Monday, 4 June 2012

A Perspective on Land Warfare Strategy
http://www.claws.in/CJ_Winter_2009.pdf

Introduction

If you were to look up “land strategy” in either Google or Wikipedia, you’d be
disappointed. Land strategy does not have the impression in cyber space as one
would expect in the belief that there is something called “land strategy”. The more
familiar term instead is rightly” “military strategy” or “land warfare strategy”.

This is due to military power being taken as one entity in its exercise as per the
dictates of strategy. As Giulio Douhet, the exponent of air power, bemoaning
the parochialism of the military, once rightly said: “There are experts of land,
sea and air warfare. but as yet there are no experts of warfare. And warfare is a
single entity, having a common purpose.”

Therefore, for this article to be titled “land warfare strategy” would appear an untenable contradiction. However, in the light of military history being replete with campaigns such as the Schilieffen
Plan, Operation Barbarossa, Rommel’s conceptualisation of the “Longest Day”,
MacArthur’s inspired landings at Inchon, Schwarzkopf “Hail Mary” manoeuvre
and Petraeus’ “surge” in Iraq, it is apparent that “land strategy” has been central
to war.

Therefore, the aim in this article, intended as a beginner’s guide to strategy,
is to discuss “land warfare strategy” defined as employment of land forces as part
of the wider unfolding of military strategy.

Situating Land Warfare Strategy

Strategy is the use or threat of force for political ends. The political ends being
paramount, strategy derives from a political formulation of the national vision,
aim and interests. The national security policy that defends and furthers these
aims provides the overarching politico-military context for thinking on strategy.

The term increasingly over the last century, has acquired wider connotations
having to do with use of power instead of merely force and not necessarily in war
but also in peace. At the next lower level, military strategy is the employment of
the military instrument of national power in conjunction with other elements
such as diplomacy, political and economic strength and, indeed, also cultural
and soft power.

Land warfare strategy, a component of military strategy, is use of
land forces in war and increasingly also in peace. For India, land warfare strategy
is of continuing consequence since it has a continental orientation, one that is
thankfully increasingly being challenged by the maritime dimension.

Every discussion on strategy necessarily begins with the bible on the military
in the modern era, it being Clausewitz’s work On War. “War is an act of violence
pushed to its utmost bounds…a mere continuation of policy by other means”.

He conceptualised war as being about chance, passion, will, friction and fog. The idea
of strategy is, therefore, to navigate through these conditions intrinsic to conflict
by creating your own circumstance. The opponent, also being so engaged, makes
strategy in the words of French strategist, Andre beaufre, “the art of the dialectic
of opposing wills”.

The widely accepted definition, also echoed in the Indian Army
Doctrine, uses the British war historian and theoretician, Liddell Hart’s words:
“The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”
It follows naturally then that military strategy is to “secure policy objectives by
the application or threat of force.”

While application of military power naturally involves violence, both doyens of strategy,

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, agreeing across two millennia, observe that “supreme (strategic)

excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.

Liddell Hart, a century after Clausewitz, concurs with Sun Tzu that the use of indirect methods to bring about a favourable situation makes better strategic sense. Thus, military strategy has

evolved to mean “management and control of military force in international
politics” (Alastair Buchan).

Two elements of the last century have impacted strategy with consequent
implications for land warfare strategy. One is the widened concept of strategy that
to the foremost Cold War strategist, Henry Kissinger, precludes compromising
two incommensurables – “purely military” or “purely political” – in favour of a
combination of military, political and economic factors.

This is equivalent to the American rediscovery of Chanakya whose discourse on grand strategy, the
Arthashastra, talks of “Sam, Dam, Bhed, and Dand” (Peace, Wealth, Divide, and
Force).

The second has been the impact of the nuclear age on the Clausewitzian
concept that strategy is to enable imposing one’s will on the enemy. In the
words of the premier nuclear strategist, Bernard Brodie, “Clausewitz’s classical
definition must be modified, at least for any opponent who has a substantial
nuclear capability behind him. Against such an opponent, one’s terms must
be modest enough to permit him to accept them, without his being pushed by
desperation into rejecting both those terms and the limitations in war-fighting.”

This second aspect is of consequence for India in relation to the nuclearisation
of South Asia in the late part of the last century.

The Indian Army Doctrine states that “military force contributes by the defeat
of an opposing force.” It defines “defeat” as “diminishing the effectiveness of the
enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or, at least,
not being able to fulfill his intention.”

Land warfare strategy would, therefore, be the plan, employing land forces supplemented by the other two Services, to bring about a condition in which the enemy is unable to fulfill his intent through
combat. The intention is the psychological paralysis of the enemy leadership

by application of combat power for the purposes of preemption, destruction,
dislocation and disruption.

Land warfare strategy could be defensive or offensive depending on the
strategic doctrine of a state. The strategic doctrine choices available to a state are
defence, offence, deterrence and compellence.

Land warfare strategy, taking a cue from the strategic choice, would then configure accordingly. For instance, India’s strategic posture with respect to the China border is one of dissuasive defence,
while that with respect to Pakistan is offensive deterrence. This would bring
to fore the bias in land warfare strategy, defensive and offensive, respectively.

Most armies prefer the latter for reasons of professional worth, and, even when
in defence, prefer offensive-defence, for instance, the doctrine practised by
the Pakistan Army.

While both terms, offence and defence, deal with the same factors majorly, such as intelligence, security, air support, fire support, logistics and communication, the former is related to the capture or destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity and the latter to denying the enemy similar success in
respect of own centre of gravity.

Increasingly, objectives no longer being terrain-centric, the emphasis in land warfare strategy between the main components of land forces — armour, infantry and artillery — would shift as per the situation.

Land Warfare Strategy in India

It has been opined by knowledgeable observers that India lacks a strategic
culture. George Tanham, writing in the early Nineties, maintained that India had a defensive strategic orientation with passivity in military affairs, leading to a non-expansionist military tradition. Increasing interest, access and capabilities with respect to military technology, however, pointed to a more offensive future direction.

To him, India was land oriented, with a protective mass army. Though it
had not articulated its goals in a coherent manner, it was interested in recognition
as a Great Power and, therefore, jealously preserved a long-term commitment
to strategic autonomy in its decision-making and military capabilities. Tanham wrote

at the time of the outbreak of the liberalisation era,and the situation

has since changed and largely along the direction predicted.

Growing power indices and increasing centrality to world politics have not only enhanced the
significance of military power in the national scheme but also brought about a
much needed balance among the three long standing components of military
power and with the newer dimensions being space, cyber and information.
India’s tryst with land warfare is due to its position as a continental power.

This is reflective in a martial history replete with land warfare exploits, including the
Chakravyuha of the Mahabharata times, Chhatrapati Shivaji’s fortress strategy, the
much denigrated “Panipat syndrome”, the pacification campaigns in the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP), the lightning campaign, the limited war strategy for
Kargil, glacial warfare in Siachen and, lately, the innovative Cold Start.

This is understandable, given its history of the last thousand years in which the ruling
regimes of the Indo-Gangetic plains were land focussd due to strategic and cultural
reasons. The british continued the legacy in their indulgence in the Great Game
from Shimla, while India’s maritime interests were taken care of by the Admiralty
in London.

This landward orientation remained a distinguishing characteristic of
Indian strategic culture well into the independent era. A disproportionately large
army and a weak institutional interface led to it overshadowing the other two
Services. Its major conflicts were with land powers, Pakistan and China.

It was only in the successful 1971 War that land warfare strategy’s sway over military strategy
began to give way to a joint approach to war-fighting. This culminated in the Kargil
War in which posturing by the three Services elsewhere, and application of air and
land power to the politically restricted battlespace, brought in the dividend.

The ascendance of air power, with increased capability and requisite doctrine, and the
importance of the maritime dimension to growing national power have brought
about a balance. Jointness enhancing institutional structures, further, and, rightly,
degrade the autonomy of land warfare.

The primary influences on land warfare are: the nuclear backdrop; joint warfighting doctrine articulated in 2006; a nascent proactive and offensive approach dictated by a national strategic doctrine of offensive deterrence; increasing resource base due to expanding budgets; heightened levels of strategic thinking
brought on by its emerging power status, increased salience in the strategic
situation in its immediate vicinity and its partnership with the US; “lessons
learnt” from wars, resulting in transformation of the army underway; and, lastly,
a more outward oriented strategic culture.

The long standing factors continue in place, namely, disputed borders on the two fronts requiring manpower intensive protection, and continuing proxy war requiring extended deployment of a
proportion of its land forces.

That a purely land warfare strategy may be a thing of the past is best
evident from the debate between the two Services, the army and the air force,
with respect to the air force’s role in land warfare.

The army’s apprehensions are articulated by its former Vice Chief Vijay Oberoi, thus: “It fears that in the quest for waging an independent air war, the Air Force will neglect to provide
adequate support to the Army, in terms of Offensive Air Support…The Army is of
the view that in its quest for a more independent role for the Air Force, the IAF is
selectively interpreting the lessons learnt from the recent wars and battles where
air power was used….”

Retired Air Marshal Vinod Patney, a votary of aerospace power, has countered: “Hard nosed practicality demanded that air power be given greater freedom of action and the overall strategy fashioned to permit this. Joint planning still remains the sine qua non for operational success but there
has been a veritable sea change in the basic premises for planning and in the
establishing of priorities.”

The air marshal continues to maintain that “a single Service operation is a valid operation of war and, at times, will be the option of choice”, in effect, making a case for a circumstance related independent air
strategy.

It can be reckoned that this debate shall continue into the middle term
and impact any future consideration of land warfare.

In the South Asian context, an additional element, “posturing”, is in play.
This involves location and movement of offensive forces in such a manner as to
keep the enemy guessing as to their intent and eventual employment. This was
particularly so in the era of “deep thrust” by strike corps. However, the doctrinal
scenehas been energised by the dissemination of the Cold Start doctrine.

It envisages multiple offensive thrusts across a broad front by divisional sized
integrated battle groups of the pivot corps and strike corps resources located
close to the border from a standing start: therefore, the term “Cold Start”. These
offensives would comprise available air power assets also, and may have a
maritime dimension, definitely involving posturing by the navy and possible
amphibious landings also.

These offensives would not only open the window for strike corps to make further inroads but would also pressure Pakistan’s military to throw in the towel along with the air force’s strategic bombing campaign. Military coercion and attrition short of the nuclear threshold is to bring about a
policy shift away from its support to proxy war, if not a regime change in Pakistan.

Clearly, then, though land forces cannot any more “go it alone”, land warfare
strategy would continue to remain central to the outcome of conflict.

Much organisational innovation has gone into operationalising the changes,
not only in the military but also in the civil-military relations domain. New
formations headquarters have been created and new formations are being
raised. The Strategic Forces Command has been formalised.

Changes pending in the earlier round of reforms of the higher defence organisation in the early
part of the decade include creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff and
the greater integration between the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of
Defence. Increasing jointness and better consideration of the military input and
perspective would likely result from further evolution of the current structures.

With respect to China, the dissuasive deterrent implying “hold and deny”
is in keeping with the prevailing agreement on peace and tranquillity along
the disputed border. The intent is to develop military capabilities in the
interim such as by creating better infrastructure, including roads up to the
border, raising new mountain strike divisions and commissioning a deterrent
based on a 5,000 km range missile in the offing.

