https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-challenge-for-this-generations?utm_source=twitter&sd=pf

The challenge for this generation of commanding officers

The first commanding officer (CO) of a Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalion of which I was once a member passed away this week. We had heard of the challenges he and his team had faced, not only in raising the battalion, but also in its simultaneous operational employment. Arguably, the first set of RR COs had perhaps the roughest – if the most professionally exhilarating – time of the generations of COs of the Indian Army thus far.

Though battalion level command is taken as the epitome of command in the army, there would be strong votaries of the company command level as offering a sterner test of leadership. The argument shifts easily in favour of the latter when the environment is of intimate, close quarter battle, such as on the Kargil heights. Even there, COs were not only equally salient - recall Joshi, Rai and Thakur – but junior leaders – as Batra and Pandey – effortlessly snatched the crown. 

Even if in battle company commanders figure prominently as the key leadership rung – judging from examples as of Zaki in 1965 and Hoshiar Singh in 1971 - COs are never far behind. Dewan Ranjit Rai in 1947, Tarapore and Hayde in 1965, Hanut in 1971, Khan in 1984 and Santosh Babu of Galwan fame are examples. Close quarter battle too has seen COs upfront, though mostly in counter insurgency or on the Line of Control (LC). Nair, Sarna and Vasanth readily come to mind. Of Nair’s feats, it’s not an easy pick between his Kirti Chakra-meriting one as a young officer and his Ashoka Chakra-winning one as a CO. 

The film Thin Red Line shows up the inter-se salience of the three leadership rungs at the tactical level – battalion, company and platoon. Bana eclipses Varinder, even if there could not have been one without the other. The moral is that none of the leadership rungs is dispensable, one or other coming to fore as the battle progresses or its fog and friction throw up imponderables.

Be that as it may, the battalion level takes the cake in the leadership hustings presumably due to operations being the less usual preoccupation of the army. The Kargil War came about some 30 years after the preceding war and even then, only involved - hands-on - merely nine battalions of the army. The rest of the army was only partially mobilized. Operation Parakram that soon followed saw the entire army on war-footing though no part of it engaged in battle itself. The LC has intermittently seen small scale cross-LC operations, the recent well-known one christened ‘surgical operations’.

The profession of arms is one in which participation in the real thing is not always possible. Not all countries are hyper-powers looking for the next country to invade. Once the neighbours are deterred and the internal security situation steadies, professional effervescence settles to a peacetime rhythm. So is the case with the Indian Army more engaged in preparing rather than partaking in operations. Even its participating in low intensity operations has been so extensive to almost be routine. The ‘intensity’ of these operations varies with the political context and location, even when part of the same campaign.

Given the preeminence of the battalion command level in the Army’s scheme of things, what does the future - strategically appraised - hold for this level of command?

Command experience is a combination of preparation and luck – luck meaning being at the right place at the right time. It can be that a combat opportunity does knock on the door, and find the commander with his pants by his ankles. Since combat opportunities are fast and fleeting, being caught flat-footed means dishonor if the enemy gets the better of one, or waiting indefinitely for the next knock.

Peak preparedness cannot be maintained forever. Socks are to be pulled up and belts tightened on receipt of strategic warning. In India’s case, that is a consistent deficit. The battalions pitch-forked into Golden Temple in 1984 required to be bailed out by tanks taking down the façade of Akal Takht. The initial assault on Jaffna – from a ‘cold start’ as it were – found some battalions at the wrong end of the Tamil Tigers’ stick. 13 Sikh Light Infantry is forever a stern reminder. Similarly, the battalions along the Kargil front were surprised by the intrusion. Since information is scarce and contradictory, the case of Galwan should find unbiased study at the war colleges.

The command challenge at battalion level therefore appears to be to keep the pot of preparedness boiling, without having it boil over prematurely. Or to put it in another way, the commander has to ‘Cry, Wolf!’, but with a straight face. However, a perennial hurdle with this is ennui. It is never easy to cook up worst case scenarios and keep the battalion tuned-in. As peace station commanding officers well know, the organization ‘conspires’ against battalion’s keeping focus. Now there are five colonels in the division headquarters, looking to distract, where once there were two. The situation has likely only worsened.

