https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/in-the-hype-around-new-war-old-war?r=i1fws

In the hype around New War, Old War is back

Among his earlier speaking engagements post Operation (Op) Sindoor, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan highlighted the ‘foremost’ challenge today as simultaneous preparedness for two types of war: the New War, as evidenced in the non-contact operations of the recent four-day India-Pakistan and eleven-day (Israel+US-Iran) wars; and for Old Wars, as being fought in Ukraine, with an admixture of New War.

He held that in light of the India-Pakistan conflict as the first one between two nuclear powers, military preparedness was necessitated across the spectrum of conflict from subconventional to nuclear levels. In his words, the potential for escalation ‘quickly and rapidly’ was present across the board.

Nevertheless, he reckoned that there is space for conventional operations. He espied scope for expansion of this scope, amplified by newer the non-kinetic domains of cyber, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cognition.

Whereas the incidence of New War (New Age Warfare in the words of the prime minister) is self-evident from Op Sindoor, the persistence of Old War cannot be missed. The raksha mantri has talked of an avenue of approach from Sir Creek to Karachi. The army is raising Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions as instruments of the Old War, presumably to make this possible.

The CDS acknowledges that even as Op Sindoor was conducted in terms of the New War paradigm, mobilization along Old War lines was underway. A general informed that at least one Indian offensive formation was threateningly poised to have a go at Pakistan by the end of the four-day crisis. The army chief’s commendation of railway officials suggests that much was whirring in the background. In the event, the New War was ‘paused’ within four days, short-circuiting the outbreak of Old War.

In short, New War is not undertaken in isolation. Old War is needed to protect the flanks. Since New War is experienced as a game of chess – per the army chief - much is dependent on the moves of the opposite side. Old Wars remaining relevant, nuclear-use considerations are back into the reckoning.

The CDS took the opportunity to ‘clarify’ and give his ‘take’ on this. His views are significant, since he is the military adviser to the nuclear command authority, sitting in its executive council chaired by the national security adviser.

To him nuclear weapons are ‘meant for deterrence, not warfighting.’ In the same breath, he recalled a tenet from India’s new strategic doctrine: India will not be bothered by ‘nuclear blackmail.’

Perhaps the CDS will clarify someday the distinction between ‘deterrence’ and ‘blackmail’, lest in the former be mistaken for the latter when Pakistan resorts to nuclear signalling, as it apparently did on the last day.

Sharing his ‘take’ of the nuclear aspect, the CDS had it that space for conventional operations during Op Sindoor owed to three factors. One, India’s ‘no first use’ (NFU) nuclear doctrine allowed for such space, as it pushed back the nuclear awning. Two, by taking the first step-up into the conventional level with Op Banyan e Marsoos, Pakistan deprived itself of the option of taking another step up, the nuclear step. And, finally, since no territory traded hands, Pakistan’s nuclear card was rendered redundant.

The CDS’ first point makes sense, but only from stand point of the stronger – Indian - side. Having a conventional edge, India wouldn’t like to foreground nuclear weapons. In contrast, Pakistan – being weaker – would constrict the conventional space by pulling on the nuclear awning; and definitely so as part of psychological operations. If and since this would complicate the Indian reading of Pakistani intentions, to be dismissive of nuclear threats is to rather too risk acceptant.

Further, as the CDS must know, firstly, some – particularly in Pakistan - think that the NFU is not worth the paper it is written on. Also, there are nuclear development tendencies that show up India as vacillating on NFU.

Finally, it is not so much Indian NFU that is of consequence to the space for conventional conflict, but the Pakistani ambiguity on nuclear first-use. It would not do for Indian assumptions on the scope for conventional conflict to, in the event, be found to be mistaken.

As regards the second, the CDS does not elaborate on why he thinks Pakistan cannot up the ante twice-over. It retains the option for asymmetric response at both levels. The opportunity for the second upping of the ante by Pakistan could have come in case it had not heeded President Trump’s incentives to desist.

Pakistani strategic culture suggests it is liable to respond, and with alacrity at that. At the tactical level, it is known for counter attacks. Recall, citations written out for a Pakistani junior-leaders conduct in counter attacks by Indian commanders. At the operational level, Op Swift Retort is an example. Even in Op Sindoor, Pakistan spurned India’s olive branch of the first night, launching Op Banyan e Marsoos. At the strategic level, it did a Kargil, ostensibly in reply to India’s capture of Siachen.

