Conventional Backdrop to
the Nuclear Foreground
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/934345695_AliAhmed.pdf
Introduction
Accustomed as the military is to the phrase “conventional war against a nuclear
backdrop,”1
the title here may require explaining. The media-conjured phrase
usually accompanies articles describing the visit of the scribe to a military
formation participating in a corps exercise or to its grand finale, usually
witnessed by VIPs. The depiction is of conventional preparedness for operations
in a nuclear backdrop. The message is that the nuclear factor, though not being
wished away, is not overly intrusive since the exercises are validating the new
doctrine of limited war under nuclear conditions.
The 2004 doctrine aims to achieve military objectives under the nuclear
umbrella. The assumption appears to be that nuclear deterrence enables
conventional operations, though with due cognisance of enemy nuclear
thresholds. The second message is that the enemy’s effort at projecting a
low nuclear threshold for deterring conventional operations are viable only
to a limited extent, in that they may constrict the scope of the conventional
operations without deterring them altogether.2
This way, India has managed to
create a window between sub-conventional and nuclear levels for conventional
operations in order to optimally exercise its military power.
Reversing the Backdrop
However, there is a case for also countenancing the
reverse: conventional backdrop to nuclear operations.
This is more by way of contingency and is in line with the
military’s preference for including the ‘worst case’ in its
deliberations. Such consideration takes Pakistan’s projection of a lower nuclear
threshold, most obviously done in its acquisition of the Nasr ‘tactical’ nuclear
missile system, at face value.3
It assumes Pakistan’s nuclear first use, the intent
being to convey that India is prepared for the worst. While general deterrence
may be expected to hold, preparedness so conveyed reinforces immediate
deterrence. Such preparedness does not cast adverse light on one’s own
deterrence credibility, but caters for a nuclear outbreak unintended by Pakistan’s
National Command Authority as a result of the fog of war, miscommunication,
accident, fear, panic or unauthorised use.4
There is also the scenario in which
terrorists gain access while the nuclear system is most vulnerable in movement
in conflict conditions. In any case, since the onus is on Pakistan to initiate a
nuclear attack, it is not impossible to visualise a state and an Army known for
past strategic misjudgements to make yet another strategic mistake. Therefore,
to exercise with the nuclear factor moving from ‘backdrop’ to ‘foreground’ is to
be prepared for eventualities, even those less likely.
Doing so has a salutary benefit in reinforcing deterrence. Noted nuclear
watcher Manpreet Sethi writes, “It should also be made widely known that Indian
troops have the ability to fight through tactical nuclear use.” This is necessary
to “send a message of preparedness to handle such use without bringing
conventional operations to a halt or even confronting the political leadership
with the choice of war termination, as assumed by Rawalpindi.” This strengthens
the concept of deterrence India subscribes to: deterrence by punishment.5
Knowledge of the fact that the Army can operate even in nuclear conditions
makes nuclear use unnecessary for Pakistan since even its use would not prevent
the Indian Army from achieving its political aims and military objectives. It
would be preferable for Pakistan in this case to admit defeat at the lower cost of
conventional punishment rather than its inevitability at a higher cost of nuclear
damage to oneself.
In any case, the ‘worst case’ would be nuclear first use by Pakistan.
Preparedness implies being prepared for the ‘worst case’ contingency even
if it is least likely, alongside ensuring through operational plans not to trigger
the contingency. The mantra since Gen Padmanabhan’s time has been, “The
Indian nuclear
strategy is
Deterrence by
punishment. Army will be trained to prepare for a nuclear war with
an emphasis on weapons, tactics and war games even
if it is unlikely to take place.”6
While the limited war
doctrine has been adequately worked on7
, there is
scope for going down the route further in conventional
operations under nuclear conditions. Currently, the tactical and protective
measures that need be taken are well covered. These, however, have to be taken
forward to include operational level responses.
What are the implications for conventional operations? The questions that
arise are: Does the Army need to shift to higher gear or be more cautious on a
nuclear outbreak? Does it hold in the sector that has witnessed a nuclear attack
and concentrate on gains in some other sector, for instance, shift its sights from
the deserts or plains to the mountains and vice versa? How will troops in the
line react? How should the communication zone be organised against counterstrikes?
