https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/viksit-bharat-needs-a-potion-from

Viksit Bharat needs a potion from India’s ‘Intellectual Architects’

While denying bail, a court termed two of some ten incarcerated Muslim political prisoners as ‘intellectual architects’. These Muslim youth have been hosted in the regime’s jails for over five years now for their ideology-inspired political activity in defence of the world’s largest - albeit internally differentiated - minority anywhere, India’s Muslims.

On the other hand, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) , intones, “(J)ust as blood is indispensable to the human body, so is ideology for a nation.” Pertinently, he left out mentioning which one he had in mind.

His saying this in the precincts of a temple trust – that had also been patronized with a visit by his predecessor - gives a hint. For backdrop was the photo of a protagonist of the Ram Temple movement that at the crux metamorphosed into one of demolition.

Earlier, the CDS in his book had required that the armed forces be imbued with political ideologies, saying, ‘(I)t (civil-military fusion) fuses military professionalism with political ideologies.’

Putting the two statements together, it is evident the CDS is plugging for a particular ideology.

How is that one ideology gets its adherents interminable tenures in jail while another gets to fuse with military professionalism?

Gauging which one should be India’s lifeblood and be subscribed to by the military cannot be left to the CDS. His credentials are not just restricted to being ethnic kin of the national security adviser and his deceased predecessor, but include his repeated demonstration of his ideological affiliations.

His most recent mouthings may well owe to his three years in office coming to a close this month. When appointed, his tenure was - insensibly phrased for such orders - set to be ‘till further orders’. By reminding the regime of his continuing as an adherent he is perhaps auditioning for an extension till he gets to 65 next year. Little wonder he took care to praise his mentor, Ajit Doval.

Instead, gauging which of the two – Hindutva (left unsaid by the good general) and liberalism (subscribed to by the imprisoned youth) – is better for national security requires stacking up the two with national security as yardstick.

How has Hindutva fared?

Hindutva’s tentacles reach down from political culture into strategic culture. Hindutva-infused national security strategy has been operational for the last quarter century. The intervening years of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) were also similarly influenced, with besieged Manmohan Singh constantly looking over his shoulder, wary of a deep state.

Lately, India’s relations with external powers, be it China or America, and with most neighbours, especially Pakistan and Bangladesh, have plumbed. The primary external threat has see-sawed between Pakistan and China, and in fisticuffs with both, India has not come out indubitably with flying colours. Even Op Sindoor’s hype fades when aircraft losses are toted up.

Allegations are that the current thaw along the China front has been bought by Indian concessions, predating Trump’s rollout of tariffs. And, Op Sindoor supposedly continues indefinitely. Neither indicates a secure neighbourhood.

Any discussion on internal security cannot but begin with Kashmir, which even if dormant has shown its disruptive potential in the Baisaran incident. Little is likely to change in Manipur, even if subject now to a belated prime ministerial visit. Chhattisgarh has seen the militarizing of central armed police and paramilitary to an illegitimate extent.

Worse, a chasm has opened up between the State and India’s principal minority community. Inter-community relations have been vitiated by the bruising impact of Hindutva politics of marginalizing the minority. The security dimension stems from the opportunity this provides for invective against the beleaguered minority such as return to phrases from thirty years ago as ‘bleeding India by a thousand cuts.’

A bleaker future

Diplomatic maneuvers and economic gains lacking uplifting heft, Hindutva continues to rely on polarization. Its next frontier is Bengal, where it is willing to put national cohesion at stake using the demographic bogey.

This is of a piece with its alienating communities on the geographic periphery as Sikhs, with gratuitous friction; southerners, by elevating Hindi; and, indeed also peaceable Ladakhis, by ignoring legitimate claims for sixth schedule protections.

In its rewriting history to invisibilise Muslims, the 22 pages of school syllabi devoted to a Maratha ‘empire’ can only serve to rile up identity politics amongst communities subject to raids and the chauth and sardeshimukhi by a fellow ethnic group in its militant ascent. Mythology on Hindu awakening is at the expense of fraternity.

Externally, muscular nationalism is liable to create a declaratory trap for India in the new doctrine of reflexive retaliation. Next time there will be no intercessors and the result, notwithstanding hyperbolic threats, can derail Amrit Kaal. 16 railway officials receiving the army chief’s commendation indicates that but for Trump’s intercession, if not with us, then with the field marshal next door, Op Sindoor was a close shave.

