Viva
Presentation – Ali Ahmed, 23 Feb 12
India’s
Limited War doctrine: Structural, Political and Organisational Factors
The genesis of
the dissertation was atop a canal obstacle where the battalion I was then
commanding was deployed as exercise enemy, Nark force, in Exercise Sanghe
Shakti in 2006. 1 Armoured Division of 2 Corps chose that site of the canal for
the break in battle. It was fore ordained that they would have broken out by
first light. In effect, my unit was cut to pieces in three hours. I did not
have anything much to do thereafter and was able to from the vantage of an
on-site bystander witness the proceedings over the next four days with exercise
timings truncated. The strike corps ended up in its projection areas across the
third obstacle, encompassing an airfield captured by a para-drop for substance
and surge. I wondered as to what a nuclear armed enemy would make of all this.
This experience has prompted the research question: Why has
It is fair to
believe that the investment in nuclearisation should have made
But first I
needed to demonstrate that there has indeed been a change in
Thereafter
answering the three questions I posed, the dissertation in subsequent chapters tries
to locate the drivers behind
There is an
extensive body of theoretical work connected to doctrine over the last two
decades that has helped make this case study’s thick description a
theoretically informed one. The well known realist theory served to provide the
theoretical backdrop to the examination of the hypothesis at the structural
level. The theory has it that the anarchical international system prompts
self-help on part of states. The states attempt to create and leverage power
against threats in the environment through internal and external balancing.
Since military capability is a significant element of national power,
harnessing it is done through formulating doctrine. Therefore doctrine is a
form of internal balancing by states since doctrine lends coherence to military
power.
Since the
realism looks at the system and not at the unit and the doctrine process occurs
within a state, there is a need to look at the unit. The cultural theoretical
lens lent itself for examination of the unit level. Cultural theory has it that
while imbalance of power may exist in a system, whether these are treated as
opportunities or threats would depend on how they are viewed. In other words,
domestic politics matters. How states make sense of the world, how other state
actions are interpreted and what states wish to do with the military instrument
owes to political culture arising in the domestic sphere. There are three
variants of culture: political culture, strategic culture and organizational
culture. Cultural theory, developed in relation to doctrine by Elisabeth Kier
in her work Imagining War, has it that strategic or political-military culture
impacts doctrine. However, its influence is mediated by organisational culture
of the military in question.
A look at
organizational culture necessitates ‘looking into the box’ or at the
organizational level. Here Graham Allison’s three models provided a conceptual
handle at this level. The rational actor model involving reasoned responses to
external stimuli in the form of threats is equivalent to the realist response
studied at the structural level. Therefore remaining at this level are the
Organisational Process models and the Bureacratic Politics model. The
organizational process model posits that doctrine, being a mandate of the
military, is something that the military would generate as part of discharging
its social obligation. In the process, organizations cater for institutional
interests such as budgets, role salience, prestige, autonomy etc. Militaries
prefer offensive doctrines for these reasons. The Bureaucratic Politics model
has it that organisations compete with each other. Since the military is not a
monolith, the doctrinal sphere becomes a battle space for bureaucratic fights.
Doctrine therefore becomes a weapon and doctrine making a strategy in this
contest.
I drew
hypothesis from the theories – realism, cultural and organization theory - at
the respective level studied and thereafter tried to make sense of the data
gathered. The dependent variable at each level was doctrine. At the structural
level, the threat perception was taken as the independent variable. The
hypothesis at this level was: The change
in
Doctrine being
the depending variable, the independent variable at the unit level was
strategic culture. Since the military as an organization reacts to its
environment through the prism of organizational culture, organizational culture
served as an intervening variable. The hypothesis at the unit level at which
the political factor was studied, was: The
change in
Lastly at the
organizational level the hypothesis was: The
change in
What did I find?
The chronology
places the Cold Start doctrine as emerging after Operation Parakram. As we know,
Looking at the
political factor, the major aspect was the change in strategic culture through
the preceding four decades. The ‘Indira doctrine’, with its emphasis on power,
had displaced the Nehruvian world view.
Taking the unit
and the organization a dyad – state/organization – the next chapter examined
the influence of institutional interest or organizational compulsions. Since
the army was considerably embarrassed by the Kargil intrusion and by its
inability to get into a position to exert military power in early enough a time
frame, it sought to compensate by formulating an offensive doctrine. This
enables it autonomy from its civilian masters, furnishes an offensive option by
way of which it can shape the battle field and if the doctrine is to be
operationalised legitimizes the budgets necessary. The bureaucratic politics
framework is very useful in understanding the
What then are my
findings?
Firstly, the
case study is one of equifinality. Doctrine generation is multidimensional and
with multiple causes. This is useful in terms of expanding the focus from
threat perception to other factors.
Secondly, the
finding is that doctrinal innovation occurs when all three factors are at play.
The three independent variables need to be active in case there is to be
movement in doctrine. In other words, not only does the threat needs to be
coped with by doctrinal movement, but such movement is not only autonomously
possible for the military to make. It needs an enabling environment at the unit
level in terms of an amenable political factor. The organizational level factor
must also be suitably positioned. This was the case with the Cold Start
doctrine. The Pakistani threat had heightened; strategic culture was assertive and
the organization wanted continued conventional relevance into the nuclear age.
What is the
relevance of these findings?
The policy relevance
is that the conundrum posed by the nuclear age has not been answered adequately
well. While the Cold Start doctrine provides a blueprint for Limited War, there
is currently no explicit doctrine for limited war. Only this month the Army
Chief has indicated that a Limited War doctrine for the nuclear backdrop is
under preparation. Secondly, since introduction of nuclear weapons into a
conflict is a decision for the adversary to make, a nuclear war can yet occur.
There is a need to stretch the limited war definition and concept to include
Limited Nuclear War. The nuclear doctrine currently believes in ‘massive’
punitive retaliation for unacceptable damage. This is not only genocidal, but
in the unmistakable equation of mutual assured destruction that the vertical
proliferation resorted to by
However, equally
importantly form point of view of the Division and Center, what are the
implications for theory? The case study, by its very nature is not
generalisable. Secondly, it was not designed to test the theories in terms of
deriving hypothesis and testing these for validity in a comparative case study.
The aim was not theoretically ambitious but limited to seeking an explanation
to the puzzle. The finding is that theories can only partially claim to answer
the complex phenomena observed in strategic studies. War is a social activity with
multiple dimensions that cannot be explicated by a single theory. The case
study however suggests that the cultural explanation has value. While a view
has it that cultural realpolitic behaviour owes to socialization of states by
the structural imperative, the reverse is possible truer depiction in that
realpolitic behavior gives rise to the security dilemma that then forms the
structural level environment for the state. This then leads to
self-perpetuation and legitimates realism inspired behaviour. While finding
suggests that states can choose to change the structural imperatives. This is
in favour of the constructivist approaches.
My final point
is in the policy feedback of this point.
I would like to
end by thanking the faculty for this opportunity. Its inputs over my last five
appearances before it over the past four years have made the thesis as it is.
Of course the thesis would not have seen the light of the day but for my
supervisor, Prof. Rajagopalan. Intellectually his suggestions of where to look
and I believe more importantly the scholarly discipline he required of me were
critical to the outcome. The shortcomings that remain are entirely mine.
Thank you for
your patience.
The Full Text of PhD
https://www.dropbox.com/s/p3qe0obnat22iac/full%20text.pdf?dl=0