This would position the army favourably in any future conflict brought on perhaps by the “clash of
titans” over strategic space and political preeminence in a future Asia. These
measures would lend teeth to the change to “active deterrence” recently
adopted for this theatre.

The aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom has witnessed Fourth
Generation Warfare in which an asymmetric counter would require application
of land forces guided by principles drawing on sub-conventional warfare
doctrine. This too is a facet of land warfare, one the Indian Army in particular
has much experience and expertise in and, therefore, not reflected on here in
any detail.

The major point is that India draws on its strength of a stoic and
disciplined soldiery to establish a counter-insurgency grid for ensuring isolation
of the insurgent ‘fish’ from the human ‘sea’. Not having the same advantages of
manpower, other armies have been known to substitute with technology and
firepower, with attendant political costs.

Conclusion

Land warfare is the raison d’etre of the army. The relative balance between the
lead arms is situation and terrain specific. Dispute on this score is good for esprit
de corps but has to cease with the onset of conflict. The strategy that enables this
balancing to optimum result in relation to the military objective is a successful
land strategy. It has to be seen in relation to the tri-Service effort that is, in turn,
part of the grand strategic orchestration of the instruments of national power.

The Indian experience has been one of land forces’ primacy. Increasingly, and
rightfully, this is no longer tenable. Thus, land warfare strategy is likely to suffer
an eclipse in favour of a joint military strategy in any future conflict. Then the
armed forces would have entered the post-modern era.

Notes

1. M Howard, and Peter Paret (eds), Baron Carl von Clausewitz’s On War (Princeton:,
Princeton University Press, 1976).
2. Army Training Command, Indian Army Doctrine (Shimla: HQ ARTRAC, 2004).
3. The US Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 100-5: Fighting Future Wars,(
brassey’s, 1994). Also see, Army Field Manual 100-5: Operations.
4. L Rangarajan (ed), Kautilya: The Arthashastra, (New Delhi: Penguin Classics, 1992).
5. G Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: RAND,
1992).
6. V Oberoi, “Air Power and Joint Operations: Doctrinal and Organisational Challenges”,
USI Journal, January 2003.
7. V Patney, “Air Power and Joint Operations: Doctrinal and Organisational Challenges”,
USI Journal, July 2003.
8. V. Patney, “Jointness in Armed Forces and Institution of Post of Chief of Defence Staff
are Mutually Exclusive”, Journal of Defence Studies (IDSA), Summer 2008, p. 35.
9. G Kanwal, “Strike Fast and Hard: Indian Army Doctrine Undergoes Change in Nuclear
Era”, Tribune (Chandigarh), 23 June 2006.
10. V Oberoi, “Need for Holistic Restructuring of Indian Military”, Journal of Defence
Studies, Summer 2008.

IDSA WORKSHOP ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
DRAFT PAPER
Nuclear Doctrine and Conflict
By Ali Ahmed

http://www.idsa.in/nationalstrategy/eventDec10/WP_AliAhmed.pdf

Introduction
India has made enviable progress since Independence in building social equality,
deepening democracy and making economic strides. These gains not only
require protection but also furthering over at least another generation and
definitely out till the time horizon of this workshop, 2020. India’s approach to
security would therefore require being mindful of the national endevour. In other
words, India’s civilisational trait of temperance and strategic culture of resolve
and restraint need to be in evidence for the duration. While crises and conflict
can be anticipated in the interim, given the security circumstance of the
neighbourhood, the national aim must not be lost sight of.
India’s military doctrines are predicated on a strategic doctrine of deterrence.
1
Deterrence is based on both the surety of denial and possibility of punishment.
To reinforce deterrence, an offensive orientation to its military doctrines and
expanding military potential has been in evidence of late.
2
Currently, India’s
conventional doctrine has a proactive and offensive orientation. Its nuclear
doctrine posits inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in retaliation.
3
While threats exist
and could arise over the decade, it is unlikely that these cannot be managed by
the diplomatic and political strategy. However, wild cards as internal political
instability affecting the judgment of both neighbours need to be factored in.
Conflict outbreak, despite best intentions and however unlikely, nevertheless
needs catering for. In any case, contingency preparedness in absence of threats
is a valid recourse.
It is argued that this requires a melding of conventional and nuclear doctrines in
their interface. This implies a movement in both doctrines. The paper suggests

∗
Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
The paper is based on the author’s monograph at IDSA, Reconciling doctrines: Prerequisite for
peace in South Asia.
1
The menu of strategic choices ranges between appeasement, conciliation, coercion, deterrence
and compellence. According to Kautilya, the strategic prongs are ‘sam, dam, dand and bhed’.
2
While conventional doctrines are routinely described as ‘proactive’, the nuclear doctrine has
some offensive elements such as the NFU caveat extending nuclear deterrence to cover a major
attack by chemical and biological weapons.
3
Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), ‘Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security
on Operationalisation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03’
http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008). 2
that conventional doctrine move towards an explicit Limited War formulation. The
nuclear doctrine in turn needs to genuflect towards limitation by ensuring conflict
termination at the lowest possible level nuclear use in line with the ‘Sundarji
doctrine’.
4
This argument is presented in two parts: in the first part the current
doctrinal interface is dilated on. In the second part, a recommendation is made in
favour of the Sundarji doctrine of ending any nuclear exchange at the lowest
possible level.
The doctrinal interface
India has two potential adversaries, Pakistan and China. Given differing power
equations and problems with each, India’s has a differentiated
5
strategic
orientation. With respect to Pakistan, India has been forced to emphasise its
capability for coercion, if not compellence, to, at a minimum, keep Pakistani
resort to terror and proxy war below India’s ‘level of tolerance’. Over the last
decade, the conventional doctrine against Pakistan has been popularly termed
as ‘Cold Start’.
6
Lessons from the Kargil War and Operation Parakram have
moved India’s strategy dating to the eighties of relying on counter offensives for
deterrence to a proactive offensive strategy.
7
This is to be executed by launch of
integrated battle groups up to limited depth with the strike corps released in their
wake as per the political aims set. Giving itself the capability does not imply
reflexive resort to offensives. Instead, military action short of war to deliver on
limited political aims would be preferred.
On the other hand, in face of Chinese assertiveness,
8
it is moving from
‘defensive defence’ to ‘active defence’,
9
implying greater investment in
conventional credibility. Improved infrastructure in Tibet has resulted in greater
Chinese capability for offensive. Combined with the problem of intrusions across
an unresolved border, this has heightened the threat perception. The response
has been for an improved defensive posture to include additional forces to
retrieve lost ground or, if necessary, to take the conflict across onto the Tibetan
plateau.
India is well aware of the nuclear backdrop and is conscious of the fallout on the
economic trajectory of military engagement. Therefore, deterrence will continue
as the primary role for the military instrument. Deterrence can only be improved

4
See K. Sundarji, ‘India’s Nuclear Options’, Wellington: DSSC Trishul, V (1), 1992; and ‘Nuclear
Deterrence Doctrine for India’, Part 1 and 2, Trishul, V (1) and V (2), 1992.
5
Karnad terms India’s doctrines varying with respect to Pakistan and China as ‘differentiated’
doctrine.
6
Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability’, IDSA Strategic Comments,
1 June 2010.
7
Praveen Swahney, ‘Punching Hard: Learning from Operation Parakram, the army sharpens its
pro-active strategy’, Force, Jan 2008
8
The PM used the term ‘assertive’ in relation to Chinese behavior.
9
Two divisions are under raising in the North East to counter the China threat perceived as
having increased with the infrastructure development in Tibet. 3
in case of preparedness for the worst-case scenario of conflict outbreak.
Doctrinal preparedness requires abiding by Limited War tenets. Limitation to
conflict would be in the mutual interest of the antagonists. Currently, India’s
doctrine in respect of Pakistan rules in offensives by strike corps. The escalatory
potentiality of this can be tempered by various means such as choice of sector of
operations etc, in accordance with Limited War doctrine. Likewise, against China,
while minimal stakes in a possible border war lend themselves to escalation
control, the problem of ‘face saving’ may constitute a significant pull in the other
direction. In other words, on both fronts, even if a war is ruled out, in the remote
case of one, there are inherent escalatory possibilities requiring a deliberate
effort at control.
This provides a two step buffer to the nuclear level – one is in war avoidance and
the second is of limitation in its conduct. The nuclear level is further insulated by
nuclear deterrence operating independently. However, being sanguine along
these lines does not help deterrence. Currently, India’s nuclear doctrine
contemplates inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation for enemy nuclear first
use of any kind against India or its forces.
10
The term used in the doctrine to
underscore the intent is ‘massive’.
11
Even if it is not ‘massive’, the very possibility,
if not certainty, of India’s violent nuclear reaction is to deter nuclear first use.
However, utmost analytical attention, necessitated by the nuclear overhang,
requires the possibility of nuclear resort by the enemy to be factored into any
consideration of conflict. In Pakistan’s case, the oft-quoted contingency of
nuclear use in own territory, in a defensive mode and against a nondescript
target as a strategic signal for termination has found mention. Since its threshold
is not known, it cannot be taken uncritically as high and its doctrine as ‘first use
but last resort’.
12
In case of China, nuclear use has not been thought through in
light of both states having a ‘No first use’ policy (NFU). But to conjure up a
scenario, China could resort to nuclear use at a low escalatory level in case two
circumstances: one in case its internal political situation, that gives rise to the
conflict in first place, is permissive; and two, in case it is placed in an untenable
position due to unexpected operational success of Indian joint air and ground
forces.