How does it cope with evacuation of families from cantonments? What
will be the sub-conventional and asymmetric fallout of nuclear operations?
This commentary does not answer these questions but attempts to discern the
doctrinal direction that must necessarily precede the impending revision of all
three doctrines – nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional – not only in the
light of these questions but because, being a decade old, they are up for revision.8
At the Conventional-Nuclear Interface
That there is a mutually influential relationship between the two levels –
conventional and nuclear – had been recognised fifteen years ago in the Draft
Nuclear Doctrine.9
The draft had required India to maintain highly effective
conventional military capabilities to raise the threshold of an outbreak of a
conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.
Further, the defence forces are to be in a position to execute operations in a
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) environment, with minimal degradation.
Barring the exceptions in the official doctrine of January 2003, the draft has
since been adopted as the nuclear doctrine.10 These stipulations of the nuclear
doctrine, therefore, are operative for conventional operations.
The Army’s cognisance of this is clear. Take, for instance, its turn from
defensive defence to active deterrence with the reconfiguration on the eastern
front over the past half-decade. It has enhanced conventional deterrence and
in the event of its failure, it can undertake operations without India resorting to
the threat of use of nuclear weapons. This will keep No First Use (NFU) inviolate.
Indian Army can
fight through a
tactical nuclear
weapon use. In so far as continuing operations in a nuclear environment is concerned, press
reports from the generally well covered corps level exercises indicate that the
nuclear dimension is incorporated in the exercises in both the conceptual and
physical facets.11 The conceptual facet is in the narratives reflecting a ‘Redland’
having a nuclear capability and the physical is witnessed in the decontamination
drills, sometimes showcased for the press corps.
The usual understanding is that in case of introduction of nuclear weapons
into a conflict, even at the lower order levels of nuclear first use and retaliation,
the conflict is dramatically transformed from its original scope. The pre-nuclear use
situation, specifically conventional operations in a nuclear backdrop, has, therefore,
to change to one in which conventional operations form the backdrop for a nuclear
foreground. This has two implications: one is that the nuclear operations will
take precedence over conventional operations; and two, political and diplomatic
strategies will acquire precedence over the military prong of grand strategy.
This implies that conventional operations will require deferring to nuclear
operations and would be subject to a greater stringency in so far as supporting
the political and diplomatic dimension goes. Clearly, with the political aims
being modified in the light of the nuclearisation of the conflict, the military aims
and conventional objectives would require review. Since this can be anticipated,
the contingencies can be thought through for early and speedy realignment of
conventional operations.
Visualising Conventional Operations
There are two conceivable directions for conventional operations: either,
proceed with greater vigour under cover of the fact that Pakistan is in the nuclear
doghouse; or, be more cautious lest conventional moves complicate the political
positioning at the strategic level or trigger avoidable nuclear escalation. Since a
nuclear war outbreak implies that conflict termination efforts will heighten, the
possibility of quickly gaining a war termination position may entail a quickened
tempo of operations so as to finish on top. Nevertheless, changing to top gear
in the midst of nuclear operations alongside may not be possible. Speeded
up operations may be more dangerous in a nuclear situation since, firstly, the
enemy may get into a ‘use them-lose them’ dilemma; and, secondly, his resulting
conventional paralysis may make him rely more on the nuclear card. Also,
own nuclear retaliatory strikes will require space for execution, uncluttered
by ongoing conventional operations. Settling for a more cautious approach to
conventional operations may well be adopted.
It is likely that the tempo of conventional operations will be considerably
degraded. While there would be immediate nuclear effects to cope with, shifting of
gears in the form of rethinking priorities, weight along thrust lines, tactical pauses,
etc. may be required. The priorities will rearrange around the nuclear retaliatory
strikes and the communication zone will have to be reconfigured to prevent targets
for a Pakistani counter-strike. In this consideration, while in-conflict deterrence
will be predominant, the anticipated fallout on conventional operations of nuclear
operations requires feeding-in into nuclear response considerations. In any case,
quickening operations under conditions of mobility and logistics under nuclear
conditions may not be readily possible. Also, the slowdown, to include tactical
pauses, may help create conditions for nuclear retaliatory strikes. Since Pakistani
counter-strikes can be expected, caution in movement and particularly in
reconfiguring of the communication zone may be necessary to prevent targeting
from counter-strikes. The greater the conventional adaptability, the greater will be
the scope and confidence in execution of the retaliatory strike.
