Paper For HR
Seminar At Baramula, J&K
23-24 March 2011
THE DSCO AND
THE HR FACTOR
Abstract
The Doctrine
for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) is due for review this year. The paper
hopes to contribute to this by suggesting directions it could better address
the Human Rights (HR) factor. It first reviews the doctrinal tenets regarding
HR and then brings out areas of dissonance in the DSCO. It then dwells on ways
to address the HR issue including supervision by the government and auto-regulation
by the military. It brings out that certain doctrinal formulations lend
themselves to a permissive understanding of use of force. This impinges on the
HR factor, rightly taken in the doctrine as central in countering insurgency.
It recommends measures to reconcile use of force and the HR factor. This is
imperative in light of the idea of
Introduction
The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), that is authorized by the
international community with overseeing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has
arrived at a useful formulation of its aim. It is to bring about a ‘reasonable
and pragmatic balance between the demands of military necessity and humanity.’[1]
This has lessons for protection of Human Rights (HR) in subconventional
operations for
The
aim of the paper is to suggest that the sub conventional operations doctrine be
unambiguous in its protection of HR as a strategic factor. The paper is laid
out in three sections. The first recapitulates the HR related tenets of
doctrine in brief. The second section brings out concepts and gaps that could
have an adverse bearing for the HR factor. The intent is to discern scope for
improvement. Lastly, it puts forward recommendations in order that the
doctrinal intent of HR primacy is furthered even in operations with higher
violence content.
HR in doctrinal tenets
Doctrine
is a written document that encapsulates thinking on an issue to serve as
guidance for all members of the organisation. The Indian Army Doctrine
(2004) is the foundational document.[4] It
lays down the broad approach to counter insurgency (CI) and Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC) operations in Section 14 of Chapter V.[5] It
restricts the military aim to ‘conflict management’ rather than ‘conflict
resolution’,[6] the
latter being the larger political objective requiring a concerted national
effort integrating all prongs of strategy. It makes clear that the foremost
principle is winning the hearts and minds (WHAM) of the population through low
profile and people-friendly operations.[7]
Echoing the COAS Commandments, it states: ‘Remember that the people you are
dealing with are your own countrymen; your behaviour must be dictated by this
single most important consideration. Violation of Human Rights, therefore, must
be avoided under all circumstances, even at the cost of operational success.’[8]
This respect for HR must persist despite the Army’s prolonged deployment in CI
operations and ‘notwithstanding the tense, stressful and turbulent situations
at the grass roots level.’[9] This
is tacit acknowledgement that HR could be compromised unless positive measures
are not firmly in place.
Flowing
from the Army doctrine, is the DSCO of 2006. It encapsulates collective
wisdom and philosophy gained over half century of such operations.[10]
It demands ‘scrupulous respect for human rights’ and ‘upholding the laws of the
land’ since the ‘center of gravity’ is identified as the populace.[11]
To enable this, it recommends that imaginative rules of engagement be
formulated in the backdrop of political, legal and moral parameters.[12]
Its emphasis on the humane and people-centric approach has led to the doctrine
being dubbed ‘Iron fist in velvet
glove’.[13]
It must therefore be acknowledged that the doctrine establishes HR protection
as the foremost doctrinal principle.
The
doctrine has it that the end state sought by the national counter insurgency
campaign is ‘conflict resolution’, which, to it, generally succeeds ‘conflict
termination’. The military aim is creation of a secure environment for
government to discharge its functions. This involves neutralization of hostile
elements in the combat zone including terrorists and their support base. Towards
this end it reiterates the principle of minimum force to neutralize rather than
eliminate. It is cognizant of the constitutional obligation to respect HR. It
outlines a pragmatic response to HR issues within the service to include
sensitization of all members, reacting to violations and negating unwarranted
allegations. A ‘zero tolerance’ regime is to be in place regarding violations.[14]
Doctrinal dissonance
The very
deployment of the Army in Aid to Civil Authority and under the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act suggests that potential and extant violence levels entail
application of military force to bring under control. Such application of force has the added
advantage of establishing psychological ascendancy over the terrorists. In a
proxy war situation it conveys the message of the resolve to external
benefactors. Internally, it reassures the public in the area and elsewhere in
the country that the government is acting with due firmness. Advantages apart,
these reasonable aims are susceptible to being thwarted by political,
ideological and institutional considerations. Therefore the HR factor, despite
its strategic salience and effort at protection, is liable to be overlooked.
