INDIA: DISSONANCE
ON THE DOCTRINAL FRONT
Doctrinal dissonance
India’s
strategic doctrine, not being available in a written form, is liable to varying
interpretation. In the official, popular, version, it is a benign one with
India seeing itself as a responsible and mature regional power. For critics of the conservative-realist
school, India is an overly self-effacing power and ought to be more assertive.
Those of liberal-rationalist persuasion find India as both ambitious and tough
and on that count prefer a mellower India (Bajpai 2002: 245-51). Given this
divergence in views on India’s strategic doctrine, gauging it is difficult but
not impossible. The broad direction of its strategic doctrine can be visible
from its program on the conventional and nuclear fronts, at the heart of which
are military doctrines: conventional and nuclear. Taken together these spell
its strategic doctrine.
While
the current day strategic doctrine is often described as strategic restraint
(Dasgupta 2012), there is also a strategic doctrine in-the-works that appears,
on the contrary, to be based on offensive realism. While the extant strategic
doctrine is for the regional power it is, the incipient strategic doctrine is
intended to place India among the great powers over the middle term.
Consequently, there appear to be two doctrines at play in India transitioning
from a regional to a great power status: professed and aspirational.
The
interplay between strategic doctrines and military doctrines is mutually
constitutive. While strategic doctrine impacts military doctrine, there is a
bottom-up interaction alongside. To this interpenetration can be ascribed the
degree of doctrinal dissonance visible in India’s strategic doctrine and its
transmission to India’s military doctrines: conventional and nuclear. This
paper seeks to trace the dissonance on the doctrinal front in India by looking
at strategic doctrine and military doctrines, both conventional and nuclear.
The
paper first lays out the theoretical linkage between strategic and military
doctrines. Next, it dwells on the Indian doctrinal inter-linkage by outlining
in brief its strategic orientation and the impact on strategic doctrine. This
is a difficult undertaking for most states in general and is exceptionally so
for India in particular for want of a written strategic doctrine in India. Thereafter,
the paper looks at conventional and nuclear doctrines, separately and in their
interface. It highlights the doctrinal dissonance in doctrines at both levels:
strategic and military. It concludes that this dissonance is problematic from a
point of view of how India ‘causes’ security for itself and for regional
security.
The doctrinal linkage
Strategic
doctrine and military doctrine are inter-twined. Strategic doctrine orients the
state in terms of its power relationship within the region and in the broader
international political space. It is blueprint for the state to meet its
internal and external security compulsions. According to Kissinger, it
translates ‘power into policy’. To him, ‘strategic doctrine must define what
objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force
appropriate for achieving them (Kissinger 1969: 4)’. Strategic doctrine
identifies whether ‘the goals of a state are offensive or defensive, whether it
seeks to achieve or to prevent a transformation (Kissinger 1969: 7).’
What
strategic doctrine is to achieve, to preserve the status quo or revise, implies
that it is itself informed by the state’s security policy. Whether a state is
status quoist or revisionist depends on the state’s comfort levels with its security
environment in relation to its political aims. It sets the compass of its
government in terms of how it views threats and opportunities and how it wishes
to deploy power in response. Security policies are thus informed by defensive
realism or offensive realism.
Self-imposition
of restraint in pursuit of power is defensive realism. States do not always
endeavour to increase their power without limits or single-mindedly. In this
understanding, states seek security. Threats are viewed in relation to relative
power, proximity, intentions, and the defence-offence balance. As increments in
capabilities can be easily countered, defensive realism suggests that a state’s
attempts to make itself secure by increasing its power are ultimately futile in
face of responses these generate among neighbouring states. Therefore, states
seek an appropriate amount of power (Elman 2007: 17-8).
On the
other hand, ‘offensive realism’ is when states facing an uncertain environment
rely on generating capabilities to offset threats and in case their aims are
ambitious, then to use power so created for shaping the security environment
for themselves. Security consequently to them implies enhancing capabilities,
or power, to the extent feasible (Mearsheimer 2001: 37). A state must be in a
position to determine its security environment through exercise of power in all
its facets. Here the restraint on power is only on account of limited internal
resources, a factor that can only be partially overcome by external balancing.
To the extent that aims are pruned in relation to capabilities it is only
temporally so.