The retaliatory strike, while certain, may not necessarily be immediate.
In the case of an enemy lower order nuclear first use such as a demonstrative
strike, there could be a case for postponing nuclear retaliation and proceeding
with conventional operations at a heightened tempo. As has been argued on
the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) website in 2008 and
recently in 201412, India’s nuclear doctrine lends itself to such interpretation.
It states that nuclear retaliation will be of unacceptable levels in the case of a
‘first strike’. If India is to interpret ‘first strike’ as a higher order first use aimed
at degrading India’s retaliatory capability, then India’s nuclear retaliation can
be flexible – later and/or lesser. In case lower order strikes are met with a lower
order nuclear retaliation, the scope for conventional operations potentially
enlarges. From a politico-diplomatic point of view, India’s position to press
on conventionally will be unassailable since Pakistan will be in violation
of the nuclear taboo.13 India can retain the choice of punishing it either by
nuclear means, by conventional means or both. In such a case, the retaliatory
strike can be reconfigured to suit the conventional battle so as to together
shape conflict termination.
At the Conventional-Subconventional Interface
From the manner in which wars of this century have played out, it is clear that
the asymmetric dimension is no longer merely an irritant, but can possibly be the
main prong of the enemy strategy. Israel and the US have faced up to the challenge in the midst of operations. For instance, the US came up
with the Petraeus Doctrine half way through the Iraq War.14
While the Indian Army has a sub-conventional doctrine; it
stops at the Line of Control. In its next iteration, it requires
a chapter on how the Army will cope with the irregular war
that will accompany conventional operations and which
stands to be heightened by the nuclear punishment India
will visit on Pakistan in case of a nuclear first use by that state.
There are two scenarios of sub-conventional possibilities in a nuclear
aftermath. The first is in nuclear retaliation stunning the state and society into
paralysis. Coping with this will absorb all the national energy. However, the
second is that there could well be a heightening of irregular war in the captured
territories. Politically, the jihadists will stand to gain as they are already better
organised and with the state disrupted by the nuclear retaliation suffered, the
nationalist-jihadist combine could mount an internal political challenge. They
will attempt to gain legitimacy for this by taking the fight to the ‘invaders’. In either
case, it can be seen that there may be an involvement of the Army in stabilisation
operations.
In the first case, this may be benign, and with international support
after conflict termination. It is the second that needs doctrinal reflection.
The conventional-subconventional firebreak will disappear. Two scenarios
can appear. First, even as the conventional operations continue, subconventional
operations will have to be launched alongside. The second is that
the conventional challenge may wither away, as with the Iraq Army in Iraq War
II, to be replaced primarily with the sub-conventional one.
Add to both the
humanitarian dimension. As the occupying power in the areas captured, the
onus would be on India to cope. It also has no problem with the Pakistani people;
therefore, it would be extending a helping hand to the people outside its reach
since the Pakistani state would be prostrate and liable to be overtaken by jihadist
forces. The point that emerges is that conventional operations may end up taking
a back seat to sub-conventional and humanitarian operations.
Conclusion
Anticipating other down-flow effects from the nuclear level to the conventional
and sub-conventional enables preparing for them. A collapsing of the three levels
– nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional – otherwise visualised as distinct in
the spectrum of conflict into one with the disappearance of the nuclear firebreak
can be expected to occur. The sub-conventional dimension can be expected to
Politico
diplomatic
strategy will
take precedence
during the
nuclear war. heighten alongside the conventional operations on a battlefield gone nuclear.
The doctrinal implications of this for both conventional and sub-conventional
doctrines need thinking through. Anticipating this enables preparation.
In sum,
the military prong of the grand strategy will take second place to the politico-diplomatic
one. Conventional operations will be overshadowed by nuclear
operations and stabilisation operations will be predominantly sub-conventional.
So far, the military exercises have had the nuclear dimension as the
background. This needs reimagining so as to come up with operational level
options in a war gone nuclear.
