What the next war
spells for Kashmir
Kashmir Times, Op-ed, 4 November 2015
http://www.kashmirtimes.in/newsdet.aspx?q=46502
The 1965 War’s fiftieth
anniversary celebrations in India saw amateur military historians
opportunistically claiming that India won the war. If Zhau Enlai’s view of
history is taken as guide – in which when questioned on effects of the French
Revolution, he is said to have remarked that it is too early to tell - it is
somewhat early to celebrate 1965 War as a victory.
Whereas there have been two wars
since – 1971 War and Kargil War – these have not been about Kashmir, even if
Kashmir figured prominently in the former’s peace treaty and served as the site
of the latter. In the 1971 War India cut Pakistan to size in the hope of
creating the conditions for having it give up on Kashmir. It succeeded
partially in this, in that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, firmly in saddle with the
Pakistan army down and out, was ready to sign away Kashmir. Later the army
hanged him for that, not for political murder. For its part, the Kargil War was
an extension of the war in Kashmir, in its theater along the Line of Control.
It extended Pakistan’s bloody fingers in the conflict by another three years.
Instead, the 1965 War was fought
by both sides over the issue of Kashmir. Pakistan was stampeded into war by
India’s political actions seeking to normalize its relationship with Kashmir in
the mid sixties. India also took the opportunity offered by Pakistani military
action to claim that having tried and failed to wrest Kashmir, Pakistan had lost
raison d’etre in Kashmir. Going by the aims of the two sides, it cannot be said
that Pakistan lost since it has kept its stake in Kashmir alive. Likewise, it
cannot be reckoned India won since the Kashmir issue is not quite history.
That Kashmir continues as an
‘issue’ ensures it will figure in the next war.
That another war is not being
ruled out by either state is clear from Pakistan’s foreign secretary
acknowledging for the first time that its Tactical Nuclear Weapons are in
response to India’s conventional war doctrine and capabilities. Within merely a
week from his statement, India announced field maneuvers for its field army,
Southern Command, and its strike corps, 21 Corps.
It is unclear if this is a
preplanned exercise since the announcement has been without the usual publicity
that attends such exercises. Incidentally, there is no name given to the
exercise as is the usual practice either. It is also uncharacteristically the
second exercise of a strike corps within the same year; 2 Corps having been
exercised in early summer this year. Usually, the three strike corps exercise
in rotation, with one being exercised each year.
This bit of ‘signalling’ by both
sides will no doubt keep both security establishments wary of war. Both hope to
deter the other and can be expected to succeed. However, there is a ‘jack in
the box’ that can upturn things.
India’s readiness to battle –
evident from exercises this year across the frontage of its South Western and
Southern Commands stretching from southern Punjab to Rann of Kutch – can only
serve as incentive to jihadists. Should they attempt another mega terror
attack, the favoured scenario of strategists would indeed play out: a terror
attack followed by India’s conventional inroads into Pakistan forcing Pakistan’s
nuclear trigger finger.
This is all the more plausible
since the two sides would be relying on the US to pick their chestnuts out of
the fire. US think tanks have extended the scenario into its post nuclear use
phase and in a war game held in Dubai conditioned players from both states that
external peacemaking initiatives would be necessary and inevitable in such a
case. Indian participants have shifted their advocacy of dispatching Pakistan
to oblivion for the temerity of nuclear first use to a softer nuclear response
of throwing back merely a double of tactical nuclear tonnage. This
non-strategic war will presumably enable de-escalation.
Kashmir will figure in such a war
not only as a theater of war but also in its aftermath. However, no scenario lately
has a mushroom cloud figuring over Kashmir. The last such cloud was conjured up
in the early eighties when a threat of a nuclear bomb on Banihal blocking its
access to Kashmir, enabling Pakistan to wrap up Kashmir, was used in
scaremongering by nuclear hawks to push India into catching up with Pakistan in
bomb making.
As a theater of war, India can
employ its new mountain strike corps to wrest territory. This would be in
keeping with its information war plank that taking back POK is what is meant by
‘outstanding’ issues of Partition. Since this could be a messy enterprise and
would take longer than a ‘short, sharp war’ allows, it could at best straighten
the Line of Control to its own advantage. It may be more forthright in
advancing in areas that it can hope to control firmly later such as along the
Skardu-Gilgit axis. The strategic gain from this would be in threatening the
Pakistan-China link and proposed economic corridor in perpetuity.
It would be sticking its hand
into a beehive in case it drives into the Punjabised areas to Kashmir’s west.
Not only will these be difficult to wrest, but there would be an irregular war
backlash even as the war progresses and prospects of failure in stabilization
operations later. It would put Indian troops on the wrong side of their
fortifications built over half century. Besides, the shifting of the Line of
Control forward would open up spaces for infiltration the likes of which would
put the infiltration of fidayeen in wake of the Kargil incursion seem a trailer.
The consequence on revival of troubles in Kashmir can be easily imagined.
As for the aftermath of what was
intended as a Limited War and ends up as a Limited Nuclear War, Kashmir can be
sure to figure in the peace. Since, as mentioned, both states would be
abdicating their accountability to respective citizens by outsourcing
peacemaking in a war that goes nuclear to the US lead international community,
the international community is unlikely to confine itself to humanitarian
assistance and mediating a ceasefire. It could legitimately engage in
structural peacemaking, meaning the elimination of structural conditions – root
causes - that lead to war.
Since India as the status quo
power – one in firm possession of its secular crown Kashmir – would not like to
see external arm twisting over Kashmir, it needs deciding now if its
inclination for the military option is in its best national interest. For
Kashmiri nationalists, war might not altogether be such a bad thing. For
jihadists it will be altogether a good thing. What’s good for them cannot also
be good for India.
Clearly, the analysis here does
not suggest that the current day militarized approach to Pakistan can protect India's interests as defined by itself. While somewhat late to inform Mr. Modi’s
package for Kashmir to be rolled out on 7 November, there is a case for
defusing Kashmir from within, rather than seeking to ‘resolve’ it through a 'final' military tryst with Pakistan. What needs doing, and urgently, is a change
of tack: leavening an ideological strategy with strategic rationality.
