Do we need a Chief Warlord?


EDITORIAL
& OPINION
THE FINANCIAL WORLD—DELHI
10 Sep 12

IN A recent article, former Chief of Army Staff,
General Deepak Kapoor, has weighed in against
the idea of a permanent chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee. One among a series of selective
leaks of the Naresh Chandra Task Force report
suggests that the task force has recommended making the
appointment of the head of the cosc a permanent one.
The leaks are themselves trial balloons sent up by a
government unable to arrive at decisions on the merits.
Aware of lacking the political heft to implement these
even if it could do so, the leaks create a storm that it can
then point to for lack of consensus and consequently a
decision. It does not see its role as exerting to create the
consensus. In this case, Deepak Kapoor’s article, taken
as reflecting the position of his former service, will help
forestall decisions, since he would be seen as voicing the
army’s position. That would be a pity, since holding out
for a cds as Deepak Kapoor’s ‘all or nothing’ position has
it, is the worse option.
This owes to the nuclear context and the ever-present
possibility of war, brought home most recently in the foreign
minister’s remark on the eve of his meeting with his
Pakistani counterpart, ‘The consequences for Pakistan
would be disastrous.’ This was to reinforce India’s deterrence
of terror provocation. However, the problem is in
India being hoist by its own petard, which in theory is the
‘commitment trap’. To ensure that such disaster for Pakistan
does not also turn into a disaster for India, there is
a need to have a military bridge between India’s conventional
and nuclear capabilities.
Currently, none exists. The Strategic Forces Command
manages India’s nuclear deterrent. However, its C-in-C
has two masters. In theory, he reports to the Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is hard to see how the Chairman
cosc, a rotating appointment that Naresh Chandra
seeks to make permanent, can possibly oversee the sfc.
While challenging enough in peacetime with the chairman,
double-hatted as boss of his service alongside, it
would be quite a tall order in war.
He would require conducting the operations of his
service, integrating those of the three services for a joint
campaign, and also overseeing the nuclear-conventional
interface. It is for this reason that Naresh Chandra perhaps
wants a permanent incumbent. At least he would not
be straddled with overseeing any particular service and
would, hopefully, be beyond its parochialism in order to
serve as a single point source of advice to the civilian master.
While the discussion could benefit by reflection, such
as General Kapoor’s, on the demerits of the organisational
reform, it would need to take on board the advantage. The
primary one is in monitoring impact on the nuclear level of
what is going on militarily on the conventional level in war.
Currently, it is possible that in practice the National Security
Adviser oversees the sfc in his capacity as head of
the Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority.
This is, to say the least, a strange arrangement. Nuclear
watcher Bharat Karnad, in a recent expose of the arrangement
suggests that the NSA relies on a retired head of sfc
for fulfilling his nuclear-related role. This arrangement
clearly calls for further institutionalisation. Naresh Chandra
possibly has an answer.
SM Krishna’s terse observation, if not threat, recounted
above suggests that India is preparing a military counter
to any major terror attack by Pakistan. In such a case, escalation
could occur depending on the Pakistani counter.
If this results in a conventional tryst, then limitation
needs being foregrounded. Advice on this, alongside
linked nuclear related reactions, would be required. This
has to be done at a mechanism one step removed from the
action, such as by a permanent chairman of the cosc.
He would be on the Executive Council to both advise
the Political Council alongside the nsa and work the nuclear-
relevant reaction as ordered by the Political Council
through the nsa. This way there is a military link between
the Nuclear Command Authority and the sfc. Secondly,
the headless hqs Integrated Defence Staff would gain a
leader and an agenda. It could provide the control staff for
the sfc since a line headquarter as is the sfc cannot also
be its own judge.
LASTLY, KAPOOR’S cds, imagined as a warlord
over all three services, has an underside. He would
not be in a position to advise the government since
it would amount to judging his own case. Such an appointment
has potential for a folly of Hindenberg-Ludendorf
proportions, praetorian figures from Germany’s
World War I past.
Therefore, to write off the task force report may not do
for the government. It will have to demonstrate it exists.
If it fears that push comes to shove as its foreign minister
thinks, then it had better emerge from somnolence.
Better still would be if it gives up threats and settles
with Pakistan through getting SM Krishna to talk meaningfully.
Then it would not manufacture a threat where
none need exist.
Ali Ahmed is Assistant Professor, Nelson Mandela
Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia

