The options conundrum
for Kashmiris
For now it is evident that
Kashmiris are into a unique form of non-cooperation, opening up enough to
survive, but not so much as to underwrite any claim by the government of a
return to normalcy. This may be as much to do with their leadership of all hues
being incarcerated as with Pakistani proxy war minders recovering from their
post 5 August shell shock.
What is certain is that history
is not an end, as the dynamic trio that heads the Indian state – Narendra Modi,
Amit Shah and Ajit Doval - might like Indians to believe. With the strains
beginning to show on their primary instrument – the central reserve police that
lost a senior officer in an avalanche as he cut corners to make it back to
Kashmir from a short breather outside it – it is clear that even the Chanakyan
duo – Shah and Doval – cannot believe this.
What the state expects and is
shaping is a substitution in the leadership of Kashmiris by well meaning and
opportunist quislings of sorts, encouragement for forgetting the recent past
through incentives in drips and drops like rekindled broadband etc, distraction
in hectic activity like preparing the house verification as part of run up to
the update of population register and census, and holding out hope for
political reinstatement through sweetners as a residency requirement of 15
years for purchase of land etc. Alongside, it keeps its dragnet in place, with
its security forces occupying, as a recent report on protests suggests, college
premises.
It is only a matter of time that
the fratricides and fraggings make an appearance, as is the spate with
repressive deployments in central India when beset with election duty
additionally. The calls on armed policing from elsewhere such as restive Assam
have resulted in some troop deinduction from Kashmir. Evidently, the string is
taut. The resulting tension may well be awaiting the proverbial spark. History
suggests winter is no time for respite, given that the events of December and
January at the turn of the nineties shook Kashmir as no other period has done
till then or since. The clampdown then, that has since lent resonance to place
names as Habba Kadal, Gau Kadal, Maisooma, Rainawari etc, only added to the
energy that it was meant to dissipate. This time too it could be no different.
Then, the army had a few columns
out on assistance to civil authority.
They are rumoured to have seen action, with mention of light machine gun
usage at the time, though history for most part records the hapless central
reserve police at the forefront. This means that the army may well be sucked in
willy nilly into any impending explosion. Quite like its counter parts in
Assam, called in from their deployment close at hand on a counter insurgency
grid for aid to civil authority against the anti-citizenship bill agitations
there, Its current utility in an anti terror role and on stand-by stands to be
rudely interrupted.
Though the army commander was
shown supervising a security meeting at the onset of the lock down, in order no
doubt so that the civilians could get a buffer should things go wrong, it is
not self-evident that the army is enamoured with its lead role. One news report
let on that the army uncomfortable with being mistaken for the paramilitary
wanted to change its camouflage pattern to a distinctive one. The resemblance
has led to it being accused of violence even if perpetrated by the
paramilitary, such as in the notorious case of broadcast of cries from torture
so as to cow the citizenry. It is not known what the army inquiry promised when
the accusation surfaced revealed.
Even so, given that that the army
chief has on at least two occasions said that the security forces in Kashmir
are hand in glove, the army cannot but gets its uniform dirty even if egregious
violence is perpetrated by the paramilitary. The advisor home having been
kicked upstairs to a sinecure in the ministry in Delhi, the burden is more
starkly on its shoulders. Its links to the bureaucrat in saddle are no doubt
challenged by protocol issues as much as lack of any known familiarity on his
part with counter insurgency.
The army is no doubt aware of the
challenges. An illustration is its losing some 20 soldiers to avalanches this
year that indicate the pressures to keep people on posts and even untenable
posts on snowed-in ridgelines for as long as possible. Apparently, avalanches
have accounted for 74 deaths over the past three years, indicating the
operational alertness. The soon-to-retire army chief, who may well be
kicked-upstairs as chief of defence staff, warns of increased border action
team assaults along the Line of Control that will add to the stretch. The
relative quiet in the Valley, a respite from militancy, stone throwing and
terrorist activity, may unravel at a higher tempo on breakdown.