10
Manpreet Sethi thinks destroying five to six cities would be 'unacceptable damage' in the
Pakistan context (Nuclear Strategy India's March Towards Credible Deterrence, Knowledge
World, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 251-252). Gurmeet Kanwal believes that up to 10 cities may require
to be targeted to inflict unacceptable damage on China.
11
Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), ‘Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security
on Operationalisation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03’
http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008).
12
Rajesh Rajagopalan posits that a rational Pakistan is unlikely to use nuclear weapons other
than as a last resort. This is unlikely to happen since India would not push it that far (Second
Strike: Arguments of Nuclear War in South Asia, Penguin, New Delhi, 2005, p. 43). 4
India’s nuclear doctrine is meant for deterrence.
13
Massive nuclear retaliation is
explicable in cases of enemy first strike intended as a disarming strike,
decapitation strike or counter value targeting. Inflicting unacceptable damage on
the enemy in case he has caused unacceptable damage in his nuclear first use is
understandable. However, in case of higher order nuclear retaliation by India in
face of lower order nuclear first use by the enemy, as in the scenarios above, a
like response from the enemy can be expected. This could prove costly for India.
Such a reaction from India that would lead to its own pain makes the doctrine of
massive nuclear retaliation incredible. Therefore, enemy nuclear first use is not
implausible.
14
India need not then be tied down by the nuclear deterrence
doctrine, but realistically prepare for a nuclear exchange, even if unprovoked and
inadvertent.
Once first use has occurred, the situation is not one of deterrence but of its
breakdown. Therefore, the doctrine need not dictate India’s response. Instead,
the response could be through a separate nuclear operational or employment
doctrine. This may rule in proportionate or commensurate response, particularly
in the scenario of low level nuclear first use by the enemy. This would enable
escalation control through avoidance of strategic nuclear exchange. In other
words, the employment doctrine could be flexible.
15
Flexibility does not reduce
deterrence since when the capability of escalating exists, India’s exercise of
choice cannot be ruled out.
Summing up this section, it bears iteration that India’s conventional doctrine
needs to be informed by Limited War thinking. This is not explicitly so at the
moment. Even while the overarching military doctrine may continue
contemplating use of strike corps etc, a separate, supplementary, Limited War
doctrine needs articulation alongside. For its part, the nuclear doctrine for
deterrence is fair enough. It unmistakably foregrounds the potentiality of a
massive nuclear retaliation in case of nuclear first use. However, in case
deterrence breakdown, the operational doctrine need not be unduly restricted by
the declaratory doctrine. Any flexibility this builds in need not necessarily be in
the open domain. However, change towards an alternative, the ‘Sundarji
doctrine’, is recommended,
16
the case for which is made in the following section.
The Sundarji doctrine

13
‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, 1999,
http://meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm (Accessed October 10, 2008).
14
Ali Ahmed, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Use and Implications for India’, Strategic Analysis, 34 (4), July
2010.
15
Bharat Karnad favours a flexible doctrine relying on a variegated set of armament.
16
K. Sundarji, Vision 2100: Strategy for the Twenty First Century, Konark Publishers, New Delhi,
2003, p. 146. 5
The Sundarji doctrine posits termination of nuclear conflict at the lowest level of
escalation.
17
This may entail offering politically acceptable terms of settlement to
bring about war termination. The doctrine’s call is for early, if not immediate,
termination, not only of nuclear exchange(s) but also of the conflict. The difficulty
of nuclear conflict termination in face of pressures for nuclear escalation is
acknowledged in this formulation. Therefore, the intent to preclude such
escalation is articulated unambiguously. This incentivizes the enemy, having a
shared interest in avoiding higher rungs of the nuclear escalatory ladder, to
acquiesce. The doctrine has two major advantages. The first is that it is in sync
with India’s national aims and with follow-on conflict aims. The second is that it is
cognizant of India’s strengths and weaknesses as a society and polity.

India’s national aim, mentioned at the outset, is to fulfill its potential. The national
interest is in conflict avoidance to the extent possible. In case of conflict
outbreak, the conflict aim would be circumscribed by the need for the least
possible deflection from India’s growth trajectory. It follows that it would be
limited, capable of being attained without inordinate economic and human costs.
Mutuality with China can be expected, since any diversion would set it back with
relation to the United States. Since India would not like a set back in relation to
China, it would restrict stakes involved in any confrontation with Pakistan. This
entails limitation both at the conventional and nuclear levels.
As seen, current doctrines at both levels do not automatically envisage limitation.
While limitation can be read in the doctrines as a subtext, it is not a given. This
could lead to inadvertent escalation in reactions and responses of the adversary.
Nuclear first use on the adversary’s part could lead to possible counter city
exchange(s). This cannot but have an adverse affect on the economy, society
and polity. The human consequences apart, economic consequences would be
on long term recovery. The gains of the last six decades and of the last two in
particular would be squandered. Even conflict termination finds India advantaged
strategically, the price may prove rather high in relation to the original stakes.
In light of India’s vulnerabilities, a nuclear exchange may prove unaffordable.
This is particularly so if a prudent view is taken of the efficacy of the ‘idea of
India’. There are known deficiencies in India’s governance structures and
processes. Given current levels of policy capacity, penetration and authority,
especially at the local level, it is unthinkable that India can cope effectively with a
nuclear attack, not only at the place of occurrence but also elsewhere in its
psychological, political and social effects. In case of disruption at the national
level, through the leadership’s indisposition due to being in the National
Command Post, or due to partial or successful decapitation, the challenge for
governance would be considerable. The targeting of the national capital could
lead to a de-centering of India over the long term. If governance is to carry on,
democratic methods may prove inadequate. Thus, even if a government regains

17
K. Sundarji, Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty First Century, New Delhi, Konark
Publishers, 2003, p. 146. 6
control, it would be at the cost of India’s democratic character. India as it has
been created post Independence cannot survive a nuclear exchange amounting
to receiving unacceptable damage. That a nuclear adversary ceases to exist
thereby is no compensation or consolation. It follows that India should prudently
avoid inflicting unacceptable damage unless it is a prior recipient of the same.
This is an under-researched area. While the physical effects have been
discussed,
18
these may in the long term turn out the lesser of the consequence.
Possible contours of political, social and geographical fallout are hazarded here.
The political effect would be a function of the fact that lower classes would be
more imposed upon. Their disposition towards Maoist philosophy would be much
pronounced. This would have its own backlash with the state and the upper
sections of society tending towards the Right. The vacuum could herald a
revolution and a counter-revolution. The second dimension is social disruption. In
case of conflict with Pakistan, involving nuclear weapons, the possibility of India’s
Muslim minority being victimized for guilt by association cannot be ignored. This
would make India ungovernable over the duration of bloodletting. Lastly, is the
geographical effect in terms of ethnicities opting out of the ‘Union’. Lack of
security that a nuclear exchange signifies involves a breach of social contract by
the state. The effected ethnic group, and those witnessing it, may choose to
rescind the tacit contract with a state that has not provisioned security as
stipulated. For instance, in case of a nuclear exchange even at the lowest level
with China in the east, the ethnic groups there may want out of an India-China
contest that risks their homelands. While this pessimistic view may not in the
event transpire, the risk of finding out that it is wrong is not worth running.
What does this imply for deterrence doctrine? The implication for deterrence
philosophy is that promise of infliction of unacceptable damage only deters
receipt of unacceptable damage in nuclear first use. The formulation, favoured by
India, that ‘nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons’ stands disputed by
Pakistan’s reliance of nuclear weapons to also deter conventional war.
Therefore, the risk of nuclear weapons use exists. Clearly, inflicting unacceptable
damage, if it lays India open to like attack, is unthinkable. The understanding that
India can take the necessary measures to survive, such as ballistic missile
defences, disaster management, civil defence improvement etc appears
plausible. However, given that India has pronounced deficiencies in institutional
culture, this could prove self-delusion at an inopportune time. A political view,
sensitive to India’s wider concerns, needs to be taken of institutionally-led
arguments along these lines. The commitment trap needs avoiding. Therefore,
instead of the cultivation of resolve as deterrence theorists prescribe, India would
do well to ponder the virtues of self-deterrence.

18
‘The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan’, Natural Resources
Defence Council, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp 7
India’s political leaders are not obliged to risk national suicide to prove that
deterrence theory - questioned by nuclear pessimists
19
- works. The strategist’s
approach to nuclear deterrence is distinct from that of the decision maker at the
political level.
20
India’s leadership in the Political Council of the Nuclear
Command Authority needs to be apprised of their democratic obligations at a
higher level than that of the strategic advice they receive from the Executive
Council.
21
The need not be held hostage to declaratory doctrine. They need not
be held hostage to nuclear strategists either. They need to envision their role as
political decision makers with India’s long term interests, of which survival is
primary, in mind.
22
The least damage to India or the idea of India would be in
case any nuclear exchange, likely to be an inadvertent escalatory act, is
terminated at the lowest level. This involves prior movement in India’s nuclear
doctrine to the Sundarji formulation.
The ‘Sundarji caveat’ – of offering the enemy politically acceptable and fair terms
for conflict termination - would also require to be operationalised.
23
This may
entail having direct and uninterruptible links with the enemy even in the face of
crises and conflict. This means creation of a standing mechanism such as the
nuclear risk reduction center. This would be more than a confidence building
measure or a nuclear risk reduction mechanism. It could prove critical in
managing escalation and war termination in a conflict. Its role at other times
could be to facilitate doctrinal exchange and more ambitiously arms control and
disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. Shared interest may help in
mirroring thinking. Reconciling doctrines can be taken up in negotiations in this
mechanism.
24

What are the implications for deterrence, the non-occurrence of nuclear war?
Deterrence has been variously conceptualized.
25
In one, the very capability
suffices to deter. This is termed existential deterrence. A variant of this is that the
capability requires being substantial, based on a thermonuclear capability. In the
second conceptualization, deterrence requires constant working upon. It is

19
Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence theory revisited’, World Politics, 31 (2), 1979, pp. 289-324.
20
This is the insight gained by both McNamara and McGeorge Gundy from their experience.
21
The organization of the Nuclear Command Authority is given in Cabinet Committee on Security
(2003), ‘Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on Operationalisation of India’s
Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03’ http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed
July 02, 2008).
22
Ali Ahmed, ‘The Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation’, Strategic Analysis, 34 (1), January
2010.
23
Ali Ahmed, 'In Tribute: Recalling the Sundarji Doctrine', USI Journal, Jan-Mar, CXXXVIII (571),
2008, pp. 108-14.
24
Ali Ahmed, Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, IDSA Monograph, pp.
78-82.
http://www.idsa.in/monograph/ReconcilingDoctrinesPrerequisiteforPeaceinSouthAsia_aahmed_2
010
25
Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Nuclear strategy and small nuclear forces: The conceptual components’,
Strategic Analysis, 23 (7), pp. 1117 — 31. 8
predicated on surety of retaliation. A variant in this is that such retaliation
requires being considerable to deter. India’s current doctrine is inspired by the
latter. Instead, when less is enough, more is not necessarily better.
26
In other
words, reversion to existential deterrence would help keep the nuclear complex
under control in both peace and war.
This problem with this is in a tendency towards deterrence ‘creep’ or a move
away from ‘minimum’ to ‘limited’ deterrence.
27
Even if with a growing economy
India can afford this, it would be to move away from the understanding explicated
in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine that India would not be slave to the Cold War
deterrence concepts. A conscious check of the nuclear complex is required.
During peacetime, the nuclear complex needs to be ensconced in the Indian
democratic system of checks and balances, in particular through two measures:
one is to extend the benefits of parliamentary oversight to it, and second, to
extend oversight through the Political Council, activated also for peace time
control. Doing so would help deepen it for qualitative deterrence. In wartime, this
is facilitated by the Sundarji doctrine that lends itself to protecting the ‘minimum’
in India’s nuclear deterrent. It eschews nuclear war-fighting, does not envisage a
variegated nuclear arsenal and enables a city avoidance strategy.
Conclusion
A critical question is: What is the national interest in case of a conflict going
nuclear? The answer is informed by India’s national aim. Though any security
circumstance is indeed substantively changed by intrusion of the nuclear
overhang into the foreground, the national aim would continue to have currency.
The primary aim would be to survive the conflict as intact as possible; which
means the less damage sustained the better. Damage inflicted on the enemy is
secondary. As seen, survival over the long term is endangered by receipt of
unacceptable damage. Democratic political responsibility lies in appreciating that
the national interest would be to ensure a termination of nuclear conflict earliest.
Termination of the war itself would be essential. This is more likely and at all
possible at the lowest level of nuclear use. The higher the levels of nuclear
exchange the less likely the possibility of nuclear war termination. The idea that
nuclear escalation control is not possible may well be right. But not attempting to
escalation control would make this inevitable. Therefore, a move towards the
Sundarji doctrine is necessary.
Words - 3117

26
More is not better when less is enough (Kenneth Waltz).
27
Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security, Singapore: NUS Press,
2009, p. 172.

