Preserving UN Peacekeeping for a Multilateral World
https://usiofindia.org/pdf/FINAL%20USI%20Journal%20-%20Jan-March%202025.pdf
Abstract
The article posits that UN peacekeeping is under an eclipse
due to the polarisation in international affairs. This may deepen in case of a
retreat to isolationism of a significant supporter of UN peace operations, the
United States. To ensure peacekeeping remains fit for purpose in an emerging
multilateral world order, the aspirant pole countries must individually and
collectively step up to shoulder a heavier peace operations’ burden not only in
terms of troop contribution, but also logistics support, doctrinal input and
increased proportion of financing. This will not only preserve peacekeeping as
the foremost multilateral instrument of choice for the international community
but will also usher in such a world order.
We recognize that the multilateral system and its institutions, with
the United Nations and its Charter at the centre, must be strengthened to keep
pace with a changing world.
– Pact for the Future
Introduction
United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping is at a critical juncture in its chequered history.
There have been no UN peacekeeping missions[1] authorized over the past
decade. The mission in Mali has pulled out subsequent to withdrawal of consent
by the government. The mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, though in
midst of drawdown at the request of the government, has been managing yet
another an upheaval in eastern Congo. The African Union is coming into its own
on peacekeeping under Charter Chapter VIII in partnership with the UN,[2] with the modalities of the
financing of its missions being worked out, its mission in Somalia likely to
serve as prototype. The return of President Trump to the White House has begun
impacting the UN on the humanitarian and development front,[3] and could also affect the
peace and security dimension through attitudes the United States (US) adopts to
the UN and to peacekeeping.[4]
It
would appear that UN peacekeeping is no longer a ready instrument of choice of
the international community. However, the hold up on peacekeeping deployments
does not have any marked deficiency in peacekeeping practice at its core.
Instead, the UN Security Council (UNSC) dynamics are at its root. The
geopolitical positioning of the US, Russia and China – three of the significant
Permanent Five (P5) – has been impacted UNSC readiness to use its peacekeeping
option. Whereas there is precedent of the General Assembly deploying peace
missions under the Uniting for Peace mechanism, it has not stepped up.
Polarisation effects peacekeeping.[5]
The
major phenomenon in international affairs is the transition from a post-Cold
War unipolar world to a multipolar world. The rise of China led by President Xi
Jinping and the return of Russia under President Putin to active involvement in
international developments has put the US-led West on notice. While Russian
actions in Ukraine have set back Russia-US relations, US-China relations are
subject to the inevitable wariness between a hegemonic power and a rising
challenger. Adversarial relations imply a return to the Cold War practices in
which the P5 privilege respective interests, restricting UN actions to where
these do not impact such interests. Alongside, the US is retreating from
liberal internationalism, which had driven its post-Cold War engagement with
peacekeeping, with no guarantee other powers might step into the void.
The
last decade long-hiatus in UN peacekeeping deployments was in the eighties,
when resurgence of the Cold War in wake of the Soviet Union intervention in
Afghanistan made the UNSC yet another site of the competition. It is no
coincidence the last UN mission deployed – to Central African Republic – was in
2014, the year when the Russians wrested Crimea from Ukraine. The situation in
Ukraine having only worsened with a war on since 2022, the effect has been on
cooperation within the UNSC.
Last
time, it took an outbreak of détente with the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan for a resurgence in peacekeeping. The present international
situation does not show signs of any such light at the end of the tunnel.
Resuscitation of the instrument of peacekeeping cannot be reliant solely on the
UNSC, in particular its feuding P5. The international community would be
deprived of a potent option to address the myriad conflicts, ongoing and
latent, if the peacekeeping instrument is not kept in good repair.[6]
This
article argues that with geopolitical positioning potentially impacting the
delivery of the UNSC mandate adversely, there is need for the emerging powers
to step up and play a proactive role. This will demonstrate their efficacy and
create space for multilateralism in line with the theme of the recent UN Summit
of the Future: “multilateral solutions for a better tomorrow.” The benefit for
the UN is that it would retain its credentials as the principle multilateral
forum,[7] while resuscitating its
premier multilateral innovation, peacekeeping.