Much depends on what the
Kashmiris opt for. They appear to have four options. One is to be quiescent, throw in the towel and get
along with the humiliation inflicted by the dynamic trio. Since even the state
does not appear to be so deluded, this option can safely be discarded at the
outset. The second is to maintain the status on non-cooperation and embarrass
the Indian state. Their effort so far has drawn blood with India being
uncharacteristically cast into the doghouse of international public opinion.
However, this option is predicated on the assumption that the dynamic trio has
ordinary sensibilities. Yashwant Sinha, formerly in the right wing corner,
informs of being aghast to discover that the national security establishment is
enamoured of a ‘doctrine of state’, presumably based on a misreading of
Kautilya that only the ‘dand’ works. Simply put, this is arrogance of power.
Believing in the trite saying that ‘pride comes before a fall’ is to wait
indefinitely. This regime’s policies are predicated on an anti-Muslim
foundation, rather than national interest mundanely defined and it is not going
anywhere any time soon.
The third option is to resume the
status quo ante of a mix of militancy, insurgency and terrorism. This is an old
script that can only yield result if there is a political prong to Indian
strategy at play. In the insurgency play book, military activity is to force a
political settlement without compromising one’s position. Since India has
chosen to cut off its nose to spite its face, there is no political prong of
strategy in sight. So a status quo ante can at best witness another four years
of self-inflicted hardship, since any change of gear can only await the
democratic departure of this government. There is no guarantee of this since it
can yet pull a Balakot on the electorate.
The fourth is to rely on Pakistan
to up its act. This flies in face of history. Pakistan did not bestir to rescue
East Pakistan in late 1971, even though Indian forces had ventured into East
Pakistan early November onwards. While India once dated the war to Pakistan’s
belated aerial attack on its airfields in early December, it is no longer
reticent in owning up to creating the conditions for the Pakistani (counter)
attack. Its veterans have a plethora of stories of their incursions starting
with Indira Gandhi’s intervention legitimizing trip to foreign capitals in
early November. Given this history of lassitude on a national interest of
following through with its promise of defending East Pakistan by acting in the
west, Pakistan is hardly likely to jeopardise its national interest of survival
and its army its institutional interest beyond a rhetorical responses, led by
the (s)elected prime minister. This option is a chimera, with Pakistan – that
has not outwitted the financial action task force just yet nor managed to
deliver on its promises to America on the Taliban – unlikely to be able to make
good any time soon.
Kashmiris therefore face a
conundrum. It is not something that would have escaped its incarcerated
leadership. Reports of political bonhomie and cross-party discussions when
confined together abound. Their next steps are perhaps solidified and await the
nod of leaderships once their confinement ends. What might the contours?
Kashmir could perhaps pitch for
the unfinished agenda of bifurcation - another bifurcation. Even if initially
this may lead to foregoing the buffer to Jammu, the earlier trifurcation agenda
could be explored. Kashmiris can be their own masters. The price is to dispense
with their control over others that has arguably partially caused their present
predicament. If this is not possible, then the regional autonomy features that
were covered in the several reports, such as of the three interlocutors, the
working groups and the mainstream parties, could be put in place to keep the
two regions currently yoked together from each other’s throats – with a Delhi
appointee playing umpire. This can in a way keep alive the Kashmiri quest for a
distinctive self-hood, which is of a piece with India’s constitutional scheme.
If and when this regime joins the debris of history, Kashmiris could reprise
their course.
Needless to say this political
course has no room for violence. As the security survey preceding the
discussion of options suggests, the situation is keyed up to blow with a bigger
bang. This is just the diversion the regime would welcome at a time it is being
challenged for its misplaced ideological initiative, on citizenship, across
India. The security establishment and its instruments would also not be averse
since Kashmir has been beneficial institutionally and personally for ticket
punching. Pakistan would be loathe to put its money where its mouth is.
Therefore, with no one else being hurt, it would be irrational for Kashmiris to
revert to militancy, but would be better advised to channel the youthful energy
to back its political course, taking a leaf from the situation developing in
rest of India.