India has a mass army and no existential threat. It is also not an expansionist power, howsoever much a politician or a pseudo-cultural politico might like to strike a Napoleonic pose calling for Akhand Bharat. The Pakistan front is now in cold storage. A spent case, its proxy war is at ebb. Even though redoubtable Minister Amit Shah has thoughtfully kept the Valley alienated, Pakistan is too internally preoccupied – economically, socially and politically – to profit. Further, we have incentivized it by diverting our west-centric military power to the China front. Pakistan no longer needs proxy war to undercut our conventional advantage. It stands proven Kashmiris were only rhetorically, a jugular. The Pakistan front ameliorated, we can afford the dilution.

 The China front sees much shadow boxing but it’s unlikely the gong will sound for the real thing. There would be instances of a repeat of the occupation of the Kailash range to spook the Chinese, but not having rolled down to Moldo-Rudok then, we can be sure we are unlikely to be doing so now. And this is not because Chinese have bolted any doors left untended, but because there is no stomach for it. The excuse is that we are catching up with the head-start the Chinese have over us and shall keep our powder dry till we do. That the gap is increasing – China is putting together a new bridge at the Pangong Tso and cutting a new road alignment - is a contradiction the ‘let’s play catch-up’ strategy is understandably very quiet on. What this bespeaks of is that there will be much ‘kadam taal’ but no assault as such from the line-of-march. Perhaps on this count, a sage has it that our military might shall remain untested, fated as we are according to his lights, to lose the next war against it within 10 days.

Where does all this leave the current generation of commanding officers?

They have the pre-1962 War and post-1971 War generations to look to. The former period was described once as the heyday of cantonment soldiering. The latter period witnessed India at its strategic peak, having exorcised the ghosts of 1962 with its 1971 vanquishing of a kin-foe. That the two periods respectively ended rather abruptly in a reckoning – with 1962 debacle and a reckoning in Sri Lanka – has the lesson. Whether, when and where a denouement will precipitate is uncertain. What commanding officers have to deliver on is that the army is not scalded when it does. They carry an inter-generational responsibility.

The official line is that there is a ‘two front’ threat. That’s been on now for some 12 years. That Pakistan did not take advantage of India’s discomfiture in Ladakh could be attributed to the Covid pandemic. But it could equally bespeak of a more stable strategic environment than the ‘two front’ hype lets on. With appeasement on both fronts, the two-front threat stands allayed - for now. The key piece of evidence of an eternal peace dawning is the Agnipath scheme. Surely, the enemy would know our defensive and non-expansionist intent by seeing how we are hobbling ourselves. His security dilemma dissipated, he would not incite ours. They can receive the message loud and clear in India continuing without a Chief of Defence Staff that we don’t mean business, strategically.  

So, does the partial mobilization in the Ladakh theatre and stepping up of alert levels along the China front show seriousness or obfuscation? China is a satiated power, having gained its 1959 claim line at little price, even if one includes our figure for its dead at Galwan. It never had a claim on rest of Ladakh and is not about to take ‘South Tibet’, which is not quite Taiwan.

This leaves the latter impulse standing: obfuscation. Inactivity would betray the policy of appeasement operational. Admitting to it is not possible since appeasement – though a legitimate strategy – acquired a bad name since Chamberlain was accused of it. Therefore, the show of seriousness, while pointing to alleged Chinese upgrades in its strategic posture. An exercise with Chinese bête noire, the Americans, is due this autumn in high-altitude Auli, a day’s drive from a disputed site on the Line of Actual Control, Barahoti. Alongside, acclimatization concerns force units even in peace tenures to keep a proportion of troops on field stations. The catch-up policy could backfire in the interim. This may be not so much from any inherent weakness, but from unfathomable internal politics at Zhongnanhai. National security could suffer as much as it did in 1962. Then, Nehru had the decency to bear the brunt, at the cost of his life. Politics has deteriorated since. The military may end up the fall guy.

