A call for nuclear sanity rather than retaliation
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/call-for-nuclear-sanity-rather-than-retaliation/162858.html
26 November 2015
Amb. G Parthasarathy’s opinion
piece in The Tribune (19 November 2015)
argues that, ‘Pakistan should be presented a stark picture of what would happen
to its Punjab province, if it resorts foolishly to nuclear adventurism, whether
tactical or strategic.’
He prefers that India respond to
any Pakistani use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, with
‘massive’ nuclear retaliation in keeping with India’s declaratory nuclear
doctrine. To him, holding densely populated Pakistani Punjab hostage would
deter Pakistan from going nuclear.
He is not alone in holding such a
position. Amb. Shyam Saran also made the same point in his Subbu
Forum Society lecture in New Delhi in 2013, when he was Chair of the
National Security Advisory Board. Saran said, ‘if it (India) is attacked with
such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and
designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary… the label on a
nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant.’
That India continues with its
declaratory nuclear doctrine that dates to 2003 implies that it is a widely
held view. It is easy to see why this is so. The prospects of near certain
destruction can only serve to deter.
However, since 2003, much water
has flown down the Indus. The subcontinent has witnessed vertical
proliferation, with Pakistan reputedly having 140-160
nuclear warheads. India is not far behind.
What this suggests is that
Pakistan has the capability to retaliate in kind in case India was to massively
counter Pakistan’s introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. Since India
stands to be grievously hurt, it may be unwilling to follow through on its
promise of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation.
This may embolden Pakistan to go
nuclear. Consequently, India would do well to arrive at safer and saner options
than the one it has currently.
Amb. Parthasarathy in his article
points to Pakistani Punjab as offering plentitude of nuclear targets for retaliation
even if Pakistan’s nuclear first use only targets Indian troops operating under
its ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
However, if India was to target
west Punjab, then its own border areas in proximity starting from Rajouri,
through Jammu and onwards via Amritsar down to Ganganagar stand to be effected
by direct and long term environmental consequences.
Even areas further away will not
be spared. The usual autumnal
media story is that burning of paddy stubble in fields in Punjab invariably
chokes Delhi with its pollution. On Diwali, the figures for pollution in Delhi
were 23
times WHO’s permissible limit. It can only be imagined what the
environmental fallout from the burning of even a couple cities would entail.
There would also be
socio-political fallout. The ongoing refugee crisis in Europe suggests multiple
problems and dangers. Population movements will be akin to those witnessed at Partition.
These will not necessarily be towards the west since across the Indus begin
deserts. Afghanistan is also an unlikely prospect as destination. India may
well be where these flows will head.
The refugees in Europe today are
unlikely to be going back any time soon. Similarly, those who gatecrash India’s
border fence will be here for the long term. As the Paris attacks show, their
influx will not be without dangers.
They would be in addition to
India’s own border populace who would likely have fled inwards. This is in
addition to the internally displaced people India may have to cope with in case
any of its cities are hit in counter retaliation. Many would flee cities such
as Delhi, fearing such targeting.
The civil administration that at
the best of times find coping with monsoons difficult will be unable to rely on
the military to bail it out. The military will be busy inside Pakistan. A
proportion of the paramilitary have relieved the army to stanch possible
resurgence of insurgency in Kashmir.
Further, there are also
imponderables such as effects of the contrived identification of Indian Muslims
with Pakistan. The latest manifestation of this was in the BJP president saying
that in case the party loses in Bihar, there would be celebrations in Pakistan.
Some have interpreted the reference to Pakistan to mean a reference to India’s
internal ‘Other’, its Muslims. Given extant conditions of polarization, it is
not impossible to visualize a communal carnage within India in case of war
going nuclear with its largest minority as scapegoat.
Clearly, with such scenarios easy
to visualize, it is strange that India persists with the logic of ‘massive’
nuclear retaliation. On these counts, Pakistan will unlikely be deterred by
this formulation, knowing India cannot follow through.
Consequently, India needs to
reframe its nuclear doctrine, moving away from ‘massive’ to a more credible
‘tit for tat’. Such exchange(s), albeit avoidable, will yet keep Indian cities
safe.
The rumours of impending nuclear
doctrine revision that attended the BJP election campaign last year must be
taken to the logical conclusion in a revised nuclear doctrine. The revised one
must be predicated on preserving India from nuclear damage to the greatest
extent possible; feasible only by a ‘city avoidance’ strategy in first place.