As for the third point, since the gap in the non-contact domain can only get wider, Pakistan will be tempted to ‘escalate to deescalate’ at both levels, conventional and nuclear.

When at the conventional level, its response could suck in Indian Rudras and Bhairavs in a tit-for-tat manner. Even if not tasked with objectives to ‘seize and hold,’ but only to retrieve on meting out destruction, their operations necessarily entail stepping across.

Mission creep setting in can manifest in territorial gains in ground operations as a measure of ‘victory.’ Essentially escalatory, measures designed to secure escalation-dominance will play out — horizontally, with the navy joining in; and vertically, with the Rudras reinforced by strike-corps “motherships.”

These are the ‘facts’ the CDS – in his interaction at the event - committed to providing a compliant media and pocket think tanks for future conflicts, in the expectation that those would then be stitched-up and purveyed as a winning narrative.

Willy-nilly, the debates of a decade back, on limiting war in a nuclear backdrop, must find resonance today.

That both India and Pakistan believe that the next step – the nuclear one – could take place is clear from their recent rhetorical exchange. This should concern.

Expectedly, the field marshal next door initiated the exchange, on a trip during which he famously supped with the president of the United States. The Indian army chief’s belated reply was reminiscent of - if less theatrical than - late ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan’s famous quip in Op Parakram. In turn, a reminder from Pakistan has it that ‘cataclysmic devastation’ would be mutual.

The good part is that the exchange foregrounds the nuclear factor.

A new-fangled strategic doctrine was drummed up in immediate wake of Op Sindoor, criticism when criticism was rife on the halt to Op Sindoor. It is plausible that the onset of the ‘new normal’ may well be internal domestic posturing, to offset the criticism – which, incidentally, was from the regime’s own constituency.

However, the new doctrine sets up a commitment trap. A new feature of the doctrine is the renouncing by India of any intermediaries to retard conflict, evident in the blindsiding of Trump this time round. This complicates extrication, dangerous when it is well known getting into a conflict is easier than getting out of one.

Also, the doctrinal tenet of ignoring nuclear blackmail might not be so much to deter at the nuclear level than at the subconventional level. It is India playing ‘chicken’ to defer, if not deter, the next terror atrocity. However, it can only work if other measures are taken, such as a draw down in any Indian intelligence activity on the far side of Pakistan. And, awareness of this prerequisite is not evident.

The final word is on General Chauhan’s dusting up of what General Ved Malik brought out over a quarter-century back. The space for conventional war has always been present. After all, such space prompted India’s Cold Start doctrine in first place.

Even though Pakistan has a proto-first use nuclear doctrine, there is no call for it to be first on the draw early in the hostilities. Arguably, it can see off India’s shallow-thrusts – be it with Rudras or heavier and more potent integrated battle groups - without the use of nukes, though it has niche nuclear weapons for just such a contingency.

Since a limited war is always possible in the nuclear shadow, the military’s promises of ‘no restraint’ does not encourage. The threat of embroilment will loom large, expanding the compulsions for nuclear first use for both sides. While for Pakistan it may be to pre-empt a debacle, for India it might be for pre-emption.

Note the escalatory tendency in each of the three Indian strikes on Pakistan so far. Each has been more lethal than the last. The last led to a bona-fide conventional turn, with three iterations in the exchange. The start next time can only be at a higher level of violence, placing escalation management out of reach, without the benefit of intermediaries to act as a wet blanket. In light of meagre returns, admitted to by the army chief, the risk is inordinate.

Consequently, the shift from deterrence to compellence is premature. The CDS’ ruling out of nuclear warfighting, by way of which limitation can be ruled in, only a cataclysm is the alternative. The CDS noted continuing vulnerability to long range precision strikes; never mind the impending sudarshan chakra.

This makes for plausibility of the mutual assured destruction paradigm in South Asia, one Pakistan pitches for and India dodges accepting. Reconciling this doctrinal divergence may yet secure the subcontinent.

For military brass-hats to lend ballast to the new doctrine and over-sell Op Sindoor smells of political gameplay. With Bihar polls at hand, they’d be well advised to leave the usual banter with Pakistan to their political boss, Rajnath Singh.

If instead, this is their way of catching up with Pakistani head start in the war of narratives, the feedback here is that the two sides are in a comical overstretch. Sobriety demands a step back, an expectation more of the Indian military since it has a reputation to protect.

The military would do well to instead save its ‘take’ for behind closed doors and, there, keep it sombre.