Readings for Officers
http://www.claws.in/SW-Autumn2010.pdf
ALI AhmED ä IDSA
the profession of arms has a striking disadvantage for its practitioners. this is that
opportunities for its practice are few and far between. in all of india’s wars, only a
partial fraction of the army has been exposed to the cut and thrust of combat.
therefore, the substance of the profession has to be acquired vicariously. However,
the nature of continual deployment in field areas comprising either counter
insurgency or in difficult terrain and weather conditions makes up for the lack of
exposure to high intensity war. ironically, a job well done in the former leads to
deterrence and consequently lack of experience of war. nevertheless, even while
accretion of experience may be had along a career span, there is a case for reading
not only to supplement it but more importantly to make sense of it.
the army is already cognizant of this. it has an introductory course to military
studies at the academy stage in the form of a military history capsule. the text for
this requires a definite makeover, not only in content and readability, but also its
presentation. even though the subject is broached in sessions with the dS, rather
than left solely to aeC instructors, serious academic attention is recommended.
the next stage is in the unit, under a watchful 2iC. But given the pace of life these
days, the mentorship system has all but vanished. reading is more eclectic and
less curricular. the Part B and Part d promotion exams are there for enhancing
exposure. But, connotations associated with ‘exams’, do little to nudge officers
into reading. reading is nevertheless a popular pastime, with officers usefully
taking to self-development and management related books. this is all for the
good, indicating that the intent and energy exist and could be usefully capitalized
on. What then needs to be done?
a change over at the Staff Course entrance exam stage from replicating the
pattern of promotion exams in the Military History paper, of a campaign study
and biographies, to a more contextual Military Studies paper may be useful. a
wider mandatory reading can be prepared by the Mt 2, comprising selections
from its Golden Hundred. this could cover the gamut of military studies including
technology, military history, military sociology, strategy and international relations. viii ä AUTUmN 2010 äSCHOLAR WARRIOR
SCHOLAR WARRIOR
this need not be confined to indian texts or experience. Since an officer is aware of
when he is to come up for the exam, preparation in terms of reading can start even
half a decade earlier. this would get the officer acquainted with the context of his
profession, even while the other papers test the content bit. the exam questions
can be framed in line with that of the net for defence and strategic studies. Past
papers are available at the uGC website for reference.
it is an ill-informed belief that officers at the spear end and tactical level can do
without contextual knowledge and sensitivity. this is a sure fire way to create Colonel
Blimps. this conception has already changed. Great strides have been made such
as placing a plethora of reading on the intranet and Wan, such as notably that of
the Junior Command course. it is important to keep the challenge stern enough for
those rising in their careers to ultimately make their minds receptive to demands at
the operational and strategic levels. While all would of course not be so privileged,
they would be none the worse off since it would better prepare them for exit into
the civilian world.
as part of reading habits, once the initial set is consumed such as the timeless
one by Major KC Praval, the officer is ready for the next higher level. the india
specific set need not be restricted to wars and biographies of military heroes.
While books such as those of LP Sen, John dalvi, dK Palit etc are available in
formation libraries, academic works need to supplement their narration. these
include earlier output of authors such as Sumit Ganguly and the more recent one
by military historian Srinath raghavan on conflicts of the nehruvian era. Works
by academics, such as Kaushik roy and Sundaram, need the encouragement of
purchase, review and mention.
ever since india’s rise, its military has gained academic attention. Works
interpreting india’s rise, such as by Stephen Cohen, S Paul Kapur, Peter Lavoy
etc are useful since these are based on access to india’s strategic community. the
work of Kanwal, Manpreet Sethi and raja Menon helps grapple with military
issues including the exotic nuclear ‘backdrop’. this helps in acquainting the
practitioner with the significance of operational engagements, such as, for
instance, proactive stance preparedness or raisings of mountain divisions. there
being an anachronistic sanction against talking ‘shop’ in messes, it is perversely
taken as infra-dig to discuss such issues. Suffice it to say this can only be tyranny
of insecure seniors.
Care needs to be taken by libraries to tap the higher end book market such as
that of routledge and Sage. the Sixth Pay Commission emoluments surely make
these accessible. numerous defence ‘glossies’ now are in the market with veterans SCHOLAR WARRIOR ä AUTUmN 2010 ä ix
SCHOLAR WARRIOR
and the defence industry driving ideas and selling products. Websites of Service
think tanks, such as this one, keep the officer updated. Web groups of course-mates
enable circulation of material for reference at leisure. a discerning eye needs to be
cultivated so as to not lose time chasing down quality reading. the military profile
of generals such as Petraeus, Panag etc indicates that reading provides ballast to
careers. that should be incentive enough in this competitive world to sometimes
also take a book to bed!

Writings in various journals

Understanding India-Pakistan Relations
http://www.biliabd.org/jia.php
Journal of International Affairs, Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, Vol 14, June and December 2010

http://sas.sagepub.com/content/16/2/335.citation

South Asia at the CrossRoads

Ali Ahmed

South Asian Survey, July/December 2009; vol. 16, 2: pp. 335-344.

July/December 2009 Review Article Security Sector Reform in South Asia South Asia at the CrossRoads Ali Ahmed Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India. REVIEW ARTICLE SOUTH...

Check Item

http://www.icpsnet.org/adm/pdf/1291710631.pdf

Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2&3, April-September, 2010.

Strategic Culture and Indian Self-assurance

Ali Ahmed*

[*Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He is pursuing a PhD

in International Politics at the School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.]

Abstract

The article examines the realist critique that India lacks a strategic culture. The realist critique is

neglectful of India’s record of strategic behavior predicated on simultaneous resolve and restraint. India’s

normative set carries the influence of its traditions and democratic political heritage. Its operational set

is sensitive to use of force in its national interest, while being alert to the limitations of force. This

reading of India’s strategic culture empowers India to proceed down the route of rapprochement with

Pakistan. Currently, the pace of resumption of the peace process is retarded by the weight of the

realist critique on policy makers, ever apprehensive of being found wanting on defence matters. This

need not be so. Armed with this self-belief, India should engage with Pakistan with greater rigour,

beginning with the expected meeting of the two foreign ministers over the winter.

http://www.spslandforces.net/ebook/24062011.pdf

Offensive in the Mountains
The decision on the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) is not only about the capability and the implications. It is
also about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to China. The message is one of deterrence and
resolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy

Sunday, 3 June 2012

Alternative Perspectives

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-98/2010/february/2/alternative-perspectives.html

Ali Ahmed

COMBATING TERRORISM: SAUDI ARABIAS ROLE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
By Ali S. Awadh Asseri
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 196, Rs 450.00

VOLUME XXXIV NUMBER 2 February 2010

It can be inferred from the author’s profile on the dust jacket that he is bassador in Lebanon, he has earlier been the Saudi kingdom’s ambassador to Pakistan between 2001 and 2009. His earlier career was in the police prior to his moving to appointments in which he looked after the security of Saudi diplomatic assets. With an increase in the threat and incidence of terror, this background as an ‘insider’ no doubt placed him at a vantage point for authoring the book. The book can be taken as reflecting the official Saudi perspective on the issue of terrorism. This is evident from the author’s acknowledgement that he is indebted to the Assistant to the Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, Prince Naif, for ‘guidance’, ‘material’ and ‘numerous meetings’ (p. xii).

Asseri’s attempt, in his words, is an articulation of ‘an alternative Saudi or Muslim perspective’ on ‘various conceptual and contextual issues relating to terrorism’. It is interesting that he does so without a mention of Wahabbism or the context of absence of democracy in his country.

In the first four chapters, the author discusses terrorism in theory and practice, the Islamic perspective on terror and root causes. He ably counters a view, originating in Islamophobic sections of the West and purveyed by the western media, on the ‘Islamic’ roots of contemporary terrorism. He distinguishes between the Islamic concept of Jihad and its appropriation by Islamists for their own political and ideological purposes. This distinction is important. However, there is a tendency towards extremism inherent in a narrow reading of Islam such as is the Saudi backed Wahabbi interpretation. This version of Islam lends itself to terror, as is seen from the perpetration of terror by its adherents both in Arabia and elsewhere.

In his discussion of ‘root causes’, of interest to Indian readers is Asseri’s mention of Kashmir: ‘in the absence of an early political settlement, the Kashmir issue may continue to provide the political context for deviant groups to engage in terrorist activities…’ (p. 77). This is in the same breath as Chechenya etc. This mistakes an essentially territorial issue between India and Pakistan as a religious, identity related one. This is the manner in which Pakistan has utilized religion to further its irredentist case. Pakistan’s use of terror is not so much religion inspired as a proxy war strategy in its ‘balance of power’ game with India. The author’s reductionist approach to the contrary apparently legitimizes terrorism. It shows that he has not been able to balance the context that he deems legitimizing, and violence against civilians which he condemns. This conceptual confusion is characteristic of those who claim that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Their position would be less confused if terror targeting civilians is condemned, irrespective of any rationale provided by the context.

In the following two chapters Asseri discusses Saudi initiatives against terror, in the domestic and international dimension respectively. In the internal dimension, the Saudis follow a three-pronged strategy: prevention, cure and care. The measures include restrictions on financing, legal and security sector measures, social sector reforms, regulation of the internet and media and, lastly, a reform programme in prisons. That no section is devoted to political reforms indicates the glacial pace, if not a complete absence of these.

On the international plane the initiatives include bilateral and multilateral cooperation in pursuing the Al Qaeda, particularly with the patronstate, the US. The author expends considerable space dealing with the Saudi organized conference on countering terrorism and the first interfaith dialogue held at Makkah. He discusses the contribution Saudi Arabia has made in shaping the perspective of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. The role of the Israel-Palestine issue as a ‘root cause’ and Saudi Arabia’s role in attempting to solve it are covered in some detail.

In his last chapter, Asseri reviews anti-terror measures in countries such as Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan in the light of the Saudi Arabian experience. He is complimentary and informative on the ‘war on terror’ waged by Indonesia describing the national effort undertaken by the Yudhoyono regime; its enlisting and use of former terrorists in the campaign; the employment of elite police, Detachment 88, to lead the fight; and lastly the judicial steps that have had a positive effect on public opinion. The de-radicalization programme of Egypt is covered in the manner the ideologue and compatriot of Ayman al Zawarhiri, Sayyid Imam Abdulaziz al Sharif, converted to moderation. By writing a slim volume, Advice Regarding the Conduct of Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World, he has considerably reinterpreted his earlier work, The Basic Principles in Making Preparations for Jihad, said to be the constitution of jihadi radicalism. The author opines that the Indonesian and Saudi model has much to offer Pakistan as it engages with terrorism. His critique of the NATO operation in Afghanistan is that, ‘There is hardly any effective governmental initiative in sight that aims to win the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign…the problem is likely to conflagrate in the absence of a strategy that prefers a non-military solution to a military solution (p. 164).’ The author does not reflect on the most significant cause of international terrorism, that of lack of democracy in most states across the Middle East and Maghreb ruled by varying shades of authoritarian regimes largely supported by the US. This was the original critique of the Al Qaeda.