Strategic
doctrine reflects and expresses the strategic philosophy of the state. This
accounts for diversity in strategic doctrines. The nature of a state’s response
to its security environment – internal and external – through its strategic
doctrine enables placing of each state along a defence-deterrence-offence
continuum. Heterogeneity of strategic doctrines of states is a function of the
political aims along with geographical, technological and political constraints
and opportunities it faces (Posen 1984: 40). This suggests that strategic
doctrines could be defensive, offensive, deterrent or compellent, depending on
aims, constraints and opportunities. The divergence in strategic doctrines is
brought out by Posen thus: ‘Offensive
doctrines aim to disarm an adversary – to destroy his armed forces. Defensive doctrines aim to deny an
adversary the objective he seeks. Deterrent
doctrines aim to punish an aggressor – to raise his costs without reference to
reducing one’s own (Posen 1984: 14).’
A state
practicing defensive realism would have its strategic doctrine inclining
towards the defensive and deterrence segments of the continuum. On the other
hand, a state with a security policy informed by offensive structural realism
can be expected to favour offensive strategic doctrines. To illustrate, status-quoist powers usually have
defensive-deterrent strategic doctrines, while expansionist or revisionist
powers are more likely to have offensive-compellent ones. Since a status quoist
power seeks to preserve, it would prefer to employ its power to stave off a
challenge, while the latter seeking change would prefer employing power to
reboot, if not reset, prevailing power equations.
Power
itself is variegated and multifaceted: political, cultural, technological,
human resources, information etc. Strategic doctrines while reliant
substantially on military power, are never exclusively so. What a state does
with its power to bring about security for itself can be seen in its grand
strategy, the manner it concertedly deploys its power for its ends. A state’s
grand strategy - orchestration of power instruments towards the national
purpose - is facilitated by its strategic doctrine. Grand strategy apportions
the amount of effort to each instrument and constantly reviews this in light of
effectiveness and changes affected in the environment. How grand strategy works
the power instruments, in particular military power, is a function of strategic
doctrine.
Military
power being the ultimate arbiter is a consequential component. The
effectiveness of the military instrument is a function of several factors such
as military budgets, technological levels, martial spirit, political and
military leadership and the civil-military interface etc. One among these, but
of considerable import is appropriate military doctrine. Military doctrine has
been defined as, ‘the underlying principles and specific guidance provided to
military officers who produce the operational plans for the use of military
forces (Sagan 2009: 222).’ Military doctrine deals with ‘what’ military means
are to be employed and ‘how’ (Posen 1984: 13). Military doctrine is to military
strategy what strategic doctrine is to grand strategy.
Military
doctrine channels military power and aligns the military instrument with
strategic doctrine. It provides the blue print for military strategy
formulation and implementation. In providing the software for military
strategy, it serves to link strategic doctrine and grand strategy at the
politico-strategic level with the military level by shaping military strategy.
Military strategy is formulated in the context of what eminent military
sociologist, Morris Janowitz, termed as its ‘operational code’ or ‘logic’ of their
professional behaviour (Janowitz 1960: 257). In other words, military doctrine
forms the basis of military strategy, in turn deployed for the ends of grand
strategy that is itself informed by strategic doctrine. Military doctrine
therefore manifests the dictates of strategic doctrine by expressing it as
either defensive, deterrent, coercive, offensive or compellent.
Indeed,
the internal variegation does not stop at strategic doctrine. It is found in
military doctrines too. For instance, a defensive strategic doctrine can well
be manifest offensively in a military doctrine of offensive defence. This would
imply an offensive bias to a defensive posture. Likewise, a deterrent strategic
doctrine can either have a defensive or an offensive bias. A military doctrine
based on denial would imply a defensive deterrent; whereas, one relying on
punishment would amount to an offensive deterrent. Offensive doctrines at best
rely on the defensive only instrumentally and for a duration, for instance to
gain time or a rationale for an offensive. Therefore, even military doctrines
of counter offensive, though awaiting the first punch by the enemy and liable
to be included in defensive doctrines, can be categorised as offensive military
doctrines. Furthermore, doctrines, while not dynamic, can transition from
defensive to offensive and vice versa under influence of changes in strategic
doctrine. Thus, for a period, doctrines can exhibit dual character.
Strategic
doctrines and military doctrines require interrogation in their
inter-relationship for understanding a state’s strategic posture and behaviour.
Strategic doctrine is a product of the security policy of a state that is
itself informed by defensive or offensive realism. Strategic doctrines are
therefore defensive, deterrent or offensive. Military doctrines, a function of
strategic doctrine, consequently can be categorised as defensive-deterrent or
offensive-compellent.
