Book Review by Vivek Chadha, Research Fellow IDSA
India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia, by Ali
Ahmed, New Delhi: Routledge India, 2014, pp. 260, INR 695
http://www.idsa.in/jds/9_2_2015_IndiasDoctrinePuzzle.html
India has often been accused of not having a strategic
culture and, more recently, of not clearly enunciating its strategic and
doctrinal thought. More often than not, this has led to interpolation of brief
statements, actions and speeches in public domain that create more doubts than
answer questions regarding the country’s strategic formulations. Ali Ahmed
attempts to dig deeper into India’s doctrinal underpinnings in light of
nuclearization in the operational domain, a field that remains limited to patchy
assessments in the past. As a former soldier, Ahmed’s quest for answers stems
from contradictions witnessed during the course of his career in the Indian
Army (p. xv), before he decided to formally undertake the rigour of research.
This provides him a unique perspective of a soldier-scholar, with a clear focus
towards questions that often bedevil soldiers in the field as well as the
strategic community. Ahmed argues that India changed course in 1971 to shift
from a defensive to an offensive military doctrine; yet, this increased the
country’s insecurities instead of achieving the opposite (p. xvi). Elaborating
on this, he assesses India’s military posture and its doctrines since 1971. He
also elaborates upon the limited war doctrine in light of the potential of
conventional conflicts against a nuclear backdrop. The author, while
identifying the doctrinal evolution in India’s context, limits his focus to the
Indian Army and its doctrine of 2004. This document, often called the ‘Cold
Start’ doctrine, came in the wake of perceived limitations to an all-out
conventional war, instead focusing on a limited one. He contends that instead
of the aim of war avoidance, the doctrine has lowered the nuclear retaliation
threshold, which defeats the very purpose of such an exercise. Ahmed writes:
These threshold are generally taken along four dimensions— military attrition,
territorial losses, economic viability, and internal stability. Concerted
offensive action by the Indian military would simultaneously nudge all four thresholds,
directly and indirectly. The cumulative physical and psychological impact could
unhinge and lower the nuclear retaliation threshold (p. 4). Ahmed analyses the
shift in organizational culture of the Army in light of the Kargil conflict of
1999, followed by the Parliament attack in 2001, which led to a feeling of
helplessness. This, according to him, ‘dented’ the military’s image and forced
introspection. The limited war option evolved as a result of the same, with the
army becoming determined to find opportunities to blunt the sub-conventional
advantage held by Pakistan. This could have only taken placed by replacing the
statusquo mindset, characterized by a defensive and attrition-based approach,
with an offensive and manoeuvre orientation instead. Therefore, the deployment
of the Army, previously focused at avoiding loss of territory, shifted to
initiating an offensive and taking the battle into enemy territory. This
required recasting the erstwhile defensive formations with an offensive
capability and calibrating the risk assessment in favour of a proactive stance.
However, Ahmed rejects the viability of the option of a limited war as
suggested by the 2004 doctrine in light of its failure after 26/11. He further
substantiates this on the basis of its rejection by the political class, as the
course of events of the period indicates. He suggests that the attempt of the
military to retain its salience through this option does not decrease, but
rather increases, the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan
(p. 150). Ahmed concludes his argument through the analysis of three principle
drivers for doctrine formulation—structural, political and organizational—which
influence its evolution process. He finds that structural-level drivers were responsible
for the doctrinal response in light of the threat from Pakistan. At the state
level, the shift in strategic culture led to the enunciation of the limited war
doctrine. Finally, the doctrinal evolution at the organizational level was a
result of the failure to force acceptable results during the Kargil conflict
and Operation Parakram.
He concludes that the three factors have played a
complementary role in shaping India’s doctrinal thought (p. 202). Ahmed
suggests policy options to include an ‘explicit Limited War doctrine’, in light
of the nuclear–conventional war interface. In pursuit of the same, he envisions
the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) an essential prerequisite. He
also finds the need to revisit the inclusion of the term ‘massive’ in terms of
the envisaged retaliation, as part of the nuclear doctrine, in view of the
negative impact it has had on the nuclear– conventional war interface. He
instead suggests a ‘flexible retaliation doctrine’ for better escalation
control. A revisit of the strategic doctrine from ‘offensive realism’ to
‘defensive realism’ is suggested, with a return to the policy of deterrence
with a defensive bias on the Pakistan front (p. 207). This also entails moving
away from Cold Start, given its short-fuse reactive nature. The importance of
this publication stems from its endeavour to understand and refocus attention
on India’s operational doctrinal evolution since 1971, and in attempting to
decipher the current thinking on the subject. In doing so, the author differs
from conventional wisdom on the subject, in view of its potential failure to
either prevent war or lead to a desirable outcome. His recommendation of
stepping back from offensive realism may be contested by votaries of a more
robust policy against Pakistan. However, the attempt at objectively debating
the subject is likely to result in greater clarity and understanding through
this important addition to literature on India’s security. The book is
recommended for both libraries and keen observers of India’s security. The
assessment of the author can best be tested by an equally compelling analysis
advocating and analysing the existing approach with justification for
‘offensive realism’. The absence of literature on these niche areas limits the
ability of readers to benefit from the kind of rigour the subject deserves.
Finally, the book could have benefited through a more careful editorial
process, with typos as a result of words getting combined, both as part of the
preface and subsequent text. This takes away from the otherwise high quality of
production process employed by the publishers