That it returns to the fore once the situation gets better is acknowledged.
However, the contention here is that it must remain in focus even when the
going gets tough.
The DSCO expresses
a preference for the maneuver warfare template so as to place the terrorist
into a reactive mode and to influence his ‘mind’ and that of other antagonists.
It however believes that ‘Such application (maneuver) cannot by itself produce
results so recourse to attritional warfare (elimination of terrorists) in the
initial stages of the campaign cannot be avoided.’[15]
It is at a later stage that both concepts - attrition and maneuver - are to be
applied. In the timeline of operations, it requires application of kinetic
means in the initial stages for attrition. Thereafter, a switch to non-kinetic
means, suggestive of maneuver warfare, is to be made at the stage at which
conflict resolution is in sight. How does this doctrinal conceptualization fare
from an HR point of view and in terms of CI strategy?
Even while
there are strictures in the manner force is required to be applied such as
minimum force, no collateral damage, after due warning etc, reliance on force
for attrition in the early stage can result in alienation setting in. Such
alienation can only translate as heightened support for the terrorist,
including additional recruitment into their ranks. This would worsen the
situation before, over the long haul, it gets any better. The initial period is
also one in which the populace forms its attitude towards military deployment.
In case the military is concentrating on neutralizing, if not eliminating,
terrorists through ‘kinetic’ means, then impositions on the population can only
be higher, though briefly, during the period. While here again there are
measures for amelioration such as ensuring professional conduct, delivering
basic needs etc, a hardening of attitudes can take place. Such an attitude has
been described in one publication as ‘insolence’.[16]
The effect on the soldiery on ground can be expected to be negative in terms of
increasing stress levels, provoking unseemly reaction and making for perception
of a hostile environment. It would take extensive WHAM efforts to retrieve lost
ground over an extended period later. Lastly, judging when to make the transition
is a challenging leadership responsibility. Inability to make the transition
timely can result in continuing disaffection and unending deployments. Responsibility
for the latter cannot solely be attributed to lack governance and political
strategy.
The
doctrine allows for ‘overwhelming’ force against ‘hard core’ terrorists and
foreign mercenaries.[17]
This gives rise to the understanding that ‘Where there is terrorism, there cannot be human rights.’[18] ‘Hard core’ terrorists do not lose their
humanity and citizenship. Even foreign terrorists - though admittedly they
forsake their humanity through brutality - are covered by international obligations
that
The
DSCO equates HR with fundamental rights.[20]
This is correct but insufficient. The Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993 defines
the term thus: ‘“human rights” means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality
and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the
International Covenants and enforceable by courts in
A problematic idea that finds mention is that, ‘the
orchestration of operations must be such that the ‘induce the desired degree of
agitational fatigue amongst supporters of the cause.’[24]
This is simplistic in its assumption that politically motivated agitators would
give up by being continually inconvenienced. State action would to them
constitute suppression and thereby legitimize their fight. Since in the early
period, terrorists have population support, a distinction, difficult to arrive
at, would require being made between over ground workers and the population.
The doctrine does maintain alongside that action against over ground workers
must be in keeping with the law of the land. However, measures taken to
distance supporters from terrorists by inducing a realization that they cannot
‘win’ against the government implies an intention to exhaust them. This may end
the problem, but does not resolve it. It helps with ‘conflict management’ and
not ‘conflict resolution’. In other words, the narrower military aim can be met,
but this does not help with achieving national aims. It also goes against the
democratic ideal of tolerance of dissent. There is danger of the Army ending up
a political actor. That these measures are not elaborated on indicates there is
scope for impinging on HR. Again tactical level problems arise, such as
identification of the targets, methods to be used and when to cease applying
such pressure. To its credit, the doctrine concedes that ‘this lever works both
ways’ and could prove ‘counter productive’. This begs the question as to why
must the idea figure in the doctrine in first place.