India’s strategic doctrine
It is a
long-standing critique in India that it lacks a strategic doctrine in the form
of a defence white paper or official strategic review document. This is
attributed variously to lack of a strategic culture; domination of bureaucrats
in the national security sector who are illiterate in strategy; and political
ignorance of ministers making them oblivious of the need to insist that
national security minders first produce strategic doctrine and the rest would
follow. For answer to why India does not have an explicit strategic doctrine,
the answer may perhaps lie one step up: Whether it has a strategic philosophy
and whether this is informed by defensive or offensive realism?
Strategic philosophy
India’s
self-belief is that defensive realism informs its security policy. It has to
cater for collusive neighbours, with both having territorial ambitions on its
territory. China uses Pakistan as its proxy in the region, while Pakistan
readily lends its strategic location for such use in return for a Chinese
assist in strategic balancing with India. China for its part wants to keep India
boxed in the region in order that the pivotal status of India in Asia remains
unrealised to its advantage in global power-play. Therefore, India believes
that it needs to bolster its strength and eliminate deficiencies mistaken for
strategic inadequacy by adversaries. Therefore, in its self-perception, its
strategic repositioning owes more to defensive realism.
However,
a slow but unmistakable shift can be seen from defensive realism to offensive
realism from 1971 when it cut Pakistan to size to 1998 when it crossed the
‘rubicon’ (Rajamohan 2003). Since India continues being coy on this shift, its
grand strategy may provide clues. Firstly, offensive realism is still
in-the-works with India first catering for the capabilities it thinks necessary
without provoking a security dilemma for its neighbours that would complicate
its transition and security in the interim. India’s grand strategy appears to
aim at transcending Pakistan and balancing against China through internal and
external balancing measures. The aim is to have Pakistan wither away as a
threat, thereby breaking out of the box of the South Asian security complex.
Obviously, the power asymmetry against China implies that India’s strategic
doctrine needs to be different. Against China, India has moved from a military
doctrine of defensive defence to offensive deterrence over the past decade.
Taken alongside its diplomatic outreach to the democracies ringing China,
including the US, this implies a shift towards offensive realism (Malik 2012).
However, in India not having stumped Pakistan or gained parity with China, its
transition from defensive to offensive realism is likely continue, remain
understated and, consequently continue to inject dissonance into strategic
doctrine.
Strategic
doctrine(s)
Whether
lack of strategic doctrine is by design or default, articulation of the need
for a strategic doctrine exists. Jasjit Singh stated that, ‘The central driving
force for planning for defence, whether articulated in specific documentation
or not, remains the strategic doctrine for defence that the country adopts… The
twin goals of credible and affordable defence capability really grow out of the
national strategic doctrine (Singh 2000: 1212-13).’ Despite cognisance of
theory, a twofold problem exists in discerning India’s strategic doctrine. The
first is the obvious one that it remains unarticulated. As a consequence, the
second problem is that there appear two strategic doctrines co-extensive:
professed, meant for the interim, and, the aspirational, for when India is
deemed to have arrived as great power.
The
professed strategic doctrine reasonably has as its aim a stable strategic
environment in which India can progress its economic trajectory. This is
understandable for an emerging power, one intent on harnessing its economic
power in order to then derive military dividends that will propel it further
into great power ranks. It protects prioritization of economic development and
stability. It is in keeping with India’s strategic culture of resolve and restraint.
However, conventional defence acquisitions and justificatory strategic
commentary bespeak of an extra-territorial capability. This is evidence of
great power ambition that cannot be attributed to or sustained by extant -
professed - doctrine. Instead, it is evidence of the expansive – aspirational -
strategic doctrine that India will scarce own up to. The professed doctrine
tides India over the interim as in its build-up of the economic indices of
power without triggering a security dilemma for its neighbours and detracting
from its security in the interim.
Grand
strategy is to hold threats from materializing into challenges by gaining time
for India in order that when indeed they do materialize, India would be in a
position to meet them. However, the aspirational doctrine detracts from this
aim in setting India up against its neighbours. Neighbours that are themselves
on power trajectories shaped by their security environments, of which India is
part, are liable to view India’s growing capabilities with skepticism and act
in accord with the concept of security dilemma (Herz 1950:157), to the
detriment of Indian security.
In any
case, the military’s significance in internal politics of its principal
neighbour, Pakistan, leads Pakistan to view India’s professed doctrine with
reservations. Pakistan therefore, albeit self-servingly for its military elite,
readily bases its security response on the ‘aspirational’ doctrine. This
explains the juncture in which India’s doctrinal shift is towards limited war under
the nuclear umbrella, leading to Pakistan precipitately lowering the nuclear
threshold in its introducing of tactical nuclear weapons into the regional
military equations. Therefore,
the dissonance in strategic doctrine carries a price tag of regional
insecurity. Though strategic dissonance contributes to India’s insecurity,
India, self-servingly, uses this as rationale for its doctrinal movement and
power shift, arguing that, living in a hostile neighbourhood, it needs to cater
for its own self-defence autonomously, justifying the shift from defensive to
offensive realism. An advantage is in obfuscation by India of its strategic
direction by way of which it can project a certain image even while taking
advantage of ambiguity to get along an otherwise ambivalent strategic path.