The level of popular endorsement of the extremists owes in part to disillusionment with the repressive regimes, particularly their neo-colonial linkages with the US. In the Middle East in particular, the perception of access of the authoritarian regimes to a US umbrella requires dispelling by the US itself. The West has interfered with democratic outcomes in Algeria earlier and in Palestine. This suggests that it is unlikely to countenance a change in the status quo. The status quo is instead preferred by the West for control of oil prices, for energy security and preservation of their way of life. Given its influence and the grip of these regimes, the counter gets restricted to violence. While the likes of Al Qaeda cannot be expected to bring democracy to their lands, they have an argument that can only be dispelled by the advent of democracy.

Given the constraints of the author’s background, it is understandable that the political approach to defusing terrorism does not find mention in this critique. It is similarly silent on the Saudi regime’s links with spreading Wahabbism, a doctrinaire version of Islam. This has had a particularly baleful influence in Pakistan, where originally syncretistic Sufi Islam held sway. Not dwelling on these two aspects detracts from the merit of the book; one that is otherwise strong on the shortfalls of the approach and prescription of the West as witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Tensions Between Security and Reconstruction

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-875/2012/may/5/tensions-between-security-and-reconstruction.html

Ali Ahmed

WHEN MORE IS LESS: THE INTERNATIONAL PROJECT IN AFGHANISTAN
By Astri Sukhre
Hurst & Co, London, 2011, pp. 293, £ 25.00

VOLUME XXXVI NUMBER 5 MAY 2012

Astri Sukhre describes how and why the US led international project in Afghanistan is in the trouble that it is. This helps with getting the picture right, for only then can prescriptions be examined for their worth. Currently, the US is engaged in getting the Taliban into a dialogue. It is simultaneously negotiating with the Afghan Government to-wards establishing a permanent US strategic presence in Afghanistan. It would be difficult to reconcile the latter with the former. This is likely to continue the series of US missteps in Afghanistan since 9/11, comprehensively critiqued by Sukhre in her book under review. It is not so much for her description of the past decade, but for the implications for the coming one that the book is important. The book is on how not to do peace- building or nation-state making. Not that the US was interested in undertaking this at the outset, given the distaste of the Bush-Rums-feld combine for employing the US military on nation-building tasks. However, if that was not their intent, then it can be said that they should have let the otherwise distasteful regimes stay in place, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than have reduced the two states to rubble by concerted, and vindictive, military action. If it was unable to reconstruct it should instead have chosen a political and policing approach post 9/11. Since the US chose the military route, it cannot be absolved for misapplying the ‘light foot-print’.

[ihc-hide-content ihc_mb_type=”show” ihc_mb_who=”reg” ihc_mb_template=”1″ ]
Outsourcing the work of rehabilitation of a state at war for two decades prior to Operation Enduring Freedom to the UN, even as military action continued under the aegis of the NATO in an out-of-area operation, was equally self-delusive. No less than a Marshall Plan was warranted, along with a peace keeping mission. However, with the Taliban kept out of the Bonn Conference, peace making was ruled out at the very outset, leaving peace enforcement by the ISAF as the only possibility. The outcome has been evident in the tension between security and reconstruction, unsparingly brought out by Sukhre.

The superpower’s self-image, and hubris of its neoconservative minders, along with the need to keep Afghanistan from becoming the ‘graveyard’ of the NATO, kept the military template operational till Obama belatedly applied a course correction in the form of a ‘surge’. Even in this the military surge proved more consequential than the civilian surge. It was spearheaded by a refurbished counter insurgency doctrine and implemented under the stewardship of America’s modern-day military hero, Petraeus. With American stamina under question, neither of the two special envoys, the late Holbrooke of the Balkans fame, nor his successor, Marc Grossman, has been able to extricate the US from the strategic predicament that its earlier Viceroy, Zalmay Khalilzad, had got it into.

The onus has been borne by the UN, represented by the assistance mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA. Even though Lakhdar Brahimi, associated with the peacekeeping reform document that bears his name, was at the helm of the UN mission initially, the UN was marginalized. For instance, though a ‘political mission’, the deputy to the Special Representative for political affairs was only appointed as late as March 12. Another entity within the blame cross hairs is the Karzai regime, arraigned for all of Afghan ills, beginning with its very weakness. The contradiction intrinsic in this self-exculpatory buck passing is in how a weak regime, one implanted by the international community, can at all be expected to deliver. Its task has been made ever more challenging by the centralized Constitution envisaged for a diverse Afghanistan; by the kind of reconstruction undertaken by the consultants-NGO system in place; by a dysfunctional judicial system prepared by Italy as lead nation; and, by the improbable creation of cohesive security forces by the militaries of the several states involved in the project. Sukhre rightly points out that emerging at the end of a decade of such engagement is a dysfunctional ‘rentier’ state.

While the military and political aspects of the project are better known, the book’s contribution is in dilating on peace building, specifically, the reconstruction, constitutional, governance and judicial dimensions. The promises of funding for Afghanistan have been plenty and liberal. However, it is spent on a ‘second civil service’ comprising high paid consultants living in a secure green zone. Elections have been based on a ‘rarely used’ Single Non Transferable Vote system, chosen seemingly to streamline power in the President by keeping the Parliament divided and the opposition weak. The problems with Karzai’s reelection and the parliamentary elections are too well known to recount. The jirga and the shura being disregarded, the Taliban stole a march as better dispensers of justice. The anti-drugs campaign has also not delivered the results that the Taliban can be credited with in its crack-down just prior to their being summarily ousted. The upshot of these inadequacies has been in the peacebuilding mission being as questionable as the military intervention.

The book’s critique of the project is not only thorough but equally importantly—timely. The surge is winding down and the 2014 time-line looms. Sukhre’s suggestions are worth working into the end game: firstly, that a settlement to be acceptable must be ‘inclusive enough’ to take on board parties that have the capability to undo it; secondly, paring down of the rentier state is necessary; and thirdly, in her words, ‘on the military side, it would be particularly important to recognize that “more is less”’. Her final point is worth reiterating that, ‘Arming the Afghans to the hilt is neither sustainable policy nor a plausible condition for a peaceful post-transition order.’
Despite its making a mere three references to India, the book could do with an Indian readership. This would help defuse the strategic arguments made by security analysts fixated on Pakistan’s seeming proximity with the Taliban. This makes India’s position on talks ambivalent, further marginalizing India. The book could help generate ‘out of the box’ ideas such as the substitution of the peace enforcement mission with a peacekeeping one, perhaps, who knows, even a hybrid UN-SAARC one!

Saturday, 2 June 2012

Publications: Ali Ahmed, PhD

Summary of writings (since July 2008)

Book (forthcoming) – 1
Edited book (co-editor) – 1
Book chapters – 11
Articles in refereed journals – 13 (Strategic Analysis – 6)
Articles in military journals – 25
Articles in other journals – 26 (Mainstream – 7)
IDSA publications – 20 (Monographs – 2, Briefs - 6)
Book reviews - 26
Columns – idsa.in - 39; Kashmir Times - 17; The Financial World - 9; Salute - 22; foreignpolicyjournal.org - 28; ipcs.org- 38 ; claws.in - 26
Other newspapers/publications– Tehelka - 5; Dawn – 2; Other - ; Light readings - 13

Publications prior to Jul 2008 - 95

Blog

http://www.ali-writings.blogspot.in

Monograph

Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, IDSA Monograph Series No. 3, 2010
India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor, IDSA Monograph Series No. 10, 2012

Edited Book

· Ali Ahmed, J Panda and Prashant Singh (eds.), Towards a New Asian Order, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2012.

Book Forthcoming

· The Doctrine Puzzle: India’s Limited War Doctrine, Routledge India, 2013

Book Chapter

‘Countering Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: Debates in Indian Army’ in Maroof Raza (ed.), Confronting Terrorism, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2009
‘Applicability of Sub-Conventional Operations Doctrine to Counter Insurgency in Assam’, in Bhattacharya, R. and S. Pulipaka (eds.), Perilous Journey : Debates on Security and Development in Assam, New Delhi: Manohar, 2011
‘India 2030: With History as guide’ in Lele, A. and N. Goswami (eds.), Asia 2030: The Unfolding Future, New Delhi: Lancer 2011
‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Military Dimension’, in Jayant Baranwal (ed.), SP’s Military Yearbook 2010-11, New Delhi: SP Guide Publications, 2011
‘Indian Strategic Culture: The Pakistan Dimension’ in Kanti Bajpai and Harsh Pant (eds.) forthcoming Routledge publication
‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, in Mohammed Badrul Alam, Perspectives On Nuclear Strategy Of India, And Pakistan, Kalpaz Publications, Delhi, India, 2013.
‘AFSPA in light of Humanitarian Law’ in Vivek Chadha, Armed Forces Special Powers Act: The Debate, IDSA Monograph Series No. 7, 2012.
‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Leveraging India’s Forte’ in IDSA Task Force, Net Security Provider: India’s Out-of-Area Contingency Operations, 2012
‘Nuclear Doctrine and Conflict’ in Krishnappa and Princy George (eds.) Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond, Pentagon Security International, 2012.
‘The military and the Line of Control’ in Varun Sahni (ed.) (forthcoming)
‘India’s Nuclear Options: The military dimension’ in SP’s Military Yearbook, 2011-12, pp. 39-42.

Articles in refereed journals

Strategic Analysis

Political level considerations and nuclear retaliation, Strategic Analysis, 36 (4), 2012
Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation, Strategic Analysis, 34 (1), Jan 2010.
India's Response Options to Pakistani Nuclear First Use, Strategic Analysis, April 2010, Volume: 4 Issue: 2.
The Interface of Strategic and War Fighting Doctrines in the India–Pakistan Context, Strategic Analysis, 33 (5), September 2009.
Towards a proactive military strategy: Cold Start and Stop, Strategic Analysis, 35 (3), May 2011.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Use and Implications for India, Strategic Analysis, 34 (4), July 2010.

Others

Cold Start: The lifecycle of a doctrine, Comparative Strategy, 31:5, 453-468
‘Internal Security Crises in Punjab, Kashmir and Jaffna: The power of moderation’, South Asian Survey, 17 : 2 (2010): 283–294, SAGE Publications
Understanding Indo-Pak Relations, Journal of International Studies, Bangladesh (BILIA), Vol 1-2, Dec 2010.
Internal security crisis: The virtue of equanimity, Journal of Peace Studies, 18 (1,2), Jan-Jun 2011.
Strategic Culture and Indian Self-assurance, Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2&3, April-September, 2010.
Strategic Culture and Indian Self Assurance, Journal of Peace Studies, 17 (2,3), Apr-Sep 2010.
L’Inde Strategique (Translated into French) (India Strategic), La renaissance de l’inde, AGIR, Paris.

Articles

Mainstream

The Army: Missing Muslim India, Mainstream, Vol L No 27, June 23, 2012
Prospects for UN Peacekeeping in Afghanistan, Mainstream, Vol L, No 38, September 8, 2012,
India-Pakistan: Unlocking the Status Quo, Mainstream, L:9, 18 February, 2012.
Kashmir: Whither Strategy?, Mainstream, Annual 2011, Dec 23-29, 11.
India-Pakistan: Advocating Accommodation, Mainstream, L: 16, April 2012.
Kashmir: The Problem with the Solution, Mainstream, March 4-10, 2011.
Kashmir: Whither Strategy, Mainstream, L:1, December 2011.