Even on the Pakistan front, Cold Start levels of alertness necessitate having a proportion of peacetime units stationed in field conditions. Cold Start - let out of the bag by General Rawat – entails integrated battle groups on the start line. This compels a small quantum of troops in a trip wire role on the border since Pakistan too could bite off an equivalent portion. With terrorism being our one-track foreign policy, we could be hoist by our own petard by but a bunch of terrorists.

Commanding officers of this generation thus have their task cut out: manage ennui from inaction and pseudo-action. Emulating he recently departed RR CO may provide a hint on how to navigate the interim: “He later raised and successfully commanded a Rashtriya Rifles Battalion in a highly active area of Poonch-Rajouri in J&K, during which time, he had rubbed enough seniors the wrong way. They reciprocated by making sure that he was curtailed in terms of rank. He did not care. The only thing he cared for was his loyalty to professional ethics.” Such an officer must no longer be ‘a military leader of a rare breed’.

 https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/

Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLII, No. 628, April-June  2022.

Abstract

The article postulates a ‘peace operations’ triangle’ with peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding as its three sides. It argues, through a case study of the UN’s Abyei Mission, UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), that the three sides of the peace operations’ triangle need to be ministered adequately for success of a mission. Through the lifecycle of the UNISFA, it foregrounds observations on the inter-linkages between the three sides. UNISFA’s turn from being a mission with a largely military mandate to a multi-faceted mission indicates the significance of the three sides in peace operations. The operational art of peace operations, therefore, lies in arriving at a balance between the three.

Introdution

The heuristic on peacekeeping, made famous by Boutros-Boutros Ghali, had four components: peacekeeping, peacemaking, post-conflict peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy.1 Preventive diplomacy, as the term suggests, is prior to the onset of violence. The other three lines of operation are not sequential and have a degree of overlap.2 Challenges in peace operations are usually faced when there is imbalance in the attention and resources devoted to these. A peace operation’s success depends on a masterly employment of the tools respective to each line of operation. As strategy, in general, is an art, so is efficacious employment of peace tools, termed here as the Operational Art of peace operations.

In this article, a case study of the UN’s Abyei Mission is undertaken through the ‘peace operations’ triangle’3. The length of the three sides depicting that the salience of the side varies at different junctures in the lifecycle of a Mission. Preventive diplomacy brings about a peace agreement that allows for peacekeeping. The ‘peace to keep’ is used for peacebuilding, deepening constituencies in favour of peace, that in turn helps with peacemaking involving dealing with ‘root causes’. Thus, an interactive relationship can be seen between the three. Slovenly peacemaking aggravates peacekeeping, thereby constricting space for peacebuilding. On the other hand, peacemaking expands the space for peacebuilding, easing the onus on peacekeeping. Operational Art lies in ensuring none of the three sides loses ballast, while the three are energised to situation-specific levels. The aim is a positive, self-reinforcing equilateral triangle.

Background to the Abyei Mission

Abyei is a territorial dispute between Sudan and South Sudan,4 a left over from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period.5 Along with the Two Areas — Kordofan and Blue Nile — Abyei remained an outstanding border dispute issue, along their 2100 km long border.6 The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was inserted as a military mission to prevent the territorial dispute from becoming a thorn in the relationship between the two new neighbours.7 UNISFA acquired another significant dimension: that of border monitoring and verification.8 The expanded mandate that brought about the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM)9 assumed significance with the two States indulging in a brief border war in early 2012 over sharing of oil proceeds.10

The mission turned out not only the most remote one, but also unique in having a single troop contributing country (TCC), Ethiopia. There is a division of labour between the UN and the regional organizations — the African Union (AU) and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) — with the latter two in the lead on peacemaking,11 while the UN did peacekeeping. Peacebuilding in the form of humanitarian relief, reconstruction and support of refugee returns was the realm of respective UN Country Teams (UNCT). UNISFA, not being an integrated mission, limited its activity to provision of security for humanitarian actors and lobbying the UNCT in both capitals to pay attention to Abyei’s needs.

