ISSUE BRIEF

A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict

Ali Ahmed

October 24, 2011

There is considerable interest in a possible conflict with China. However, little discussion exists in the open domain on conflict possibilities. This Brief attempts to fill this gap by dilating upon conflict scenarios along the spectrum of conflict. It brings out the need for limitation to conflict and the necessity for a grand strategic approach towards China as against a military driven one.

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http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/AConsiderationofSinoIndianConflict
Introduction
The Indian position on the power balance is Asia is that there exists enough space in
Asia for both states and civilisations.1 Consequently India’s policy towards China is one
of multifaceted engagement.2 Yet, there is considerable concern among strategic analysts
in India about the possibilities of conflict.3 Despite the focus on the ‘China threat’, there is
surprisingly little in the open domain on the possible military manifestation of the threat.
The popular narrative restricts itself to pointing out the head start China has had in
infrastructure building in Tibet and the military uses to which this can be put. Its capability
for sustaining forces is taken in one account as 34 divisions and half a million men in
another.4 The factors leading to war that find mention are the boundary dispute, pressure
tactics by China in ‘balance of power’ games, outward projection of internal political
unrest in China and stand-off over markets and resources elsewhere.
This Brief sets out hypothetical conflict scenarios against the spectrum of conflict.5 It first
outlines the contours of conflict,6 including that of the ‘collusive’ threat, and then discusses
limitation. It ends by looking at the two buffer states Nepal and Bhutan in context. The
conclusion is that coping with China will be a test equally of military jointness as of
‘jointedness’ of the Indian national security establishment.7
Conflict Scenarios
The spectrum of conflict is a conceptual aid to discuss conflict and subsumes along its
continuum subconventional conflict; conventional war in its limited and total dimensions;
and nuclear war in its limited and strategic dimensions. Placement along the spectrum
would depend on the aims and intensity of conflict, troops and resources committed, etc.
Subconventional Level
In the subconventional level are proxy wars. The Chinese support for rebels in the North
East up until the late sixties can be subsumed under this. It has been suggested that
IDSA Issue Brief 3
India must prosecute an asymmetric contest vis-à-vis China by: ‘(a) …reach[ing] out to
the restive, discontented and oppressed Tibetan population, particularly the youth, in
Tibet; [and] (b) support[ing] the cause of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang Autonomous Region
(XUAR) and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR).’8 Such playing of the proxy
war ‘card’ can be done in peacetime and it can be enhanced in war to keep the
communication zone of the adversary unsettled for operational gains. However, the
factor of India’s own multiple vulnerabilities in this sphere cannot be overlooked.9
While the foregoing are intelligence operations, military actions can also occur at the
subconventional level. These include patrol clashes and border skirmishes.10 Reports of
border ‘transgressions’11 suggest that patrol clashes can occur inadvertently or by design.12
This was the pattern in the run up to the 1962 conflict as part of the ‘forward policy’
adopted of both states resulting in clashes at the grassroots level.13 Such occurrences
could build up to a border skirmish or this could be engineered as a separate incident.
The 1967 stand off at Nathu la and the Walong-Sumdorong Chu incidents of the late
eighties are examples.
Conventional Level
This is the key area of focus of the Indian military. The military takes its primary task of
safeguarding territorial integrity seriously. The border and Line of Actual Control (LAC)
is over 4000 km long. Much of this is disputed and China claims Tawang and even the
whole of Arunachal Pradesh. The Army’s ‘Transformation’ study reportedly proposes
urgent and long term action necessary for preserving the status quo till a resolution is
arrived at.14 Infrastructure improvement in the form of road building is underway.15
The Army’s proposal for a mountain strike corps for the eastern sector, in addition to the
two mountain divisions under raising there currently, stands approved. To supplement
firepower resources that have been revealed as critical in mountains, a regiment of
8 Mandip Singh, ‘Asymmetric Wars in the Indian Context’, IDSA Comment, http://www.idsa.in/
idsacomments/AsymmetricWarsintheIndianContext_msingh_131011
9 The North East insurgencies are currently at a low ebb while the Maoist challenge is acute. China
can exploit these in retaliation in case India plays the ‘Tibet’ card. Such cards are avoidable since
they would impact both Indian friends (Tibetans) and Indian citizens.
10 Doctrine of Sub Conventional Operations, Shimla: HQ ARTRAC, p. 2.
11 ‘No increase in deployment of forces on China-India border: Army’, Economic Times, 14 January
2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-14/news/28429087_1_patrols-indiachina-
india-and-china
12 ‘India-China Territorial Dispute: Way Ahead’, CLAWS Article 1933, 25 August 2011, http://
www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=934&u_id=36
13 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010, pp. 270-87.
14 This is a confidential study reportedly conducted under the current army chief during his former
assignment as Eastern Army Commander.
15 The BRO has a budgetary allocation of Rs. 5,425 crore. See ‘Progress of 61 roads to be built on
Indo-China border reviewed’, Economic Times, 13 September 2011.
A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict
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Brahmos missiles is to be deployed in Arunachal.16 Strategic commentary variously has
it that it needs two or three such corps.17 The Air Force has placed its latest strike assets,
the Su 30s, in the North East and is expanding its infrastructure and capability in Ladakh.18
The lower end of the conflict at this level could be a Kargil-like situation. China’s aim
could be to ‘teach India a lesson’ so as to influence India’s rise before its capacity building
underway acquires traction. This could be a limited war confined to a specific section of
the border or LAC, limited in duration and amenable to a negotiated termination. At a
higher level could be a territorial grab by China, for example a bid to take Tawang. At
the next rung could be a more ambitious bid southwards up to its claim line. Lateral or
horizontal expansion of conflict from one theatre to another is the next step, with the
conflict engulfing one or more of the four possible theatres: Ladakh, Central Sector,
Sikkim and Arunachal. Alongside, it may impact the buffer states, Nepal and Bhutan
(discussed later). A higher end war may spread outwards from the mountains to include
air and missile action against the hinterland and the ‘mainland’ or strategic heartland.
There is a possibility of the involvement of allies, in the least in a supportive role. The
most extensive dimension of this could be the ‘collusive’ threat.19
16 P. Samanta, ‘China flexing muscles, govt clears Brahmos for Arunachal’, Indian Express, 17 October
2011, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-flexing-muscles-govt-clears-brahmos-forarunachal/
860799/
17 Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Wars in the mountains: Capacity building needed for future conflict’, CLAWS
Article 1927, 14 August 2011, http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=928&u_id=7;
GD Bakshi, ‘The Age Of Differences...Wasn’t It Born Before 1962?’, Outlook, 3 October 2011.
18 ‘IAF raises new squadron of SU-30 warplanes in NE’, Hindustan Times, 1 March 2011.
19 VK Kapoor, ‘Fighting a Two Front War’, http://www.spslandforces.net/story.asp?id=124
IDSA Issue Brief 5
The Collusive Threat20
Such a threat has not transpired historically and has not developed so far. However, the
‘threat’ has been envisaged now due to juxtaposing of infrastructure developments in
Tibet with taking over of transport corridor projects and infrastructure such as dams by
the Chinese in Pakistan’s Northern Areas.21 The manifestation of the threat in terms of
scenarios could be either Pakistan- or China- led. Alternatively, it could be with either
state taking advantage of an adverse situation for India brought on by the other state.
Lastly is a grand strategic design between the two.
From this emerge five possibilities: China instigated, Pakistan instigated, Chinese hyena
act, Pakistan’s hyena act and lastly a planned twin strike. Since China can act on its own,
it does not need Pakistani collusion. In fact it may find such collusion escalatory since it
would place India in a worse position, from which India would only want to come out
fighting. On the other hand, Pakistan can do with Chinese support. Yet, China would not
want to be physically drawn in though it could use the transport corridors being developed
in the Gilgit-Baltistan region to send in logistic support.
In a China-led case, a twin threat could be in case of Chinese designs to the east. These
could be grandiose in terms of seizing limited territory such as Tawang or the whole of
Arunachal, or to ‘teach India a lesson’. This may entail tying India down in the western
sector by having Pakistan make diversionary moves in Siachen or Kargil. This could
result in 14 Corps based in Ladakh being forced to look both ways. The possibility of
Chinese participation with movement through the Gilgit axis is possible, but the logistics
and possibility of Indian air interdiction makes this unviable.
A Pakistan-led case is difficult to visualize since China would not like the ‘tail to wag the
dog’. China could nevertheless participate in such an adventure if it were to set India
back and restrict India’s strategic space to South Asia. Dual use formations that could tilt
the balance in India’s favour would then not be available, making for greater symmetry
with Pakistan.
A ‘hyena act’ by Pakistan is easier to visualize than by China since China is more likely
to be able to place India at a military disadvantage than Pakistan. In such a case, with
India militarily distracted in an engagement with China, Pakistan could try and gain
psychological ascendance, remove vulnerabilities through military action or recreate
proxy war conditions.
20 Ali Ahmed, ‘The Sino-Pak ‘collusive’ threat’, CLAWS Article 1794, 31 March 2011, http://
www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=795&u_id=77
21 Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 653: ‘Chinese presence in POK’, http://www.idsa.in/
resources/parliament/ChinesepresenceinPOK030811
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The last possibility of a concerted twin strike is the ‘most threatening-least likely’ one. In
such a case, India may turn its attention and weight first towards Pakistan while it holds
in the North. This serves as deterrent to Pakistani participation in such an enterprise.
Since India would be greatly imposed upon, the possibility of going beyond the ‘limited
war’ profile exists. India could legitimately rescind its NFU in such circumstance as a
clear signal. This brings up the nuclear level.
Nuclear Level
Both India and China subscribe to a ‘No First Use’ (NFU) doctrine. Since this is a unilateral
undertaking, it may be rescinded at any time. Therefore this level cannot be ruled out ab
initio. Retracting from NFU itself would be a significant move to indicate that thresholds
are being crossed in a conventional war. Nuclear exchanges can be either graduated or
spasmic. The former indicates that within this level there is also space for Limited Nuclear
War.22 Theoretically, despite its implausibility, limitation in the nuclear domain can be
restricted to specific targets or theatres; for instance, strikes on strategic lines of
communications such as mountain passes or strategic bridges in the hinterland. The
variegated capability available with both states in terms of types of weapons and delivery
platforms and the nuclear weapon numbers make this possible. Counter value targeting
would be a step up from such exchanges. In effect, a wider war may have all three levels
of the spectrum in play: proxy war, conventional war and nuclear war. This brings to
fore the imperative of limitation.
On Limitation
The pattern of Indian procurements, infrastructure building and force restructuring
suggests preparedness for conflict scenarios across the board. In future, India could be
subject to China’s hegemonic attention. Since India would be better prepared by then,
China may instead wish to set India back now by a preventive war. This means current
day preparedness is as essential as preparation for the future. A reverse now will have
as severe political costs, internally and externally, as it had back in 1962; for, as then,
