. India in Modi’s
regime has adopted a self-consciously hyper-realist perspective on national
security. By this yardstick, an unsettled Afghanistan is in its better interest
since it keeps Pakistan preoccupied to its western flank, thereby providing
India with some breathing space to reconcile Kashmir to its new reality within
India. Unsettled Afghanistan provides India a proxy war arena - to counter
Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir - both within Afghanistan and, from
Afghanistan, a handle into Pakistan’s ethnic cauldron. Its power-centric
national security approach places India as a spoiler in the ongoing peace
process in Afghanistan.
If its national interest is all
that drives India these days, then there is another route by way of which it
can bring this about. The national interest it wishes to further is perhaps to
see that Pakistan does not get its way in Afghanistan, and having got its way
there, turns on India yet again in Kashmir. India may also want to preserve its
space in Afghanistan, by propping up hitherto allies and seeing its donor aid
not go down the drain. Indian national security minders need to be persuaded
that this national interest can be obtained without trying to outpoint Pakistan
by jinxing the peace talks.
There are two visits to Delhi.
Trump is visiting in end February and the council of heads of government of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), being chaired by India this year,
meets in autumn. The latter would bring four other heads of government with an
interest in Afghanistan together: Russia, China, Pakistan and India. India
could take a measure of where the Afghan peace talks are going when Trump is
here and present a plan - outlined below – that would make India part of the
solution rather than the problem as the US seems to see it currently.
The plan proposed here is to that India make a
pitch at the SCO for a meeting of minds on the peace process. Since
Afghanistan’s membership is pending with the SCO, it could champion this.
Already, the SCO has a contact group on Afghanistan that can in the interim
work on supporting the peace talks in Afghanistan.
Just as the proof of the pudding
is in the eating, a peace process is only as good as its implementation. The
SCO as a continental organization is best positioned to undertake such support.
This would be in keeping with the United Nations Charter and with its best
practice of outsourcing peace initiatives to regional organizations with
capacity, interest and will to take these on. The political heft of China and
Russia can help with Security Council endorsement of an SCO initiative. China
and India have the financial capacity for helping with peace building. Evan as
the Americans wind up their military presence, they need to be around with
rebuilding the country they brought to dust. It would not be entirely
outlandish to suggest a peacekeeping operation under SCO aegis, including
troops from China, India and Pakistan, among others as Muslim states and other
South Asian states.
Pakistan’s advantage in its hold
over the Taliban would be moderated thus. In any case, while Taliban is
beholden to Pakistan, it remains an autonomous player. India’s financial
largesse would be much needed at a stage when the Taliban can dispense with
political support and would not any more need the military support of its
erstwhile sponsor. India can thus outflank Pakistan, without antagonizing that
state. And, who knows what habits of cooperation interfacing in an Afghan peace
process may instill between these two states?