The key take away from the G20 fixture in Srinagar
By Ali Ahmed
Exercising its rights as a host
state on the meetings in the run up to the G20 Leaders’ Summit, India settled
on Srinagar to host the Third Tourism Working Group meeting, the earlier two being
non-controversially held at the Rann of Kutch and Siliguri/Darjeeling
respectively.
The criteria of selecting scenic
venues apt for showcasing India’s tourism potential makes Srinagar a logical
choice. Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is a major tourist and pilgrimage destination,
notwithstanding the security situation.
However, since its long-standing security
problem has international connotations, India’s alighting on it as a choice
was liable to be taken as politically loaded and elicited a politicised
response.
Consequently, as expected, some
countries chose to absent themselves, the most prominent one being China.
In the event, though 29 delegations
were represented, along with China,
absent
were G20 member states, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and ‘guest countries’, Oman
and Egypt. Indonesia sent an embassy representative.
India’s relations with the latter
four countries being cordial, it begs the question if India’s choice – though
legal and legitimate – proved good for it or otherwise. Afterall, even Egypt,
whose president was guest at this year’s Republic Day parade, skipped the
event.
India’s determination to proceed
even in the face of a possible terror
threat shows that it believed that the benefits of showcasing Srinagar
would outweigh any cons.
Implicit in its choice of venue
was a reassertion of Indian sovereignty. India was determined not to allow
anyone veto its sovereign right or allow itself to be self-deterred from
exercising it.
India rightly assessed China would
stay away, which China reflexively did, claiming
it was against holding such multilateral meetings in a ‘disputed territory’. In
this it echoed its ally, Pakistan, which is not a G20 member.
That the argument resonated with
more countries than India possibly expected shows that India has been unable to
fully persuade even states assumed to be close to India on its case on J&K.
On the security front, Pakistan
exploited the opportunity with having its proxy groups conduct damaging terror
attacks where the security grid is relatively sparse south of the Pir
Panjals. However, closer to the event, hoping to stave off allegations of
terrorism, it was careful to target the military and used local groups as
fronts.
In the Valley, that two
out-of-Srinagar trips – to Gulmarg and Dachigam sanctuary respectively - were cancelled
for the delegates indicates that instability persists, a feature that could not
have escaped attention of delegates.
Though India might have wished to
present a picture of relative quietude, the abiding impression left on visitors
is likely that problems continue in J&K.
India’s extensive security
arrangements serve to betray that the seeming normality that results is only
superficial.
This implies that India’s completion
of integration of J&K through reworking of Article 370 remains a work-in-progress.
India would require working
harder or doing things differently. Working harder can only be ‘more of the
same’, at most packaged differently. Doing things differently is preferable.
That India ran the risk of holding
the G20 meeting in Srinagar shows that India has the best interest of Kashmiris
at heart. Kashmir was presented as a
tourist destination, with Srinagar all dressed up as a Smart City.
This sense of empathy must be
taken to its logical conclusion in heeding the truism that insurgency is best
tackled politically.
India is already on
course to holding elections to the assembly. If it is wary of the elections
being undermined by parties insisting that the elections be for a state
assembly and not to a legislature of a Union Territory (UT), it could be more
forthright with its statehood promises.
Diplomatically, Pakistan, that
has been holding
out ever since its umbrage at the Article 370 dilution, would likely use
the opportunity to reengage with India.
Chinese positioning on the issue,
largely forged in reference to its relationship with Pakistan, would have to
acknowledge the changed facts on ground in Pakistani reconciliation with the
change.
Though the Ladakh factor remains
consequential in relation to China, it could potentially stand separated from
the J&K issue.
Since all the pieces are already
in place, including delimitation
of constituencies and an internally beset Pakistan, elections can be held over
summer.
This is the best way to neutralise
reservations expressed by the UN Rapporteur on Minority Issues when he opined
that India sought to ‘instrumentalise’ the meeting to present a ‘façade of
normality’.
A return to rule by elected
representatives in J&K by the time of the G20 Summit in early September would
clinch India’s image as the Mother of Democracy.