The
way ahead
That
application of force is to be tempered with human rights concerns, best practices
and ‘lessons learnt’ is a well acknowledged by the military. Both doctrine and theatre-specific
strategy acclaim centrality for the HR factor. Violating HR proves counter
protective in the long run. Sensitivity to HR norms, rules and practices has
consequently been developed in the leadership and soldiery. While in the
context of current day CI preoccupations it is clear that the HR factor is to
the forefront, it bears reminding that the security situation is much better.
The real test for HR sensitivity is therefore not so much when the going is
good, but when the situation is challenging. In order to ensure that the HR
factor remains fore-grounded even when under severe test, there may be more
work to be done in terms of internalizing it. This is especially so in light of
CI practices elsewhere more permissive of use of force and firepower, acting as
influence on doctrine revision. [25]
Firstly,
given the considerable autonomy for the military under the AFSPA, there is a
premium on self-regulation. However, this has its limits. It needs to be
reinforced by the force of sanctions. This presumes a superior authority.
Towards this end the state government and, at the Center, Ministries of Defence
(MoD) and Home Affairs (MHA) are candidates. However, lines of authority are
indistinct. While MHA is responsible for internal security, the military when
deployed on such duty continues to answer to the MoD. The state government does
not have power over the military and is dependent on its ‘cooperation’. This
arrangement between the military and the state government has sanction of the
Supreme Court.[26] While
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the state human rights
commissions exist, the military is outside their purview except as mediated by
the central government.[27]
At best theirs is a reporting function, rather than a watch-dog one. There is
therefore additional need for oversight, over and above internal oversight
mechanisms of the military such as Human Rights cells, functioning of the chain
of command etc.
Five
suggestions can be mentioned. The first is that of multi-level ‘grievance
cells’ mooted by the Jeevan Reddy committee.[28] Second
is internal to the military. It is in having ‘staff courts of enquiry’
investigate any incidence of loss of life or excesses.[29] The
third is in reframing of Section 6 of the AFSPA. A suggestion reads: ‘No
prosecution … shall be instituted against any person in respect of anything
done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act
where the Central government provides reasons in writing and the competent
court upholds the legal validity of these reasons.’[30] Fourth,
is that the Center could be more liberal in granting permissions to proceed
with prosecution, where warranted. And lastly parliamentary standing committees
on defence and home could have theater commanders depose before them to field
questions on strategy and HR. A parliamentary standing committee can be set up
for each ‘disturbed area’ under the AFSPA. These measures would obviate any sense
of impunity, act as deterrent, ensure accountability and serve the ends of
justice. Eventually, how this is brought about is the call of the political
leadership at MoD.
Secondly,
it is interesting that the DSCO does not carry any discussion
of the AFSPA. At the time of writing of the doctrine the Act was under scrutiny
by the Jeevan Reddy committee.[31]
The Act has been under review since and the Army Chief has opined on its
necessity.[32]
Given that it will likely stay, amending it as suggested by the Supreme Court
by making violations of the Chief’s Do’s and Don’ts punishable, is a way to
ensure domestication of the AFSPA.[33]
Also, the parameters in the discussion on end state and exit policy[34]
can include guidance on when the Act can be withdrawn from areas returning to
normalcy. In the absence of this, the military carries the onus of appearing
yet another vested interest in the insurgency economy.
Thirdly,
the Army by taking ownership of HR can become the foremost human rights
defender. This can be done in redefining ‘AOR’ – area of operations – away from
its territorial connotation to focusing on the population in its boundaries.
This would shift the focus to ‘population’ from ‘area’.[35]
The resulting sense of ownership would help fend of institutional pressures
that are sometimes known to develop in light of the ‘command culture’ prevalent
at the spear end.
Lastly,
the understanding is that conflict termination precedes conflict resolution.[36] But
as in the peacekeeping heuristic, peace making can proceed apace with peace
enforcement and peacekeeping.[37]
In other words, conflict resolution efforts can be co-extensive with conflict
management, in which case conflict termination would be co-terminus with to
conflict resolution. As the doctrine says the military can at best create the
conditions conducive to peace agreement. However, usually the unending search
for the position of strength from which to engage with the insurgent group
holds up conflict resolution. This has HR implications in terms of soft core rights
being curtailed of the innocent population for inordinately long.