The continuing validity of peacekeeping
For
now, some conflicts are being addressed by the UN through the medium of Special
Political Missions (SPM).[8] A peacekeeping option on
the table helps make for success of SPMs’ peacemaking endeavours by offering
peacekeeping as a means to ensure and support implementation of agreements
arrived at. A peacekeeping mission, by definition, creates and sustains a secure
environment that, to begin with, helps with humanitarian relief, and over time
helps sustain a peaceable environment for furthering peacebuilding. Early
peacebuilding - known in theory as structural peacebuilding - is enabled by
multidimensional peace operations. This is necessary to lay the foundation for
prevention of relapse into conflict, setting the stage for development and
cultural peacebuilding.[9]
UN
peacekeeping, having traversed much ground across multiple conflict zones, now
has a thoroughly practiced repertoire.[10] Peacekeeping has come a
long way since its beginning at the cusp of the Cold War in what has come to be
known as traditional peacekeeping. It has since traversed into second
generation or wider peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War and, this century, has
been engaged in integrated, multidimensional peace operations. This owed to the
shift in the types of conflict from inter-state to internal conflict. However,
lately, inter-state conflict appears to have rekindled, which alongside
continuing internal conflict, puts a premium on UN’s operational expertise.
To be
sure, peacekeeping has had its troughs, but has a credible record of learning
alongside.[11]
In fact, it was its setback in the mid-nineties that led up to the progressive
professionalization of peacekeeping,[12] beginning with the
Brahimi report. Training infrastructure and networks are now highly evolved and
variegated.[13]
Though the last official doctrinal product is some 15 years old, doctrinal
evolution has kept the UN peacekeeping doctrine contemporary and adaptable. The
command and control aspect, at both strategic and operational levels, has come
a long way. Gender balance, geographic representation and enhancing quality of
leadership are a continuing focus. Technology and best practices absorption are
a key area of upgrades. The civilian component, both substantive and support,
now has both expertise and depth. The troop and police contributing countries
(T/PCC) are conscious of the quality of capability offered.[14] The Chinese – a P5 member
– are upping their game also as a TCC.
A
challenge foreseen is the financing of operations.[15] This is attenuated by the
fresh approaches that the new US administration may take as it settles in.
However, the UN has faced financial troughs earlier, such as in the in the
mid-sixties over the costs of the Congo mission. In President Trump’s second
term there may be financing issues that unsettle peacekeeping. This could prove
an opportunity for the Chinese to up its act. Since opening up space for China
might not be in US interest, it is possible that peacekeeping may not see the
financial turbulence apprehended. Instead, a competition to stay engaged by
both the powers so as not to concede space to the other could benefit
peacekeeping. Even so, developing countries with adequate financial muscle, as
India, could increase their contribution on a non-reimbursable basis in the
form of transportation, supplies and personnel contributions beyond their
assessed share.
Even
as the unipolar moment is decisively over, fresh winds buoy multilateralism.
That a multipolar world is on the horizon is visible in the effervescence of
the Global South, in the G20 and the expanding footprint of groupings as the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Peacekeeping offers
scope for multipolarity advocating countries to show their salience in their
peacekeeping presence and contribution.
The UN
is looking for enablers and the latest in technology. This is an area for
emerging powers to displace UN leaning on Western countries for niche subunits.
This would not only be reflective of multipolar world but also usher in the
reality. It would help fill in any vacuum that possible US disengagement might
create. A case to point is equipment such as surveillance drones, mine clearing
innovations,[16]
soft-skinned and armoured vehicles from its atmanirbhar
program could be offered to the UN or its agencies service in UN missions.
Making
peacekeeping fit-for-purpose in a multipolar world is a potential site for
contenders for a permanent seat in the UNSC to make their mark. The UN Charter
requires that those selected for the UNSC are distinguished by their
contribution. Countries as India could then make credible demands at the
intergovernmental negotiations in the General Assembly move to text-based
negotiations. Power dynamics, that otherwise mostly have the Western bloc to
the fore, will shift to privilege the interests of the non-West. Getting to the
horseshoe table needs such fresh pathways.