Defence publications

Offensive in the mountains: Mountain Strike Corps, SPs Land Forces, 8/6, Dec 11-Jan 12.
Understanding India’s Military, Sardar, 1 (6), 2010 (Kazakhstan military magazine).
Rethinking India’s Nuclear Doctrine – Agni, XII (II), Jan-Mar 2010.
The Nuclear Factor in India’s Post 26/11 Military Options, Agni, XII:1, Jan-Mar 2009, pp. 50-65..
Reconciling doctrinal dichotomy, Aakrosh, 13 (49), Oct 2010.
Counter insurgency in the liberal perspective, Aakrosh, 13 (47), April 2010.
Indian Nuclear Command and Control, Aakrosh, 14 (50), Jan 2010 (Also on IDR website, Parts 1 and 2, 12-13 Jul 2011).
Limited War Thinking in India, Aakrosh, January 2010, 13 (46), p. 82-97.
Rethinking the Pakistan Strategy, Geopolitics, May 2011.
Tackling Terror Holistically, Conference Brochure, Security Watch India, 2009.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine, Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2009-12-30.
Reflection on Conflict Duration, Indian Defence Review, 24.3, Jul-Sep 2009.
Managing ‘Transformation’, South Asia Defence and Strategic Review, Sep-Oct 2009.
Uncertain Course: India-Pak strategic doctrines and balance of power, Strategic Affairs, Aug 2009-12-30.
Dealing with Two Fronts Needs Matching Capabilities, India Strategic (with V. Anand), Jan 2010
The Grammar of War, Defence and Strategic Review, October 2012.

Others

Pakistan in India’s strategic perspective, Indian Journal of Social Enquiry, 1 (4), Dec 2009.
Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan: India as Catalyst, IPCS Special
Report, December 2011.
AfPak: A Strategic Opportunity for South Asia?, IPCS Special Report, Dec 2009

Articles in military journals

Infantry Journal

Limited War: A mental framework, Infantry, June 2012
One Star: The Organisational Responsibility, Infantry Journal, June 2013.
Understanding Internal Security, The Infantry (India), Dec 2008.
The Infantry: ‘At’ Peace while ‘in’ peace?, Infantry, 2009 (?)
Perspectives on Defence Challenges faced by India, Infantry (India), June 2011
Battalion Command: A Template, 2009 (?), pp. 10-13.
Strategic India: An Introduction, Infantry, 2012 (?), p. 13-19.

War College Journal

Understanding India-Pakistan relations, War College Journal, 2011 (?)
Afghanistan: A Strategic Assessment, War College Journal, Autumn 2008.
An Analysis of Grand Strategy in Operation Barbarossa, War College Journal, Spring 2008.
Next Steps in India’s China Strategy, War College Journal, 2011, pp. 61-63.

Center for Land Warfare Studies

Readings for Officers, Scholar Warrior, Center for Land Warfare Studies, Autumn 2010.
Mizo Hills: Revisiting the Early Phase, Scholar Warrior, CLAWS, Autumn 2011.
The Invisible dimension of modernization, CLAWS Journal, Winter 2010.
A Perspective on Land Warfare Strategy, CLAWS Journal, Winter 2009.

USI Journal

India’s Strategic and Military Doctrines: A Post 1971 Snapshot, USI Journal, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 578, October-December 2009.
India’s Military Options in a Future 26/11 Scenario, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 575, January-March 2009.
India’s Military Options in a Future 26/11 Scenario, USI Journal, Jan-Mar 2009.

Jungle Warfare and Counter Insurgency School Journal

Jihad in Strategic Theory, Pratividrohi, Autumn 2009.
Learning from the Mizo Hills Experience, Pratividrohi, 2010.
Command Endeavour: The Regimental Way, Maratha Regiment Magazine, 2008.
Counter insurgency in a conventional war scenario, Pratividrohi, Journal of Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School, 2010.
The Counter Insurgency Oeuvre, Pratividrohi,

Others

The Limited War concept and India’s conventional doctrines, Trishul (Staff College), XXII (2), Spring 2010
Regimenatal Command, Maratha 2008, Regiment Journal

IDSA publications

Journal of Defence Studies

Reconciling the AFSPA with the legal spheres, Journal of Defence Studies, 5 (2), Apr 2011.
India-Pakistan relations: Military diplomacy vs Strategic Engagement, Journal of Defence Studies, 5 (1), Jan 2010.
TNW in Nuclear First Use: The Legal Counter, Journal of Defence Studies, 5 (4), Oct 2011.
Military Response to a Future 26/11 – A Dissuasive Analysis, JDS, 3 (4), 2009.
Reconciling AFSPA with legal spheres, Journal of Defence Studies, 5 (2), April 2011.
India’s Response Options to Pakistani Nuclear First Use, Journal of Defence Studies, 4 (2), April 2010.
TNW in Nuclear First Use: The Legal Factor, JDS, 5 (4), 2011.
India’s conflict strategy: The legal angle, JDS, 4 (3), July 2010.
Furthering No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context, JDS, 3 (3), July 2009
India’s Conflict Strategy: The Legal Angle, Journal of Defence Studies, July 2010 Volume: 4 Issue: 3.
Cold Start and the Sehjra Option, JDS, 4 (4), Oct 2010

Policy/Issue Briefs

Revision of DSCO: Human Rights to the fore, Policy Brief, IDSA, March 2011.
Reviewing India’s Nuclear Doctrine, Policy Brief, IDSA, April 24, 2009.
Elevate Human Rights as the Core Organising Principle in Counter Insurgency, IDSA Issue Brief, November 2011.
A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict, IDSA Issue Brief, October 2011.
2011 and Beyond: Visualising AfPak, IDSA Issue Brief, November 2009
2011 and beyond: Visualising Af-Pak, Issue Brief, IDSA, December 23, 2009.

Other

India’s Response to CBW Attack, Journal of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Oct-Dec 2008

IDSA Website, idsa.in

Strategic Comments

Reopening the debate on Limited War, 29 Feb 2012
The Indian Army: What the stars foretell for 2012, Dec 2011
Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Option, Oct 2011
What does Pakistan hope to achieve with Nasr?, Aug 2011
Afghanistan: An idea anticipating peace, June 2011
Pakistan’s first use in perspective, May 2011
Making sense of Nasr, Apr 2011
Ongoing revision of Indian Army doctrine, Jan 2011
The Arab Tumult in its wider meaning, Feb 2011
Army Transformation: A radical one?, Jan 2011
Political Dimensions of Limited War, March 29, 2010.
The advantages of ‘Cold Start Minor’, December 13, 2010
Obama’s AfPak Review should emphasise on Peace Talks with the Taliban November 23, 2010
The Third Front: Military Ethics, November 4, 2010
Clarifying India’s Strategic Doctrine, October 25, 2010
The ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy, September 28, 2010
Military Doctrines: Next steps, August 16, 2010
Civil-Military relations: Under scan, July 14, 2010
An additional dish for the India-Pakistan platter, July 5, 2010
Darfur and enhancing India’s peacekeeping profile, June 2010
The message from mock battles, May 7, 2010
The military intelligence function in future war, February 26, 2010.
Nuclear targeting caveats, April 21, 2010
Ongoing revision of army doctrine, 6 Jan 2010.
Nuclear implications of the two front formulation, 29 Jan 10
The Army’s Subculture in the Coming Decade, December 22, 2009
The Army’s decade in review, November 30, 2009
India-Pakistan Conflict Outcome Probability, October 27, 2009
Re-visioning the Nuclear Command Authority, September 9, 2009
India’s response to the next terror attack, August 26, 2009
For an Indo-Pak strategic dialogue forum, August 4, 2009
The central debate in India’s civil military relations, July 6, 2009
Seizing the moment: India and the ‘moderate Taliban’, June 8, 2009
Exit Points and the Updation of Cold Start Doctrine, April 22, 2009
Initiatives to transform the Army Officer Corps, March 5, 2009
Foregrounding ‘Non-Combatant Immunity’, January 30, 2009
The Post 26/11 Regional Strategic Predicament, December 3, 2008
Need for clarity in India's nuclear doctrine, Oct 2008
An overview of the Russo-Georgian conflict, Sep 2008

Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) Website, ipcs.org

India

and Pakistan: Azm-e-Nau as a Response to the Cold Start, July 2013

India

and Pakistan: Moving Beyond CBMs, July 2012

3. Civil-Military Relations: Questioning the VK Singh Thesis, June 2012

4. The Missing Element in the Counter Naxal Strategy, May 2012

5. India-Pakistan: Winds of Change, April 2012

6. NCBMs: Scaremongering but with a purpose, Feb 2012

7. Cold Start: One step forward, two steps back, Jan 2012

8. AFSPA: The renewed debate, Nov 2011

9. The direction of India’s deterrent, Sep 2011

10. Saxena Task Force: Farewell to the Chiefs, Sep 2011

11. Internal Security Reform: Yet another Opportunity, July 2011

12. The Sense in Networking with Kayani, Apr 2011

13. Implications of Indian BMD developments, Mar 2011

14. Kashmir: A Hot Summer Ahead?, Jan 2010

15. WikiWrecks: The US Perspective on Cold Start, Dec 2010

16. Capping the ‘Volcano’: Indian Military Action against Pakistan?, Oct 2010

17. AFSPA: A Practical Approach, Sep 2010

18. J&K: Implement the Working Group Recommendations, Aug 2010

19. General Kayani: Implications of Extension, July 2010

20. Should India give up its NFU Doctrine?, June 2010

21. India-Pakistan Dialogue: Going Beyond Thimpu, May 2010

22. The New Chief and Transformation, Apr 2010

23.

India

and Pakistan: Losing time, Feb 2009

24. The Logic of the Sundarji Doctrine, Dec 2009

25. The Obama Decision Making Model, Dec 2009

26. The Illogic of ‘Unacceptable Damage’, Oct 2009

27. The ‘Pause’ in India-Pakistan Dialogue, Oct 2009

28. India's Thermonuclear Test: Bombed?, Aug 2009

29. Talks As Strategy, Aug 2009

30. The illogic of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation, Jul 2009

31. Nuclear Trajectory in South Asia, Jun 2009

32. Tackling Insurgency In Assam, May 2009

33. The ‘Context’ of Islamism, Apr 2009

34. Questioning ‘Compellence’ as Answer to India’s Pakistan Dilemma, Mar 2009

35. Engaging a Reluctant Pakistan, Jan 2009

36. Post 26/11 Strategy Recomendation For India, Dec 2008

37. The Pay Commission Outcome as Opportunity, Oct 2008

38. Thinking Beyond the Line of Control, Aug 2008

Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) Website, claws.in

Naval operations in an India-Pakistan context, 20 June 2012
Pakistan’s military strategy: The best case scenario, 12 Jun 2011
Arguing for NBC Training, 26 Aug 2011
Dimensions of the MacChrystal episode, 8 July 2010
India’s North East: Insurgency and Civil Services Reform, 19 April 2010
Psychological opertions as key, Jan 2012
Mountain Strike Corps: The nuclear dimension, Dec 2011
Implications of BrahMos deployment, Oct 2011
Demonstration Strikes in an India-Pakistan Scenario, 16 Feb 2010
Arguing for NBC Training, Aug 2011
Hatf IX and possible Indian responses, 5 May 2011
The Sino-Pak ‘collusive’ threat, 31 March 2011
Deterrence Stability in a Context of Strategic Instability, 11 Feb 2011
Counter insurgency learning from Kashmir, 20 Jan 2011
Conflict strategy for the decade ahead, 25 Dec 2010
Nuclear C2: The balance agenda, 28 November 2010
Appraising a Pakistani military response, 16 Oct 2010.
Sociological Dimension of the ‘Transformation’ Initiative, June 2009
Nuclear Use Consequences For Pakistan, Aug 2009
Some Implications of the ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine, Sep 2009
Building India’s Strategic Culture: A Roadmap, Oct 2009
Towards A Limited War Doctrine, Nov 2009
Towards a National Security Doctrine, 10 Nov 2011
Kargil: Afterthoughts at the Operational Level, Dec 2009
Army Deployment in Central India, Feb 2009
Strategy Advocacy for Pakistan, 14 March 2010.