Lifecycle of UNISFA

The intimate interplay between the triangle’s sides can be seen over the lifecycle of the UNISFA.12 In light of the border war outbreak in early 2012, the AU turned its attention through the AU High Level Panel (AUHIP)13 to tidying up the CPA period leftovers. It put forward proposals on Abyei in September 201214 and an implementation matrix with a timeline in March 2013.15

Peacemaking in Abyei was through the implementation of June 2011 Abyei Agreement that had requested the Mission deployment.16 The Agreement formed the basis of UNISFA mandate. Talks proceeded for setting up an interim joint administration over the disputed area, reporting to a joint oversight committee (AJOC) between the two sides. However, a debilitating setback occurred when in May 2013, the paramount chief of the Ngok Dinka community was assassinated by a Misseriya youth.17

Hardening of the Ngok Dinka position, led to a unilateral referendum by the Ngok Dinka on Abyei’s status in October 2013. The referendum under AU auspices had been held up with disagreement over the definition of a ‘resident’. The Misseriya are a migrant community that is present in Abyei Area only during the dry season for cattle grazing. On the other hand, the Ngok Dinka is a settled community, mostly residing in the southern part of Abyei Area.18 In the event, the unilateral October 2013 referendum was not recognized by either South Sudan or the AU.19

Resulting insecurity at ground level held up local inter-community peacemaking and setback peacebuilding effort on part of UN Agencies, Funds and Programs (AFP). At the local level in Abyei, the Mission resorted temporarily to a ‘zone of separation’, wherein the Misseriya herds were not allowed to cross into settled Ngok Dinka areas for pasture. An intercommunity peace committee was formed in 2016 to dialogue on resumption of relations. This UNISFA supported the initiative for setting up of a joint market at Amiet. The Abyei common market became an economic hub, with a cascading effect on intercommunity relations as commercial stakeholders acquired a stake in peace. Equally, spoilers were active, periodically disrupting the peace effort with violence directed at the common market. UNISFA used troops to secure the market, but also bid for formed police units for the task.20

By end 2013, South Sudan was in the midst of a deadly civil war.21 This held up the political process at the national level. The period witnessed UNISFA slowly expanding its presence for border monitoring to a four point deployment on both sides at sector level, and, by 2018, also at team site level within a 20 km broad Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ). The two sides promised to demilitarise the zone in anticipation of AU-coordinated demarcation activity, logistically supported by JBVMM.22

There was an interesting tug-of-war of sorts between Sudan that only wanted a military predominant mission, while the Mission attempted to expand its scope of activity as per best practices elsewhere in integrated missions. Security Council Resolutions added facets, such as human rights, women and child protection, to the UNISFA mandate. Sudan — the host state — being weak and internally distracted, asserted its sovereignty through being difficult with the Mission on issues as visas and transit of logistics.

Peacebuilding progress was reflected in the return of refugees and recovery activity. However, the divided responsibility between the two UNCTs, distracted from a joint effort. There was a sense of alienation in northern Abyei among the Misseriya, since Khartoum-based AFPs were thinly represented in Abyei.23 The AFPs argued that the Misseriya were not as much conflict-affected as poverty-struck, precluding equivalence between the two communities.

In the interim, national level peacemaking under IGAD auspices concentrated on the fallout of the South Sudan civil war,24 a proxy war of sorts between Sudan and South Sudan. The two sides were agreeable to disengaging from their proxy war and even went so far as to not only rein in respective proxies but bring them to the table for settlement with the opposite capital. By 2018, insurgencies in both sides ceased, brightening prospects that the two could now discuss Abyei and the border issue.