India is yet again contemplating a global role.
While India’s is taken as a ‘benign’ rise, China’s projection of ‘peaceful rise’ meets with
scepticism.23 China is better positioned for gaining super power status and may attempt
to gain a position of dominance. This may place it at odds with India which wishes to
preserve its autonomy and image. Short of this ‘worst case’ developing, perhaps a decade
22 Indian Army Doctrine, p. 12.
23 Baladas Ghoshal, ‘India and China: Towards a Competitive-Cooperative Relationship?’, IPCS
Issue Brief No. 153, August 2010.
IDSA Issue Brief 7
or so from now, there are conflict scenarios that may spool out in the interim. The issue of
‘saving face’ and reputation for both sides will have an escalatory affect.
Against such a background, India’s national aim, in light of its economic trajectory and
national interest of strategic autonomy, is war avoidance. In case of conflict breaks out,
limitation is desirable. At the upper ends of conflict, early conflict termination recommends
itself, lest escalation result. Applying the Limited War concept makes sense in that it
would not deflect India from its economic trajectory overly. Limitation would help ensure
that the No First Use (NFU) doctrine, subscribed to by both states, holds. Localised
conflicts are easier to terminate since ‘saving face’ is easier as resources committed are
less and prestige is not staked inordinately. Limited War is a concept that has been aired
in India since 2000, though this has found greater reflection in the India-Pakistan context.24
Likewise, the Chinese concept of ‘limited war in informationalised conditions’ seemingly
privileges limitation.
Limited War by definition is one limited along one of several dimensions. In the case in
question, compartmentalising a conflict zone, easier brought about in the Himalayas,
helps keep the conflict limited. There are potentially four conflict theatres: the Ladakh
theatre, the central theatre, the Sikkim theatre and the last along the erstwhile McMahon
Line. Restricting the conflict to one or more of these theatres would help localise it. For
limitation in weapons used, saliencies exist in the employment of air power, as was done
in 1962. Additional thresholds are the limit of employment of air power in terms of
spread and type of targets; employment of weapons systems such as missiles; levels of
employment of proxies in irregular war in the communication zones and hinterland and
the opening up of the maritime front.
Lastly, is the use of the nuclear plane for posturing and for ‘tacit bargaining’. Rescinding
the NFU when warranted can help send an unambiguous message of thresholds being
reached. Lower order nuclear first use, such as against a geographic target such as a
critical pass for operational gains and the strategic purpose of signalling would bring
about a nuclear war. Consideration of keeping nuclear outbreak limited is in order,
since neither state would prefer its ‘mainland’ being attacked. This means limitation to
Limited Nuclear War also needs to be factored in for contingency planning purposes,
howsoever far-fetched the enterprise otherwise appears.
Limitation can thus be both horizontal and vertical. Horizontally, it may mean opening
of other fronts, including the maritime front. Vertically, it means stepping up the ladder,
not necessarily in a graduated manner. It could mean introduction of air power, missile
24 Swaran Singh, ‘Indian Debate on Limited War’, Strategic Analysis, XXIII (12), 2000:
pp. 2179-83.
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strikes with conventional warheads, use of tactical nuclear weapons, etc. In the upper
end of the scale, both vertical and horizontal expansion are virtually assured, since both
sides may want to capitalise on their advantages in other fronts or compensate for any
advantage the other has on a particular front. This means that saliencies and thresholds
need to be identified.
An example could be when would India prefer to employ its maritime advantage in the
Indian Ocean to pressurise China in case of outbreak of war in the Himalayas? This
would perhaps be less useful for a short duration encounter such as a border skirmish,
but would be consequential as an escalatory manoeuvre designed as war termination
pressure in case of a wider war.
Likewise, at the nuclear level, for instance, a consideration could be at which hypothetical
stage of an adverse situation would India rescind NFU and introduce nuclear weapons
into the conflict? A scenario could be if and when a Chinese breakthrough is threatened
onto the Siliguri corridor, in conjunction with an adverse situation developing on the
Arunachal front. The aspect of in-conflict nuclear deterrence of strategic nuclear exchanges
is catered for by India’s second strike capability, likely to be increasingly sea-based by
the turn of the decade.
Since it takes two to keep war limited by cooperating to prevent escalation, firstly, their
communication through direct and indirect channels and tacitly by action manifest on
the ground would help condition the other to follow suit. This means that diplomatic
channels need to be kept open and governmental communication uncluttered by political
rhetoric. Secondly, choice in fighting at a particular level may be with the initiator of a
conflict, though escalation cannot be ruled out in all cases. To deny the enemy the
advantage he seeks at his level of choice, there may be a need to respond in a more
vigorous fashion. But getting the conflict to stabilise at that higher level of seeming
advantage would require communication of sorts. In effect, game theory kicks in with
defection and cooperation in evidence. Limited War in a sense is cooperation to mutually
avoid the worse penalties of war, such as to prevent a conflict from going nuclear.
Impact on Nepal and Bhutan
What would be the implication of a conflict between the two Asian giants for the two
buffer states, Nepal and Bhutan? Nepal will unlikely see military operations progressed
through its territory in violation of its sovereignty due to it being geographically distant
from the consequential theatres, Ladakh and Arunachal. Conversely, being close to Indian
base areas India has a defensive advantage in case China were to open up a front through
Nepal in an extensive war. For these reasons, China is unlikely to involve Nepali territory.
The lack of infrastructure on the far side of Nepal for the progress of an Indian offensive
would also make Nepal a less likely theatre of operations.
IDSA Issue Brief 9
Myanmar has figured in conflicts earlier during World War II with the airlift ‘over the
hump’ forming part of legend. Given its improving infrastructure links with Yunnan, a
threat developing in this direction can figure either in the context of a localised war
restricted to the tri-junction or a much wider Total War. The other link to conflict is in
case of external support for insurgents in the North East. This last factor influences India’s
deepening relations with Myanmar.
In the case of Bhutan there is greater likelihood that it could emerge as a future site of
contest, given its border dispute with China along the Chumbi valley. India has inherited
military-strategic ties with Bhutan. These ties include the permanent presence of an Indian
military training team in Bhutan and strategic stewardship of that state. Bhutan’s strategic
location may make it critical to war at the upper level of the spectrum. As can be seen in
the map, its eastern and western flanks abut Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim respectively.
In the hypothetical case of conflict in the eastern Himalayas, it is not implausible that
Bhutan may get embroiled. China could offensively exploit its territory for outflanking
Indian forces so as to pressurise India’s vulnerability in the 21 km wide Siliguri corridor,
aptly dubbed as ‘Chicken’s Neck’. Fearing such movement, Indian forces may stage
forward defensively. Given the military advantages that would accrue to the force acting
first in the mountains, pressures to pre-empt the other side will arise.
In so far as Bhutan would incline towards India in any such conflict, an Indian position
could have it that this is in India’s interest. The 2007 treaty states that the two ‘shall
cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests’. It goes on
to state that ‘neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful
to the national security and interest of the other.’25 Thus, even as Bhutan contests any
Chinese ingress, it would be free to call upon India for assistance. This could enable
India to respond militarily on request. Such military movement would help India defend
its own territory better.
However, two problems arise. One is that a potential Indian-Bhutanese linkage may
tempt China to be both offensive and pre-emptive. This could lead to a race between
those ‘rolling down’ and those ‘rushing up’, reminiscent of the military action in Belgium
at the start of the First World War and at the end of the ‘phoney war’ in the Second
World War. Second, an inadvertent expansion of the conflict could take place from what
is originally intended as a localised theatre.
Therefore, in case Bhutanese territory does not figure in the military calculus of either
state, it may be better for both. While there may be military compulsions, predicated on
gaining a position of operational advantage or denying the same to the adversary, these
25 ‘Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty’, text available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
newsletters/SAP/pdf/march07/india_bhutan_treaty.pdf
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need to be weighed against the strategic imperative of limitation to conflict between
nuclear states. A measure to this end would be to respect Bhutan’s neutrality. This would
require Bhutan to emerge as the ‘Switzerland of the Himalayas’.
Bhutan has been released from its 1949 treaty obligation of being ‘guided by the advice
of the Government of India in regard to its external relations’ by the exclusion of this
clause from the new 2007 friendship treaty.26 This reflects India’s respect for the sovereign
right of Bhutan to act by its own lights. Since an extension of war into Bhutan by
inadvertence or design is not in India’s or Bhutan’s interest, respect for neutrality of
Bhutan could be considered. This can be done by arriving at a tacit strategic
understanding with China as part of the strategic dialogue.
Policy Choices
From among a menu ranging from compellence, deterrence and defence, India’s strategic
doctrinal choice is evident. Compellence is ruled out, as is defence. The former cannot be
tried against a strong nuclear power and the latter has not worked adequately earlier in
the fifties. The choice is restricted to deterrence, with its two variants: offensive deterrence
and defensive deterrence. The former involves more expensive offensive capabilities
and is predicated on deterrence by punishment. The latter is based on deterrence by
denial.
Defensive deterrence makes grand strategic sense as articulated by the National Security
Advisor:
Our goal must be defence, not offense, unless offense is necessary for deterrence or to protect...
We must recognise that other countries too could have similar imperatives as ours and
their own reasons for what they do. And why create self-fulfilling prophesies of conflict
with powerful neighbours like China?27
The military is also on board with this formulation. The former Chairman Chiefs of Staff
Committee, Admiral S. Mehta had stated, ‘On the military front, our strategy to deal
with China must include reducing the military gap...The traditional or ‘attritionist’
approach of matching ‘Division for Division’ must give way…’28 These must be
supplemented by ‘harnessing modern technology for developing high situational
awareness and creating a reliable stand-off deterrent.’29 This will enable the fine
26 ‘Treaty Between India and Bhutan 1949’, text available at http://www.indianembassythimphu.bt/
treaty.htm
27 Shivshankar Menon, ‘Our ability to change India in a globalised world’, Tribune, 14 August 2011.
28 Admiral Sureesh Mehta, ‘India’s National Security Challenges – An Armed Forces Overview’, Address
At India Habitat Centre – 10 Aug 09, p. 3, http://maritimeindia.org/sites/all/files/pdf/
CNS_Lec_at_Habitat.pdf
29 Ibid.
IDSA Issue Brief 11
distinction between offensive and defensive deterrence. The strategic doctrine would
require being ensconced in grand strategy involving diplomacy, trade ties, etc.
accordingly, as, is indeed, already the case, albeit one under-appreciated.
Conclusion
The bad news is that conflict scenarios are not impossible to visualise, but the good news
is that the higher one moves up in the spectrum the less likely the scenario. The sobering
aspect is that the likelihood depends on the level of preparedness; but one not necessarily
confined to military preparedness. The ‘China threat’ thesis requires being placed in
perspective. The stridency attending it has the advantage of focusing attention on the
challenge. Conflict potential cannot be ignored; but, coping cannot be solely a military,
territory-centric enterprise.