As for the ideology being military-friendly, the Agnipath scheme ought to have woken up the CDS. Since he was military adviser in the national security council secretariat and may have been consulted, his culpability won’t permit him to acknowledge the body-blow.

A military professionalism infused with Hindutva - as the CDS would have it – puts it at odds with modernity - the characteristic sorely needed in today’s tech-intensive wars.

The only gain is for the regime: military subservience where subordination would do. This is reminiscent of the indelible phrase, ‘crawled when asked merely to bend.’

The CDS mistakes such incidence of ‘subjective civilian control’ (inducing likemindedness in the military) with fusionism (breaking barriers to interactivity), the former visible in dictatorial regimes. The latter does not require political ideology for ballast, but structural change accompanied by organizational culture anchored in a modern work ethic.

In short, Hindutva puts paid to the three pillars of Indian military professionalism: secular, apolitical and professional - thereby manifestly failing the test on a criterion it touts itself on – strong-on-defence.

What of locked-away liberalism?

Liberalism starts off with a marked advantage over Hindutva on the three counts. A military imbued with liberalism is self-evidently ‘secular’. The military remains ‘apolitical,’ since liberalism inclines towards democratic alternation in power. As for ‘professional’, the record of the military in the years liberalism was politically dominant is testimony.

To the extent liberalism is in the lifeblood, it lends itself to nation-building in a diverse India. Liberalism is oxygen for India’s minorities, and, in a telling, India is a nation of minorities. Liberalism allows for dissent, with dialogue as the default conflict-resolution instrument.

It is antidote to extremism, extant today as religious majoritarianism. Hindutva, seeing diversity as a threat, steam-rolls angularities. A contrived majority is meant to preserve a micro-minority atop the social pyramid. The process itself is a national security threat, the Constitution taken as a referent.

As for the future, liberalism is the only fallback to Hindutva expending itself as it eventually must under the weight of its own contradictions. Liberalism-mid-wifed Viksit Bharat lies at the far side of such an implosion.

Viksit Bharat needs being alternatively imagined as a federated union of states of coequal, autonomous, geographically-distributed and self-regarding ethinicities.

In its external relations, such a State melds with the neighbours, who - since less-insecure - are less prickly. It can energise a regional union – an undoing of Partition as it were in an Akhand Bharat of sorts (p. 110-117).

South Asia can thus close itself from exploitation of its differences by the aspirant global hegemon, China. As a regional pole, with India as powerhouse, such an entity can then credibly press for a multipolar world.

What this means for the military is a return to reflecting India’s diversity, with constituent ethnic groups finding appropriate representation and, thereby, a sense of belonging and ownership.

This requires reversing an incipient Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan bias and nascent north India-centricity. Of 343 gentlemen cadets commissioned, a 110 were from two Uttars, Pradesh and Khand. As though it has something to hide, the military has stopped releasing disaggregated state-wise figures since.

More than lip-service to inclusivity is necessary in terms higher numbers of social, geographical and religious minorities in its ranks. It cannot be that the top two Manu-defined social groups appropriate national security, with the top providing the intellectual grist and the second the martial vigour, as sought to be depicted in the painting favoured for his office by the army chief.

A contention of ideologies in a democratic system needs a fair and level play field. Given the known propensities of Hindutva, most recently exposed in the electoral field, this is too much of an ask when a nation-wide special intensive revision is in the offing, as substitute for or to presage a post-census national register of citizens. No wonder the Muslim youth icons remain in prison.

That the Muslim ‘intellectual architects’ are in jail, their Bhima Koregaon counterparts equally put upon and liberal media heads intimidated by police calls to ‘join investigation,’ means a democratic outcome is distant.

Bharat’s electoral pretensions will persist. A benign patriarch has thoughtfully lifted the 75 year glass ceiling. A parliamentarian has already endorsed Modi for 2034 and while also named his successor. The hon’ble justices have also been streamlined despite objection, with a Gujarati chief justice set to take over in 2031.

Under the circumstance, the CDS’ uninhibited advocacy for proliferation of a particular ideology makes it easier for - and seemingly legitimizes - the military’s sipping at the ideological fount. Why he was plucked out of retirement after the CDS selection criteria was incomprehensively diluted to fill a chair kept empty for some nine months suggests itself.

It is moot which of two national security implications of Hindutva as an all-pervasive ideology - as the CDS would have it - is worse: a possible civil war or its successful suppression by a partisan military.