On the Cusp of an Exit Strategy

Even as South Sudan embarked on implementing the Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS) signed on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa, the situation in Sudan unravelled. A civilian uprising unseated Omar al Bashir in April 2019. However, the military continued with its peacemaking — with South Sudanese assistance — with Sudanese rebels in Darfur and Two Areas.25  On the other side, the South Sudanese civil war protagonist, Riek Machar, re-joined the government in South Sudan in February 2020.26 These political developments put in place the political atmospherics necessary for settlement.27

However, peace at the local level proved elusive. The Ngok Dinka worried that with inter-capital bonhomie might see their cause sold down-river. They sought to be more hardline. In turn, Sudanese followed up by putting in a unilateral local administration in place.28 The two local administrations displaced the traditional chiefs, on whose back the local peace process was run, to a subordinate role. At the local level, the Ngok Dinka resiled from the local level peace process. A particularly gruesome incident in January 2020 had left some 35 Dinka dead.29 The annual Misseriya migration was held up. Fallout has been in a de-facto separation of the north from southern Abyei. This irks the Ngok Dinka who emphasise the de-jure borders of Abyei, arrived at under Permanent Court of Arbitration award during the CPA period.30

The mechanism AJOC, that was to oversee the joint administration as per the June 2011 Agreement, went into a limbo. The last time the AJOC met was at Addis Ababa in November 2017, when the AU facilitator last exerted his political role. At the time the chieftains of both sides also met.31 The Ngok Dinka viewed a joint local administration as Khartoum’s way to reassert its sway over the area. They want a time bound joint administration charged with holding a referendum. The Misseriya want the joint local administration to restore sway of Sudan over southern Abyei Area.

The Mission brought the two sides to dialogue again in Abyei in 2020.32 Peacemaking involves inclusivity, but this brings the problem of too many voices at the table and conflicting agendas. The national authorities like to play the lower levels against each other, sometimes using plausibly-deniable violence through non-state armed groups. This aggravates the protection of civilians (POC) task. Insecurity keeps peacebuilding from moving from humanitarian recovery to the development stage with donors shying away. Counter-intuitively, the Mission’s peacekeeping success served to setback peacemaking at the national level, since the two sides were each distracted with other more compelling crises. Peacebuilding in terms of reconciliation, therefore, got held up at the ground level, subject as the two communities are, to cues from the national level. Reviving the grassroots peace process has been the Mission’s priority, which has only recently borne fruit.  The Mission brought the two together for three conferences over 2020, to little avail. An innovation was in the Mission taking their representatives to a peace conference in Northern Bahr el Gazal State of South Sudan in 2021.33 This was followed up by another peace conference in Entebbe in May 2022.34

The competing demands on the transitional administrations in both capitals, and bouts of instability such as most recently in Sudan,35 make the Abyei issue recede further from national priorities. The UN is thus left with a lack of peacemaking to complement peacekeeping. This put paid to an exit strategy, eating up limited UN resources.

Lack of an exit strategy leads to risk from unforeseen events. The Sudanese-Ethiopian relations soured over a border issue in wake of outbreak of the Ethiopian civil war.36 Sudan asked for a changeover from the single TCC format.37 India has reportedly volunteered one battalion.38 Thus, the Mission is in midst of transition, opening up space to spoilers.39 At the local level, such risks are reflected in the spate of intra-Dinka violence with its unexpected onset in southern Abyei, between the Ngok Dinka and the Twic Dinka, from Twic County, Warrap State, South Sudan, to the south.40

With improved relations, prospects of advance on vexed issues such as the border, stand enhanced. In anticipation, local border communities have become more assertive, worried that their traditional homelands will be rent asunder by modern-day borders. The local communities evicted the JBVMM from three sites in the SDBZ and a sector headquarters in 2021.41 The two defence ministers meet periodically in a Joint Security Committee (JSC) to resolve such matters. The JSC could use the improved relations to put confidence building measures in place on the common border as per the security agreements of 2012. Whereas a border war has not recurred, proxy war has occurred across the SDBZ. The JBVMM can be enlarged to assist with border management, pending territorial resolution. The Abyei issue also awaits joint attention.42 Abyei is part of the basket of border problems, numbering 10 sites.43 Therefore, it will be part of the give-and-take of border negotiations. The Mission may therefore have to craft a pragmatic exit strategy with a time horizon into mid-decade, taking on board the political compulsions of the two sides.44

Conclusion — From a Scalene to an Equilateral Triangle

As seen from this case study on Abyei, each of the sides — peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding — is significant on its own count, as also the three together are mutually reinforcing. Operational Art is to get to a successful closure through synergy between the three. To be sure, there would be periods of predominance of one: unless security is provisioned by peacekeeping, peacebuilding cannot proceed; peacemaking opens up space for peacekeeping; and bottom-up peacebuilding and national level peacemaking are intertwined. Strategizing for a peace operation can use the visualization of an equilateral triangle as guide for operational planning and decisions.