A Perspective on Land Warfare Strategy
http://www.claws.in/CJ_Winter_2009.pdf

Introduction

If you were to look up “land strategy” in either Google or Wikipedia, you’d be
disappointed. Land strategy does not have the impression in cyber space as one
would expect in the belief that there is something called “land strategy”. The more
familiar term instead is rightly” “military strategy” or “land warfare strategy”.

This is due to military power being taken as one entity in its exercise as per the
dictates of strategy. As Giulio Douhet, the exponent of air power, bemoaning
the parochialism of the military, once rightly said: “There are experts of land,
sea and air warfare. but as yet there are no experts of warfare. And warfare is a
single entity, having a common purpose.” 

Therefore, for this article to be titled “land warfare strategy” would appear an untenable contradiction. However, in the light of military history being replete with campaigns such as the Schilieffen
Plan, Operation Barbarossa, Rommel’s conceptualisation of the “Longest Day”,
MacArthur’s inspired landings at Inchon, Schwarzkopf “Hail Mary” manoeuvre
and Petraeus’ “surge” in Iraq, it is apparent that “land strategy” has been central
to war. 

Therefore, the aim in this article, intended as a beginner’s guide to strategy,
is to discuss “land warfare strategy” defined as employment of land forces as part
of the wider unfolding of military strategy.

Situating Land Warfare Strategy

Strategy is the use or threat of force for political ends. The political ends being
paramount, strategy derives from a political formulation of the national vision,
aim and interests. The national security policy that defends and furthers these 
aims provides the overarching politico-military context for thinking on strategy.

The term increasingly over the last century, has acquired wider connotations
having to do with use of power instead of merely force and not necessarily in war
but also in peace. At the next lower level, military strategy is the employment of
the military instrument of national power in conjunction with other elements
such as diplomacy, political and economic strength and, indeed, also cultural
and soft power. 

Land warfare strategy, a component of military strategy, is use of
land forces in war and increasingly also in peace. For India, land warfare strategy
is of continuing consequence since it has a continental orientation, one that is
thankfully increasingly being challenged by the maritime dimension.

Every discussion on strategy necessarily begins with the bible on the military
in the modern era, it being Clausewitz’s work On War. “War is an act of violence
pushed to its utmost bounds…a mere continuation of policy by other means”. 

He conceptualised war as being about chance, passion, will, friction and fog. The idea
of strategy is, therefore, to navigate through these conditions intrinsic to conflict
by creating your own circumstance. The opponent, also being so engaged, makes
strategy in the words of French strategist, Andre beaufre, “the art of the dialectic
of opposing wills”. 

The widely accepted definition, also echoed in the Indian Army
Doctrine, uses the British war historian and theoretician, Liddell Hart’s words:
“The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”
It follows naturally then that military strategy is to “secure policy objectives by
the application or threat of force.”

While application of military power naturally involves violence, both doyens of strategy, 

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, agreeing across two millennia, observe that “supreme (strategic) 

excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”. 

Liddell Hart, a century after Clausewitz, concurs with Sun Tzu that the use of indirect methods to bring about a favourable situation makes better strategic sense. Thus, military strategy has

evolved to mean “management and control of military force in international
politics” (Alastair Buchan).

Two elements of the last century have impacted strategy with consequent
implications for land warfare strategy. One is the widened concept of strategy that
to the foremost Cold War strategist, Henry Kissinger, precludes compromising
two incommensurables – “purely military” or “purely political” – in favour of a
combination of military, political and economic factors. 

This is equivalent to the American rediscovery of Chanakya whose discourse on grand strategy, the
Arthashastra, talks of “Sam, Dam, Bhed, and Dand” (Peace, Wealth, Divide, and
Force).

The second has been the impact of the nuclear age on the Clausewitzian
concept that strategy is to enable imposing one’s will on the enemy. In the
words of the premier nuclear strategist, Bernard Brodie, “Clausewitz’s classical
definition must be modified, at least for any opponent who has a substantial
nuclear capability behind him. Against such an opponent, one’s terms must
be modest enough to permit him to accept them, without his being pushed by
desperation into rejecting both those terms and the limitations in war-fighting.”

This second aspect is of consequence for India in relation to the nuclearisation
of South Asia in the late part of the last century.

The Indian Army Doctrine states that “military force contributes by the defeat
of an opposing force.” It defines “defeat” as “diminishing the effectiveness of the
enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or, at least,
not being able to fulfill his intention.” 

Land warfare strategy would, therefore, be the plan, employing land forces supplemented by the other two Services, to bring about a condition in which the enemy is unable to fulfill his intent through
combat. The intention is the psychological paralysis of the enemy leadership

by application of combat power for the purposes of preemption, destruction,
dislocation and disruption.

Land warfare strategy could be defensive or offensive depending on the
strategic doctrine of a state. The strategic doctrine choices available to a state are
defence, offence, deterrence and compellence. 

Land warfare strategy, taking a cue from the strategic choice, would then configure accordingly. For instance, India’s strategic posture with respect to the China border is one of dissuasive defence,
while that with respect to Pakistan is offensive deterrence. This would bring
to fore the bias in land warfare strategy, defensive and offensive, respectively.

Most armies prefer the latter for reasons of professional worth, and, even when
in defence, prefer offensive-defence, for instance, the doctrine practised by
the Pakistan Army. 

While both terms, offence and defence, deal with the same factors majorly, such as intelligence, security, air support, fire support, logistics and communication, the former is related to the capture or destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity and the latter to denying the enemy similar success in
respect of own centre of gravity. 

Increasingly, objectives no longer being terrain-centric, the emphasis in land warfare strategy between the main components of land forces — armour, infantry and artillery — would shift as per the situation.

Land Warfare Strategy in India

It has been opined by knowledgeable observers that India lacks a strategic
culture. George Tanham, writing in the early Nineties, maintained that India had a defensive strategic orientation with passivity in military affairs, leading to a non-expansionist military tradition. Increasing interest, access and capabilities with respect to military technology, however, pointed to a more offensive future direction. 