Ushering in multilateralism
Peacekeeping
has demonstrated its flexibility and relevance through all phases of
contemporary history. Lately, inter-state conflicts have also been witnessed.
Peacekeeping, particularly it’s preventive deployment variant, calls out for a
relook in such circumstance. The grievous damage that recent conflicts have
wrought makes recovery and reconstruction and peacebuilding all the more
necessary. The increased involvement of other states in conflict zones is
making peacemaking more complex, putting to naught years of efforts by
successive mediators. Cumulatively, the interplay between peacekeeping,
peacemaking and peacebuilding has got more complex.[17] A wider ideational
engagement than the hitherto reliance on Western sources for doctrinal
next-steps is required.
Precedence
of peacekeeping flexibility and resilience indicates that it can adapt to the
challenges of the times,[18] such as from new domains
as information and challenges therein of mis/disinformation and hate speech. It
has been able to draw on regional capabilities in sequential, parallel and
hybrid operations, such as of the African Union and the African regional
communities in southern and western Africa. It has adjusted to out-of-area
interventions by bodies as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). It has managed transitions taking on an interim
administrative role. It has been relied on by UN-authorized and arbitrary
coalitions, as in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, and by the NATO in Kosovo,
to oversee the aftermath of the peace enforcement. The pragmatism that
underpins peacekeeping keeps it resilient and responsive to the nuances of the
discrete challenges thrown up over the years. Its record suggests that it must
be retained as instrument of choice in a multilateral world.
Multilateral
engagement will bring fresh thinking and innovation, especially from the
hitherto under-represented ones as Africa and Latin America. Since
multilateralism-enthused countries are also rising in economic stature, the
financing aspect can be revisited, so as to balance the onus that is currently
on developed countries. The adage, ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune,’ is
also applicable to the UN. Greater voice for a wider cross-section of powers
allow for a larger peacekeeping budget to insulate against financial
vagaries.
A
greater sense of ownership in the developing world will revitalize the C34
forum. This can potentially dispel reservations that Russia and China have
regards peacekeeping. Their fuller support in the UNSC will then be
forthcoming. It would also balance the perceived asymmetry in the Security
Council in which three of the P5 are of the Western bloc. It would rekindle UN
credibility, that’s taken a beating in Israel’s war in Gaza.
Mutually-empowering
engagement of rising powers with peacekeeping helps with democratizing of
global governance, even as the structures catch up through UNSC reforms in
their own good time. Such engagement distances peacekeeping from the perception
that is seemingly an instrument of the West, making it proximate to the
developing world and its concerns. This would have a positive tactical level
effect on the security of peacekeepers, who may otherwise unwittingly be taken
as proximate to the West and liable to be targeted by forces inimical to the
West. A broad-basing of support in a larger body of ‘friends of peacekeeping’
will ensure makes for easier accorded host state consent to missions. Host
states will be more sanguine that they are not subject to a re-colonising
agenda. They would prove less obstructive in terms of imposing movement
restrictions on missions or be more forthcoming with consent.
Keeping peacekeeping ticking
Upcoming
forums must be appropriated by multilateralism-persuaded countries. The Pact for the Future adopted at last
year’s Summit of the Future has mandated a review of peace operations.[19] This is a decade on since
the last comprehensive report on peacekeeping, that of the High-Level Panel,
popularly known as the ‘Hippo report’.[20] The interested countries,
in which number principal TCCs, can participate in the exercise both
individually, as also as part of collectives. Placing peacekeeping renaissance
on the agenda of collective forums will create momentum and critical mass for broad-basing
international peace and security ownership away from being held hostage by
powerplay in the UNSC. This will enhance the outcome of the forthcoming
biennial Ministerial in Berlin.[21]
A
recent think-piece from the Department of Peace Operations, The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and
Related Capabilities,[22]
lends direction to the reforms ahead, as do publications from think tanks, such
as, Future of the Pact.[23]
The former study shows the versatility of peace operations in the listed range
of the 30 functional capabilities of peace operations. While multidimensional
peace operations undertook these functions as mandated, the thrust appears to
be to make operations manageable by niche interventions, such as electoral
support, security sector reform or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
(DDR) assistance. This will keep operations modular, nimble, smaller, and so,
less costly.