Other
than insecurity, there are significant drawbacks. Externally, an opportunity
for reassurance that a written strategic doctrine could impart to neighbours is
lost. Operating in the realist paradigm themselves, they would incline towards
the ‘worst case’. Pakistan would see a regional hegemon, while China may see
India as the US cats-paw. Internally, democratic accountability suffers.
Manufacturing of consent of the attentive public is easier. Measures can be
explained away as defensive and neighbours as aggressive, necessitating further
movement by a self-regarding India. This leads to a democratic deficit in which
public acceptability of India’s strategic direction is only seemingly
democratic. Popularity of decisions, such as the nuclear tests, is mistaken as
democratic endorsement of decisions that are otherwise taken, as Gaurav Kampani
informs, by a secretive and narrow strategic elite (Kampani 2014: 81-2). Finally, military
doctrine is doubly taxed. Not only must it cater for the current day clear and
present dangers with what is at hand, but also cater for an India on-the-make
and its security concerns. While admittedly both the present and the future are
the temporal domains of military doctrine, leaving military doctrine without a
valid start point, transmits dissonance in strategic doctrine to military
doctrine.
India’s military doctrines
India’s
professed strategic doctrine calls for offensive deterrence. However, its
aspirational doctrine, aiming to transcend the regional box in which it is
hemmed in by Pakistan and China, appears to approximate a quasi-compellent
military doctrine in so far as its in-region challenger, Pakistan, is
concerned. Consequently, it appears, further, as a differentiated strategic
doctrine: with regard to Pakistan it is more assertive than it is in face of
China (Ryan 2012: 39).
The conventional doctrine
In the
nuclear era, limited war is the only kind of war-of-choice that India can
possibly embark on. However, absent political direction to the military on this
score, the army doctrine of ten years ago, does not explicitly articulate a
limited war doctrine, even though it genuflects to the concept. While the basic
doctrine of the air force is in the open domain, it is relatively sanitised.
Professional discussion however centers on air dominance. It is clear that the
first step – strategic doctrine articulation - not having been taken, the
military has proceeded doctrinally without explicitly engaging with the
requirement of limited war. Official imprimature to doctrines of the services
is not reflected in annual reports of the ministry of defence. This means that
the doctrinal space has been largely left to the military. This is problematic
in the nuclear age since doctrine cannot but be a civil-military product.
However, if civilians do not venture to construct strategic doctrine that is
unmistakably within their ambit, with input from the military, they would
unlikely be found engaging with what is largely a military product, but one
that cannot be without civilian input and oversight.
The
upshot is that the military is undecided on weighing in unambiguously on the
side of limited war. The World War II syndrome of large battles involving large
fronts and several formations persists even though the region entered the
atomic age arguably by late eighties and definitely by late nineties. Since
communication of limited war intent
can help raise the nuclear threshold for conventional force
application, the non-articulation of limited war doctrine would appear
surprising. Reassuring the enemy of a limited war can prevent stampeding it
into nuclear use. While in the overall reckoning the conventional doctrines
have the limited war stamp, that these stop short nevertheless, conveys a
threat of total war.
Militaries
conceptualise a spectrum of conflict, defined as ‘a continuum defined primarily
by the magnitude of the declared objectives’, and plan to be capable of
victory, across the spectrum. Consequently, escalation dominance or superiority
at the highest level of force in use along a particular scale in the spectrum
of conflict assumes importance. Capabilities and plans aim for generating
asymmetry and, in case of financial or technological constraints, at a minimum,
symmetry (Cannon 1992: 94-5). Enemy capabilities become the defining yardstick
rather than intentions. Since India faces two fronts, with adversaries of
differing relative capabilities, its strategic doctrine has of necessity to be
sensitive to relative power across respective borders.
Escalation
dominance strategies are sought with respect to Pakistan. The firming in of the
so-called ‘cold start’ doctrine is to bolster deterrence (Shukla 2012). The
ability to punish has been enhanced by the creation of a mountain strike corps,
ostensibly for the China front, but one that can be dual tasked for the
Pakistani front. Escalation dominance across the spectrum is seen as useful in
keeping conflict limited, in that Pakistan realising that the situation cannot
be very different at a higher level may throw in the towel at the lower level
and at lower cost. Escalation dominance can be read as a way to deter ‘asymmetric
escalation’ (Narang 2009/10). However, the reverse can well occur since a
nuclear adversary may equally lower the nuclear threshold to undercut any
attempt at dominance.