To him, India was land oriented, with a protective mass army. Though it
had not articulated its goals in a coherent manner, it was interested in recognition
as a Great Power and, therefore, jealously preserved a long-term commitment
to strategic autonomy in its decision-making and military capabilities. Tanham wrote 

at the time of the outbreak of the liberalisation era,and the situation

has since changed and largely along the direction predicted. 

Growing power indices and increasing centrality to world politics have not only enhanced the
significance of military power in the national scheme but also brought about a
much needed balance among the three long standing components of military
power and with the newer dimensions being space, cyber and information.
India’s tryst with land warfare is due to its position as a continental power. 

This is reflective in a martial history replete with land warfare exploits, including the
Chakravyuha of the Mahabharata times, Chhatrapati Shivaji’s fortress strategy, the
much denigrated “Panipat syndrome”, the pacification campaigns in the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP), the lightning campaign, the limited war strategy for
Kargil, glacial warfare in Siachen and, lately, the innovative Cold Start. 

This is understandable, given its history of the last thousand years in which the ruling
regimes of the Indo-Gangetic plains were land focussd due to strategic and cultural
reasons. The british continued the legacy in their indulgence in the Great Game
from Shimla, while India’s maritime interests were taken care of by the Admiralty
in London. 

This landward orientation remained a distinguishing characteristic of
Indian strategic culture well into the independent era. A disproportionately large
army and a weak institutional interface led to it overshadowing the other two
Services. Its major conflicts were with land powers, Pakistan and China. 

It was only in the successful 1971 War that land warfare strategy’s sway over military strategy
began to give way to a joint approach to war-fighting. This culminated in the Kargil
War in which posturing by the three Services elsewhere, and application of air and
land power to the politically restricted battlespace, brought in the dividend. 

The ascendance of air power, with increased capability and requisite doctrine, and the
importance of the maritime dimension to growing national power have brought
about a balance. Jointness enhancing institutional structures, further, and, rightly,
degrade the autonomy of land warfare.

The primary influences on land warfare are: the nuclear backdrop; joint warfighting doctrine articulated in 2006; a nascent proactive and offensive approach dictated by a national strategic doctrine of offensive deterrence; increasing resource base due to expanding budgets; heightened levels of strategic thinking
brought on by its emerging power status, increased salience in the strategic
situation in its immediate vicinity and its partnership with the US; “lessons
learnt” from wars, resulting in transformation of the army underway; and, lastly,
a more outward oriented strategic culture. 

The long standing factors continue in place, namely, disputed borders on the two fronts requiring manpower intensive protection, and continuing proxy war requiring extended deployment of a
proportion of its land forces.

That a purely land warfare strategy may be a thing of the past is best
evident from the debate between the two Services, the army and the air force,
with respect to the air force’s role in land warfare. 

The army’s apprehensions are articulated by its former Vice Chief Vijay Oberoi, thus: “It fears that in the quest for waging an independent air war, the Air Force will neglect to provide
adequate support to the Army, in terms of Offensive Air Support…The Army is of
the view that in its quest for a more independent role for the Air Force, the IAF is
selectively interpreting the lessons learnt from the recent wars and battles where
air power was used….”

Retired Air Marshal Vinod Patney, a votary of aerospace power, has countered: “Hard nosed practicality demanded that air power be given greater freedom of action and the overall strategy fashioned to permit this. Joint planning still remains the sine qua non for operational success but there
has been a veritable sea change in the basic premises for planning and in the
establishing of priorities.”

The air marshal continues to maintain that “a single Service operation is a valid operation of war and, at times, will be the option of choice”, in effect, making a case for a circumstance related independent air
strategy.

It can be reckoned that this debate shall continue into the middle term
and impact any future consideration of land warfare.

In the South Asian context, an additional element, “posturing”, is in play.
This involves location and movement of offensive forces in such a manner as to
keep the enemy guessing as to their intent and eventual employment. This was
particularly so in the era of “deep thrust” by strike corps. However, the doctrinal
scenehas  been energised by the dissemination of the Cold Start doctrine.

It envisages multiple offensive thrusts across a broad front by divisional sized
integrated battle groups of the pivot corps and strike corps resources located
close to the border from a standing start: therefore, the term “Cold Start”. These
offensives would comprise available air power assets also, and may have a
maritime dimension, definitely involving posturing by the navy and possible
amphibious landings also.

These offensives would not only open the window for strike corps to make further inroads but would also pressure Pakistan’s military to throw in the towel along with the air force’s strategic bombing campaign. Military coercion and attrition short of the nuclear threshold is to bring about a
policy shift away from its support to proxy war, if not a regime change in Pakistan.

Clearly, then, though land forces cannot any more “go it alone”, land warfare
strategy would continue to remain central to the outcome of conflict.

Much organisational innovation has gone into operationalising the changes,
not only in the military but also in the civil-military relations domain. New
formations headquarters have been created and new formations are being
raised. The Strategic Forces Command has been formalised. 

Changes pending in the earlier round of reforms of the higher defence organisation in the early
part of the decade include creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff and
the greater integration between the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of
Defence. Increasing jointness and better consideration of the military input and
perspective would likely result from further evolution of the current structures.

With respect to China, the dissuasive deterrent implying “hold and deny”
is in keeping with the prevailing agreement on peace and tranquillity along
the disputed border. The intent is to develop military capabilities in the
interim such as by creating better infrastructure, including roads up to the
border, raising new mountain strike divisions and commissioning a deterrent
based on a 5,000 km range missile in the offing. 

This would position the army favourably in any future conflict brought on perhaps by the “clash of
titans” over strategic space and political preeminence in a future Asia. These
measures would lend teeth to the change to “active deterrence” recently
adopted for this theatre.

The aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom has witnessed Fourth
Generation Warfare in which an asymmetric counter would require application
of land forces guided by principles drawing on sub-conventional warfare
doctrine. This too is a facet of land warfare, one the Indian Army in particular
has much experience and expertise in and, therefore, not reflected on here in
any detail. 

The major point is that India draws on its strength of a stoic and
disciplined soldiery to establish a counter-insurgency grid for ensuring isolation
of the insurgent ‘fish’ from the human ‘sea’. Not having the same advantages of
manpower, other armies have been known to substitute with technology and
firepower, with attendant political costs.

Conclusion

Land warfare is the raison d’etre of the army. The relative balance between the
lead arms is situation and terrain specific. Dispute on this score is good for esprit
de corps but has to cease with the onset of conflict. The strategy that enables this
balancing to optimum result in relation to the military objective is a successful
land strategy. It has to be seen in relation to the tri-Service effort that is, in turn,
part of the grand strategic orchestration of the instruments of national power.

The Indian experience has been one of land forces’ primacy. Increasingly, and
rightfully, this is no longer tenable. Thus, land warfare strategy is likely to suffer
an eclipse in favour of a joint military strategy in any future conflict. Then the
armed forces would have entered the post-modern era.

Notes

1. M Howard, and Peter Paret (eds), Baron Carl von Clausewitz’s On War (Princeton:,
Princeton University Press, 1976).
2. Army Training Command, Indian Army Doctrine (Shimla: HQ ARTRAC, 2004).
3. The US Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 100-5: Fighting Future Wars,(
brassey’s, 1994). Also see, Army Field Manual 100-5: Operations.
4. L Rangarajan (ed), Kautilya: The Arthashastra, (New Delhi: Penguin Classics, 1992).
5. G Tanham,  Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: RAND,
1992).
6. V Oberoi, “Air Power and Joint Operations: Doctrinal and Organisational Challenges”,
USI Journal, January 2003.
7. V Patney, “Air Power and Joint Operations: Doctrinal and Organisational Challenges”,
USI Journal, July 2003.
8. V. Patney, “Jointness in Armed Forces and Institution of Post of Chief of Defence Staff
are Mutually Exclusive”, Journal of Defence Studies (IDSA), Summer 2008, p. 35.
9. G Kanwal, “Strike Fast and Hard: Indian Army Doctrine Undergoes Change in Nuclear
Era”, Tribune (Chandigarh), 23 June 2006.
10. V Oberoi, “Need for Holistic Restructuring of Indian Military”,  Journal of Defence
Studies, Summer 2008.