Foreign Policy Journal Website (foreignpolicyjournal.com)

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/author/ali-ahmed/

Non-alignment 2.0 and India’s strategic direction, 28 May 2012
The Exit from ‘AfPak’: Don’t Blame Pakistan, June 2012
Kashmir: Preparing for a contingency, July 2012
South Asia: Pakistan holds the key, April 2012
Behind India’s Defence Budget, March 2012
India and Pakistan: Missing NCBMs, February 2012
India: For an introspective turn, Jan 2012
India-Pakistan: Solving the ‘chicken or egg’ conundrum, Dec 2011
Evaluating the China ‘threat’ thesis in India, Nov 2011
Using military dangers gainfully, Oct 2011
India, China and the US: The debate in India, Sept 2011
The Muslim Question: An Understanding for Difficult Times, July 2011
South Asia: Of war clouds and silver linings, June 2011
Saving Pakistan, May 2011
India-Pak: Justifiable pessimism, Apr 2011
India-Pakistan: Nothing in the offing, Mar 2011
Coping with Islamist Pakistan, Feb 2011
AfPak: Talks as the way out, Dec 2010
Towards the endgame in Afghanistan, Jul 2010
The coming escalation in Obama’s war, Jun 2010
Reconciling the AfPak conundrum, Apr 2010
Getting Pakistan to bandwagon, Mar 2010
India-Pakistan Dialogue: The Way Forward, February 2010
India’s Inter strategic paradigm debate and Pakistan, Jan 2010
Prospects of India-Pakistan Nuclear Confidence Building, Dec 2009
India-Pakistan relations: Movement?, Nov 2009
Obama and the Limitations of Conventional Strategy, Oct 2009
Af-Pak: Opportunity for a Regional Initiative, Oct 2009

Book Reviews

1. When More Is Less: The International Project In Afghanistan, By Astri Sukhre, Hurst & Co, London, 2011, in The Book Review, XXXVI (5), May 2012

2. The New Protectorates: International Tutelage And The Making Of Liberal States, Edited by James Mayall , Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, C Hurst & Co,, London, 2011, in The Book Review, XXXVI (9), Sept 2012

3. Vortex Of Conflict: US Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan And Iraq, By D. Caldwell, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011 (First South Asian Edition 2012), in The Book Review, XXXVI (9), Sept 2012

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, A metahistory of the clash of civilisations: Us and them beyond Orientalism, Hurst, 2011 in Strategic Analysis, 35 (2), 2012, pp. 337-38.
Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur , in Strategic Analysis, Volume: 34 Issue: 4, July 2010
MJ Akbar, Tinderbox: The past and future of Pakistan, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2011 in Strategic Analysis, 36 (1), pp. 169-170, January 2012.
Stephen Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming without aiming, in JDS,
Armed Conflicts In South Asia 2011: The Promise And Threat Of Transformation, Edited by D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari, Routledge, New Delhi, 2012 in The Book Review, October 2012,
Talmiz Ahmad, Children of Abraham at War: Clash of Messianic Militarisms, in Strategic Analysis, September 2011, 35:5, 849-851
K. Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces in LIC, in Strategic Analysis, 35 (3) May 2011.
Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler, India and Counter insurgency, in Pratividrohi, 2010, in
Priyanjali Malik, India’s Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb, in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Apr-Jun 2010
Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, in Third Frame, Journal of Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia
Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and Wars Within, in India Quarterly, July-Sep 2008
Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army: Vision 2020, in Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA, 2 (2), Winter 2008
Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, in Third Frame, 2009, pp. 159-162
Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy in Defence Management, in Defence Management, Mar 2009, and Third Frame (?), pp. 204-06
Wajahat Habibullah, My Kashmir: Conflict and Prospects of Enduring Peace, in Third Frame, 2010 (?), pp. 207-09.
Rajesh Rajagopalan, Fighting Like a Guerilla: The Indian Army and Counter Insurgency, in Third Frame, 1:3, Jul-Sep 2008.
Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova (eds.) Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation, in Strategic Analysis, 33 (5), Sept 2009
Harsh Pant, Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System, in Strategic Analysis, Sept 2009
E Sridharan, The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, in IPCS, ipcs.org, 21 November 2008.
Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence, in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, July-Sep 09
Asseri, Anti terrorism: Saudi Arabias Role In The War On Terror, in Indian Review of Books, XXXIV (2), February 2010.
Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007) in India Quarterly 65, 3 (2009): 329–343.
Carey Schofield, Inside the Pakistan Army, in Purple Beret, April 2012, p. 41.

Newspapers/Periodicals

Kashmir Times

Kashmir: More of the same, 3 July 2012.
Lessons from Bandipore, 10 August 2012.
AFSPA: A question of justice, 13 Feb 12
Kashmir: Declaring premature victory, 4 Feb 12
Acknowledging the blindspot on Kashmir, 27 Jan 2012
An agenda point for the foreign secretaries, 16 June 2011
Kashmir: Its now or never, 9 Dec 2011
The agenda this winter, 6 Oct 2011
Solving Kashmir: Is it feasible?, 19 October 2011
Fixing responsibility: CI decisions and consequences, 30 Aug 2011
Kashmir in the wider India-Pak scheme, 24 Aug 2011
Kashmir back in the news, 10 July 2010
No escaping political solution to Kashmir, 7 Aug 2010
A ceasefire enabled reckoning possible, 9 Oct 2010
Preliminaries towards a solution – 24 Feb 2011
Domesticating the AFSPA – 28 Mar 2011
A novel option for the coming summer – 13 Apr 2011

Tehelka

India-Pakistan peace process, Tehelka, June 2011
Time not to let the guard down in Kashmir, Tehelka, 7 Nov 2011
Deterrence has a shaky and brief shelf life, Tehelka, 3 Jan 12
Smile but keep the powder dry, Tehelka, 10 April 2012
A General’s unforgettable legacy, Tehelka, 31 May 2012

Financial World

Why are Muslims missing from Army?, Financial World, 16 June 2012
LWE: There’s a problem with the ‘solution’, 3 May 2012
Tribal communities in the cross-hairs, Financial World, 9 July 2012
To call out the army or not, Financial World - 2 Aug 12
The sub-unit cries for army attention, Financial World, 27 Aug 2012
Do we need a Chief Warlord? Opinion, The Financial World—Delhi, 10 Sep 12
Kashmir, The Financial World, 13 Dec 2011
A grand bargain for India and Pakistan, The Financial World, 20 June 2011
Closed doors mean no dialogue, no peace, The Financial World, 13 Dec 2011.

Dawn (Pakistan)

Time for the Grand Bargain, Oct 2011 – Dawn blog
Afghanistan: Lets try peacekeeping, 19 Nov 2011 – Dawn blog

Miscellaneous

The Army: Why Muslims are Missing?, The Aligarh Movement, May-June 2012.
Taking Nuclear Warfighting Seriously, IDR, 12.1, March 2012.
A Plan for Bonn, Outlook blog, 5 Dec 2011
Muslim India: Through the Security Prism, Milligazette, Jan 2009
Making Cold Start Doctrine work, 2010 – Tribune, 11 Oct 2010
In Defence of the Chief, the Two-Front war issue, 21 January 2010, 8ak.in
Defending India’s Strategic Culture, Purple Beret, 28 March 2012
Isreal matters, but only so much, Purple Beret
Inside the Pakistan Army, Purple Beret
Af-Pak endgame: Implications for Kashmir, International Business Times, 11 Aug 2011.
Legal warfare: The neglected dimension, IDR, Jan 2012
UN Peacekeeping: Thinking out of the box, Indian Defence Review, Feb 2012
AfPak Endgame: Implications for Kashmir, International Business Times, 11 August 2011
‘Limitations of military response options to 26/11’, The Front Page, Dec 2008
'Brown Sahibs' to blame for Chintalnar massacre of CRPF jawans, 8ak.in (a media partner of defpro.com), Apr 2010.
‘India-Pakistan: Prospects of War’, 8ak.in, Aug 2010.
‘Kashmir: Back in the news’, 8ak.in, countercurrents.org, July 2010.
‘Sukhna Scam: Additional Dimensions’, 8ak.in, Mar 2010.
What to do about Pakistan?, Sahara Time, June 11, 2011

Salute

Army’s role order, July 2011
Soldiering: An Indian Experience by S. Sardeshpande (Book Review) – May 2010
Lessons from North Cachar, May 2010
Rethink the Afghan Strategy – June 2010
Indian Maritime Doctrine, IHQ of MoD (Navy) (Book Review), June 2010
Action for Hyderabad, July 2010
Are we pedantic? July 2010
The 1947-48 War had pioneered the shape of Indian policies, Aug 2010
Crisis response: Changing the contours, Sep 2010
Making sense of jointness – Nov 2010
Poor bloody Infanteer – Nov 2010
Watch out for schism – Dec 2010
India in Pakistan’s threat perception – Apr 2011
Not just about them – May 2011
What to do about Pakistan?, June 2011
Battalion Command: A Template, Feb 2010
An Infanteer’s Life, April 2009
The ‘Sundarji Doctrine’ Revisited, Oct 2009
The ‘New’ Vision for Indo-Pak Relations, Sep 2009
A Fauji Forrest Gump, 2-16 May 2009
Mentoring in the time of Shortages, July 2009
Stop ‘OG’, Think ‘Purple’

Light Reading

Book Chapter

· ‘Through the Rear View Mirror’ and ‘When Things Go Wrong’ in Raksha Bharadia et al (eds.), Chicken Soup for the Indian Armed Forces Soul, New Delhi: Westland, 2009

Mayur Infomail (Locality newspaper)

Neighbour
All in a morning’s walk
Independence: Buisness unfinished
Neighbour’s Envy
The Message in the Lights
By the Traffic Light
A Day in a Muyuran’s Life
Mayur Vihar and Delhi Olympics
The Toughest Jobs are Right Here
Heroes All
Honouring the Kargil Legacy