However,
multidimensional peace operations with a large footprint must not be thrown out
with the bathwater. With countrywide presence and visibility, these serve a
purpose in stabilization and extension of state authority. By deterring
spoilers, they help with protection of civilians. They serve as an embarrassing
witness, helping prevent atrocity crimes. A heavier footprint is necessary to
access and surveil remote areas and reduce extent of ungoverned spaces.
Peacebuilding activity is given incidental security cover by their very
presence and humanitarian protection assured. The peacebuilding architecture is
also due for an upgrade, a timely opportunity to rethink the relationship
between the two.
Imagining counter factual possibilities
Continued
resort to peacekeeping over the past decade could have made a constructive
difference to the conflict and their outcomes. To be sure, peacekeeping could
not have been applicable in tackling the Islamic State (IS) episode, requiring
as it did peace enforcement. However, though a counter factual, it can be
argued that the drawdown and departure from both Iraq and Afghanistan of the
coalitions could have witnessed successor peacekeeping operations. If a peace
operation in Syria had got off the ground after the brief three-month long SPM
there, it could have created a new reality supportive of the several rounds of
talks as part of the peace process. The long-running conflicts in Libya and
Yemen could also have been suitably addressed, with a preventive impact on
current-day turmoil in Sahel and in the Red Sea respectively.
If
peace operations were not held in abeyance in the UNSC, it was possible to
visualize a pre-war insertion also in eastern Ukraine in a preventive
deployment mode.[24]
Even at this juncture, Ukraine is a candidate location for a peace
intervention, as the prospects of a ceasefire have increased lately.[25] Indeed, today, Syria,
Yemen and Sudan could benefit from deployment of a multidimensional
peacekeeping operation to help recoup their broken societies and polities.
An
illustrative case is of the UN Mission in South Sudan.[26] Six years of relative
peace since signing of the peace agreement have witnessed a power-sharing in
the government, with consensual extensions in the interim period till elections
in end 2026. This is plausible response to the financial crisis brought about
by the stoppage in oil flows owing to the civil war in neighbouring Sudan.
Since the government is balancing the geopolitical extant in Africa, it is
pressurized by Western countries over the election timeline. This makes an
already fragile security situation, tenuous. Increased engagement with
peacekeeping in its operational detail by a larger set of countries persuaded
by the multilateral principle would prevent such use of peacekeeping operations
by powerful states for their foreign policy purposes by, for instance,
weaponizing criticism of the interim government.[27] It will give South Sudan
greater breathing space and UNMISS a modified mandate of state capacity
building support, arguably more relevant to its current circumstance.
Under
the circumstance of the deadlock in the Security Council and the inattention to
peacekeeping as a viable and desirable instrument over the past decade, it is
possible to visualize that the impunity of Israel’s actions in the areas of
operation of the UN inter-positioning operations along the Blue Line and on the
Golan. It also explains in part the nonchalance with which the Rwandese
trespassed into the area of operations of the stabilization mission in Congo,
in close and direct support of the M23 rebel outfit. It would be fair
assessment that the dwindling of the UN’s clout has been an enabling condition
for such blatant actions. The corollary is stark: the UN needs revitalization.
Conclusion
Peacekeeping
is an efficacious peace intervention in conflict environments. It must be
preserved from the vagaries of geopolitics reflected in UNSC dynamics. Emerging
powers could step up to preserve it as a desirable practice in a forthcoming
multilateral world. Doing so will not only see further evolution of
peacekeeping but also help construct such a multilateral world. India, as a
leading advocate for the UN, peacekeeping and a multilateral future, has a
significant role to play in mobilizing support on these lines.[28] It must use the
multilateral forums it is part of to energise support for peacekeeping with
other likeminded actors. Alongside, it must increase its contribution in all
dimensions of peacekeeping beyond its forte of boots on ground. The downswing
in UN peace interventions must be taken as an opportunity to forge a desired future.