Strategically,
it can be argued not owning up to the limited war doctrine officially is to
prevent Pakistan gaining the notion that it can escape at lower cost, thereby
emboldening it on the subconventional level. Spelling out a limited war
doctrine may exact a political cost in making India appear aggressive. It could
also enable cues for the enemy to formulate its counter, thereby checkmating
India’s moves. However, lack of an explicit doctrine will make a nuanced
offensive difficult and on that count can lead to inadvertent escalation. For
instance, India’s keeping of its strike corps even though a proportion has been
parcelled out as integrated battle groups for the initial phase, of the
conflict, that employment of these formations in the subsequent phases could
prove escalatory. India appears to be relying on the nuclear deterrence for
continued conventional escalation dominance.
For the
China front, the power asymmetry (Singh, R. 2013) moderates India’s aims,
restricting these to preventing escalation dominance through offensive
deterrence. At the conventional level, defences strengthened with two divisions
and a mountain strike corps are in place, while at the nuclear level the triad
with its missile leg able to cover all of China, is in the offing by decade end
(Clary and Narang 2013). This means that measures for deterrence both by denial
and by punishment are being put in place. This is termed active defence in
light of the offensive content in the deterrence. While defences would be
static based on strong points across the disputed border, there would be
adequate reserves and these would be recreated as necessary. The road network
is being expanded towards this end. Even if losses in territory result, these
will be compensated by the mountain strike corps making gains elsewhere.
Measures for nuclear parity in hand are to prevent nuclear coercion by China in
light of its nuclear head-start. In case of adverse circumstance, the debate
surrounding the No First Use (NFU) retention is an indication that India could
reserve the right to rescind it at an opportune moment.
The nuclear doctrine
The short
hand for India’s
declaratory nuclear doctrine is credible minimum deterrence (Press Information
Bureau 2003). NFU is taken as its
central pillar. However, the significant aspect from doctrinal point of view is
in the nature of nuclear employment in case of breakdown of deterrence. Since
NFU is in place this is a retaliation-only policy that can be easily be taken
as defensive. However, the nature of retaliation promised is consequential in
determining whether it is defensive or offensive. The retaliatory doctrine
posits that in case of nuclear first use by an adversary in any manner against
India and its forces anywhere, India will retaliate with a massive counter to
inflict unacceptable damage.
In
case of Chinese nuclear first use against India, for India to go massive in
retaliation is incredible. Firstly, it does not have the capability (Narang
2013: 144) and secondly it would be suicidal. Aware perhaps of NFU on both
sides, it can afford to make promises it cannot keep. The cost for its
credibility, critical to nuclear deterrence, appears to be disregarded. In
respect of Pakistan, massive nuclear retaliation against its nuclear first use
of higher order proportions makes eminent sense. However, in case of nuclear
first use by Pakistan restricted to a lower order strike, for India to go
massive is arguably incredible in light of Pakistan’s vertical proliferation
over the past decade. Pakistan incentivised to retaliate similarly is well able
to do so since its nuclear numbers are reportedly in the range of lower three
figures. Its unveiling of Nasr, a tactical nuclear missile system, suggests
that whatever India’s belief in credibility of its deterrence, Pakistan views
it through its own lens.
When
nuclear first use by the enemy is of such an order as to result in unacceptable
damage to oneself, then it makes eminent sense to consider retaliation of
levels that inflict unacceptable damage right back. But, in case the damage
caused by the nuclear first use is not of an unacceptable order, such as in the
popular scenario when it is a single warhead of low kilo-tonnage on a tactical
level target, then inflicting unacceptable damage in return would be to run the
risk of suffering unacceptable damage in return. This consideration rules in a
‘tit for tat’ nuclear response. It is conceivable therefore that in India’s
case declaratory doctrine may be distinct from operational doctrine. The latter
may be predicated on limited nuclear operations enabled by a flexible nuclear
retaliation. This debate between massive and flexible retaliation votaries has
been set off by recent mention in the conservative nationalist party, the
Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP) election manifesto expressing intent to revise
the nuclear doctrine (BJP 2014: 39; Rajaraman 2014).