IDSA WORKSHOP ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
DRAFT PAPER
Nuclear Doctrine and Conflict
By Ali Ahmed


http://www.idsa.in/nationalstrategy/eventDec10/WP_AliAhmed.pdf

Introduction
India has made enviable progress since Independence in building social equality,
deepening democracy and making economic strides. These gains not only
require protection but also furthering over at least  another generation and
definitely out till the time horizon of  this workshop, 2020. India’s approach to
security would therefore require being mindful of the national endevour. In other
words, India’s civilisational trait of temperance and strategic culture of resolve
and restraint need to be in evidence for the duration. While crises and conflict
can be anticipated in the interim, given the security circumstance of the
neighbourhood, the national aim must not be lost sight of.
India’s military doctrines are predicated on a strategic doctrine of deterrence.
1
Deterrence is based on both the surety of denial and possibility of punishment.
To reinforce deterrence, an offensive orientation to its military doctrines and
expanding military potential has been in evidence of late.
2
 Currently, India’s
conventional doctrine has a proactive and offensive orientation. Its nuclear
doctrine posits inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in retaliation.
3
 While threats exist
and could arise over the decade, it is unlikely that these cannot be managed by
the diplomatic and political strategy. However, wild cards as internal political
instability affecting the judgment of both neighbours need to be factored in.
Conflict outbreak, despite best intentions and however unlikely, nevertheless
needs catering for. In any case, contingency preparedness in absence of threats
is a valid recourse.
It is argued that this requires a melding of conventional and nuclear doctrines in
their interface. This implies a movement in both doctrines. The paper suggests
                                             
∗
 Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
The paper is based on the author’s monograph at IDSA, Reconciling doctrines: Prerequisite for
peace in South Asia.
1
 The menu of strategic choices ranges between appeasement, conciliation, coercion, deterrence
and compellence. According to Kautilya, the strategic prongs are ‘sam, dam, dand and bhed’.
2
 While conventional doctrines are routinely described as ‘proactive’, the nuclear doctrine has
some offensive elements such as the NFU caveat extending nuclear deterrence to cover a major
attack by chemical and biological weapons.
3
 Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), ‘Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security
on Operationalisation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03’
http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008). 2
that conventional doctrine move towards an explicit Limited War formulation. The
nuclear doctrine in turn needs to genuflect towards limitation by ensuring conflict
termination at the lowest possible level  nuclear use in line with the ‘Sundarji
doctrine’.
4
 This argument is presented in two parts: in the first part the current
doctrinal interface is dilated on. In the second part, a recommendation is made in
favour of the Sundarji doctrine of ending any nuclear  exchange at the lowest
possible level.
The doctrinal interface
India has two potential adversaries, Pakistan and China. Given differing power
equations and problems with each,  India’s has a differentiated
5
 strategic
orientation. With respect to Pakistan, India has been forced to emphasise its
capability for coercion, if  not compellence, to, at  a minimum, keep Pakistani
resort to terror and proxy war below India’s ‘level of tolerance’. Over the last
decade, the conventional doctrine against Pakistan has been popularly termed
as ‘Cold Start’.
6
 Lessons from the Kargil War and Operation Parakram have
moved India’s strategy dating to the eighties of relying on counter offensives for
deterrence to a proactive offensive strategy.
7
 This is to be executed by launch of
integrated battle groups up to limited depth with the strike corps released in their
wake as per the political aims set. Giving itself the capability does not imply
reflexive resort to offensives. Instead, military action short of war to deliver on
limited political aims would be preferred.
On the other hand, in face  of Chinese assertiveness,
8
  it  is  moving  from
‘defensive defence’ to ‘active defence’,
9
 implying greater investment in
conventional credibility. Improved infrastructure in Tibet has resulted in greater
Chinese capability for offensive. Combined with the problem of intrusions across
an unresolved border, this has heightened the threat perception. The response
has been for an improved defensive posture to include additional forces to
retrieve lost ground or, if necessary, to take the conflict across onto the Tibetan
plateau.
India is well aware of the nuclear backdrop and is conscious of the fallout on the
economic trajectory of military engagement. Therefore, deterrence will continue
as the primary role for the military instrument. Deterrence can only be improved
                                             
4
 See K. Sundarji, ‘India’s Nuclear Options’, Wellington: DSSC Trishul, V (1), 1992; and ‘Nuclear
Deterrence Doctrine for India’, Part 1 and 2, Trishul, V (1) and V (2), 1992.
5
 Karnad terms India’s doctrines varying with respect to Pakistan and China as ‘differentiated’
doctrine.
6
 Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability’, IDSA Strategic Comments,
1 June 2010.
7
 Praveen Swahney, ‘Punching Hard: Learning from Operation Parakram, the army sharpens its
pro-active strategy’, Force, Jan 2008
8
 The PM used the term ‘assertive’ in relation to Chinese behavior.
9
 Two divisions are under raising in the North East to counter the China threat perceived as
having increased with the infrastructure development in Tibet.  3
in case of preparedness for the worst-case scenario of conflict outbreak.
Doctrinal preparedness requires abiding by  Limited War tenets. Limitation to
conflict would be in the mutual interest of the antagonists. Currently, India’s
doctrine in respect of Pakistan rules in offensives by strike corps. The escalatory
potentiality of this can be tempered by various means such as choice of sector of
operations etc, in accordance with Limited War doctrine. Likewise, against China,
while minimal stakes in a possible border war lend themselves to escalation
control, the problem of ‘face saving’ may constitute a significant pull in the other
direction. In other words, on both fronts, even if a war is ruled out, in the remote
case of one, there are inherent escalatory possibilities requiring a deliberate
effort at control.
This provides a two step buffer to the nuclear level – one is in war avoidance and
the second is of limitation in its conduct. The nuclear level is further insulated by
nuclear deterrence operating independently. However, being sanguine along
these lines does not help deterrence. Currently, India’s nuclear doctrine
contemplates inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation for enemy nuclear first
use of any kind against India or its forces.
10
 The term used in the doctrine to
underscore the intent is ‘massive’.
11
 Even if it is not ‘massive’, the very possibility,
if not certainty, of India’s violent nuclear reaction is to deter nuclear first use.
However, utmost analytical attention, necessitated by the nuclear overhang,
requires the possibility of nuclear resort  by the enemy to be factored into any
consideration of conflict. In Pakistan’s case, the oft-quoted contingency of
nuclear use in own territory, in a defensive mode and against a nondescript
target as a strategic signal for termination has found mention. Since its threshold
is not known, it cannot be taken uncritically as high and its doctrine as ‘first use
but last resort’.
12
 In case of China, nuclear use has not been thought through in
light of both states having a ‘No first use’ policy (NFU). But to conjure up a
scenario, China could resort to nuclear use at a low escalatory level in case two
circumstances: one in case its internal political situation, that gives rise to the
conflict in first place, is permissive; and two, in case it is placed in an untenable
position due to unexpected operational success of Indian joint air and ground
forces.
                                             
10
 Manpreet Sethi thinks destroying five to six cities would be 'unacceptable damage' in the
Pakistan context (Nuclear Strategy India's March Towards Credible Deterrence, Knowledge
World, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 251-252). Gurmeet Kanwal believes that up to 10 cities may require
to be targeted to inflict unacceptable damage on China.
11
 Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), ‘Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security
on Operationalisation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03’
http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008).
12
 Rajesh Rajagopalan posits that a rational Pakistan is unlikely to use nuclear weapons other
than as a last resort. This is unlikely to happen since India would not push it that far (Second
Strike: Arguments of Nuclear War in South Asia, Penguin, New Delhi, 2005, p. 43).  4
India’s nuclear doctrine is meant for deterrence.
13
 Massive nuclear retaliation is
explicable in cases of enemy first strike intended as a disarming strike,
decapitation strike or counter value targeting. Inflicting unacceptable damage on
the enemy in case he has caused unacceptable damage in his nuclear first use is
understandable. However, in case of higher order nuclear retaliation by India in
face of lower order nuclear first use by the enemy, as in the scenarios above, a
like response from the enemy can be expected. This could prove costly for India.
Such a reaction from India that would lead to its own pain makes the doctrine of
massive nuclear retaliation incredible. Therefore, enemy nuclear first use is not
implausible.
14
 India need not then be tied down by the nuclear deterrence
doctrine, but realistically prepare for a nuclear exchange, even if unprovoked and
inadvertent.
Once first use has occurred, the situation is not one of deterrence but of its
breakdown. Therefore, the doctrine need not dictate India’s response. Instead,
the response could be through a separate  nuclear operational or employment
doctrine. This may rule in proportionate or commensurate response, particularly
in the scenario of low level nuclear first use by the enemy. This would enable
escalation control through avoidance of  strategic nuclear exchange. In other
words, the employment doctrine could be flexible.
15
 Flexibility does not reduce
deterrence since when the capability of escalating exists, India’s exercise of
choice cannot be ruled out.
Summing up this section, it  bears iteration that India’s conventional doctrine
needs to be informed by Limited War thinking. This is not explicitly so at the
moment. Even while the overarching military doctrine may continue
contemplating use of strike corps etc, a separate, supplementary, Limited War
doctrine needs articulation alongside. For its part, the nuclear doctrine for
deterrence is fair enough. It unmistakably foregrounds the  potentiality of a
massive nuclear retaliation in case of  nuclear first use. However, in case
deterrence breakdown, the operational doctrine need not be unduly restricted by
the declaratory doctrine. Any flexibility this builds in need not necessarily be in
the open domain. However, change towards an alternative, the ‘Sundarji
doctrine’, is recommended,
16
 the case for which is made in the following section.
The Sundarji doctrine
                                             
13
 ‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, 1999,
http://meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm (Accessed October 10, 2008).
14
 Ali Ahmed, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Use and Implications for India’, Strategic Analysis, 34 (4), July
2010.
15
 Bharat Karnad favours a flexible doctrine relying on a variegated set of armament.
16
K. Sundarji, Vision 2100: Strategy for the Twenty First Century, Konark Publishers, New Delhi,
2003, p. 146. 5
The Sundarji doctrine posits termination of nuclear conflict at the lowest level of
escalation.
17
 This may entail offering politically acceptable terms of settlement to
bring about war termination. The doctrine’s call is for early, if not immediate,
termination, not only of nuclear exchange(s) but also of the conflict. The difficulty
of nuclear conflict termination in face of pressures for nuclear escalation is
acknowledged in this formulation. Therefore, the intent to preclude such
escalation is articulated unambiguously. This incentivizes the enemy, having a
shared interest in avoiding higher rungs of the nuclear escalatory ladder, to
acquiesce. The doctrine has two major advantages. The first is that it is in sync
with India’s national aims and with follow-on conflict aims. The second is that it is
cognizant of India’s strengths and weaknesses as a society and polity.