Naresh Chandra Task Force: Farewell to the Chiefs
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/saxena-task-force-farewell-to-the-chiefs-3448.html

News reports have it that one of the last acts of the former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee prior to retirement was a letter for the prime minister mentioning a longstanding grievance of the service chiefs that they feel left out of the policy curve. This can be remedied by the Naresh Chandra Task Force that is to recommend a reorganization of the higher defence structure. However, it would have to contend with the military chiefs wanting to have their cake and eat it too.

The issue that would pose the problem in question is one of command over the respective services. The chiefs currently are on top twice over: as operational commanders and as chiefs of staff. This means that they are currently responsible for all facets of their service ranging from force generation through its sustenance to its employment. While they have the army commanders minding the operational part of their jobs, the service headquarters enable the remainder.

The next steps are on two lines: one is that of jointness or integration of the services, and the second is integration of the service headquarters with the ministry of defence. Both require the service chiefs’ amenability to a redefinition of their roles. This is a hold up, apart from perennial inter-service rivalry and the bureaucrat-brass face-off that Mr Naresh Saxena would have to cope with.

Jasjit Singh provides a conceptual entry point on the issue, writing, "Higher defence organization has two distinct functions: one is creation of capabilities for the future and second of fighting a war or employment of military power. The former involves perspective planning, procurement of weapons and equipment, recruitment training, and employment policies of military manpower. The latter involves operations within existing resources…So the first issue is would the CDS be the commander in chief or chief of staff…."

There are two models. The first model implies an integrated ministry with the CDS ensconced, provisioning the operational forces under respective service chiefs. An alternative model is of the CDS responsible for force employment by joint commands, with the service chiefs and the defence secretary taking on the force planning and management functions in an integrated ministry.

K Subrahmanyam was for a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee model, since to him, “What this country needs is a full time chairman of the chiefs of staff committee who will have no power to command any troops at all. His role will mostly be in areas of policy, coordination among the three services, training, budget, long terms planning and evolving future war doctrines.” (Subrahmanyam 2006:13). This was favoured by Jasjit Singh too, who writes: “CDS (but with no command functions) would work in coordination with the defence secretary to build tomorrow’s defence forces.”

This is a practicable solution in that it is evolutionary and therefore more suited to the Indian system. The weakness of this model however is in the service chiefs retaining their role as operational heads of respective services. This means that the barriers to jointness in terms of service parochialisms would remain into the future.

The second model has the military supremo taking on a war-fighting role with the HQs IDS overseeing joint commands. The votaries of this model express a preference for joint theatre commands. This has the advantage of bringing to bear the synergy of jointness and enabling focus on operational tasks. The drawback in Subrahmanyam’s words is that, “vesting the combined command over three services is something the Indian political leadership very justifiably rejects.”

It is clear that the difficulty in adjudicating between the two alternatives may lead to Mr Chandra and his team choosing to settle for a half-way house. In this third model, the CDS takes on the responsibility for joint functional commands, for example the SFC and others such as cyber command, air defence command and logistics command etc that may be set up in future. In this case the service chiefs remain in both saddles over respective services, operational and administrative, but in an integrated ministry.

The point emerges that the shedding of the operational role of the service chiefs alone will enable them to concentrate on their equally onerous task of creating, sustaining and training the service. This operational role will then have to be discharged by someone. It can only be a joint commander. This means that facing up to joint theatre commands is inevitable. The Task Force, in order not to inject too much instability into the system, could suggest a step by step process with a time line extending into the next decade.

The grouse of the former COSC that the wise counsel of the service chiefs does not inform policy sufficiently can only be removed if the chiefs are willing to shed some of their workload to enable fuller participation ‘in the loop’. Their plate is additionally loaded with ceremonial and social details, with anachronistic Colonel of the Regiment duties thrown in as an icing. The chiefs would require taking a call on the nature of their role to help ease Mr Chandra's report.