The
second feature, NFU, has been under existential threat, so much so that the
outgoing prime minister’s final address on strategic issues at the traditional
venue for defence policy statements, the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA), was a call for a negotiated NFU between nuclear powers (Chari
2014). The position is unlikely to gather any momentum among nuclear powers
addressed, especially since India’s own commitment to NFU is under question
(Ahmed 2014). In effect, the reiteration of the NFU treaty may have been with
intent of tying India down to the NFU by warding off the internal ideational
challenge to NFU (Chari 2014). In the event, the election time controversy over
NFU was however put to rest by the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Mr. Modi,
ruling in favour of NFU citing the cultural rationale, indicating that it is of
a piece with India’s historical tradition of military restraint in the world
view of cultural nationalists (Reuters 2014).
Whereas the NFU projects India’s nuclear doctrine
as defensive deterrent, this is upturned, firstly, by the caveats that attend
NFU (Ahmed 2014: 23), and, secondly, by the introduction of the term, massive,
into the doctrine. Even if massive is disregarded, the intent to inflict ‘unacceptable
damage’ has the effect of pushing the doctrine towards the offensive camp since
deterrence by punishment is by definition offensive deterrence. This goes
against the grain of India’s posturing on nuclear maturity. Further, it is
strategically bereft, placing India in harm’s way of an equal counter strike.
Since the doctrine is for deterrence, it is possible to infer that in case
deterrence breaks down, a different, operational, doctrine may kick in. This
could well countenance limited nuclear operations. It is here that dissonance
can be detected in that India argues that limited nuclear war is an oxymoron
(Shyam Saran 2013: 16).
The
conventional-nuclear interface
With
respect to Pakistan, the deterrence logic is that the likelihood, if not
inevitability, of spiral of nuclear exchanges on introduction of nuclear
weapons into a conflict, would see Pakistan worse off, while India owing to its
size will survive such exchange(s). This would stay Pakistan’s nuclear hand.
With Pakistan deterred, India can then proceed to administer conventional
punishment for subconventional provocation. Since this would be a limited war,
not intended to occupy territory, first use thresholds are to be steered clear
of. Conventional assertion is to put an end to the ‘stability-instability
paradox’ under which Pakistan, and its army, has impunity while India has
suffered. The paradox has it that nuclear dangers having receded by mutual
deterrence, Pakistan can get away with being venturesome at a lower level. By
declaring an intention to go massive for Pakistan breaking the nuclear taboo,
India has attempted to force upwards the nuclear threshold. This further under
lines the offensive nature of India’s nuclear doctrine. Read in conjunction
with the offensive content of conventional doctrine, this implies that against
the grain of expectation, India does have quasi-compellent military
doctrines.
The
emphasis earlier on unacceptable damage, reflected in the Draft Nuclear
Doctrine using the term (National Security Advisory Board 1999) owed to a
buffer existing through the 1990s at the conventional-nuclear interface.
India’s conventional doctrine was defensive-offensive based on counter
offensive capability. India had an extensive defensive line that would cushion
Pakistani aggression and provide the openings for launch of strike corps that
were, like India’s proverbial war elephants, not particularly quick or agile.
Pakistan was expected to be quicker off the blocks since it had its cantonments
within striking distance of the border. It followed a military doctrine of
offensive defence, one brought about by its limited strategic depth. Therefore,
the nuclear factor could only come into the conflict once India’s counter
offensives made good progress. This could only be well into the war, an
unlikely eventuality in light of war termination efforts by the international
community energized by war between two states known to be covert nuclear
powers.
This
situation has changed dramatically over the past decade in light of a changed
conventional doctrine in India. India’s military doctrine is one of proactive,
offensive operations. Keeping with a limited war concept, these operations are
only to be to limited depths. India’s readiness to be off-the-blocks in case of
subconventional provocation is to deter such provocations in first place and to
be responsive in case deterrence does not succeed. The doctrinal formulation
covering conventional operations in enemy territory is that India will go
massive even in case of Indian troops being targeted ‘anywhere’. This links the
nuclear and conventional levels and can cumulatively be taken as coercion.
After all, Indian forces in light of absence of a limited war doctrine may well
tread on the nuclear threshold, thereby prompting a nuclear response by
Pakistan.
With
Pakistan’s introduction of the tactical missile system, but one with a
strategic import in terms of nuclear messaging, nuclear outbreak can be in
fairly short order. The nature of Pakistani reaction is only partially in
Indian hands. Pakistan has demonstrated a capability for tactical nuclear
employment that is suggestive of early nuclear first use in a low nuclear
threshold mode and cannot be discounted by the argument that its ‘bluff’ needs
being called. This makes India a party to Pakistan’s breaking of the nuclear
taboo. This modifies the understanding that the NFU makes for a non-aggressive
nuclear doctrine on India’s part. Being offensive at the conventional level as
also at the nuclear level means India’s military doctrines are both offensive
when taken cumulatively. This is the work of dissonance in India’s military
doctrines. By implication its unstated strategic doctrine, subject to bottom-up
influence, cannot but be taken as offensive in respect of Pakistan.