India’s national aim, mentioned at the outset, is to fulfill its potential. The national
interest is in conflict avoidance to the  extent possible. In case of conflict
outbreak, the conflict aim would be circumscribed by the need for the least
possible deflection from India’s growth trajectory. It follows that it would be
limited, capable of being attained without inordinate economic and human costs.
Mutuality with China can be expected, since any diversion would set it back with
relation to the United States. Since India would not like a set back in relation to
China, it would restrict stakes involved in any confrontation with Pakistan. This
entails limitation both at the conventional and nuclear levels.
As seen, current doctrines at both levels do not automatically envisage limitation.
While limitation can be read in the doctrines as a subtext, it is not a given. This
could lead to inadvertent escalation in reactions and responses of the adversary.
Nuclear first use on the adversary’s part  could lead to possible counter city
exchange(s). This cannot but have an adverse affect on the economy, society
and polity. The human consequences apart, economic consequences would be
on long term recovery. The gains of the last six decades and of the last two in
particular would be squandered. Even conflict termination finds India advantaged
strategically, the price may prove rather high in relation to the original stakes.
In light of India’s vulnerabilities, a  nuclear exchange may prove unaffordable.
This is particularly so if a prudent view  is taken of the efficacy of the ‘idea of
India’. There are known deficiencies  in India’s governance structures and
processes. Given current levels of  policy capacity, penetration and authority,
especially at the local level, it is unthinkable that India can cope effectively with a
nuclear attack, not only at the place of occurrence but also elsewhere in its
psychological, political and social effects.  In case of disruption at the national
level, through the leadership’s indisposition due to being in the National
Command Post, or due to partial or successful decapitation, the challenge for
governance would be considerable. The targeting of the national capital could
lead to a de-centering of India over the long term. If governance is to carry on,
democratic methods may prove inadequate. Thus, even if a government regains
                                             
17
 K. Sundarji,  Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty First Century, New Delhi, Konark
Publishers, 2003, p. 146. 6
control, it would be at the cost of India’s democratic character. India as it has
been created post Independence cannot survive a nuclear exchange amounting
to receiving unacceptable damage. That a  nuclear adversary ceases to exist
thereby is no compensation or consolation. It follows that India should prudently
avoid inflicting unacceptable damage unless it is a prior recipient of the same.
This is an under-researched area. While the physical effects have been
discussed,
18
 these may in the long term turn out the lesser of the consequence.
Possible contours of political, social and geographical fallout are hazarded here.
The political effect would be a function of the fact that lower classes would be
more imposed upon. Their disposition towards Maoist philosophy would be much
pronounced. This would have its own  backlash with the state and the upper
sections of society tending towards  the Right. The vacuum could herald a
revolution and a counter-revolution. The second dimension is social disruption. In
case of conflict with Pakistan, involving nuclear weapons, the possibility of India’s
Muslim minority being victimized for guilt by association cannot be ignored. This
would make India ungovernable over the duration of bloodletting. Lastly, is the
geographical effect in terms of ethnicities opting out of the ‘Union’. Lack of
security that a nuclear exchange signifies involves a breach of social contract by
the state. The effected  ethnic group, and those witnessing it, may choose to
rescind the tacit contract with a state  that has not provisioned security as
stipulated. For instance, in case of a nuclear exchange even at the lowest level
with China in the east, the ethnic groups there may want out of an India-China
contest that risks their homelands. While  this pessimistic view may not in the
event transpire, the risk of finding out that it is wrong is not worth running.  
What does this imply for deterrence doctrine? The implication for deterrence
philosophy is that promise of infliction of unacceptable damage only deters
receipt of unacceptable damage in nuclear first use. The formulation, favoured by
India, that ‘nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons’ stands disputed by
Pakistan’s reliance of nuclear weapons  to also deter conventional war.
Therefore, the risk of nuclear weapons use exists. Clearly, inflicting unacceptable
damage, if it lays India open to like attack, is unthinkable. The understanding that
India can take the necessary measures to survive, such as ballistic missile
defences, disaster management, civil defence improvement etc appears
plausible. However, given that India has pronounced deficiencies in institutional
culture, this could prove self-delusion at an inopportune time. A political view,
sensitive to India’s wider concerns, needs to be taken of institutionally-led
arguments along these lines. The commitment trap needs avoiding. Therefore,
instead of the cultivation of resolve as deterrence theorists prescribe, India would
do well to ponder the virtues of self-deterrence.
                                             
18
 ‘The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan’, Natural Resources
Defence Council, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp 7
India’s political leaders are not obliged to risk national suicide to prove that
deterrence theory - questioned by nuclear pessimists
19
 - works. The strategist’s
approach to nuclear deterrence is distinct from that of the decision maker at the
political level.
20
 India’s leadership in the Political Council of the Nuclear
Command Authority needs to be apprised of  their democratic obligations at a
higher level than that of the strategic advice they receive from the Executive
Council.
21
 The need not be held hostage to declaratory doctrine. They need not
be held hostage to nuclear strategists either. They need to envision their role as
political decision makers with India’s long  term interests, of which survival is
primary, in mind.
22
 The least damage to India or  the idea of India would be in
case any nuclear exchange, likely to be an inadvertent escalatory act, is
terminated at the lowest level. This involves prior movement in India’s nuclear
doctrine to the Sundarji formulation.
The ‘Sundarji caveat’ – of offering the enemy politically acceptable and fair terms
for conflict termination - would also require to be operationalised.
23
 This may
entail having direct and uninterruptible links with the enemy even in the face of
crises and conflict. This means creation  of a standing mechanism such as the
nuclear risk reduction center. This would be more than a confidence building
measure or a nuclear risk reduction mechanism. It could prove critical in
managing escalation and war termination in  a conflict. Its role at other times
could be to facilitate doctrinal exchange and more ambitiously arms control and
disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. Shared interest may help in
mirroring thinking. Reconciling doctrines can be taken up in negotiations in this
mechanism.
24

What are the implications for deterrence, the non-occurrence of nuclear war?
Deterrence has been variously conceptualized.
25
 In one, the very capability
suffices to deter. This is termed existential deterrence. A variant of this is that the
capability requires being substantial, based on a thermonuclear capability. In the
second conceptualization, deterrence requires constant working upon. It is
                                             
19
 Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence theory revisited’, World Politics, 31 (2), 1979, pp. 289-324.
20
 This is the insight gained by both McNamara and McGeorge Gundy from their experience.
21
 The organization of the Nuclear Command Authority is given in Cabinet Committee on Security
(2003), ‘Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on Operationalisation of India’s
Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03’ http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed
July 02, 2008).
22
 Ali Ahmed, ‘The Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation’, Strategic Analysis,  34 (1), January
2010.
23
 Ali Ahmed, 'In Tribute: Recalling the Sundarji Doctrine', USI Journal, Jan-Mar, CXXXVIII (571),
2008, pp. 108-14.
24
Ali Ahmed, Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, IDSA Monograph, pp.
78-82.
http://www.idsa.in/monograph/ReconcilingDoctrinesPrerequisiteforPeaceinSouthAsia_aahmed_2
010
25
 Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Nuclear strategy and small nuclear forces: The conceptual components’,
Strategic Analysis, 23 (7), pp. 1117 — 31. 8
predicated on surety of retaliation. A variant in this is that such retaliation
requires being considerable to  deter. India’s current doctrine is inspired by the
latter. Instead, when less is enough, more is not necessarily better.
26
 In other
words, reversion to existential deterrence would help keep the nuclear complex
under control in both peace and war.
This problem with this is in a tendency  towards deterrence ‘creep’ or a move
away from ‘minimum’ to ‘limited’ deterrence.
27
 Even if with a growing economy
India can afford this, it would be to move away from the understanding explicated
in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine that India would not be slave to the Cold War
deterrence concepts. A conscious check  of the nuclear complex is required.
During peacetime, the nuclear complex  needs to be ensconced in the Indian
democratic system of checks and balances, in particular through two measures:
one is to extend the benefits of parliamentary oversight to it, and second, to
extend oversight through the Political Council, activated also for peace time
control.  Doing so would help deepen it for qualitative deterrence. In wartime, this
is facilitated by the Sundarji doctrine that lends itself to protecting the ‘minimum’
in India’s nuclear deterrent. It eschews nuclear war-fighting, does not envisage a
variegated nuclear arsenal and enables a city avoidance strategy.
Conclusion
A critical question is:  What is the national interest in case of a conflict going
nuclear?  The answer is informed by India’s  national aim. Though any security
circumstance is indeed substantively  changed by intrusion of the nuclear
overhang into the foreground, the national aim would continue to have currency.
The primary aim would be to survive the  conflict as intact as possible; which
means the less damage sustained the better. Damage inflicted on the enemy is
secondary. As seen, survival over the long term is endangered by receipt of
unacceptable damage. Democratic political responsibility lies in appreciating that
the national interest would be to ensure a termination of nuclear conflict earliest.
Termination of the war itself  would be essential. This is more likely and at all
possible at the lowest level of nuclear use. The higher the levels of nuclear
exchange the less likely the possibility of nuclear war termination. The idea that
nuclear escalation control is not possible may well be right. But not attempting to
escalation control would make this inevitable. Therefore, a move towards the
Sundarji doctrine is necessary.
Words - 3117
                                             
26
 More is not better when less is enough (Kenneth Waltz).
27
 Rajesh Basrur,  Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security, Singapore: NUS Press,
2009, p. 172.