Here Abyei has served as locale for application of this model of Operational Art. The Mission has been hobbled by outsourcing of peacemaking to the regional organizations. Its local level peacemaking suffered since the two communities adapted their stances to suit the position of the two national capitals. Constrained by an outdated June 2011 Agreement, the Mission can facilitate peacemaking, rather than take on mediator role. This deficit in peacemaking places a premium on peacekeeping. While a single TCC model has its advantages, particularly in a mid-sized mission, the regional political flux led to substitution by a multi-national force. Peacekeeping is thus back to square one with the resulting loss in institutional memory and preoccupation with transition logistics, the latter being difficult at the best of times in a UN setting, made worse in Abyei’s case as it’s the most remote mission in the world besides being only helicopter supported.

Given the vicissitudes of peacekeeping, peacebuilding faces the challenge of resource mobilization. The new Mission in Sudan, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS),45 which is an integrated Mission, can oversee AFP activity in northern Abyei, easing Misseriya concerns. However, it is challenged by the scope of needs, stretching as they are from the newly opened up Two Areas and Darfur, to refugees from the Ethiopian civil war.46 The Abyei Mission is poised for continuing tension between the three sides of the peace operations’ triangle, balancing which should keep the Mission leadership, the Secretariat and the Security Council engaged out to the middle term. Once the two States have had their respective UN-supported democratic elections, UNISFA may return to center stage. It would have to persist with enlightened conflict management in the interim.

Endnotes

1 Report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, A/47/277 – S/24111, June 17, 1992

2 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Department of Field Support, 2008, 19.

3 The term is inspired by Johan Galtung’s 1969 paper, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.

4 Ajay Jaswal, “United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA): A New Mission in the Hot Spot of Sudan,” USI Journal, CXLII, Jan-Mar 2012, 90-104, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/united-nations-interim-security-force-in-abyei-unisfa-a-mission-in-the-hotspot-of-sudan/.

5 For a background to the UNISFA, see https://unisfa.unmissions.org/background.

6 Details on UNISFA are at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unisfa.

7 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1990 (2011), June 27, 2011, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1990.

8 Security Council Resolution S/RES/2024 (2011), December 14, 2011, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2024.

9 “Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan,” July 30, 2011, https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1372.

10 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei,” S/2012/358, May 24, 2012.

11 Permanent Mission of India to the UN, “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri, Deputy Permanent Representative, on Resolution 2046 on Sudan & South Sudan at the United Nations Security Council, on May 02, 2012,” https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/42390ind2018.pdf.

12 For details on the UN’s activity in Abyei through its lifecycle, see https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/sudansouth-sudan/.

13 Aman Sethi, “Deadlock on Abyei persists,” October 25, 2012, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/deadlock-on-abyei-persists/article4028441.ece.

14 AUHIP for Sudan, “Proposal on the Final Status of Abyei Area,” appendix to African Union (Peace and Security Department), “Progress Report of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan,” December 14, 2012, https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/8219/PSC%20PR%202%20CCCXLIX_E.pdf?sequence= 1&isAllowed=y.

15 AU press release, March 9, 2013, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20130309/chairperson-commission-welcomes-signing-agreement-modalities-implementation.

16 “Agreement between the Government of Republic of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army on the Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security in the Abyei Area,” June 20, 2011, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_110620_Agreement TemporaryArrangementsAbyeiArea.pdf.

17 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei,” S/2013/294, May 17, 2013.

18 Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, “Update on Abyei,” Small Arms Survey, July 13, 2015.