India’s
nuclear efforts are taken as motivated by the nuclear asymmetry with China
(Narang 2013: 144). This helps India position itself in respect of the emerging
superpower, China, rather than being hyphenated with Pakistan, a regional
challenger. The NFU in place by both sides is useful to ensure that the
situation of nuclear asymmetry does not overly disadvantage India.
Nevertheless, India is in catch up mode with its nuclear ballistic missile
submarine coming into action along with the Agni V and MIRV capable Agni VI by
decade end (Subramanian 2013). However, the geographical disadvantage of a
proximate heartland cannot be overcome. Consequently, India has taken care to
up its conventional capabilities. These raise any resort to the threat of use
of nuclear weapons on India’s part. The conventional capabilities are to action
‘active deterrence’ with defensive formations in a territory guarding role and
reserves, constantly recreated and repositioned, by using the upcoming road
network and air mobility capability, to compensate losses. This is reasonable
under the extant, professed, doctrine of defensive deterrence.
The
problem of dissonance kicks in with the possibility of horizontal expansion of
the conflict. India’s aspirational doctrine appears to be relying on the sea
front to compensate for any setbacks on the Himalayan front. Thus naval power
is to activate to address the vulnerability of China at the Malacca straits.
Since a limited war doctrine is not in place, the danger from such a strategic
maneuver is under appreciated in India. While the idea appears to be to deter
China with the threat of expansion and thereby keep conflict, expected to at
best begin as a localized border incident, confined to its initial locale. A
limited war doctrine could have explicated escalation control measures, exit
points, firebreaks and saliencies, and benchmarks to recognize these and
stimulate necessary action. Absent these, Indian deterrence appears to be
relying on the ‘threat that leaves something to chance’ (Schelling 1980: 187).
China is deterred from taking recourse to its advantages for fear of an
escalation spiral, but attendant risks are higher.
Prospective doctrine review agenda
India
is going in for a nuclear triad, working towards a ballistic missile shield and
for missiles with extended ranges. These are taken as reinforcing its NFU
pledge in that the enhanced survivability will help with assured retaliation.
The numbers needed are reckoned as the minimum needed to inflict unacceptable
damage after surviving a first strike. These are reckoned in relation to both
adversaries and furthermore in light of the proverbial ‘bolt from the blue’
attack or the worst case scenario. In addition, there is to be a reserve. Such
calculations tend to make the numbers climb, impinging on ‘minimum’. Already,
numbers in the middle three digits are abroad intended to drive up numbers in
any case. Besides, depending on how the missile shield shapes up, India, with
its additional numbers, could position itself to even consider abandoning NFU.
First strike considerations in light of surveillance capability and missile
accuracy developments can be the next step. This possibility will enhance the
‘Will he, won’t he?’ apprehension on both sides, building in a tendency to
preemption (Schelling 1980: 208). A preventive or preemptive war rationale, in
deference to influence of global strategic culture, could appear.
The
Cold War logic that may drive up numbers has so far been eschewed by India.
India therefore has the opportunity of the nuclear doctrine review in the
offing to rethink its nuclear doctrine. Other measures meriting attention are
continuation of the NFU, rethink on the massive formulation and the nuclear
cover provided for Indian forces anywhere. A
holistic approach to the nuclear doctrine review could follow a sequential
laying out of a strategic doctrine in a strategic review or whitepaper. The
resulting strategic doctrine will then precede military doctrine.
Strategic
doctrine remains amorphous, under-developed and little articulated. If this is
the case with strategic doctrine that is essentially a civilian responsibility,
inadequacies can only spill over to civilian engagement with military doctrine.
The apex defence structure contributes to this firewall between the civilian
and military. The ministry does not have either the ‘hardware’ (structure) or
‘software’ (doctrinal felicity) to think through linkages between the strategic
and military doctrines. Further, the ministry is also not the site for nuclear
doctrinal thinking, preserve of the National Security Council (NSC) system,
comprising the National Security Council and its Secretariat (NSCS). The
ministry also does not engage with military doctrines, seen as preserve of the
military. Thus there is a structural disconnect.