Readings for Officers
http://www.claws.in/SW-Autumn2010.pdf
ALI AhmED ä IDSA
the profession of arms has a striking disadvantage for its practitioners. this is that
opportunities for its practice are few and far between. in all of india’s wars, only a
partial fraction of the  army has been exposed to the cut and thrust of combat.
therefore, the substance of the profession has to be acquired vicariously. However,
the nature of continual deployment in field areas comprising either counter
insurgency or in difficult terrain and weather conditions makes up for the lack of
exposure to high intensity war. ironically, a job well done in the former leads to
deterrence and consequently lack of experience of war. nevertheless, even while
accretion of experience may be had along a career span, there is a case for reading
not only to supplement it but more importantly to make sense of it.
the army is already cognizant of this. it has an introductory course to military
studies at the academy stage in the form of a military history capsule. the text for
this requires a definite makeover, not only in content and readability, but also its
presentation. even though the subject is broached in sessions with the dS, rather
than left solely to aeC instructors, serious academic attention is recommended.
the next stage is in the unit, under a watchful 2iC. But given the pace of life these
days, the mentorship system has all but vanished. reading is more eclectic and
less curricular. the Part B and Part d promotion exams are there for enhancing
exposure. But, connotations associated with ‘exams’, do little to nudge officers
into reading. reading is nevertheless a popular pastime, with officers usefully
taking to self-development and management related books. this is all for the
good, indicating that the intent and energy exist and could be usefully capitalized
on. What then needs to be done?
a change over at the Staff Course entrance exam stage from replicating the
pattern of promotion exams in the Military History paper, of a campaign study
and biographies, to a more contextual Military Studies paper may be useful.  a
wider mandatory reading can be prepared by the Mt 2, comprising selections
from its Golden Hundred. this could cover the gamut of military studies including
technology, military history, military sociology, strategy and international relations. viii ä AUTUmN 2010 äSCHOLAR WARRIOR
SCHOLAR WARRIOR
this need not be confined to indian texts or experience. Since an officer is aware of
when he is to come up for the exam, preparation in terms of reading can start even
half a decade earlier. this would get the officer acquainted with the context of his
profession, even while the other papers test the content bit. the exam questions
can be framed in line with that of the net for defence and strategic studies. Past
papers are available at the uGC website for reference.
it is an ill-informed belief that officers at the spear end and tactical level can do
without contextual knowledge and sensitivity. this is a sure fire way to create Colonel
Blimps. this conception has already changed. Great strides have been made such
as placing a plethora of reading on the intranet and Wan, such as notably that of
the Junior Command course. it is important to keep the challenge stern enough for
those rising in their careers to ultimately make their minds receptive to demands at
the operational and strategic levels. While all would of course not be so privileged,
they would be none the worse off since it would better prepare them for exit into
the civilian world.
as part of reading habits, once the initial set is consumed such as the timeless
one by Major KC Praval, the officer is ready for the next higher level. the india
specific set need not be restricted to wars and biographies of military heroes.
While books such as those of LP Sen, John dalvi, dK Palit etc are available in
formation libraries, academic works need to supplement their narration. these
include earlier output of authors such as Sumit Ganguly and the more recent one
by military historian Srinath raghavan on conflicts of the nehruvian era. Works
by academics, such as Kaushik roy and Sundaram, need the encouragement of
purchase, review and mention.
ever since  india’s rise, its military has gained academic attention. Works
interpreting india’s rise, such as by Stephen Cohen, S Paul Kapur, Peter Lavoy
etc are useful since these are based on access to india’s strategic community. the
work of Kanwal, Manpreet Sethi and raja Menon helps grapple with military
issues including the exotic nuclear ‘backdrop’.  this helps in acquainting the
practitioner with the significance of operational engagements, such as, for
instance, proactive stance preparedness or raisings of mountain divisions. there
being an anachronistic sanction against talking ‘shop’ in messes, it is perversely
taken as infra-dig to discuss such issues. Suffice it to say this can only be tyranny
of insecure seniors.
Care needs to be taken by libraries to tap the higher end book market such as
that of routledge and Sage. the Sixth Pay Commission emoluments surely make
these accessible. numerous defence ‘glossies’ now are in the market with veterans SCHOLAR WARRIOR ä AUTUmN 2010 ä ix
SCHOLAR WARRIOR
and the defence industry driving ideas and selling products. Websites of Service
think tanks, such as this one, keep the officer updated. Web groups of course-mates
enable circulation of material for reference at leisure. a discerning eye needs to be
cultivated so as to not lose time chasing down quality reading. the military profile
of generals such as Petraeus, Panag etc indicates that reading provides ballast to
careers. that should be incentive enough in this competitive world to sometimes
also take a book to bed!

Writings in various journals

Understanding India-Pakistan Relations
http://www.biliabd.org/jia.php
Journal of International Affairs, Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, Vol 14, June and December 2010



http://sas.sagepub.com/content/16/2/335.citation

South Asia at the CrossRoads

• Ali Ahmed

South Asian Survey, July/December 2009; vol. 16, 2: pp. 335-344.

July/December 2009 Review Article Security Sector Reform in South Asia South Asia at the CrossRoads Ali Ahmed Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India. REVIEW ARTICLE SOUTH...

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• Full Text (PDF)
 
• Table of Contents

http://www.icpsnet.org/adm/pdf/1291710631.pdf

Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2&3, April-September, 2010.

Strategic Culture and Indian Self-assurance

Ali Ahmed*

[*Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He is pursuing a PhD

in International Politics at the School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.]

Abstract

The article examines the realist critique that India lacks a strategic culture. The realist critique is

neglectful of India’s record of strategic behavior predicated on simultaneous resolve and restraint. India’s

normative set carries the influence of its traditions and democratic political heritage. Its operational set

is sensitive to use of force in its national interest, while being alert to the limitations of force. This

reading of India’s strategic culture empowers India to proceed down the route of rapprochement with

Pakistan. Currently, the pace of resumption of the peace process is retarded by the weight of the

realist critique on policy makers, ever apprehensive of being found wanting on defence matters. This

need not be so. Armed with this self-belief, India should engage with Pakistan with greater rigour,

beginning with the expected meeting of the two foreign ministers over the winter.

http://www.spslandforces.net/ebook/24062011.pdf

Offensive in the Mountains
The decision on the Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) is not only about the capability and the implications. It is
also about the message that India is, by its raisings, sending to China. The message is one of deterrence and
resolve. It is not an aggressive one, but the second prong of India’s strategy

Alternative Perspectives

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-98/2010/february/2/alternative-perspectives.html

Ali Ahmed 

COMBATING TERRORISM: SAUDI ARABIAS ROLE IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
By Ali S. Awadh Asseri 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 196, Rs 450.00

VOLUME XXXIV NUMBER 2 February 2010

It can be inferred from the author’s profile on the dust jacket that he is bassador in Lebanon, he has earlier been the Saudi kingdom’s ambassador to Pakistan between 2001 and 2009. His earlier career was in the police prior to his moving to appointments in which he looked after the security of Saudi diplomatic assets. With an increase in the threat and incidence of terror, this background as an ‘insider’ no doubt placed him at a vantage point for authoring the book. The book can be taken as reflecting the official Saudi perspective on the issue of terrorism. This is evident from the author’s acknowledgement that he is indebted to the Assistant to the Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, Prince Naif, for ‘guidance’, ‘material’ and ‘numerous meetings’ (p. xii).

Asseri’s attempt, in his words, is an articulation of ‘an alternative Saudi or Muslim perspective’ on ‘various conceptual and contextual issues relating to terrorism’. It is interesting that he does so without a mention of Wahabbism or the context of absence of democracy in his country.

In the first four chapters, the author discusses terrorism in theory and practice, the Islamic perspective on terror and root causes. He ably counters a view, originating in Islamophobic sections of the West and purveyed by the western media, on the ‘Islamic’ roots of contemporary terrorism. He distinguishes between the Islamic concept of Jihad and its appropriation by Islamists for their own political and ideological purposes. This distinction is important. However, there is a tendency towards extremism inherent in a narrow reading of Islam such as is the Saudi backed Wahabbi interpretation. This version of Islam lends itself to terror, as is seen from the perpetration of terror by its adherents both in Arabia and elsewhere.