19 AU press release, October 28, 2013, https://au.int/en/newsevents/20131028/african-union-strongly-condemns-holding-unilateral-referendum-abyei.

20 For the 2018 UNISFA Strategic Review, that dwells on the Mission during its consolidation phase, see “Letter dated 20 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” https://undocs.org/S/2018/778.

21 Global Conflict Tracker, “Civil War in South Sudan,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan.

22 “Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (S/2017/293),” https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/special-report-secretary-general-review-mandate-united-nations-interim-security-force.

23 Details on the UN Country Team in Sudan are at https://sudan.un.org/en/about/about-the-un.

24 United States Institute of Peace, “South Sudan Peace Process: Key Facts,” https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts.

25 International Crisis Group, “The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement,” February 23, 2021 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b168-rebels-come-khartoum-how-implement-sudans-new-peace-agreement.

26 “South Sudan rivals Salva Kiir and Riek Machar strike unity deal,” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51562367.

27 Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, “Special Envoy commends the continued strengthening of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan,” October 22, 2020, https://dppa.un.org/en/special-envoy-commends-continued-strengthening-of-relationship-between-sudan-and-south-sudan.

28 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General – Situation in Abyei,” S/2020/1019, October 15, 2020.

29 “More than a dozen killed in attack in South Sudan border region”, Al Jazeera, 23 January 2020, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/23/more-than-a-dozen-killed-in-attack-in-south-sudan-border-region, accessed on 30 January 2022.

30 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The Government of Sudan / The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration),” https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/92/.

31 AU press release, “The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the Outcomes of the African Union Joint Oversight (Abyei) Meetings 24 November 2017”, https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/7920.

32 UNISFA, “Inter-Community Meetings Between The Ngok Dinka And Misseriya,” https://unisfa.unmissions.org/inter-community-meetings-between-ngok-dinka-and-misseriya.

33 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General Situation in Abyei,” S/2020/1019, October 15, 2020.

34 Press release, https://unisfa.unmissions.org/unisfa-brokers-peace-accord-between-two-communities-abyei, May 19, 2022.

35Rajen Harshe, “Another military coup in Sudan,” Observer Research Foundation, November 8, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/another-military-coup-in-sudan/

36 Zecharias Zelalem, “Rising tension as Ethiopia and Sudan deadlocked on border dispute,” https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/2/1/rising-tension-ethiopia-sudan-deadlocked-border-dispute-fashaga.

37 “UN to withdraw Ethiopian peacekeeping force on Sudan’s request: Khartoum,” Al Arabia, August 24, 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/08/24/UN-to-withdraw-Ethiopian-peacekeeping-force-on-Sudan-s-request-Khartoum.

38 Rajat Pandit, “India to send a battalion for peacekeeping ops in Africa,” Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/88939315.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_ campaign=cppst.

39 Press release, https://unisfa.unmissions.org/ sites/default/files/unisfa_pis_pr_97.pdf, October 17, 2022.

40 “Ngok-Twic Border Conflict: A Manifestation of Botched Socioeconomic Development in South Sudan,” Reliefweb, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/ngok-twic-border-conflict-manifestation-botched-socioeconomic-development-south-sudan.

41 “UNISFA expresses grave concern over the development in JBVMM’s Sector One,” Reliefweb, September 4, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/unisfa-expresses-grave-concern-over-development-jbvmm-s-sector-one.

42 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, “Chapter IV – Resolution to the Abyei Conflict,” https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369. It was signed at Naivasha, Kenya, on May 26, 2004.

43 Elsheikh Chol, “Sudan, South Sudanese officials discuss border disputes,” Eye Radio, https://eyeradio.org/sudan-south-sudanese-officials-discuss-border-disputes/.

44 UN press release, “Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2609 (2021),” December 15, 2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14738.doc.htm.

45 UNITAMS website is at https://unitams.unmissions.org/en.

46 UNITAMS press release, ‘Security Council briefing on the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, , https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/security-council-briefing-un-integrated-transition-assistance-mission-sudan-unitams-14, Reliefweb, September 14, 2021.