The
logic underlying nuclear doctrine is that these are political weapons and not
for war fighting. However, in practice, as seen, it is apparent that India ends
up looking to do more operationally with nuclear weapons by attempting to push
up the nuclear threshold for conventional force application. The conventional
doctrine domain is seen as the preserve of the military. The military, being
historically little integrated at the nuclear strategy making level, the
interface between conventional and nuclear doctrine and strategy is limited. As
a result the two are undertaken autonomous from each other (Koithara 2012: 1).
The civilian component has been loath to incorporate the military lest the
growing operationalisation of the deterrent lead to rebalancing in
civil-military equation in a way that would favour the military (Saran 2014).
However,
cognisant of the potential for disconnect, an organisational innovation has
been the creation of the Strategy Programs Staff within the NSCS (Saran 2013:
11). This comprises a multi-disciplinary staff to oversee the quality and
growth of India’s deterrent. However, its charter does not mention operational
planning other than having an intelligence role. This means there is an
operational gap. India does not want to replicate the Strategic Plans Division
(SPD) of Pakistan’s National Command Authority in its structures, knowing that
the SPD is Pakistani military’s way to control Pakistan’s nuclear trajectory
and trigger. However,
lack of operationalisation keeps the military out, at the price of closing
limited nuclear options, which as seen here, may require being ruled in. A
start point on this exists for the review to follow up on the Naresh Chandra
Committee’s recommendation of creation of a four star permanent chairman of the
chiefs of staff committee (Sarin 2014). The nuclear staff under the general
could provide the operational picture at the interstices of nuclear and
conventional levels, while the NSCS Strategy Programs Staff, duly mandated, can
help integrate the strategic picture for input by the National Security Adviser
to the Nuclear Command Authority’s Political Council.
Finally,
and more importantly, the doctrine review if holistic to include a strategic
policy review would help end dissonance surrounding India’s strategic doctrine.
The conservative nationalist party has ideological anchor and political
strength currently to be able to outline its strategic doctrine. This will
enable the cue for military doctrines, thereby allowing doctrines to be
rationally arrived at. While dissonance will ebb with aspirational doctrine
finding voice, it is debatable whether the resulting doctrines will be in
consonance with India’s national security.
Way forward
A
regional nuclear war will have consequence not only for the region but the
planet (Helfand 2013). Further, India is hardly likely to survive unchanged,
even if territorial frontiers remain unchanged. While there is little doubt
that both states, India and Pakistan, have an assured retaliation capability,
India may question Pakistan’s ability for assured destruction in light of
India’s size. However, if not viewed in Cold War calculations of assured
destruction, Pakistan can be expected to have the capability of counter
strike(s) able to indubitably set India back in its ambitions in relation to
China and in Asia. By this yardstick, the review needs to proceed on the
assumption that Pakistan has assured destruction capability, as does India.
Doing so will ensure a nuclear doctrine based on rational assumptions. The
problem is in ideological blinkers of the cultural nationalist strategic
subculture currently ascendant in India preventing acknowledgement of the fact
that nuclear weapons as equalizers have leveled the strategic playfield in
South Asia.
This
implies that more needs doing to prevent war beyond deterrence. Firstly,
nuclear and conventional doctrines cannot any longer be arrived at in isolation
of each other; secondly, India must recognize that civilian and military
domains overlap in doctrine making; and lastly, the political implications of
the nuclear age compel overriding strategic and military compulsions that hitherto
informed doctrine. Given this, the coming review cannot be left to experts
alone.
India
needs ensuring limitation in both conventional and nuclear doctrines (Ahmed
2014). It has to abandon the understanding that nuclear use inevitably triggers
a spasmic nuclear exchange. It needs to ensure that the nuclear war is brought
to a speedy close at the lowest levels of nuclear use by either side. Going a
step further, counter-intuitively, a nuclear war entails cooperation with the
enemy for escalation control and conflict termination. Therefore, the doctrine
making exercise, even if national, needs a forum for exchange with the
adversary in the form of a nuclear risk reduction center. In the case of India
and Pakistan, the existing track in the dialogue process envisaging doctrinal
exchanges needs being energized. More importantly, the region must arrive at a
modus vivendi on the issues that could take the region down the nuclear route.
Instead of an interminable and risky search for the elusive position of strength,
politically negotiated deals envisaging a mutual give and take over Kashmir and
the India-China border problem will mitigate the potential for conflict in the
region. That is the inexorable logic of the nuclear age.
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The unpublished paper was submitted for the SIPRI Project ‘Emerging Military Technologies and
the Implications for Strategic Stability in the Twenty-first Century’. The
author thanks Arko Dasgupta for research assistance.