The author would like to
thank the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal
Academy of Higher Education, for an opportunity to present the thoughts in the
paper at a presentation on 13 Feb 2025.
[1] The
terms ‘peacekeeping missions’ and ‘peace operations’ are used interchangeably
here.
[2] UN, Resolution 2719 (2023) Adopted by the
Security Council at its 9518th meeting, on 21 December 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4031070?v=pdf&ln=en
[3] Richard Gowan, “Stefanik’s Senate Confirmation Hearings”, 15 Jan 2025,
https://www.justsecurity.org/106397/stefanik-confirmation-hearing/
[4] World
Politics Review, “The Trump Administration’s Approach Could Make or Break UN
Reform”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/trump-administrations-approach-could-make-or-break-un-reform
[5] Security Council Report (SCR), “In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2024 and Looking Ahead to 2025”, 30
Dec 2024, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-01/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2024-and-looking-ahead-to-2025.php#:~:text=30%20December%202024-,In%20Hindsight%3A%20The%20Security%20Council%20in%202024%20and%20Looking%20Ahead,the%20political%20situation%20in%20Syria
[6] Richard Gowan, “The U.N. May Regret Getting Out of the Peacekeeping Business”, World
Politics Review, 16 Jan 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/un-may-regret-getting-out-peacekeeping-business
[7] SCR,
“Multilateralism”, 30 Jan 2025,https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/multilateralism-and-the-un-charter/
[8] Department of Political Affairs and
Peacebuilding, “Special Political Missions and Good Offices
Engagements”, https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world
[9] “The 2025 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding
Architecture”, UN,
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2025-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture
[10] “Our history”, UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history
[11] “A4P: Highlights of key achievements”,
UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/191101_a4p_achievements_one_pager.pdf
[12] “Reforming peacekeeping”, UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/reforming-peacekeeping
[13] Koops et. al., “Peacekeeping in the
Twenty-First Century” in eds. Koops et. al., The Oxford Handbook UN
Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 608-613
[14] UN, Our Common Agenda: A New Agenda for
Peace, Policy Brief, 9 July 2023, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/08/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-peace-en.pdf
[15] “How
we are funded”, UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded
[16]
UNISFA, “Mine clearing bot”, Blue Sentinels, Vol. 3 (9 Nov 2024), https://unisfa.unmissions.org/beacon-0
[17] Ban Ki-moon, Resolved: UN in a Divided
World (Noida: Harper Collins, 2021), 315-328
[18] Berma Goldewijk and J. Soeters, “Peace
operations and ‘no peace to keep’”, in Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies
(New York: Routledge, 2020), 265-68.
[19] “Pact for the Future”, UN, https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future
[20] “Report of the Independent High-level Panel on
Peace Operations”, UN, 19 Jun 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp
[21] “United Nations Peacekeeping
Ministerial 2025”, UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/united-nations-peacekeeping-ministerial-2025
[22] Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
“The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related
Capabilities”, 1 Nov 2024, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/study-on-future-of-peacekeeping-new-models-and-related-capabilities
[23] SCR, “Future of the Pact: Recommendations for Security Council Action”, 20 Dec
2024, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/future-of-the-pact-recommendations-for-security-council-action.php
[24] Ali Ahmed, “Conflict
Prevention-Peacemaking-Preventive Deployment: A triangle whose time has come?,”
https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/conflict-prevention-peacemaking-preventive?utm_source=publication-search
[25] The Hindu, “Russia opposes Western peacekeepers in Ukraine”, 30 Dec 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/russia-opposes-western-peacekeepers-in-ukraine/article69044434.ece
[26] Reconstituted Joint
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), “South Sudan: RJMEC Quarterly Report:
December 2024”, 20 Jan 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/rjmec-quarterly-report-status-implementation-r-arcss-1st-october-31st-december-2024
[27] “Troika Statement”, US Embassy, https://ss.usembassy.gov/troikastate-103024/#:~:text=The%20leaders%20of%20South%20Sudan,the%20people%20of%20South%20Sudan
[28]
“Letter dated 25 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of India to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”, UN, 25
Nov 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3996440?v=pdf