In his discussion of ‘root causes’, of interest to Indian readers is Asseri’s mention of Kashmir: ‘in the absence of an early political settlement, the Kashmir issue may continue to provide the political context for deviant groups to engage in terrorist activities…’ (p. 77). This is in the same breath as Chechenya etc. This mistakes an essentially territorial issue between India and Pakistan as a religious, identity related one. This is the manner in which Pakistan has utilized religion to further its irredentist case. Pakistan’s use of terror is not so much religion inspired as a proxy war strategy in its ‘balance of power’ game with India. The author’s reductionist approach to the contrary apparently legitimizes terrorism. It shows that he has not been able to balance the context that he deems legitimizing, and violence against civilians which he condemns. This conceptual confusion is characteristic of those who claim that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Their position would be less confused if terror targeting civilians is condemned, irrespective of any rationale provided by the context.

In the following two chapters Asseri discusses Saudi initiatives against terror, in the domestic and international dimension respectively. In the internal dimension, the Saudis follow a three-pronged strategy: prevention, cure and care. The measures include restrictions on financing, legal and security sector measures, social sector reforms, regulation of the internet and media and, lastly, a reform programme in prisons. That no section is devoted to political reforms indicates the glacial pace, if not a complete absence of these.

On the international plane the initiatives include bilateral and multilateral cooperation in pursuing the Al Qaeda, particularly with the patronstate, the US. The author expends considerable space dealing with the Saudi organized conference on countering terrorism and the first interfaith dialogue held at Makkah. He discusses the contribution Saudi Arabia has made in shaping the perspective of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. The role of the Israel-Palestine issue as a ‘root cause’ and Saudi Arabia’s role in attempting to solve it are covered in some detail.

In his last chapter, Asseri reviews anti-terror measures in countries such as Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan in the light of the Saudi Arabian experience. He is complimentary and informative on the ‘war on terror’ waged by Indonesia describing the national effort undertaken by the Yudhoyono regime; its enlisting and use of former terrorists in the campaign; the employment of elite police, Detachment 88, to lead the fight; and lastly the judicial steps that have had a positive effect on public opinion. The de-radicalization programme of Egypt is covered in the manner the ideologue and compatriot of Ayman al Zawarhiri, Sayyid Imam Abdulaziz al Sharif, converted to moderation. By writing a slim volume, Advice Regarding the Conduct of Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World, he has considerably reinterpreted his earlier work, The Basic Principles in Making Preparations for Jihad, said to be the constitution of jihadi radicalism. The author opines that the Indonesian and Saudi model has much to offer Pakistan as it engages with terrorism. His critique of the NATO operation in Afghanistan is that, ‘There is hardly any effective governmental initiative in sight that aims to win the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign…the problem is likely to conflagrate in the absence of a strategy that prefers a non-military solution to a military solution (p. 164).’ The author does not reflect on the most significant cause of international terrorism, that of lack of democracy in most states across the Middle East and Maghreb ruled by varying shades of authoritarian regimes largely supported by the US. This was the original critique of the Al Qaeda.

The level of popular endorsement of the extremists owes in part to disillusionment with the repressive regimes, particularly their neo-colonial linkages with the US. In the Middle East in particular, the perception of access of the authoritarian regimes to a US umbrella requires dispelling by the US itself. The West has interfered with democratic outcomes in Algeria earlier and in Palestine. This suggests that it is unlikely to countenance a change in the status quo. The status quo is instead preferred by the West for control of oil prices, for energy security and preservation of their way of life. Given its influence and the grip of these regimes, the counter gets restricted to violence. While the likes of Al Qaeda cannot be expected to bring democracy to their lands, they have an argument that can only be dispelled by the advent of democracy.

Given the constraints of the author’s background, it is understandable that the political approach to defusing terrorism does not find mention in this critique. It is similarly silent on the Saudi regime’s links with spreading Wahabbism, a doctrinaire version of Islam. This has had a particularly baleful influence in Pakistan, where originally syncretistic Sufi Islam held sway. Not dwelling on these two aspects detracts from the merit of the book; one that is otherwise strong on the shortfalls of the approach and prescription of the West as witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Tensions Between Security and Reconstruction

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-875/2012/may/5/tensions-between-security-and-reconstruction.html

Ali Ahmed 

WHEN MORE IS LESS: THE INTERNATIONAL PROJECT IN AFGHANISTAN 
By Astri Sukhre 
Hurst & Co, London, 2011, pp. 293, £ 25.00

VOLUME XXXVI NUMBER 5 MAY 2012

Astri Sukhre describes how and why the US led international project in Afghanistan is in the trouble that it is. This helps with getting the picture right, for only then can prescriptions be examined for their worth. Currently, the US is engaged in getting the Taliban into a dialogue. It is simultaneously negotiating with the Afghan Government to-wards establishing a permanent US strategic presence in Afghanistan. It would be difficult to reconcile the latter with the former. This is likely to continue the series of US missteps in Afghanistan since 9/11, comprehensively critiqued by Sukhre in her book under review. It is not so much for her description of the past decade, but for the implications for the coming one that the book is important. The book is on how not to do peace- building or nation-state making. Not that the US was interested in undertaking this at the outset, given the distaste of the Bush-Rums-feld combine for employing the US military on nation-building tasks. However, if that was not their intent, then it can be said that they should have let the otherwise distasteful regimes stay in place, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than have reduced the two states to rubble by concerted, and vindictive, military action. If it was unable to reconstruct it should instead have chosen a political and policing approach post 9/11. Since the US chose the military route, it cannot be absolved for misapplying the ‘light foot-print’.

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Outsourcing the work of rehabilitation of a state at war for two decades prior to Operation Enduring Freedom to the UN, even as military action continued under the aegis of the NATO in an out-of-area operation, was equally self-delusive. No less than a Marshall Plan was warranted, along with a peace keeping mission. However, with the Taliban kept out of the Bonn Conference, peace making was ruled out at the very outset, leaving peace enforcement by the ISAF as the only possibility. The outcome has been evident in the tension between security and reconstruction, unsparingly brought out by Sukhre.

The superpower’s self-image, and hubris of its neoconservative minders, along with the need to keep Afghanistan from becoming the ‘graveyard’ of the NATO, kept the military template operational till Obama belatedly applied a course correction in the form of a ‘surge’. Even in this the military surge proved more consequential than the civilian surge. It was spearheaded by a refurbished counter insurgency doctrine and implemented under the stewardship of America’s modern-day military hero, Petraeus. With American stamina under question, neither of the two special envoys, the late Holbrooke of the Balkans fame, nor his successor, Marc Grossman, has been able to extricate the US from the strategic predicament that its earlier Viceroy, Zalmay Khalilzad, had got it into.

The onus has been borne by the UN, represented by the assistance mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA. Even though Lakhdar Brahimi, associated with the peacekeeping reform document that bears his name, was at the helm of the UN mission initially, the UN was marginalized. For instance, though a ‘political mission’, the deputy to the Special Representative for political affairs was only appointed as late as March 12. Another entity within the blame cross hairs is the Karzai regime, arraigned for all of Afghan ills, beginning with its very weakness. The contradiction intrinsic in this self-exculpatory buck passing is in how a weak regime, one implanted by the international community, can at all be expected to deliver. Its task has been made ever more challenging by the centralized Constitution envisaged for a diverse Afghanistan; by the kind of reconstruction undertaken by the consultants-NGO system in place; by a dysfunctional judicial system prepared by Italy as lead nation; and, by the improbable creation of cohesive security forces by the militaries of the several states involved in the project. Sukhre rightly points out that emerging at the end of a decade of such engagement is a dysfunctional ‘rentier’ state.

While the military and political aspects of the project are better known, the book’s contribution is in dilating on peace building, specifically, the reconstruction, constitutional, governance and judicial dimensions. The promises of funding for Afghanistan have been plenty and liberal. However, it is spent on a ‘second civil service’ comprising high paid consultants living in a secure green zone. Elections have been based on a ‘rarely used’ Single Non Transferable Vote system, chosen seemingly to streamline power in the President by keeping the Parliament divided and the opposition weak. The problems with Karzai’s reelection and the parliamentary elections are too well known to recount. The jirga and the shura being disregarded, the Taliban stole a march as better dispensers of justice. The anti-drugs campaign has also not delivered the results that the Taliban can be credited with in its crack-down just prior to their being summarily ousted. The upshot of these inadequacies has been in the peacebuilding mission being as questionable as the military intervention.

The book’s critique of the project is not only thorough but equally importantly—timely. The surge is winding down and the 2014 time-line looms. Sukhre’s suggestions are worth working into the end game: firstly, that a settlement to be acceptable must be ‘inclusive enough’ to take on board parties that have the capability to undo it; secondly, paring down of the rentier state is necessary; and thirdly, in her words, ‘on the military side, it would be particularly important to recognize that “more is less”’. Her final point is worth reiterating that, ‘Arming the Afghans to the hilt is neither sustainable policy nor a plausible condition for a peaceful post-transition order.’
Despite its making a mere three references to India, the book could do with an Indian readership. This would help defuse the strategic arguments made by security analysts fixated on Pakistan’s seeming proximity with the Taliban. This makes India’s position on talks ambivalent, further marginalizing India. The book could help generate ‘out of the box’ ideas such as the substitution of the peace enforcement mission with a peacekeeping one, perhaps, who knows, even a hybrid UN-SAARC one!