Conclusion
Skepticism on the HR record of security forces (SF)
increases with proximity to the affected site, usually in
However,
in light of reticence in the written word being a well known facet of Indian
strategic culture, the Army would have to plough a lonely furrow. As the Indian
Army Doctrine ruefully acknowledges, ‘As distinct from conventional war,
clear-cut directions in a LIC scenario may not always be available.’[38] The
recently released Joint Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations is a fair
start point for the revision of DSCO underway.[39]
In
the ongoing revision, of primary doctrinal consequence is the instrumental and
normative value of HR factor. The former is that respecting HR can potentially
yield up political dividend. Its normative value lies in helping create the liberal-democratic
idea of
(Words
– 3060)
* Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
[1] ‘Statement by the
ICRC on the Status of the Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, 2008’, October 24, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/statement-icrc-status-protocols-1949-geneva-conventions-relating-protection-victims-armed-conflicts-2008/p22309
[2] Army Training Command (ARTRAC), Doctrine
for Sub Conventional Operations, Shimla: ARTRAC, 2006. Available at HQ
Integrated Defence Staff website -
http://ids.nic.in/Indian%20Army%20Doctrine/doctrine%20sub%20conv%20w.pdf
[3] See KS Jamwal, ‘Promulgation’, DSCO
.
[4] ARTRAC, Indian Army Doctrine,
Shimla: ARTRAC, 2004. It is available in two parts on HQ IDS website - http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm.
[5] Ibid., pp. 23-31.
[6] Indian Army Doctrine, p. 23.
[7] Ibid., p. 25.
[8] Ibid., p. 26.
[9] Ibid., p. 29.
[10] Foreword by General JJ Singh, DSCO,
p. i.
[11] Ibid., p. 16.
[12] Ibid., p. 33.
[13] Ibid., p. 3.
[14] Chapter 7 (DSCO, pp. 53-55) is
devoted to HR.
[15] Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[16] KS Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed
Forces in Low Intensity Conflict, Centre for Land Warfare Studies,
[17] DSCO, p. 3.
[18] KS Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces
in Low Intensity Conflict, p. 4.
[19] Indian Army Doctrine, p. 24.
[20] DSCO, p. 53.
[21] The Protection of HR Act, 1993 (As
amended in 2006), p. 1. Available at National Human Rights Commission website -
http://www.nhrc.nic.in/
[22] Office of the UN Commissioner for
Human Rights, ‘Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee :
[23] Available at
http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/Armed%20forces%20_J&K_%20Spl.%20powers%20act,%201990.pdf
[24] DSCO, p. 21.
[25] Such examples include that of the
[26] See judgement of Supreme Court in the
Nagaland case of 1997. Text available at - See text of judgment at
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx
[27] The Protection of HR Act, 1993,
[28] Text of recommendations is at http://www.hinduonnet.com/nic/afa/afa-part-iv.pdf./
See for ‘Grievance cell’, p. 79.
[29] Nilendra Kumar, ‘Finding a way
out of the AFSPA conundrum’, Business
Standard, 19 September 2010.
[30] S. Varadarajan, ‘A modest proposal on
AFSPA’, The Hindu, 5 September 2010.
[31] The Jeevan Reddy committee was set up to review the AFSPA pursuant to the agitations in Manipur over the alleged rape and killing of Th. Manorama Devi by Assam Rifles in 2004-05.
[32] ‘AFSPA an enabling provision, not arbitrary: Army Chief’, Times of India, 18 September 2010.
[33] See Supreme Court judgment, Note 26.
[34] DSCO, p. 38-39.
[35] Ali Ahmed, ‘AOR: The
CT Ops Version’,
[36] DSCO, pp. 17, 20.
[37] See UN ‘Capstone Doctrine’, p. 19, available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf
[38] Indian Army Doctrine, p. 24.
[39] HQ Integrated Defence Staff website -
http://ids.nic.in/whatnew.htm