One way to do this is to cease beginning exercises
with an ‘I’ Day scenario in which ‘I’ stands for a mass terror incident. Instead,
some exercises could also begin with an ‘N’ Day scenario in which ‘N’ stands for
the day of nuclear first use. Preparedness such as this helps with deterrence as
also with its breakdown. The outcome can be in the form of an explicit limited
war doctrine for conventional operations under nuclear conditions.
While conventional doctrine needs to acquire a new chapter on conventional
operations under nuclear conditions, the nuclear doctrine would require examining
which of the options of nuclear retaliation is better suited for India in the light of
its conventional advantage: does ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation suit India better or
is ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliation better? The answer can help in the revision, when
carried out, of the nuclear doctrine. As seen, the principal effect in both cases of
lower order first use – catalytic and operational – is that the conventional level is
superseded by the nuclear level. Therefore, how the nuclear doctrine shapes up is
of consequence for the military.
The military would require engaging with this if
the traditional and unwarranted distinction between the nuclear and conventional
spheres in India continues. Lastly, a post nuclear strikes scenario has the potential
to rearrange the Army’s priorities. It would need to start thinking this through to
remain, to quote the last Chief, “a very relevant instrument of national power”.15
Notes
1. S P Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia,
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p.55.
2. M Sethi, “Responding to Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Strategy for India”, IPCS,
January 18, 2014, available at http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/ipcs-debate-respondingto-pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-a-strategy-4263.html,
accessed on August 01, 2014.
scholar warrior ä spring 2015 ä 21
scholar warrior
3. ISPR Press Release of April 19, 2011, available at https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.
asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721, accessed on July 13, 2014.
4. M Krepon, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability”, Stimson Centre, available
at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_
Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf, accessed on July 14, 2014.
5. M Sethi, “Counter Pak Nuke Tactics”, New Indian Express, July 24, 2014, available at
http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Counter-Pak-Nuke-Tactics/2014/07/24/
article2345369.ece, accessed on July 25, 2014. Also see by same author, n.2.
6. Harinder Baweja, ‘Readying for Nukes’, India Today, May 21, 2001, available at http://
indiatoday.intoday.in/story/for-the-first-time-after-india-became-a-nuclear-power-armystages-a-nuclear-war-game/1/233562.html,
accessed on January 15, 2015.
7. For a discussion on India’s Limited War doctrine, see Ali Ahmed, India’s Doctrine Puzzle:
Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge, 2014).
8. The conventional doctrine, Indian Army Doctrine, is a 2004 publication of the Army Training
Command (ARTRAC). The Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations was released by
ARTRAC in 2006. The nuclear doctrinal review has been promised by the government of the
official nuclear doctrine of 2003.
9. National Security Advisory Board, “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine”, August 1999, Arms
Control Association, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_07-08/ffja99,
accessed on July 20, 2014.
10. Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet Committee On Security Reviews Progress In
Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine”, Cabinet Committee on Security, January 03, 2003,
available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.
html, accessed on July 20, 2014.
11. R Pandit, “Army Undertakes Major Exercise Along Western Front to Hone Combat Skills”, The
Times of India, April 29, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Army-undertakesmajor-exercise-along-western-front-to-hone-combat-skills/articleshow/34348704.cms
12. A Ahmed, “The Need for Clarity in India’s Nuclear Doctrine”, IDSA,
November 11, 2008, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/
TheNeedForClarityInIndiaSNuclearDoctrine_AAhmed_111108.html, accessed on August
02, 2014; and Balachandran G and Kapil Patil, “Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine”, IDSA,
June 20, 2014, available at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/RevisitingIndiasNuclearDoctrine_
gbalachandran_200614.html, accessed on August 02, 2014.
13. A Ahmed, “Diplomatic Engagement in a Post Nuclear Use Environment”, Indian Defence
Review, May 27, 2014, available at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/
diplomatic-engagement-in-a-post-nuclear-use-environment/, accessed on July 12, 2014.
14. A Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine”, The Atlantic, October 01, 2008, available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/10/the-petraeus-doctrine/306964/, accessed on
July 15, 2014.
15. IANS, “India ‘Gave Befitting Reply’ to Soldier Beheading”, The Hindustan Times, July 31, 2014,
available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-gave-befitting-reply-tosoldier-beheading/article1-1246684.aspx,
accessed on August 02, 2014.