PUBLISHED WORK: PRIOR TO JULY 2008

ARTICLES

Infantry Journal

1. Beget the Devil’s Own Platoon, Infantry Journal, 1993.

2. Tips on the Reading Habit, Infantry Journal, 1993.

3. Cohesion: Bibliographical Note, Infantry Journal, 1995.

4. Civil-Military Relations: A Theoretical Perspective, Infantry Journal, 1997.

5. Company Command: A Template, Infantry Journal, 2000.

6. Whither Infantry?, Infantry Journal, 2001

7. Drill Deadens, Infantry Journal, 2002

Combat/War College Journal

1. On the Indian Use of Force: The Critiques Reexamined, Combat Journal, Mar 2000.

2. SAARC – The Strategic Debate in India, Combat Journal, Mar 01

3. Self Esteem: Room for improvement, War College Journal, 2005

4. AOR: The CT Ops Version, War College Journal, 2005

5. An Analysis of Grand Strategy in Operation Barbarossa, War College Journal, Spring 08

Pratividrohi (Anti Terrorism Journal of the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School)

1. Pseudo Gang Operations, Pratividrohi, 1997

2. Rethinking Human Rights, Pratividrohi, 2000.

3. On Military Leadership in Counter Insurgency Operations, Pratividrohi, 1998.

4. The Army, Media and LIC, Pratividrohi, 2002

5. J&K: The Perspectives Contrasted, Pratividrohi, 2001

6. Peace Enforcement: The direction of the future, Pratividrohi, 2003

7. Offensive air power in J&K; Pratividrohi, Sep 05

8. Peacekeeping and Peaceenforcement, Pratividrohi, 2002

Intelligence Journal (Journal of Military Intelligence School)

1. Society and Military Intelligence: A Sociological Perspective, Intelligence Journal, 1996-97.

2. The Pathology of Info War, Intelligence Journal, 2004

USI Journal (United Services Institution of India)

1. The Fauji Memsahib, USI Journal, 1999.

2. The Doctrinal Challenge, USI Journal, Jan 2000.

3. MONUC, USI Journal, Jan 2004

4. Short Wars: Creating Tomorrow’s Reality, USI Journal, Jan 2008

5. In Tribute: Recalling The ‘Sundarji Doctrine’, USI Journal, Vol. CXXXVIII, No. 571, January-March 2008.

Pinnacle (Journal of the Army Training Command)

1. The Strategic Community, Pinnacle, Mar 2003

2. Reflection on Military Ethos, Pinnacle, Mar 2003

3. Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sociological Perspective, Pinnacle, Sep 03

4. Reader’s Forum: Short Wars; Dec 07

5. Reader’s Forum: Transformation and the Officer Corps; Spring 08 (under consideration)

Others

1. Recruiting Anecdotes, Maratha Journal, 1992

2. A Professional’s Trekking Experience, Maratha Journal,1990

3. The Trade Secret Unveiled, Infantry Day Supplement, The Statesman, Oct 27, 1999.

4. CAMs and CBMs, Mainstream, July 23, 1994.

5. Style of Command, CDM Journal, 2002

6. Educating Future Army Officers, Educationist (Journal of the Army Education Corps), 2002

7. A Brief on Research and Analysis, Educationist, 2008

8. Command Endeavour: A Regimental Way, Maratha Journal, 2007

BOOK REVIEWS

USI Journal

1. Alexis Heraclitus, Self determination of minorities in International Politics, London, Frank Cass, 1991.

2. Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: A Renewal of Social Democracy, London, Polity Press, 1998.

3. Anthony McGrew, Paul Lewis, Global Politics, Globalisation, and the Nation State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992.

4. Avnar Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York, Colombia University Press, 1998.

5. Bruce Lawrence, Shattering The Myth: Islam Beyond Violence, New Jersey, Priceton University Press, 1998.

6. Craig Baxter, ed. Government and Politics in South Asia, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987.

7. Ethan Kapstein, Michel Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, West Sussex, Colombia University Press, 1999.

8. From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000.

9. Gwyn Prins, Strategy, Force Planning and Diplomatic/Military Operations, London, RIIA, 1998.

10. John Pimlott, Stephen Bayley, ed. The Gulf War Assessed, London, Arms and Armour, 1992.

11. Kedourie, E., Nationalism, Fourth Edition, Oxford, Blackwell, 1961.

12. Lawrence Freedman, Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, London, Faber, 1992.

13. Maroof Raza, Low Intensity Conflict: The New Dimension to India’s Military Commitment, Meerut, Kartikeya Publications, 1995.

14. Marshall Hodgson, Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

15. Maya Chaddha, Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India, New York, Colombia Univeristy Press, 1997.

16. Michel Clark, Simon Seraty, ed. New Thinking and Old Realities: America, Europe and Russia, Washington, Seven Locks, 1991.

17. MK Kaw, Bureaucracy: IAS Unmasked, Delhi, Konark, 1993.

18. Morton Halperin ed. Self Determination in the New World Order, Washington DC, Carneigie Endowment, 1992.

19. Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power, New Jersey, Princeton, 1992.

20. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, New York, Cornell University Press, 1999.

21. Torbjorn Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992.

22. Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence, New York, Manchester University Press, 1996.

23. Sahadevan, P., Conflict and Peace Making in South Asia, New Delhi, Lancers Books, 2001.

24. Philpot, D., Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Modern Ideas Shaped the World, Princeton, 2001

25. Synnott, H., The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests, Adelphi Paper 332, London, OUP, 1999

26. Chari, PR., ed., Security and Governance in South Asia, New Delhi, Manohar, 2001

27. FitzGibbon, S., Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Myth of the Battle of Goose Green, Cambridge, Lutterworth Press, 2001

28. Haq, K., The South Asian Challenge, Oxford, OUP, 2002

Others

1. Karnad, B., Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, New Delhi, MacMillan, 2002 - Pinnacle, Mar 03

2. Tellis, A., India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal, New Delhi, OUP, 2001 – Pinnacle, Sep 03

3. Perkovich, G., India’s Nuclear Bomb, New Delhi, OUP, 1999 - Pinnacle, 2004; Trishul, Vol XIII, No 2

4. Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan; New Delhi, OUP - War College Journal, 2005

5. Maududi, SA, Towards Understanding Islam, New Delhi, Markazi Maktab Islami - Trishul (DSSC Journal), Spring 2005

6. Chadha, V., Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis, New Delhi, Sage, 2005 - The Infantry (India), 2005

7. Fitzgibbon, S., Not mentioned in dispatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green; Cambridge, Lutterworth Press, 1995; War College Journal - Autumn 2006

8. Raman, Sudha, Nuclear Strategy: The Doctrine of Just War; New Delhi, Manas Publication, 2006 – USI Journal, Apr-Jun 07

9. Singh, Jaswant, A Call to Honour, New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2006 – Defence Management, Apr 07

10. Musharraf, P., In the Line of Fire; New York, Simon and Shuster, 2006 – The Infantry (India), Autumn 06

11. Bammi, Y., War Against Insurgency and Terrorism in Kashmir; Dehra Dun, Nataraj Publishers, 2007 – Pinnacle Dec 07

12. Chandran, S., Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo Pak Conflict; Omdoa Research Press, New Delhi, 2005 – War College Journal 2007

13. Malik, SK, Quranic Concept of War; New Delhi, Himalayan Books, 1986 – War College Journal, 2007

14. Rajagopalan, R., Fighting Like a Guerilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, New Delhi, Routledge, 2007; The Third Frame, Autumn 08 (forthcoming)

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Combat/ War College Journal

1. Understanding Violence and Militancy, 1992.

2. The Need for Curricular Innovation, 1999.

3. Information War, 1999.

4. Letter to the Editor on Bharat Karnad article, Autumn 06

5. Dangers of Strategic Determinism, 2001

Infantry Journal

1. Indo Pak War: The Fourth Round in On

2. Pardon, but your Political Slip is Showing, 1999

3. Comment on Book Review of Salman Khursheed’s ‘Beyond Terrorism’, 2003

USI Journal

Need for a military archives, 1995.

CDM Journal (College of Defence Management)

Directive Control: An Advocacy, 2002

Published work over 2006-08

Articles

· Short Wars: From Desirable to Feasible, USI Journal, Jan 2008

· In Tribute: A Recall of the Sundarji Doctrine, USI Journal, Apr 08

· An Analysis of Grand Strategy in Operation Barbarossa, War College Journal, Spring 08

· A Brief on Research and Analysis, Educationist, 2008

· The Command Challenge, Maratha Regiment Journal, 08

Book Reviews

· Fitzgibbon, S., Not mentioned in dispatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green; Cambridge, Lutterworth Press, 1995; War College Journal - Autumn 2006

· Raman, S., Nuclear Strategy: The Doctrine of Just War; New Delhi, Manas Publication, 2006 – USI Journal, Apr-Jun 07

· Singh, Jaswant, A Call to Honour, New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2006 – Defence Management, Apr 07

· Musharraf, P., In the Line of Fire; New York, Simon and Shuster, 2006 – The Infantry (India), Autumn 06

· Bammi, Y., War Against Insurgency and Terrorism in Kashmir; Dehra Dun, Nataraj Publishers, 2007 – Pinnacle Dec 07

· Chandran, S., Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo Pak Conflict; Omdoa Research Press, New Delhi, 2005 – War College Journal 2007

· Malik, SK, Quranic Concept of War; New Delhi, Himalayan Books, 1986 – War College Journal, 2007

· Rajagopalan, R., Fighting Like a Guerilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency, New Delhi, Routledge, 2007; The Third Frame, Autumn 08

UNPUBLISHED WORK

· MA dissertation at Dept of War Studies, King’s College London, London University: 1994-95 -“UN Peacekeeping and the Problem of Military Doctrine” Guide: Dr. Christopher Dandekar, Professor in Military Sociology

· MPhil dissertation at Center of International Studies, Cambridge University: 1995-96 - “Intervention in Internal Affairs by States in South Asia” Guide: Dr. Philip Towle, HOD

· MA dissertation in Defence and Strategic Studies at Defence Services Staff College, University of Madras: 2000-01 - “The Contending Philosophies in Indian Strategic Discourse and the Impact on SAARC”

· Monograph: Ministry of External Affairs Chair at United Services Institute: 1999-2000 “Institutional Interest: A Study of Indian Strategic Culture” Guide: Mr. K Subrahmanyam, IAS (Retd)

My other blog: Subcontinental Musings

Monday, 4 June 2012

Sunday, 3 June 2012

Alternative Perspectives

Tensions Between Security and Reconstruction

Saturday, 2 June 2012

32. Tackling Insurgency In Assam, May 2009

33. The ‘Context’ of Islamism, Apr 2009

34. Questioning ‘Compellence’ as Answer to India’s Pakistan Dilemma, Mar 2009

35. Engaging a Reluctant Pakistan, Jan 2009

36. Post 26/11 Strategy Recomendation For India, Dec 2008

37. The Pay Commission Outcome as Opportunity, Oct 2008

38. Thinking Beyond the Line of Control, Aug 2008

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/author/ali-ahmed/

Infantry Journal

Combat/War College Journal

Intelligence Journal (Journal of Military Intelligence School)

USI Journal (United Services Institution of India)

Pinnacle (Journal of the Army Training Command)

Others

BOOK REVIEWS

USI Journal

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Combat/ War College Journal

Infantry Journal

USI Journal

CDM Journal (College of Defence Management)

UNPUBLISHED WORK